

DIALECTICS OF SOCIAL TRUST AND DISTRUST¹

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Introduction

Trust – as the cornerstone of the existence of human society, self-organization and social partnership, mutual aid and cooperation – has been attracting the close attention of researchers for many decades already. Interest in researching social trust is stimulated by changes in the political and socio-economic order of a significant part of the world, crisis processes in the economy, and globalization and anti-globalization tendencies. So far, the “trust deficit” that formed in Russian society toward the middle of the 1990s has been felt in many spheres, especially the economic, political, and social. This phenomenon is an obstacle on the path toward the formation of a full-fledged civil society. An effective society (civil) is a society where civic organizations and the state act as partners, where the functioning of social institutions is the result of the interaction of all interested parties, where the social responsibility of business and any citizen is supported, where an atmosphere of mature relations of trust prevails, not one of blind faith or fear. In this society, partnership relations prevail over paternalistic ones, while a dynamic balance between trust and distrust, based on knowledge and identity, prevails over patriarchal, clan-based, naïve and emotional trust/distrust.

A host of studies in recent years has been devoted to the urgent problems of researching trust, in particular the types and kinds, the dynamics, the social-psychological functions, and the consequences and effects of trust, and its interrelation with the various phenomena in the life activity of an individual and a group (Antonenko, 2004; Veselov, 2004; Dunkin, 2000; Zhuravlev, Sumarokova, 1998; Zhuravleva, 2004; Kupreychenko, 2008, 2011; Minina, 2004; Skripkina, 2000; Sasaki, Davydenko, Latov, Romashkin, 2009; Shihirev, 1998; Schrader, 2004; Bachmann, Zaheer, 2006; Fukuyama, 1995; Hardin, 2004; Kramer, 1999; Luhmann, 1979; Seligman, 1997; Shaw, 1997; Sztompka, 1998; Yamagishi et al., 1998; Yamagishi, Yamagishi, 1994; Yoshino, Rangan, 1995; etc.).

In recent years, researchers have also begun to show an interest in distrust as a relatively independent phenomenon (Eremicheva, Simpura, 1999; Kupreychenko, 2006,

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2008; Minina, 2004; Kupreychenko, Tabharova, 2007, 2008; Cook, 1998; Govier, 1994; Hardin, 2004; Kramer, 1999; Lewicki, McAllister, Bies, 1998; Macedo, 2000; Markova, Gillespie, 2007; Mishler, Rose, 1997; Montpetit, 2003; Moody, 2010; Sztompka, 1998; Kramer, Cook, 2004; Worchel 1979; Zadeh, Khoshalhan, 2011; etc.).

Interest in researching distrust stems from the fact that differences, and often contradictions in objectives and values and in the norms and rules of behaviour as well, are characteristic of real social interaction. Not infrequently, interaction takes place in conditions of high uncertainty, in the absence of regimentation and of the possibility of oversight. In such conditions, a balance between the levels of trust and distrust becomes an ever more promising form of mutual relations. Such tendencies in social life determine the high relevance of *joint analysis of trust and distrust* as relatively independent phenomena, fulfilling specific functions in the regulation of the life activity of an individual and a group. It was just this joint analysis that acted as the objective of our research. In the course of a theoretical-empirical analysis, we are going to carry out a demarcation of the signs and the causes of trust and distrust and determine their positive and negative functions, as well as carrying out an analysis of the fundamental reasons for the emergence of ambivalence – i. e. the concurrent existence of trust and distrust of other people, as well as of social institutions.

The positive and negative effects of trust and distrust

The majority of modern-day authors share a point of view about the positive significance of a high level of trust for the interaction of various subjects. To researchers, the “minuses” of distrust are likewise obvious. Distrust not only leads to an increase in transaction costs connected with the need for guarantees and oversight, but likewise restricts communications and complicates the transfer of information, thereby complicating and dragging out decision-making processes.

In the majority of modern-day works on the problem of trust, the advantages of relations of trust are justified and the negative consequences of distrust are noted. However, there exists a series of special studies dedicated to analysing the negative consequences for relations and the efficiency of joint activity that high trust entails, and the positive impact on relations of moderate distrust (Lewicki, McAllister, Bies, 1998; McAllister, 1997, Kramer, Cook, 2004). A series of the works mentioned contains a deep analysis of the researchers’ notions about the consequences of an unequivocally high level of trust and the advantages of an optimal correlation between trust and distrust. Basing ourselves on the results of our own empirical research, we shall add to this analysis with notions about the positive role of a balance of trust and distrust in regulating relations.

High and unequivocal trust can lead to a whole series of negative consequences. In the opinion of the majority of authors, the principal minus of relations of trust is *abuse of trust*. This can occur in the form of breach of trust, when a partner’s openness and vulnerability are used to gain advantage. In this case, the trust will be irrevocably lost; however, the gain can be extremely significant. It is perfectly likely that the person who has not justified the trust would not have been capable of attaining it by way of negotiations or in the course of honest struggle. Another variant of abuse of trust, one that is not connected with deceit, but is a manipulation, is possible as well. Thus, by threatening a loss of trust, one can attain various concessions and additional benefits from a partner as proofs of friendship and devotion.

It is imperative to likewise note the “minuses” of trust for the person whom others are intending to trust as well. He may not have the desire to act as an object of trust. Firstly, because the trust assumes a responsibility that he is not prepared to take on. Secondly, the reduction in psychological distance does not allow him to maximise his own gain from the interaction. In the event that the person feels himself capable of winning in conditions of rivalry in an absence of trust, i. e. he has, in his own opinion, high chances of success in a competitive situation, then he is more limited in the choice of ways and means of influence in conditions of trust. Inasmuch as, having applied force, cunning, or intimidation in relation to a person who trusts him, he will turn out to be a betrayer, a swindler. But this is unacceptable for the majority of people, who strive to maintain their self-respect. The imposition of trust in order to reduce uncertainty and to ensure one’s own security is a manipulative method: “See, *I trust you*, and this means *you have got to...*”. It can be said that *the stronger partner loses in conditions of trust*. Therefore, far from everybody is ready to accept a high level of trust imposed by other participants in interaction. If the manipulation of trust is mutual, then such “pseudo-trust” can be a dangerous game. Characteristic of it is the readiness of each party to strike an unexpected blow in the conditions of periodic demonstration of openness that a *game of trust* inevitably assumes. Sooner or later, one of the parties is going to make use of this unprotectedness, and the outcome is going to depend on who manages to be the first to strike the blow.

For the sake of fairness, it is imperative to note that the *game of distrust* as well is fraught with no fewer negative consequences. This game consists of a demonstration of unreadiness to trust a partner who is interested in earning it. The partner is forced to constantly demonstrate his good intentions, reliability, predictability, and so on. At the same time, the position of the initiator of the game of “I do not trust him” is more advantageous – inasmuch as it allows the initiator to be demanding and impatient, as well as not to observe social norms in relation to the partner.

Yet another unpleasant outcome of a high level of trust is, the fact that an *absence of oversight and competition has a relaxing effect on the interacting parties*. A partner’s errors and omissions in conditions of excessive trust remain unnoticed, prospective opportunities unrealised, existing potential undiscovered (Lewicki, McAllister, Bies, 1998). In such a manner, too high a level of trust reduces the efficiency of activity, even if the parties have the best of intentions.

When there is a high level of trust, there likewise arise situations when the suspicious behaviour of the other person is brushed aside or interpreted in a positive light. This can serve as a justification of the efforts that have been put into the formation of the trust. We consider that one of the social-psychological functions of trust – the reproduction of social-psychological personal space – can likewise be realised in such a manner. It is imperative to sometimes “close one’s eyes” to a partner’s unseemly behaviour in order to preserve close relations.

Acting as a defence against such negative consequences of excessive and unequivocal trust are *trust limiters*, as well as a *dynamic balance of trust and distrust*. It is not by chance that the question of analysing the effectiveness, functionality, and usefulness of distrust is raised by a series of researchers. In the majority of works, what is being spoken of is *institutional distrust*, i. e. the rules and norms embodied in formal and informal institutional codes (Lewicki, McAllister, Bies, 1998; Luhmann, 1979). These norms limit the free exchange of information and other resources between interacting subjects and prescribe procedures for mutual oversight and reporting, as well as sanctions in the event of violation of these norms.

Depersonalisation of distrust allows a sufficiently high level of trust and morale and a comfortable psychological atmosphere to be maintained in an organisation. This is possible because the carrying out of institutionalised oversight and reporting procedures are not perceived of as suspiciousness and surveillance, but is appraised as the voluntary and valid observance of the norms of corporate culture.

Yet another important advantage of a balance of trust and distrust in relations can be noted. Having become the norm of interaction with associates, an optimal correlation between trust and distrust expands the circle of people, organisations, and social groups with which a subject can enter into contact, and whose assistance he can make use of.

Ambivalence of trust and distrust

Yet another question that elicits the interest of modern-day researchers is analysis of the conditions under which the co-existence of trust and distrust is possible in social relations.

In conditions where complexity, uncertainty, and role conflicts are common, where interpersonal relations are formed gradually and are multi-faceted by nature, there exists a high potential for *one-time intensification of trust and distrust* (Lewicki, McAllister, Bies, 1998).

What is being spoken of is the multi-dimensionality of relations, brought about by a confluence of different spheres of the partners' life activity: civic, business, friendship, family, and so on. Thus, for example, partners in business may be connected by bonds of friendship or kinship; at the same time, they may possess similar or contradictory world-view positions, political convictions, religious conventions, predilections in the area of leisure pursuits, and so on. Their statuses and the social roles they play in each of these spheres of life are going to differ. On the athletic field, the head of an organisation may switch roles with his subordinate – the captain of an amateur team.

We are convinced that trust and distrust can manifest themselves and co-exist in the same aspects of relations between people. In particular, acting as a cause may be the presence of contradictory qualities in the person being appraised. Thus, a partner's high competence (which creates confidence that he will be able to handle a task) may act as a basis for trust in business relations, while other peculiarities of his personality, for example disorganisation (which is going to lead to deadlines not being met) may act as a basis for just as high distrust.

Besides that, it was established in the course of our empirical research that there exist qualities of an individual that may elicit both trust and distrust at the same time. First and foremost, these are such personality traits as: strength, activeness, boldness, and optimism, as well as weakness, difference of interests, hyper-responsibility, and the like. One of the explanations for this may be an assertion about how strength, activeness, boldness, and so on may bring significant benefit in cooperation. These same traits become dangerous if they are possessed by a potential adversary. Analogously, a partner's weakness in interaction reduces trust in him, because it may reflect negatively on the results of the joint activity. At the same time, it likewise holds back distrust, because it is a guarantee of no danger.

The incongruity between the psychological gain from justification of trust and the psychological loss in the event that one's worst fears come to fruition is yet another reason for the ambivalence of trust and distrust. Thus, optimistic expectations about the results of the realisation of a joint business project may be based on a literately worked out business plan (the basis for high trust). In real life, they are accompanied by fears not

only that the project will drag out or will bring less income than expected (low trust), but likewise the fear that compromising information about his personal life will have a negative impact on the company's image (the basis for low trust). One can likewise have a fear that one's partner will turn out to be connected with the criminal world (a basis for high distrust). This threatens heavier consequences – loss of one's business, and perhaps even of one's life.

Yet another reason for ambivalence in the attitude toward one and the same person are connected with the psychological peculiarities of the truster. Thus, cases of the emergence of "multiple reality", connected with a patient's inability to accept that one and the same person can bring pleasure and cause frustration, have been described in clinical practice (Kafka, 1989). In such cases, the images of real people may "bifurcate"; in so doing, one part may elicit positive feelings and the other – negative ones. Sometimes these images may correspond to various sub-personalities of the perceiving person or to his various states. This multiplicity of sub-personalities and psychological spaces both of the subject of trust and of his partner, in our opinion, can also give rise to an ambivalence of trust and distrust in relations.

There exists yet another reason for an intensification of distrust concurrently with a rise in trust. The fact is that with an increase in the partners' openness, the risks connected with it (the possible negative consequences of defrauding the trust) grow. Indeed, the closer that partners in interaction are socially and physically, the more vulnerable they are to one another. A high appraisal of the risks arising as a result of the openness of a subject and a partner in interaction may lead to a rise in distrust. In such relations, distrust, in contrast with trust, often does not have objective foundations, because it is not corroborated by any negative facts. Such unjustified distrust is rather typical of highly significant relations and depends little on evidence of a partner's reliability. As has already been noted above, only guarantees of security will help to reduce distrust.

For example, the following methods are not infrequently used in clan communities: restriction of partners' access to full information about one another ("the less you know, the sounder you sleep"), or, on the contrary, the existence of common secrets ("joined at the hip"). Strict interdependence and mutual responsibility between the partners ("covering each other's backside") also reduces distrust. Only psychological closeness – the existence of a common world-view or system of values, as well as mutual acceptance, respect, and so on – can act as a more reliable guarantee. Truly deep relations are the only restrictor of distrust that is effective in full measure in the most significant spheres of a subject's life activity. A commonality of objectives and interests, a good knowledge of the partner, and confidence in his high morality create the conditions for overcoming ambivalence in relations and forming high trust against a background of low distrust. However, this type of relations of absolute and complete trust is not often encountered in real life, and, besides that, may have not only positive consequences, but negative ones as well, for example in the event of abuse of trust.

The relationship between trust and distrust

Some grounds for distinguishing between their content and origin are proposed in the works of the Russian historian and social psychologist Porshnev (1965, 1972). Understanding trust as a predisposition toward suggestion and dependence on another, Porshnev notes that "dependence" (suggestion) is more primary than the "internal world" of a loner". In his opinion, distrust is an attitude that forms a person's internal world. Psy-

chological independence is achieved by resisting dependence. In such a manner, the ability not to trust, along with the ability to trust is ontogenetically and phylogenetically one of the most ancient of formations.

Such a view, in our opinion, is capable of expanding the notions about the formation of basic trust at the early stages of ontogenesis that had been laid down by Erikson and have become traditional (Erikson, 1950). One can express the hypothesis that basic trust (a sense of unity and identity with one's mother, of the comfort and safety of one's surrounding environment) is what a child enters the world with. Continuing Porshnev's analogy, it ought to be assumed that it is more primary than the sense of independence. At the foundation of basic distrust lies the self-preservation instinct, which determines the avoidance of unpleasant factors in the milieu and forms a child's awareness of his boundaries and the need to protect them. Basic distrust – the sense that the surrounding world is not devoid of danger – emerges at the early stages of ontogenesis as a natural consequence of the basic trust with which a child comes into the world.

In such a manner, the skills of trusting and distrusting the world in a certain proportion are formed at the initial stage of the development of the personality. A balanced mix of the ability to be open to the world and be closed, when it is needed – is what, in our opinion, is true autonomy. I.e. precisely that new growth that is formed at the first stage of the psycho-social development of the personality, called “the cornerstone of a personality's viability”. Among other elements, a person's autonomy includes the awareness by him of the boundaries of his own “I”, his psychological space and the boundaries of the surrounding world. Fears connected with the intrusion of surrounding people inside of these boundaries, as well as fears connected with the violation by the subject of the boundaries of the surrounding world and of other people, is the foundation of distrust. Acting as the foundation of trust are expectations of usefulness (kind and fair treatment) from those to whom the individual opens the boundaries of his own psychological space or those whose boundaries he violates.

Analysis of the origin of trust and distrust brings us directly to an examination of the functions that these phenomena perform in the life of a subject. A separate paragraph in a special work is dedicated to their detailed analysis (Kupreychenko, 2008). But here we shall merely note that trust and distrust fulfil a series of similar functions – they regulate relations with the surrounding world, reproduce a person's social-psychological space, and other things. At the same time, one can identify functions that are specific to trust and distrust. Thanks to trust, a subject enters into interaction with the world, and knows and transforms it and himself. In such a manner, it is precisely trust that creates the conditions for a subject's *interaction* with the surrounding world. But distrust promotes the *isolation and self-preservation* of a subject and his psychological space. In this is manifest its protective function. Consequently, yet another characteristic capable of distinguishing between trust and distrust is “orientation at interaction – orientation at isolation and self-preservation”.

In our opinion, trust represents positive expectations far from all the time. When we trust a person, we accept from him not only positive appraisals of our own behaviour, but negative ones too, as well as behaviours that are unpleasant for us, but fair (for example, punishment). Undeserved praise is capable of shaking trust to a greater degree than is an unpleasant but justified reprimand. In its turn, good as well, coming from a person whom we do not trust, becomes a basis for even greater suspicions. Especially if we did nothing to deserve such good treatment. There exist wise maxims that reveal the true significance of this “benefit”: “The only free cheese is in a mousetrap”, “Beware of Greeks

bearing gifts". In such a manner, one can identify the features that allow trust and distrust to be distinguished more reliably than positive and negative expectations do. Acting as such, in our opinion, are expectation of benefit (a feature of trust), including in the form of admonition, restriction, or punishment and expectation of harm (a feature of distrust), including, also in the form of undeserved reward, flattery, helpfulness, and so on.

It can be seen that there are conative, cognitive, and emotional formations among the principal factors of trust-distrust. This allows for trust and distrust to be regarded as an attitude with its traditional structure that includes the enumerated components.

Trust includes interest in and respect for the object or partner; a notion of the needs that can be satisfied as the result of interaction with him; emotions from anticipating the partner's satisfaction with them and his positive emotional appraisal; relaxation and an unconditional readiness to manifest good will in relation to him, as well as to perform certain actions conducive to successful interaction. In its turn, **distrust** includes the following basic elements: an conscious awareness of risks; a feeling of danger and fear in combination with negative emotional appraisals of the partner and of the possible results of interaction; vigilance and tension, as well as a readiness to cease contact, to respond to aggression, or to manifest anticipatory proactive animosity – to inflict a "preventive strike".

It is important to note that the content and the degree of apprehensions (distrust), as a rule, are not equivalent to the content and the level of hopes (trust). It is known that the satisfaction of winning is always lower than the aggravation of losing. This phenomenon has been sufficiently well researched and can be explained by the fact that we lose something that already belongs to us – something that is "ours", while we acquire something that is not yet included in this understanding. Therefore, quantitatively equivalent acquisitions and losses have different psychological significance. However, yet another important aspect exists in relations of trust and distrust. What we lose, often times, is not even by objective appraisals the equivalent of what we are counting on acquiring as the result of interaction – the item of trust is non-equivalent to the item of distrust.

What has been said can be clarified with the following example. Thus, for many people, the arguments in favour of marriage are expectations of understanding, love, comfort, and so on (a characteristic of high trust). For other people, expectations of the enumerated values in family life are not high, and this does not elicit particular worry in them (medium or low trust). However, if a marriage turns out to be unsuccessful, the losses will turn out to be more significant. Faith in people, hope for the future, a social circle, social status, and material benefits may turn out to have been lost. A subject who gives thought to this far ahead of time experiences high distrust. One who barely thinks about this at all experiences low distrust. These peculiarities of trust and distrust allow one to look in a new way at the problem of the ways and the methods of forming relations of trust. As follows from what has been said, to fight distrust, increasing the weightiness of the advantages and benefits that a subject can acquire as the result of trust (self-disclosure), presents itself as useless. Only some guarantees can reduce distrust (a marriage contract, retaining separate circles of contacts, and so on). In exactly the same way, discounting tickets or enhancing the level of comfort of airliners are not capable of reducing distrust in air transport.

In such a manner, high trust signifies the expectation of a significant benefit; low trust – not-high expectations. High distrust manifests itself in the form of fears of greater losses. Low distrust is characterised by unexpressed apprehensions. In so doing, *acquisitions from justification of trust and losses as the result of confirmation of distrust, in*

the majority of cases, are not equivalent, be it qualitatively, or quantitatively, or, all the more so, psychologically. If expectations of trust do not prove to be true, nothing horrible is going to happen. But if expectations of distrust prove to be true, then, having stepped onto a dangerous partner's own "territory", we may lose something highly significant.

One can imagine the problem of trust-distrust figuratively as "the dilemma of the mouse before the mousetrap". In the event that trust is justified, it gets a piece of cheese, but in the event of confirmation of distrust, it loses its life. Acting as the item of trust is the piece of cheese, the item of distrust (the stake) – life. Increasing the weight of the cheese will elevate trust, but only rust on the mousetrap or something of the kind can reduce distrust.

Empirical research on the factors of trust and distrust

The assumptions voiced above about the relationship of trust and distrust are without a doubt in need of verification. A certain corroboration of them was obtained by us in the course of empirical research into the phenomena of trust and distrust of other people (Kupreychenko, Tabharova, 2007, 2008). 310 people participated in the study. At the first stage, 165 people took part in it – predominantly psychology students getting a first and second higher education aged 20 to 35, (65% women, 35% men). The sample for the second stage of the study – 145 top-tier managers, entrepreneurs, and rank-and-file employees of organisations (43% managers, 57% rank-and-file employees). Of these: 45% men, 55% women.

The gathering of empirical data was carried out in the course of the conducting of focus groups and a survey. Content-analysis, factor analysis, and analysis of differences were used for processing the data. The proprietary questionnaire proposed to appraise the significance for trust and distrust of each descriptor from an expansive list. This list of 97 descriptors had been formed at the first stage of the study. We designated the descriptors that were the most significant from the point of view of our respondents as criteria of trust and distrust.

An asymmetry in the criteria of trust and distrust was established in the course of a frequency analysis. High appraisals of a partner's strength, activeness, boldness, and optimism act as especially significant criteria of trust for the overwhelming number of the participants in the study. But their antonyms (weakness, passivity, timidity, and pessimism) are not criteria of distrust for the majority of the respondents. Along with this, there do exist symmetrical criteria of trust and distrust: morality–amorality, reliability–unreliability, openness–secretiveness, intellect–stupidity, independence–dependence, no propensity for conflict–propensity for conflict.

The results of the frequency analysis were checked in the course of the factor analysis. Analysed separately were the factor structures of trust and distrust toward three categories of people: a stranger, an acquaintance, and a close person. These results were analysed in special works. Here we shall only pause on an analysis of the factors of trust and distrust in business relations toward close people. On the whole, the factor structures of trust and distrust have much in common. At the same time, a series of factors specific to each of them has been singled out.

The greatest percentage of the variance is explained by the "**Boldness, charm, activeness, strength**" ("Faith in the power of good") factor. The given factor exerts an influence on how significant those indicators of the person being appraised that are basic (common) personality traits – ones of activeness, strength, boldness, and optimism – are

for the forming of trust or distrust. The set of these indicators corresponds to a description of a personality that acts as the embodiment of the “forces of good”. From all appearances, the significance of the enumerated indicators as criteria of trust and distrust is determined by the subject’s general orientation to trust (“basic trust” or “faith in people”), as well as by other more general factors of a person’s attitude toward surrounding people. It is our belief that this factor is connected to a high degree with the individual’s motivation (the desire to enter into interaction and the value of a positive outcome to the latter), as well as with the individual’s social competence (confidence in his ability to build relations of trust with surrounding people in the presence of good will).

The attitude toward human qualities that are polar in their modality to the variables of the “Faith in the power of good” factor is formed by a separate factor, which characterises an individual’s attitude toward weakness and dependence – **“Weakness, passivity and dependence”**.

Data about how unity and identity with a partner in interaction is the most significant criterion of trust were corroborated as the result of a frequency analysis. Likewise singled out at the given stage was the **“Presence of spiritual community and similar life position”** factor, which explains the greatest percentage of the variance in relation to acquaintances. Significant factor weights were singled out among the variables reflecting a unity of world-view and behaviour among the interacting subjects. For the category of strangers, characterisation data do not lend themselves to appraisal (and were not appraised by the study participants), but in relations with close people, though, they are especially significant as a criterion of trust for the overwhelming majority of respondents. It is precisely for this reason that the percentage of the explainable variance in the “Presence of a close life position” factor is significantly lower in relation to a close person than to an acquaintance.

It is important to trace just how significant the respondents’ attitude is to the absence of unity and the presence of contradictions with the person being appraised. The peculiarities of the attitude toward a person who has interests, life goals, and a perception of the world that are other and contradictory in directionality manifest themselves under the influence of the **“Dissimilarity of interests”** factor on distrust of all three categories of people and on trust of strangers and acquaintances.

For trusting a close person, such a factor as **“Reliability, support, and likeability”** is significant. It is perfectly obvious that help in affairs and in life, responsibility in relationships, and support are important foundations for trusting another person. Correspondingly, the **“Amorality and unreliability”** factor is significant for distrusting a close person.

As to an individual’s expectation of confrontation and rivalry on the part of another person, it manifests itself in the **“Competitiveness and animosity”** factor. In such a manner, animosity, competitiveness, and a propensity for conflict intensify an individual’s distrust of other people. The influence of this factor on trust is not as univalent for various subjects – there are those for whom these characteristics reduce trust, and there are those who are not sensitive to them.

Of special interest are two more factors: **“External features of an unfortunate person”** and **“External features of a ‘outsider’ person”**. As the frequency analysis showed, our respondents do indeed differ in what significance they ascribe to membership in another social group (ethnic, confessional, economic, demographic, and so on), and likewise to features of social and spiritual misfortune. Those who ascribe much significance to these characteristics as criteria for trust and distrust connect them, as a rule, with the irresponsibility, unfairness, and animosity of the other person, the presence in him of life

goals that are in contradiction with their own. In this is manifested the wary attitude of the given respondents toward an “outsider”. We assume that the significance of the given characteristics for making a decision on trust or distrust is determined by the factor of “*basic distrust*” – *an individual’s generally wary attitude toward the world and other people*.

Yet another group of factors – the factors of attitude toward ease and difficulty of communication, as well as difficulty of interaction – is “**Predictability**”, “**Unpredictability**”, and “**Difficulty of communication**”. It is not important to the individual what the difficulties that arise in interaction or communication are connected with – whether they are determined by peculiarities of intellect, temperament, or self-regulation, or perhaps by social-group membership, amorality and difference of interests.

The last factor, which has received the name “**Assurance**”, characterises the attitude toward someone who relies upon himself and is a person of principle. The influence of this factor can be traced only in distrust toward a close person. Perhaps this is connected with the fact that close people are the only category we are capable of trusting “blindly”, *i. e.* without sufficient grounds and guarantees for this. In connection with this, the risk of deception and disenchantment is great. Only the person’s confidence in himself (trust in himself) acts as a guarantee. The peculiarities of the respondents’ attitude toward a person who highly trusts himself is what determine, in our opinion, the variance explainable by the given factor.

In such a manner, singled out in the course of the frequency and factor analysis were the principal criteria that comprise the “essence” of trust – reliability, predictability, morality, and so on, which can be considered *direct criteria of trust*. Besides them, there exists a whole series of characteristics that play a significant role in the regulation of relations of trust, but which are *indirect indicators of trust*.

Acting as such indicators first and foremost are: openness, politeness, stability, and so on. It is not by chance that “openness” is interconnected with the principal components of trust – reliability, predictability, and likeability.

The singled out factors of trust can provisionally be divided into two large groups: factors having to do with appraising the positive prospects of a potential interaction as a whole (interestedness in trust, the value of trust, and prediction of the result of trust), as well as factors having to do with predicting the successfulness of building relations of trust (prediction of the possibility and the ease/difficulty of the process of building trust). The latter are subdivided into factors having to do with subjective traits (appraisal of one’s own abilities and opportunities to build relations of trust), the partner’s traits (his readiness), and, finally, characteristics of the process of inter-personal or inter-group interaction itself (difference of interests and positions, the influence of social stereotypes, and so on). Analogously, factors of distrust too are likewise divided into: factors having to do with appraising the negative consequences of interaction (risks of openness), as well as factors having to do with predicting the successfulness of protection from them (prediction of the possibility and the ease/difficulty of protection). Traits, both of the subject himself and the partner in interaction, and of the conditions and the process of interaction, are likewise significant for distrust.

It is important that some of the singled out factors correspond with the model of basic trust and distrust proposed above. These, in particular, are the factors having to do with faith in the power of good and with the attitude toward a partner’s morality and amorality, as well as the factors having to do with a wary attitude toward the external features of an unfortunate person or an “outsider” (an incomprehensible one or an unknown one).

Descriptors of trust and distrust in social institutions

The second stage of our research is an analysis of the descriptors of trust and distrust in social institutions. As noted above, the level of trust and distrust in social institutions is an important indicator of the state of society. Despite the fact that there have been a significant number of contemporary studies on the problem of trust in social institutions, there has been no differentiated analysis of trust and distrust, and the ambivalence toward it has not been researched. The main objective of this stage of our study is to find descriptors of trust and distrust that are universal for various social institutions.

The authors of various studies have used their own conceptual models for the structure of trust. R. B. Shaw highlights the following key imperatives of trust in organizations: the *impact* of activity, *decency* of mutual relations, and *concern* for people (Shaw, 2000). Maintaining the proper trust in organizations requires a balance of these imperatives, even if they are in conflict with one another. R. C. Mayer and J. G. Davis described the three main components of employee trust in their managers: integrity – “the company leaders aim to be fair; benevolence – “the company leaders sincerely aim to understand what workers need”; and *ability* – “the company leaders are good at their jobs” (Mayer, Davis, 1999). These factors are the most significant meaningful components of any type of social trust.

E. M. Whitener et al. highlight five conditions necessary for building trust: 1) consistency and integrity; 2) honesty; 3) distribution and delegation of control; 4) communication (accuracy, ability to explain, openness); and 5) caring and participation (Whitener, 1998). Other researchers studying the conditions under which people are likely to be trusting of their managers showed that the following characteristics are important: honesty, motives, consistency of behavior, openness, integrity, functional competence, interpersonal competence, and judgment (Gabarro, 1978). J. Butler also found that the assessment of working capacity, competency, consistency, lawfulness, honesty, loyalty, openness, full trust, fulfilling promises and sensibility impact employees' judgment of trust in their managers (Butler, 1991). In these approaches, in addition to content foundation of trust (performance, decency, concern), there are formal-dynamic foundations related to the predictable behavior, openness and perceptivity of the object of trust, i. e. factors that facilitate or impede communication, inevitably affecting the formation of trust.

This is supported by research on the influence of non-mandatory implementation of organizational rules and procedures on trust in managers (Brockner et al., 1996, 1997). The rules and procedures are important not only because they convey information about requirements and goals of the organization's activities, but also because the necessary compliance with them is assessed by employees as procedural competency of the management. The data showed that procedures that are fair from the staff's point of view tend to increased trust. Not following the procedure and unfair rules correlate with a low level of trust (Brockner et al., 1996, 1997). The research of economic psychologists highlights that the foundation of law-abiding tax behavior is a function of a perception that the tax authorities are fair (Hartner et al., 2008, 2010). The descriptors of procedural justice for the tax authorities' activities are as follows: tax office decisions are fair; rules and methods used in tax inspections are the same for all taxpayers; decisions made by tax inspectors are fair according to their own line of behavior [return code]; decisions made by the tax office are based mainly on fact, and not opinion; if a decisions made by the tax authorities is inaccurate or unsuccessful, it can be changed. In turn, *interactional justice* is assessed using the following factors: the tax authorities treat me with respect;

tax officers treat me with kindness and respect; tax officers take me seriously; tax officers treat me without prejudice; I receive respectful advice from tax officers.

The above-listed characteristics are similar to the descriptors of trust and form the basis of such components as reliability, unity and predictability, among others. However, these are not sufficient, as they do not account for the complexity of the structure and organization of any social institution. For example, healthcare is made up of several levels, from the highest – the Health Ministry – to the lowest – a specific medical professional. Accordingly, trust and distrust in every level of the hierarchy will be different. Thus, interaction with the social institution and its representatives takes place simultaneously on several levels: interpersonal and inter-group; intra- and inter-organizational; personalized and impersonalized. In addition, trust in institutions is often defined in relation to its legal and regulatory base, its material and technical resources and various types of technology.

Thus, the fact that trust/distrust in social institutions encompasses its relationship with various hierarchical levels and structural blocks must be taken into account:

- A system of rules and regulations for the functioning of the institution.
- Various hierarchical levels within the institution.
- Organizations that carry out the institutions activities.
- Groups of people that create and/or regulate the activities of the institution, and implement and supervise its functioning.
- Material and technical resources and technology of the institution etc.

Each of these structural blocks of any social institutions can be assessed on a five-point scale:

- Reliable, high-quality fulfillment of its function (Reliability)
- Shared goals and values with the subject (Unity).
- Predictable (Predictability).
- Elicits a positive emotion (Affability).
- Understandable benefits of maintaining trust (Calculation).

In the above description of the structural model of trust/distrust, it was noted that is as far as the subject is an active participant in interactions with social institutions, an important component trust/distrust is the *status of the subject of trust and its position in relation to the institution*. It matters whether this subject is an organizer, leader or simple administrator in the institution or a consumer of its services. The activities of the institutions might conflict with the interests of a specific subject and be seen as a threat (real or imaginary). The threat is imaginary when dealing with irrational fears and prejudices, and real when the subject performs an illegal or antisocial behavior. Therefore, the following are indicators of subjective determinants of trust/distrust in social institutions:

- *Inclusion* of the subject in the institution's activities (the level and type of participation in its activities, including professionally, voluntarily, or as an opponent, etc.).
- *Awareness* of the institution's work.
- *Experience interacting* with the institution and *modality of evaluation* of the results.
- Subjective evaluation of the institution's *importance* in the life of the subject (including the positive and negative modality).
- The subject's *perception*, e. g. of its *ability to influence* the institution's activities.

This approach allows for the differentiated study of categories of people that have various relationships with the institution. These can be separated as follows:

- People who are professionally associated with the institution from the consumers of its services.
- People for whom the institution plays an insignificant role in their lives from those whose lives are significantly affected by the institution's activities (positively or negatively).
- People that work directly with the institution from those who know about it second-hand from other people or the media.
- People detached from society from those actively involved in social processes.

It is worth reminding that another component of trust/distrust in social and socio-technical systems is trust/distrust in the *conditions of a system's functioning* (Kupreychenko, 2012a). We have already established the need to consider the influence of environmental conditions on building trust, as favorable and unfavorable conditions have the opposite facts on the state of the subject and its willingness to cooperate and general trust/distrust of the outside world.

All of this complicates the study of trust and distrust in social institutions, as it means a large number of variables need to be measured. Of course, the set of specific indicators for each empirical study is defined by its objectives, and any other characteristics can be omitted. However, excessive simplification inevitably leads to mistakes when interpreting the results.

The novelty of the suggested approach and the methodological instrumentation upon which it is based allows researchers to evaluate the level of trust in an institution. Thus, for each institution, the share of high-trusting and low-trusting, high-distrusting and low-distrusting people can be defined, as well as the ambivalence of respondents. A fundamentally new feature is the possibility for of empirical research to identify the ambivalence of trust and distrust. As noted earlier, any object of trust can pose a certain level of threat that is not directly related to the fulfillment of its functions. In this case, along with trust (positive expectations of the effectiveness of interaction) there is distrust (the threat of unexpected unpleasantness). Focus groups and expert interviews have helped identify the main descriptors of distrust as it relates to interacting with social institutions and their various components.

The research shows that there is a **universal set of predictors of distrust** for a variety of institutions: government authorities, mass media, education, healthcare etc. They are:

- Discrepancy between the rules and regulations of the institution with contemporary demands.
- Inhumane principals of the institutions activities.
- Professional incompetency.
- Low-quality material and technical equipment.
- Inadequate technology (e. g. bureaucratic red tape – several papers and permits; poor organization – queues, stuffiness, lack of waiting areas, inconvenient working hours etc.).
- Slow work of the staff.
- Reluctance of the staff to fulfill their duties (indifference or even refusal to help).
- Concealment by the staff of important information or even providing false information.

- Extortion.
- Physical violence and/or psychological pressure from the institution's staff.
- Invasion of privacy.
- Rudeness, impudence, unfriendliness of the institution's staff.

An analysis shows that some of these characteristics of the activities of an institution's organizations and employees can be classified as *descriptors of low trust* (danger of low-quality results of interaction), while others are *descriptors of distrust* (threat of the infringement of individual rights, causing harm to property, health and dignity).

In practice, it is not only important to establish the level of trust or distrust in social institutions, but also identify ways to build trust. Focus groups and expert surveys were conducted aimed at identifying *measures to increase trust and reduce distrust* in a variety of social institutions. The focus groups named the following **measures to increase trust and overcome distrust** in social institutions:

- Informing citizens of the principals and rules of social institutions and supporting their social significance.
- Giving citizens the ability to influence the activities of social institutions.
- Supporting and promoting a responsible attitude between citizens and the activities of institutions.
- Improving the rules and regulations of institutions.
- Better organizing the staff's work and improving the technology used by the institution.
- Making the work of the staff and the institution more efficient.
- Increasing the level of professionalism of the staff.
- Paying attention to morality of the institution's representatives.
- Strengthening government control over the activities of the staff and the institution.
- Providing security guarantees for the health and personal freedom of citizens.
- Making the activities of the institution and its employees more open and transparent to public organizations and citizens.
- Using an individual approach for every citizen.
- Providing real opportunities to challenge and request a review of decisions made by employees of the institution.
- Building personal experience of cooperation between citizens and the institution.
- Demonstrating a common purpose between the social institution and citizens.
- Building a positive image of social institutions.

The list of proposed ideas includes measures to improve the structure, organization and quality of an institution's activities and its informational support, as well as measures to build a more positive image of it and improve transparency. The importance of any measure varies depending on the group and category of respondents, which makes it possible to develop a set of measures to improve trust that is differentiated for each target group.

The merit of the proposed approach is that it allows us to evaluate not only the formal-dynamic aspect of trust/distrust in social institutions (level, trends etc.), but also its content (components, quality indicators etc.). Our recent studies devoted to a qualitative analysis of trust showed that the variety, diversity and multi-functionality of different types of trust/distrust raise important questions about their modality and qualitative characteristics (Kupreychenko, 2012b). Firstly, what type of trust exactly are we are evaluating with the question about trust in "people in general"? And secondly, what

type of trust or relationship between trust and distrust is optimal for a particular community at its current stage of development, and for modern Russian society in particular? In practical terms, this means that different types of trust are prevalent in different categories of modern Russia's population. Some (business, humanistic, or "mature" – based on experience of interacting in socially conscious groups of citizens) are more progressive than others ("blind" or "clandestine" trust) and are more closely aligned with the expectations and needs of society. Thus, it is important to evaluate not only the level of social trust, but also build a kind of "map" of the prevalence of various types of trust/distrust, i. e. divide the population into various categories based on the "quality" of trust.

Overall, the above approach allows us to assess the level of development of civil society in which the population and the government are partners, the functioning of social institutions is the result of cooperation of all interested parties, and where there is a mature relationship of trust, and not blind faith or fear. Building this type of society should lead to a transition from paternalism to partnership; from passivity to cooperation; from indifference to interest; from ignorance to competence; from unrealistic expectations to a willingness to make a contribution; from disbelief and fear, or blind faith, to genuine trust. The program includes indicators of all of the above-mentioned states of social consciousness. The research reveals an ambivalent attitude toward social institutions in which positive expectations (trust) mix with fears (distrust). The practical significance of the data can be obtained via an analysis of what prevents people from trusting, and what would help build trust and reduce distrust.

Conclusions

1. Trust and distrust are relatively autonomous phenomena that have similar and differing characteristics: signs, conditions, criteria and functions in regulating a subject's life. The main functions of trust are social awareness and exchange. The main functions of distrust are self-preservation and isolation.

The conditions under which trust and distrust can exist simultaneously in relation to the same object and appear as ambivalence in an evaluation include: first, multi-dimensionality, an associated inclusiveness simultaneously in various aspects of life, as well as the dynamic nature of relationships between people; second, the presence of contradictory qualities in a partner in the interaction; third, contradictory relationships between the subject and several personality traits of the person being assessed (strength, activity, weakness etc.); fourth, a high level of subjectivity in assessing the risks associated with being open and trusting; fifth, various foundations for trust and distrust; and sixth, the plurality of sub-personalities and psychology for the subject of trust and its partner. Moreover, gains from the justification of trust and losses as a result of confirmed distrust, in most cases, are *not equivalent quantitatively, qualitatively, or even psychologically*. Thus, a theoretical analysis of the conditions of the simultaneous presence of trust and distrust confirmed the need to analyze them together, as ambivalence of trust and distrust is characteristic of most types and forms of social relationships.

2. The assumptions about the relationship of trust and distrust in the course of empirical research were confirmed. An asymmetry in the criteria of trust and distrust was established in the course of a frequency analysis. The results of the frequency analysis were checked in the course of the factor analysis. The singled out factors of trust can provisionally be divided into two large groups: factors having to do with

- appraising the positive prospects of a potential interaction as a whole (interestness in trust, the value of trust, and prediction of the result of trust), as well as factors having to do with predicting the successfulness of building relations of trust (prediction of the possibility and the ease/difficulty of the process of building trust). The latter are subdivided into factors having to do with subjective traits (appraisal of one's own abilities and opportunities to build relations of trust), the partner's traits (his readiness), and, finally, characteristics of the process of inter-personal or inter-group interaction itself (difference of interests and positions, the influence of social stereotypes, and so on). Analogously, factors of distrust too are likewise divided into: factors having to do with appraising the negative consequences of interaction (risks of openness), as well as factors having to do with predicting the successfulness of protection from them (prediction of the possibility and the ease/difficulty of protection). Traits, both of the subject himself and the partner in interaction, and of the conditions and the process of interaction, are likewise significant for distrust.
3. A program has been designed to study trust and distrust in social institutions that makes it possible to evaluate the level and relationship of trust/distrust in social institutions among various groups and categories of the population, as well as their dynamics. It also allows us to separate the population into categories by "quality" of trust/distrust (blind or naïve, clandestine, mature etc.). Thus, the tools make it possible to study trust both quantitatively and qualitatively: its types, foundations, factors that hinder its growth and reduce distrust. The research may point to an ambivalence toward social institutions, whereby positive expectations (trust) mix with threats (distrust). Distrust is assessed as agreement with the fact that the system can have certain dangers related directly to the fulfillment of its function. The data should correlate with such characteristics of the subject of trust as *inclusion* in the activities of the institution (level and type of participation in its activities, including professionally or voluntarily), *awareness* of its activities, the *presence of experience* interacting, the *modality for evaluating its results*, a subjective assessment of the *importance of a social institution* (including positive and negative modalities), and the perception of one's own *ability to influence* its activities. Based on the data received, concrete recommendations can be made for developing measures aimed at building mature civic trust among various categories of the population.

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