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*Anaël Labigne, Olga N. Kononykhina,
Irina V. Mersianova*

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Anaël Labigne¹, Olga N. Kononykhina², Irina V. Mersianova³

IN SEARCH OF CRITICAL CAPACITY: EXPLORING ATTITUDES OF NPO LEADERS IN RUSSIA⁴

Following a public sphere approach to civil society research, we develop a working definition of Critical Capacity to analyze what leaders of Russian nonprofit organizations (NPOs) say regarding their political embeddedness. Theoretically, we stress the value added of differentiating more explicitly between the nonprofit sector, the third sector and civil society – the Critical Capacity concept represents a way forward towards applying that essential differentiation. Empirically, factor analysis on representative and current survey data confirms four dimensions of Critical Capacity, namely NPO leaders' attitudes toward the role of the state, other NPOs, international cooperation as well as recent political events. In a second step, and based on these four dimensions, a cluster analytical model helps us to identify six reliable opinion clusters as well as the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of each group. Finally, we conclude on strengths and weaknesses of our approach and address further research.

JEL Classification: Z

KEYWORDS: cluster analysis; critical capacity, civil society; institutionalism, nonprofit sector; public sphere; Russia; third sector

¹ Stifterverband, Civil Society Research, Berlin. Senior Associate. E-mail: anael.labigne@stifterverband.de – corresponding author.

² Hertie School of Governance, Berlin. Research Associate. E-mail: kononykhina@hertie-school.org

³ HSE Center for Studies of Civil Society & the Not-For-Profit Sector, Moscow. Director. E-mail: imersianova@hse.ru

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The Problem

We link a public sphere approach with third sector and civil society research to answer an empirical question with important theoretical implications. Different popular theories of civil society exist and in most of them nonprofit organizations (NPOs) play a crucial role. However, this study asserts that, from a political sociology perspective, to better understand the role of NPOs in general and in Russia in particular the view that civil society is a third or independent arena beside state and market needs to be on the one hand adjusted and more strongly contextualized – but without simply deconstructing common internationally used concepts on the other.

A public sphere approach emphasizes that voluntary associations do not only have a social but also a political function. More precisely, they are at least to a certain extent expected to take in, condense and critically spell out current political issues in front of other powerful political actors, most importantly the state (cf. Habermas 1992: 443). An open empirical question is if this is the role of NPOs that we observe based on time and place specific data. The research at hand aims at insights for third sector research by studying NPO leader's attitudes as a proxy indicator for the third sectors Critical Capacity and does so by taking a close look at the Russian case. Russian NPO leader's attitudes are of special interest to our research question because this kind of data allows us to study on the theoretical level how the meaning of third sector research theory frames travel between diverse political regimes.

We thereby learn about the methodological problems and its implications of contextualizing theory frames including their key terms as well as empirical observations, whereby – from our epistemological standpoint – the first presuppose the second. Therefore we need to – as Pierre Bourdieu would have put it – properly construct the phenomena under investigation (Bourdieu, 1991). Theoretically we aim at demonstrating that only if key dimensions of Critical Capacity are empirically observable the notion of a *third* sector can count as a valid description. Therefore we discuss a reduction which can easily produce a simplistic equation deficit below and which takes this basic formula: nonprofit sector = third sector = civil society.

Over the past twenty years, a growing number of publications on Russian civil society came out. Many of these publications underscore the complexity of defining as well as contextualizing civil society, its institutional framework, and functions (Jakobson, 2008; Petrenko, 2008; Jakobson, 2011;

Mersianova, 2011; Motroshilova, 2009; Kapustin, 2011). In Russia just like in other countries around the globe, the third sector is considered to be a core civil society institution (Mersianova, Jakobson, 2007). In order to define the third sector, scholars in Russia seek responses to three major questions which all link well with international third sector research: First, is it justified to incorporate a plethora of diverse organizations into a single sector? Second, how clearly the third sector is separated from the other two – the public and business sectors? Third, what is the number of NPOs and therefore, the scope of the actually functional third sector? (Mersianova, Korneeva, 2011). Available publications focus on different aspects of Russia's third sector, such as public support of the sector (Mersianova, Korneeva, 2013; Mersianova, 2009) its collaboration with authorities and other NPOs (Mersianova, Jakobson, 2011; Mersianova, 2008; Yakimets, 2002).

However, there is a drastic lack of knowledge about how NPOs position themselves with regard to political events as well as transformational processes taking shape in Russia. A social cohort of NGO leaders, which is of enormous interest for analysis, has never been an object of empirical studies. Most often, NGO leaders are viewed as only a source of information for NGO surveys, and the resulting publications focus on the state of the NGO sector as viewed by NPO leaders. The present paper addresses this gap in knowledge about Russia's third sector by placing the views and opinions held by NPO leaders in the focus of research. With this specific focus in mind we do not provide yet another discussion about the correct interpretation of the development of Russian civil society in a comparative perspective (Gill, 2008; Hanson, 2010) nor about the evolution of the Russian third sector (Alekseeva, 2010; Jakobson and Sanovich, 2010, 2011; Sundstrom, 2011).

No matter what political context, the typical unit of analysis under investigation in civil society research usually is the organization itself. But in the multifaceted terminological debates around what constitutes civil society, two basic units of analysis should be explicitly distinguished: “organizations and the infrastructure they generate on the one hand, and individuals and their values and activities on the other” (Anheier, 2001, 225). We link the public sphere approach with the neglected research on the value-based dimension of civil society, precisely with attitudes that people leading voluntary organizations hold. These leaders have a strong influence on the organization and therefore their attitudes are of special interest to answer the Critical Capacity question.

Third sector as an independent institution

In the Russian context, we often read statement such as the following: “the version of civil society that has been brought into being by western design – the third sector – is far from what Russian activists desired and what donor agencies promised” (Hemment, 2004). To research such disappointments we start by acknowledging the conceptual limitations of a decontextualized third sector concept *ex ante*. Theoretical limitations have real implications on the social construction of the political world. Our analysis of the Russian context therefore explicitly proceeds in two clearly separated steps: theoretical clarifications are needed before valid and reliable data analysis including its theoretically guided interpretation.

At this stage, it is important for our analysis to recognize that civil society has been understood in social science conceptualizations not only as a nonprofit sector or a third sector. Theories of civil society have been linked to the notion of a public sphere as well as to other generalized ideas such as the ideal of a “good society” (Evers, 2011). Alexander (2006) has tried to link both of these perspectives within a new theory of “civil sphere”, however, with a strong reference to a cultural sociologists interpretation of Habermasian theory (cf. Habermas, 1974). For Habermas and his followers the very idea of “the public” refers “to the tasks of criticism and control which a public body of citizens informally – and, in periodic elections, formally as well – practices *vis-à-vis* the ruling structure organized in [the] form of the state” (Habermas, 1974, p. 49).

In contrast to broad and general civil society concepts, the nonprofit and third sector terminologies seem more useful for applied analysis and more theoretically speaking more neutral – but especially the latter one only at first glance. Of course these labels of empirical phenomena have themselves historical and normative roots (Lorentzen, 2010). It is a deficit in contemporary research that this point is not stressed. In third sector debates, “the implicit equation deficit” still takes the formula of integrating the idea of “nonprofitness”, with the idea of a distinct institutional sector, namely the third sector, and then links these ideas with the concept of civil society. The danger for a truly transnational research agenda based on this implicit equation is the reproduction of prejudgments, instead of the construction of useful new conceptual boxes, or useful “islands of meaning” (Zerubavel, 2010). In that sense sound theoretical and conceptual work is essential groundwork for the interpretation of context specific data and its interpretation within a common conceptual language.

We claim that any theoretically meaningful civil society conception necessarily asks for normative content, namely an explicit reference to the value-based dimension. In this debate the

meaning of the adjective “civil” within the notion of civil society in theory as well as in applied terms has been researched (Labigne, 2012, 2014; Mouritsen, 2003). Another approach is to look for other values than civility typically linked to the third sector, such as the capacity to criticize other political actors – a key function of NPOs if understood as actors in the public sphere. Further more we claim that the same argument holds true to an important extent for the nonprofit as well as importantly for the third sector concept. The notion of a nonprofit sector focuses on organizational form, namely on organizations’ economic dimension only. Most would agree, that the nonprofit sector is the sum of all organizations that fulfill a so-called “non-distribution constraint” (Hansmann, 1980, p. 383). Applied to a nation-state framework: depending on the number of organizations that have a “non-distribution constraint”, we find country variation in nonprofit sector size. In 1977, a program on nonprofit organizations at Yale University dissimilated this line of reasoning with global impact: “Over the following decade more than 175 journal articles and book chapters as well as 32 books were produced (Brewster, 1989). A united academic effort, based on economic models and theoretical assumptions, laid the ground for the nonprofit approach which came into increasing use over the 1980s” (Lorentzen, 2010, p. 30). The normative assumptions grow when moving from the nonprofit concept to the third sector concept and subsequently to an understanding of civil society: awareness of the changes in normative quality matters.

Dominant third sector theories, including to a more limited degree the interdependence theory (cf. Salamon, 2002) outline the third sector as a distinct institutional realm. Theoretically, we question a simple version of a neo-institutional theory frame, namely the idea that NPOs are part of an institutional realm labeled “third sector” – understood as a distinct institutional environment. Many authors see the third sector as a special institutional space, where unique organizational forms are at the base of a so-called “third force” beside the state and the market. This third force is said to be, to an observable degree, *independent* of the market realm and the state realm (see for example DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990; Fukuyama, 2000; Putnam et al. 1993; Putnam, 1995; Taylor, 2010). Analysis on historical data has shown that the third force associated with the third sector can pull in many different directions (Berman, 2007; Reiter, 2009) and also comparative cross country analysis advances in researching this question (Labigne, 2014). Unlike the profit versus nonprofit binary, the notion of a third sector emerged not from economic theory, but from institutional theory.

Importantly, thinking about society in three broad institutional systems is a specific 19th century product (Strawe, 2009). The very idea of a third sector is much older than Theodore Levitt’s or Amitai

Etzioni's employments of the notion – even though some scholars trace the third sector perspective back to intellectual developments of the 1970 and American debates (cf. Lorentzen, 2010). The more general idea that society consists of different institutional realms is a classical sociological perspective and emergences complementarily to the discipline itself. The idea of different institutional realms can be found for example and among many others in Durkheim's writings on the division of labor (Durkheim, 1893) as well as Weber's writings on value spheres (Weber, 1922). Precise overviews of the three –claimed as the most important once – institutional realms, namely market, state and a third associational realm have been offered in contemporary macro-sociological theory. The third institutional realm – or third sector – is in such a theory seen as realm with distinct organizational carriers, namely voluntary associations, distinct social units, which are not classes or status groups but “moralizing communities”, and even with distinct institutional myths. While the market functions through the myth of formal rationality, the state through the myth of justice and the associational realm through the myth of critical discourse (Eder, 2001, p. 223). The key aspect for our analysis is that the very notion and idea of a third sector is necessarily linked with the idea of at some institutional independence. To talk about the third sector of a country implies independence from the state as well as the market realm. Now, that key concept underlying our further analysis have been established, we can describe the dimensions we propose to measure the “critical capacity” – a concept helpful to make the value related dimension of third sector research more explicit. But to what extent do the attitudes of Russian NPO leaders empirically support the idea of a third sector as a distinct institutional realm? Simplified, how independent and critical are Russian NPO leaders' attitudes?

Dimensions of Critical Capacity

We define Critical Capacity as the third sector's capacity to criticize other actors of the political and pre-political space. Criticism, after all, is the ability to make independent judgments. Our thinking on CC also relates to, but does not directly follow, Boltanski's and Thévenot's writings on “The sociology of Critical Capacity” (1999). We take from them the basic idea that actors who criticize other actors must produce justification in order to support criticism just as the actor who is the target of criticism must justify his or her actions in order to defend their own course (cf. Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, 360.). However, while we put criticism in the center of our theoretical framework, we do not

investigate the “moment critiques”, namely the interactive situations when criticism evolves but the question of how actors face criticism and how they criticize is key to our analysis.

Theory becomes most explicit in its operationalization. As proxy-measures we propose the investigation of attitudes. Depending on the degree of attitudes independent of and critical toward other actors of the political and pre-political space we may have, for example, a sector consisting of organizations with a non-distribution constraint but without its own institutional logic, namely without any distinct value-based dimension. We would then have a case where the third sector concept did lose its meaning while traveling between different political regimes.

An initial assessment of the third sector’s Critical Capacity demands an explorative and multidimensional conceptualization. We do not have the ambition or the space here to develop a full fledged theory of CC. Given our empirical interest, we next explain the four dimensions of Critical Capacity with reference to the measures used in our operationalization. This methodological approach strengthens the reliability of our answer to the research question.

The first and most important dimension addresses attitudes that Russian NPO leaders have towards the state. For example, when asked “what individuals and organizations represent and effectively protect the interests of Russian NPOs?” we expect NPO leaders to vary in their responses. While some may choose “The Public Chamber of the Russian Federation” or the “The Presidential Council of the Russian Federation for Developing Civil Society Institutions” as important in this regard, other NPO leaders may opt for response choices such as “some politicians”, “some artists”, or “some scientists”. In other words, we can analyze to what extent NPO leaders affirm that official state organizations represent and protect their interests most and how critical the NPO leaders are towards these organs.

Table I: Four dimensions of Critical Capacity

1. Attitudes towards the state
2. Attitudes towards the third sector
3. Attitudes towards international cooperation
4. Attitudes towards political events

The first dimension includes many other straightforward questions. For example, the Russian third sector’s relationship to the state is also investigated when asked: “what attitude, in your opinion, does

the government currently have towards public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives?” or “what do you think about government policy towards public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives?”. Do Russian NPO leaders think that the state “encourages their development” or “tries to establish control over them”? Obviously, we cannot discuss every single indicator used (see Appendix). However, by translating the Russian survey and by illustrating our approach with explicit reference to the actual questions asked, we aim to make our operationalization as transparent as possible. With regard to the first dimension of our Critical Capacity concept, we learn about the relationship of Russian NPOs to state authorities. Moreover, by looking at the evaluation of NPO leaders with regard to the quality of the relationship (for example, “In your opinion, how successfully do these individuals and organizations express the interests of NPOs such as yours?”) we expect to identify clear differences in response patterns.

Secondly, to speak of the Russian third sector’s Critical Capacity in the sense of a reasonably independent institutional realm makes us analyze NPO leaders’ attitudes towards the third sector itself. The idea of a third sector depends at least to some degree on a sense of common identity as a sector. When we investigate the response pattern towards a question such as “How willing or unwilling are you to work together with other NPOs to solve common problems, to defend common interests?” we are analyzing a part of the sector’s self-identity. Are Russian NPO leaders rather willing to work together or not? Furthermore, do Russian NPO leaders think, “it is possible to trust the majority of NPOs in our country or is this not possible?” Attitudes towards the third sector itself matter, because such attitudes can counterbalance the attitudes towards the state. A strong third sector identity and rather critical attitudes towards state authorities is the typical story for the widely acknowledged “social accountability perspective” that sees NPOs “as instruments of greater transparency, heightened accountability, and improved governance of public institutions” (Anheier, 2009, p. 1082). How do – taking attitudes as proxies – Russian NPOs measure up?

Thirdly, foreign ties matter for domestic third sectors. NPOs can be locally rooted and globally connected at the same time (for example Stark et al. 2006). We therefore analyze not only the relationship to domestic NPOs but also to the international community. As such, we take into account questions such as “Is your organization a member of any international association, union or network of NPOs or is it not?” When we analyze this response pattern, clear value preferences come into view because indicators such as “In your opinion, what are the main motives for foreign assistance to Russian nonprofit organizations at the present time?” can be answered in very different ways. While

some NPO leaders may think that the introduction of Western values or the protection of the rights of Russians is a motive for non-Russian partners, others may think that international cooperation “makes Russia a country controlled by foreign governments” or that foreign partners only “conduct intelligence activities”. To study the Russian third sector with regard to the value related dimension, we need to know how responses on such indicators are distributed.

Finally, we propose to have a closer look at the orientations of Russian NPO leaders with regard to social and political events. Given the Russian political context, how progressive are these sometimes so-called “civil society organizations”? We need to investigate if NPO leaders evaluate a question such as the following positively or negatively: “In your opinion, leaving political parties aside, do a majority of public associations and other NPOs wish to take a direct part in preparing and implementing major political changes in our country?” And “did the NPO take part in recent political events (e.g. supported election campaigns of parties and/or selected candidates, worked as election observers, organized rallies and demonstrations etc.)?” The following table summarizes the four dimensions of Critical Capacity, which we empirically explore.

Concerning the direction of the interpretation, we saw above that the very idea of third sector suggests some independence from the other two institutional realms, some Critical Capacity. That means NPO leaders attitudes towards the state (first dimension) and attitudes towards political events (forth dimension) are, at the very least, not uniformly affirming state activities and that a positive view of other NPOs – including international ones – is, at least to some degree, expressed by NPO leaders (third and fourth dimension). In the next section, we do not propose to evaluate a hypothesis test in deductive logic. Instead, we ask to what extend these four dimensions can be identified. This brings us to the methodology and data.

Methodology and data

From a technical point of view our paper tries to explore the theoretically constructed four dimensional critical capacity space. This helps us to understand how Russian nonprofit leader’s attitudes can be profiled within that space. As there are no direct questions asking about critical capacity on the one hand and as it is not helpful to well interpret profiles of respondents based on too many survey questions on the other hand, we have to construct this latent space from the set of survey questions first. We then answer our main question on where the attitudes of Russian NPO leaders are positioned.

We preselect the 24 most relevant questions for developing the critical capacity space and then treat two technical problems: First, a significant number of indicators are multiple-choice questions (with a nominal scale response option). We address this problem by recoding all indicators into sets of binary variables (yes/no). Second, some questions have a limited number of observations. We therefore merged categories to ensure a significant representation of the options that are close to each other (for example, “strongly agree” and “rather agree” are merged into a larger category labeled as, “agree”). We thereby achieved a data matrix containing 1,005 observations and 102 variables ready for dimension reduction.⁵

The literature describes multiple techniques to construct a latent space (exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, IRT, structural equation modeling etc.) with its advantages and drawbacks. We chose exploratory factor analysis (with a variation however, applying tetrachoric correlations as input correlation matrix due to binary nature of our data). By utilizing the exploratory factor analysis technique we analyze if there is a critical capacity space and if latent dimensions can match our theoretical idea of four dimensions. We are not trying to understand which questions feed a certain dimension of critical capacity the best, or which questions are the most critical to answer in a certain way to have a high score on the latent tray.⁶ To answer the second part of our empirical question regarding profiles of NPO leaders within this critical capacity space, we applied cluster analysis to previously identified latent factors – both hierarchical (to visualize aggregation steps) and k-means (to identify cluster centers).⁷ Last but not least, the very essence of our empirical exercise is based in the survey that was carried out by the Centre for Studies of Civil Society and Not-for-profit Sector (CSCSNS) throughout the year 2012. The data was collected through semi-structured interviews with a representative sample of NPO leaders. The notion of NPO leaders refers plainly to the position the interviewee has within the organizational hierarchy: heads of NPOs were interviewed. The sample size was 1,005. Concerning the sampling procedure, NPO leaders situated in urban districts, towns and other municipal units in the territory of 33 constituent entities were interviewed. The basis for the selection procedure was an urbanization index – a so-called indicator of civil society development –

⁵ See appendix for the overview.

⁶ Implementation takes place through R packages polycor and psych. Factors are rotated using the Varimax method, missing values are addressed using pairwise linkage and the results of the factor analysis are saved as regression coefficients.


⁷ Using the R-package “Stats”.

and an index of per capita gross regional product. Selecting respondents was based on lists of NPO registers in the respective constituent entities. The random selection was machine made.

Analysis

We expect to identify the latent space preferably formed by four factors. On the one hand, as demonstrated by additional statistics, the four factor solution can indeed be statistically justified.⁸ On the other hand, the following graph 1 displays all possible combinations of factor pairs and demonstrates that many observations lie very close to each other, consequently, that the dimensions are in the empirical reality not as clear-cut as they are in theoretical construction.

Graph 1: Factor analysis results based on the four factors



From this point of view, more factors – strictly statistically speaking – would correspond to better results. Additional analysis provides statistical justification for using eight-factor model as the best possible solution. However, and this is important, addition of more factors does not power-up our interpretation: More factors just significantly repeat the first four.


This is why we choose the four factors as the best observable solution given the questions under investigation. This solution has not only acceptable statistical parameters regarding the goodness of the model, but also provides a clear interpretation of unrepeated angles. In that sense our conceptual

⁸ Consider especially the RMSR and RMSEA scores as well as the goodness of fit index within table IV of the appendix.

apparatus of a critical capacity space does not only address an important sociological question but is working with regard to the validity of our study.

Next, we save these four factor scores and use them as an input for a cluster analysis as the second step of our empirical investigation. This allows us to go beyond an analysis of how variables correlate with each other and to explore large opinion clusters. In their authoritative reference work Everitt et al. (2011) differentiate between seven algorithms of agglomerative hierarchical clustering methods. Advantages und drawbacks are discussed for each of them (Everitt et al. 2011, p. 79).

Graph 2: Dendrogram with highlighted six cluster solution



Ward’s method is a standard with comparatively strong sensitivity to outliers. We follow the standard procedure, which uses Ward’s method and its Euclidean mathematical foundation to identify the clusters. This approach results in the identification of six large opinion clusters (see the Graph 2), which group Russian NPO leaders with comparable attitudes regarding the four dimensions of Critical Capacity. We triangulated our results using k-means cluster analysis and bootstrapping.

Qualitative and quantitative profiling of Russian NPO leaders

In this section, we profile Russian NPO leaders based on their attitudes towards the state, attitudes towards the third sector itself, attitudes towards international cooperation and attitudes towards political events. To illustrate our description of opinion clusters, we next describe every cluster using similar wording. We interpret attitudes of any cluster group as strongly positive if a cluster average falls in the top twenty-five percent of scores (for a given factor), as rather positive for the scores that lie between median and the 3rd quartile, as rather negative when the scores are between the 1st quartile and median, and as strongly negative when the scores belong to the bottom twenty-five percent of a distribution. To

interpret the extensive data analysis, we break opinion clusters down to the most illustrative response patterns and illustrate those questions where NPO leaders of a specific opinion cluster tend to answer in a more positive or in a more negative way than the average Russian NPO leader. Thereby we refer to the original data set coding to allow for a maximum of inter-observant reliability.

Table II: Summary of findings

Cluster	Amount of observations in the cluster	Attitudes towards international cooperation	Attitudes towards the third sector	Attitudes towards the state	Attitudes towards political events
“Social change agents - but on their own”	184	Rather negative	Rather positive	Rather positive	Strongly positive
“Patriots - but without a further mission”	230	Rather negative	Rather negative	Rather positive	Strongly negative
“Dissatisfied - but without reform”	142	Rather negative	Strongly positive	Rather negative	Rather positive
“Cosmopolitans - but without confrontation”	166	Strongly positive	Neutral	Rather positive	Strongly positive
“Realists - but without hope”	119	Rather positive	Strongly negative	Rather negative	Strongly negative
“Developers - but only with a strong social order”	150	Strongly positive	Rather negative	Rather negative	Strongly negative

We find that there is not one dominant attitude pattern within Russian NPO leadership: The biggest opinion cluster, cluster number two (“*Russian patriots – but without a mission*”) regroups 23% percent of the Russian NPO leaders and the largest opinion cluster, cluster number five (“*Realists – but without hope*”) regroups 12% percent of Russian NPO leaders.

First opinion cluster (19%): “Social change agents - but on their own”

NPO leaders assigned to the first opinion cluster express more often than the average Russian NPO leader that the majority of public associations and NPOs wish to take part in preparing and implementing political changes in the country (e10). They often participated in recent political events – in election campaigns, as observers, or in protests (e11). The NPO they lead adheres to a set of distinctive values (e12) and they think that NPOs generally should support recent political protests (n8). Concerning protests, these respondents also tend to report that the NPO they lead supported protests (n9).

At the same time, NPO leaders grouped in this first cluster think that the main motive for international cooperation, especially for foreign funders, is to control Russia (p10). Generally, these NPO leaders are convinced that it is important where the money for nonprofit work is coming from. If it is foreign money which supports a Russian NPOs or if it's not foreign money does matter (p32). These NPO leaders report to more strongly trust NPOs that do not receive foreign funding (p29) and believe that foreign funding should be restricted (p30). For them, foreign donors tend to play a negative role (P4.2), the knowledge and skills gained from foreign partners and donors are not seen as useful (p6.2). *Less often* than the average NPO leader, the “social change agents who want to stay on their own” do think that the main motive for foreign assistance is the promotion of greater personal freedoms or the promotion of socio-economic development (p10, see also p11).

Not only cooperation with international actors, but also cooperation with Russian NPOs is held responsible for an unsatisfactory status quo by leaders regrouped in opinion cluster one. *Less often* than the average NPO leader they are satisfied with the interactions with Russian NPOs (g2.4). It is not so much a problem that state authorities mind their own business (H7): all civic initiatives should not be state supported anyway (H13).

Second opinion cluster (23%): “Patriots – but without a further mission”

Compared to the average Russian NPO leader, respondents grouped within the second opinion cluster more often disagree with the statement that recent social and political events carry risks for NPOs like the one they run (e4). They mostly did not participate in recent political events (e11). In terms of economics and politics, Russia should have its own way of development and not follow the US, the EU, China or any other model (e21, e22).

Respondents regrouped into this cluster tend to think that the main motive for foreign assistance is the introduction of western values or the destabilization of the political situation in Russia (p10). Just as the respondents in cluster one; they more often trust those who do not receive foreign funding (p29). Also comparable to cluster one members, NPO leaders grouped in this second opinion cluster tend to think that it is important where funding comes from – foreign or domestic. Clearly, Russian NPOs should not accept foreign funding (p32).

Less often than the average Russian NPO leader, they agree with the statement that the majority of Russian NPOs wish to take part in the preparation and implementation of major political changes (e10). Interestingly, they even say that their organization does not adhere to a specific set of values (e12). At

the same time, in the interview they express to not think that the government tries to establish control over NPOs (h9). Russian NPOs should generally not support protest activities (n8).

Compared to the average Russian NPO leader, respondents regrouped in this cluster are very skeptical about international cooperation: foreign support does not play a positive role (p4.2), the knowledge and skills provided by foreign partners and donors are not useful (p6.2), and the general impact of foreign assistance is not positive (p8.2). Accordingly, the main motive for foreign assistance is not the promotion of socio-economic development (p10) and foreign assistance priorities tend not to coincide with Russian needs (p11). Finally, NPO leaders grouped in this second opinion cluster are more satisfied by the interaction with regional authorities than the average NPO leaders (g2.2).

Third opinion cluster (14%): “Dissatisfied – but without reform”

More often than an average NPO leader, respondents grouped in opinion cluster three believe that the government should provide favorable conditions for organizations that do not harm society – that is, for organizations that “really help people”, that are “engaged in solving local problems” as well as for “human rights organizations” (h13).

The government – in return for its support – should then demand that NPOs provide detailed and credible reporting and refrain from participation in corruption and tax evasion (h14). These NPO leaders think that it is indeed a problem that political parties try to use NPOs (n7), but the same holds true, interestingly, for foreign actors. According to their perspective, the main motive for foreign support is to control Russia.

NPO leaders grouped in cluster three are, unlike those of cluster two, not satisfied with interaction with state authorities, such as local authorities (g2.1). Neither are they satisfied with the cooperation among Russian nonprofits (g2.4). Less often than the average respondent, they agree that the state significantly supports civil society development (i8), that there is agreement or cohesion between NPOs (l22), or that parties cooperate with NPOs as equal partners (n7). Nevertheless, NPOs should not support protest activities (n8).

Fourth opinion cluster (17%): “Cosmopolitans – but without confrontation”

NPO leaders grouped in the fourth opinion cluster highlight that the majority of NPOs wish to take part in preparation and implementation of political changes in Russia (e10). However, their own NPOs mostly did not participate in recent political events (e11) even though NPOs should support protests

(n8). At the same time, however, respondents grouped in this cluster would not say that the big problem is that state authorities only mind their own business (h7).

Less often than an average NPO leader, these respondents think that Russia should have its own political and economic way of development (e21, e22). These NPO leaders think that foreign donors play a positive role (p4.2), that knowledge and skills gained from foreign partners and donors are useful (p6.2) and that the main motive for foreign funding is the promotion of greater personal freedoms or the promotion of socio-economic development (p10). Generally, priorities of foreign assistance overlap with Russian needs (p11). The main motives for foreign support are not to make Russia a country controlled by foreign governments or to destabilize the political situation, neither to conduct intelligence services (p10). Respondents grouped in cluster four do not trust more those NPOs who do not receive funding from foreign donors (p30). Restrictions on foreign assistance are not necessary (p30) and it is not important where the funding is coming from. NPOs should accept foreign funding (p32).

Fifth opinion cluster (12%): “Realists – but without hope”

Comparing Russian NPO leaders grouped in opinion cluster number five with the average Russian NPO leader, they more often disagree with the statement that recent political events opened new opportunities. They do not think so. Moreover, the NPOs they work for mostly did not take part in recent political events (e11). Their attitudes towards the third sector itself are negative just as their attitudes towards political events such protest activities.

At the same time, these NPO leaders do not see that state authorities will be of much help. Most NPOs should be aware that authorities mind their own business (H8) and that the government attitude towards NPOs can be called “indifference” or “ignorance” (H9). Legislation imposes barriers for NPOs (K3): the civic chamber, the presidential council for civil society development or public figures unsuccessfully express the interests of NPOs (L28).

Public-private partnerships are in the Russian context a ridiculous situation – a farce – according to these NPO leaders. NPOs together with state authorities seldom develop and implement programs (H8). At the same time, the government should not create more favorable conditions for only specific organizations. As these NPO leaders do not see much state support anyway, they also do not think that in return for its support the government may demand anything. NPOs should not report in detailed form nor strictly abide the Russian law (H14). A little help may come from outside of Russia, but not much.

Sixth opinion cluster (15%): “Developers – but only with a strong social order”

More often than an average Russian NPO leader, the respondents grouped in the sixth opinion cluster are not too critical regarding the interaction with state authorities, at least not concerning regional authorities (G2.2). Other NPOs, not them, may think that authorities mind their own business (h7).

At the same time, foreign donors also tend to play – generally speaking – a very positive role (p4.2): Knowledge and skills gained from foreign partners and donors is useful (p6.2). More generally, the overall impact from foreign assistance is useful (p8.2). Just as the “cosmopolitans” of cluster four, these “developers” of opinion cluster six see the main motives for foreign assistance in the promotion of greater personal freedoms for citizens as well as promotion of socio-economic development (p10). For them, foreign assistance priorities match with Russian needs (p11).

Accordingly, these respondents do not think that the main motive for foreign support is the introduction of western values in Russia or that international cooperation is making Russia a country controlled by foreign governments (p10). Respondents grouped in this opinion cluster may even trust more those NPOs who do receive foreign funding (p29). Restriction of foreign support is accordingly not necessary (p30). What matters is not where the money is coming from. Russian NPOs should accept foreign funding (p32). Finally, they think that the majority of NPOs does not wish to take part in the preparation and implementation of political changes (e10) and also their own NPO did not participate in recent political events (e11). NPOs should not support protest activities (p8).

Conclusion

The outcome of the analysis conducted in the first part of this paper was the finding that the very idea of a third sector theoretically implies a distinct and independent institutional realm. Still, this is a theoretical assumption. At its core, the investigation at hand was therefore able to develop based on a public sphere approach a four dimensional concept of what we call the sectors Critical Capacity to then empirically address the conceptual limitations of decontextualized and purely descriptive third sector research in general as well as the analysis of NPO leader’s attitudes in Russia in particular. In the second part we investigated the third sector in Russia through this new methodological lens and identified statistically opinion groups, namely six reliable clusters. We described the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of each cluster.

Substantially, our contemporary classification of a representative sample of Russian NPO leader’s attitudes supports the results of historical investigations to a certain extent: Already under the Soviet

Union, the revitalized discourse on “gosudarstvennost”, which declared loyalty to the state, was central to state-civil society relationships in Russia (Fröhlich, 2012, p. 371; Golenkova, 2010). By analyzing attitudes of Russian NPO leaders, we observe that this legacy is still apparent. However, clusters of “social change agents”, “cosmopolitans” and “developers” do not only exist but add up to half of the respondents interviewed (51 per cent of the sample). Yet, more important than the quantitative findings are our qualitative descriptions of each cluster. Our main goal was not to find out if Critical Capacity is high or low, as would have been operationalized in an index, but to explore and describe the diversity of large opinion clusters on the one hand as well as specific trends on the other within a clear conceptual apparatus.

While the findings from our factor analysis as well as the findings from our cluster analysis are significant, three potential weaknesses need to be addressed in further research. First, as our cluster analysis does not test a theory, our conceptual discussion did not aim at establishing causal relationships between independent and dependent variables. Nevertheless – in further research – we need to arrive from conceptual considerations to robust theory frames which imply causality. Second, on the empirical level, the question is how to further improve our understanding of multidimensional third sector characteristics – an ongoing effort within the research field. We think that one especially fruitful way forward is to research the correspondence between opinion clusters and fields of engagement. For example, cluster number six, the “*Developers – but with a strong social order*” combines response patterns which were to some regard ambiguous: On the one hand, members of this opinion cluster definitely have strongly positive attitudes towards international cooperation, on the other hand, they share a strongly negative attitude with regard to political activism. As soon as one finds out that NPO leaders grouped in this opinion cluster mostly are leaders of religious associations, our knowledge of this part of the Russian third sector leadership significantly improves and leads us towards new and neglected research questions of practical relevance to social science as well as to social policy. Finally, as emphasized throughout the paper at hand, we analyzed attitudes of NPO leaders, not public opinion. Therefore the link to the sociology of elites matters. From a neo-institutional perspective it makes sense to look at NPO leaders’ attitudes as proxy for attitudes within the third sector, however, NPO leaders are part of a special group of elites whose attitudes differ from the activists’ attitudes. A comparison of public opinion in the sense of citizen attitudes with NPO leaders attitudes regarding Critical Capacity would be of enormous help in future research. Thereby

especially the timing of representative polling would need to be controlled for to avoid diverging external effects on public opinion.

On a more general level further research should link the differentiated findings of our empirical analysis to develop different theoretical possibilities of state-third sector relationships in a systematic and theoretically sound way which goes beyond the description of single cases (cf. Najam, 2000). Obviously the state-third sector relationship cannot only be based on cooperation or confrontation between the third sector and state. There is also the less obvious option of co-optation, a classical concept within political regime studies which may be applied successfully to third sector studies (cf. Kabalo, 2009). In this analysis, we did not answer the question of “cooperation or co-optation for civil society in Russia” (Nikitin, Buchanan, 2002) and it was not our goal to answer that question, not even with regard to NPO leadership attitudes only. However, our interpretation of the Russian case suggests that political co-optation is a concept that further research should take into account to understand the role of values and attitudes within NPOs in Russia. In that sense, more empirical knowledge about specific empirical phenomena such as the Critical Capacity of the Russian third sector as measured through the factor and cluster analysis of Russian NPO leader’s attitudes may contribute to the common challenge of establishing more robust theories about state-third sector relationships around the globe – a challenge with important real life consequences.

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Appendix

Table III: List of factor loadings

Question	Recorded variables	Factor “International Cooperation”	Factor “Third Sector”	Factor “The State”	Factor “Political Events”
E1.1 Do you agree with the statement: Recent social and political events have opened up new opportunities for such organisations as ours?	#1 disagree #0 agree	0.01	0.02	-0.54	-0.16
E.1 Do you agree with the statement: Recent social and political events carry risks for the position and activity of such organisations as ours?	#1 disagree #0 agree	0.01	-0.01	0.4	-0.29
E8.1 In your opinion, do the wishes of a majority of NPOs with respect to directions of political changes in our country coincide?	#1 yes #0 no	0.13	0.13	0.18	0.14
E10.1 In your opinion, leaving political parties aside, does a majority of public associations and other NPOs wish to take a direct part in preparing and implementing major political changes in our countries?	#1 yes #0 no	-0.12	0.07	0.04	0.52
E11.1 Did your NPO or its members/employees take part in recent political events (e.g. support election campaigns of parties and / or selected candidates, work as election observers, organize rallies and demonstrations etc.)	#1 neither NPO, no members/employees participated #0 other	0.1	-0.15	-0.08	-0.56
E11.2 Did your NPO or its members/employees take part in recent political events (e.g. support election campaigns of parties and / or selected candidates, work as election observers, organize rallies and demonstrations etc.)	#1 neither NPO, no members/employees participated #0 other	0.13	0.16	-0.09	0.16
E11.3 Did your NPO or its members/employees take part in recent political events (e.g. support election campaigns of parties and / or selected candidates, work as election observers, organize rallies and demonstrations etc.)	#1 both NPO and members/employees participated #0 other	-0.26	0.04	0.17	0.52
E1.1 Does your organisation adhere to a specific set of values (religious, socio-political, ideological)?	#1 yes #0 no	-0.05	0.06	0.09	0.33
E1.1 In terms of politics Russia should take the same way as...	#1 Russia has its own way #0 any other way (USA, Europe, China, USSR)	-0.23	0.07	0.22	-0.3
E.1 In terms of economics Russia should take the same way as	#1 Russia has its own way #0 any other way (USA, Europe, China, USSR)	-0.21	0.02	0.24	-0.15
G.1 To what extent are you satisfied by your interaction with this entity - Local authorities?	#1 satisfied; #0 not satisfied	0.17	-0.07	0.5	-0.15

G. To what extent are you satisfied by your interaction with this entity - Regional authorities?	#1 satisfied #0 not satisfied	0.14	0.03	0.53	-0.37
G. To what extent are you satisfied by your interaction with this entity - Russian non-profit organizations?	#1 satisfied #0 not satisfied	0.4	-0.15	0.38	-0.36
H7.1 What attitude toward authorities, in your opinion, do most public associations and other NPOs, civic initiatives currently have?	#1 assist authorities in their activities and undertakings #0 other	-0.19	-0.02	0.4	0.05
H7. 2What attitude toward authorities, in your opinion, do most public associations and other NPOs, civic initiatives currently have?	#1 jointly with authorities develop and implement socially important programs #0 other	0.03	0.08	0.37	-0.08
H7. 3What attitude toward authorities, in your opinion, do most public associations and other NPOs, civic initiatives currently have?	#1 use the authorities to solve own problems #0 other	-0.06	0.21	-0.17	0.06
H7. 4What attitude toward authorities, in your opinion, do most public associations and other NPOs, civic initiatives currently have?	#1 protect citizens interests vis-a-vis authorities #0 other	0.04	-0.03	-0.22	0.35
H7. 5What attitude toward authorities, in your opinion, do most public associations and other NPOs, civic initiatives currently have?	#1 Inhibit the work of authorities #0 other	-0.04	-0.08	-0.21	0.3
H7. 6 What attitude toward authorities, in your opinion, do most public associations and other NPOs, civic initiatives currently have?	#1 mind their own business, avoiding unnecessary contacts with authorities #0 other	0.14	-0.17	-0.36	-0.3
H8.1 And what attitude toward authorities, in your opinion, most public associations and other NPOs, civic initiatives should have presently?	# 1 assist authorities in their activities and undertakings #0 other	-0.15	0.06	0.33	0.1
H8.2 And what attitude toward authorities, in your opinion, most public associations and other NPOs, civic initiatives should have presently?	#1 jointly with authorities develop and implement socially important programs #0 other	-0.01	0.23	0.01	-0.13
H8.3 And what attitude toward authorities, in your opinion, most public associations and other NPOs, civic initiatives should have presently?	#1 use the authorities to solve own problems #0 other	0.06	0.03	-0.08	0.02
H8.4 And what attitude toward authorities, in your opinion, most public associations and other NPOs, civic initiatives should have presently?	#1 protect citizens interests vis-a-vis authorities #0 other	0.05	-0.14	-0.13	0.27
H8.5 And what attitude toward authorities, in your opinion, most public associations and other NPOs,	#1 inhibit the work of authorities	0.06	0.08	-0.11	0.45

civic initiatives should have presently?	#0 other				
H8.6 And what attitude toward authorities, in your opinion, most public associations and other NPOs, civic initiatives should have presently?	#1 mind their own business, avoiding unnecessary contacts with authorities #0 other	0.18	-0.35	-0.32	-0.21
H9.1 What attitude, in your opinion, does the government currently have towards public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives?	#1 encourage their development #0 other	-0.11	0.02	0.62	-0.16
H9.2 What attitude, in your opinion, does the government currently have towards public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives?	#1 establish cooperation with them as with equal partners #0 other	0.04	-0.01	0.63	-0.05
H9.3 What attitude, in your opinion, does the government currently have towards public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives?	#1 try to assist and cooperate, but unsuccessfully #0 other	-0.01	0.35	0.01	-0.18
H9.4 What attitude, in your opinion, does the government currently have towards public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives?	#1 be indifferent, ignore them #0 other	-0.02	-0.09	-0.46	0.21
H9.5 What attitude, in your opinion, does the government currently have towards public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives?	#1 try to establish control over them #0 other	0.13	0.12	-0.37	0.33
H9.6 What attitude, in your opinion, does the government currently have towards public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives?	#1 try to abolish independent initiatives, non-governmental, non-profit organizations #0 other	0.26	0.01	-0.45	0.41
H13.1 What do you think, for which public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives should the government create favorable conditions?	#1 if possible, for all without any exception #0 other	0.22	-0.52	0.06	0.02
H13.2 What do you think, for which public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives should the government create favorable conditions?	#1 for organizations, which do not harm society and the state with their activity #0 other	-0.08	0.48	0.13	-0.08
H13.3 What do you think, for which public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives should the government create favorable conditions?	#1 for organizations, engaged in implementation of tasks set by authorities #0 other	-0.18	0.45	0.33	0.16
H13.4 What do you think, for which public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives should the government create favorable conditions?	#1 for organizations, which really help people and provide them benefits #0 other	-0.01	0.72	-0.04	0.1
H13.5 What do you think, for which public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives should	#1 for organizations, engaged in solving local problems in their	-0.08	0.72	-0.03	0.02

the government create favorable conditions?	city/town/village; #0 other				
H13.6 What do you think, for which public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives should the government create favorable conditions?	#1 for organizations, which in time provide an activity report #0 other	-0.06	0.52	0.02	0.1
H13.7 What do you think, for which public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives should the government create favorable conditions?	#1 for human rights organizations #0 other	0.01	0.72	-0.01	0.12
H13.8 What do you think, for which public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives should the government create favorable conditions?	#1 for politically active organizations #0 other	-0.19	0.31	0.06	0.55
H14.1 In your opinion, what may the government demand from public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives in return for its support?	#1 provide detailed and credible reporting #0 other	0.07	0.38	0.06	-0.03
H14.2 In your opinion, what may the government demand from public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives in return for its support?	#1 strictly abide by the law #0 other	-0.08	0.41	0.13	-0.13
H14.3 In your opinion, what may the government demand from public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives in return for its support?	#1 refrain from participation in corruption, tax avoidance, not serve as cover for unscrupulous businesses #0 other	-0.04	0.57	0.13	0
H14.4 In your opinion, what may the government demand from public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives in return for its support?	#1 formulate the mission and goals of an organizations in coordination with authorities #0 other	-0.04	0.27	0.22	0.18
H14.5 In your opinion, what may the government demand from public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives in return for its support?	#1 conduct highly effective activity #0 other	0	0.24	0.15	0.05
H14. 6 In your opinion, what may the government demand from public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives in return for its support?	#1 be loyal to authorities, support its initiatives #0 other	-0.03	0.27	0.15	0.13
H14. 7 In your opinion, what may the government demand from public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives in return for its support?	#1 refrain from engagement in political activity #0 other	-0.1	0.18	-0.11	-0.03
H14. 8 In your opinion, what may the government demand from public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives in return for its support?	#1 renounce foreign support #0 other	-0.57	0.33	-0.07	0.17
H14. 9 In your opinion, what may the government demand from public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives in return for its support?	#1 renounce close contacts with business #0 other	-0.21	0.6	-0.14	0.13

H14.10 In your opinion, what may the government demand from public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives in return for its support?	#1 restrict its commercial (income-generating) activity #0 other	-0.22	0.57	-0.18	0.06
H14.11 In your opinion, what may the government demand from public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives in return for its support?	#1 more closely observe ethical norms compared to commercial organizations #0 other	0.01	0.56	-0.08	0.13
H14.12 In your opinion, what may the government demand from public associations, other NPOs and civic initiatives in return for its support?	#1 show initiative, conduct vigorous activity #0 other	0.02	0.5	0.06	0.1
I8.1 How does state support influence civil society's development in our country?	#1 significantly #0 insignificantly	0.01	-0.03	0.47	-0.08
K3.1 What can you say, generally, about the legislative regulation of NCO's activity in our country?	#1 imposes barriers #0 does not impose barriers	0.21	-0.11	-0.36	0.21
L7.1 How willing (or unwilling) are you to work together with other NPOs to solve common problems, to defend the common interests?	#1 willing #0 not willing	0.09	0.29	0.32	0.08
L22.1 What do you think prevails among NPOs in our country today: is there is more consent / cohesion OR disagreement / disunity?	#1 agreement #0 disagreement	0.18	-0.15	0.36	0.01
L27.1 What individuals and organizations represent and protect effectively the interests of Russian NPOs?	#1 Civic Chamber or its members #0 other	-0.06	0.18	0.49	0.14
L27.2 What individuals and organizations represent and protect effectively the interests of Russian NPOs?	#1 The Presidential Council or its members #0 other	0.03	0.14	0.3	0.28
L27.3 What individuals and organizations represent and protect effectively the interests of Russian NPOs?	#1 public figures #0 other	0.02	0.25	0.05	0.3
L28.1 In your opinion, how successfully do these individuals and organizations express the interests of such NPOs as your?	#1 unsuccessfully #0 successfully	-0.12	0.03	-0.44	0.03
L30. Is your organization a member of any international association, union or network of NPOs or is not it?	#1 yes #0 no	0.19	0.27	-0.09	0.23
N7.1 According to your opinion how would you define the present attitude of political parties towards public associations, NPOs, civic initiatives?	#1 parties encourage their development #0 other	-0.04	-0.13	0.54	0.29
N7.2 According to your opinion how would you define the present attitude of political parties towards public associations, NPOs, civic initiatives?	#1 parties cooperate with them as equal partners #0 other	-0.06	0.01	0.57	0.38

N7.3 According to your opinion how would you define the present attitude of political parties towards public associations, NPOs, civic initiatives?	#1 parties try to help and to cooperate, but do it clumsily #0 other	0.06	0.05	0.29	0.03
N7.4 According to your opinion how would you define the present attitude of political parties towards public associations, NPOs, civic initiatives?	#1 indifference, parties ignore them #0 other	-0.11	-0.08	-0.27	-0.2
N7.5 According to your opinion how would you define the present attitude of political parties towards public associations, NPOs, civic initiatives?	#1 parties try to establish control over them #0 other	0.15	0.25	-0.32	0.18
N7.6 According to your opinion how would you define the present attitude of political parties towards public associations, NPOs, civic initiatives?	#1 parties try to use NPOs in political campaigns #0 other	-0.05	0.41	-0.31	0
N7.7 According to your opinion how would you define the present attitude of political parties towards public associations, NPOs, civic initiatives?	#1 parties try to destroy independent initiatives and NPOs" #0 other	0.34	0	-0.3	0.34
N7.8 According to your opinion how would you define the present attitude of political parties towards public associations, NPOs, civic initiatives?	#1 political parties have no single attitude toward NPOs #0 other	0.04	0.13	-0.29	-0.02
N7.9 According to your opinion how would you define the present attitude of political parties towards public associations, NPOs, civic initiatives?	#1there is a big gap between proclaimed and actual policy #0 other	0.05	0.32	-0.28	0
N8.1 Protest activities have mounted in the country during the last six months. In your opinion, what attitude should NPOs take to these protests?	#1 SUPPORT for protest activities regardless participation #0 no support	0.11	-0.01	0.07	0.73
N9.1 What attitude did your NPO take towards protest actions?	#1 SUPPORT for protest activities regardless participation #0 no support	0.07	-0.12	0.07	0.73
P4.2. What, in your opinion, is the role - positive or negative - of foreign donors, their technical assistance and charitable donations in the development of the nonprofit sector in our country? What role do they play now?	#1 positive #0 negative	0.83	0.04	0.05	0.07
P6.2. How useful, in your opinion, are knowledge and skills gained from foreign partners and international donors, for the functioning of our organizations and the development of the nonprofit sector in our country as a whole: present time?	#1 useful #0 not useful	0.71	0	0.03	0.09
P8.2. In your opinion, is the impact positive or negative at the present time?	#1 positive #0 negative	0.82	-0.13	0.09	0.09
P10.1 In your opinion, what are the main motives for foreign assistance to Russian non-profit	#1 introduce in Russia values of western society; #0 other	-0.27	0.01	-0.05	0.15

organizations at the present time?					
P10.2 In your opinion, what are the main motives for foreign assistance to Russian non-profit organizations at the present time?	#1 promote greater personal freedom of citizens of Russia #0 other	0.64	0.06	-0.05	0.15
P10.3 In your opinion, what are the main motives for foreign assistance to Russian non-profit organizations at the present time?	#1 make Russia a country controlled by foreign governments #0 other	-0.6	0.19	-0.05	0.08
P10.4 In your opinion, what are the main motives for foreign assistance to Russian non-profit organizations at the present time?	#1 destabilize the political situation in our country #0 other	-0.6	0.2	0.09	0
P10.5 In your opinion, what are the main motives for foreign assistance to Russian non-profit organizations at the present time?	#1 reduce the perceived threat from Russia to foreign countries #0 other	-0.07	0.23	-0.05	0.01
P10.6 In your opinion, what are the main motives for foreign assistance to Russian non-profit organizations at the present time?	#1 promote the protection of the rights of Russians #0 other	0.63	0.04	0	0.16
P10.7 In your opinion, what are the main motives for foreign assistance to Russian non-profit organizations at the present time?	#1 promote socio-economic development of our country #0 other	0.7	-0.11	0.09	-0.09
P10.8 In your opinion, what are the main motives for foreign assistance to Russian non-profit organizations at the present time?	#1 conduct intelligence activities #0 other	-0.47	0.09	-0.09	0.06
P11.1 Foreign assistance often addresses priorities chosen by foreign donors. To what extent, in your opinion, the priorities of foreign assistance coincide with what is most significant for the Russian society?	#1 coincide #0 do not coincide	0.81	-0.14	0.04	0.02
P29.1 Generally speaking, do you trust more or less the Russian public organizations receiving financial assistance from the international / foreign organizations and individuals compared to NGOs who do not receive such assistance from abroad?	#1 trust more those, who don't receive foreign support #0 either equal trust or more trust to those who receive foreign funding	-0.67	0.17	0.08	-0.02
P30.1 In your opinion, should foreign investment of money to non-profit organizations engaged in charitable / environmental / educational activities be restricted or not?	#1 restrictions are necessary #0 restrictions are not necessary	-0.48	-0.07	0.19	0.13
P32.1 Some believe that it is important, where funding for non-profit organizations comes from, and that NGOs should not accept foreign aid. Others believe that if the activity is useful, it does not matter where the money comes. Which point of view do you	#1 it is important where funding for non-profit organizations comes from, and that NGOs should not accept foreign aid #0 it does not matter where the funding coming from	-0.61	0.05	0.24	0.14

Table IV: Factor analysis details

Mean item complexity = 1.7
The degrees of freedom for the null model = 3655
The objective function = 680.09
Chi Square = 662747.4
The degrees of freedom for the model = 3317
The objective function = 660.77
The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) = 0.08
The df corrected root mean square of the residuals = 0.12
The harmonic number of observations = 1005
The empirical chi square = 49034.27 with prob < 0
MLE Chi Square = 642162.5 with prob < 0
Tucker Lewis Index of factoring reliability = -0.071
RMSEA index = 0.445 and the 90 % confidence intervals are 0.437 0.439
BIC = 619232.9
Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.72

Table V: Cluster medians

Cluster	International cooperation	Third Sector	State	Political events
1	-0.55	-0.23	0.71	-0.17
2	-0.55	-0.48	0.85	-5
3	0.18	1.6	-0.02	-2.2
4	2.27	-0.39	0.7	-0.63
5	0.61	-3.66	-0.39	-2.72
6	2.59	-0.87	0.16	-5
Median	0.44	-0.39	0.41	-2.51
Mean	0.6	-0.5	0.5	-2.45