



ВЫСШАЯ ШКОЛА ЭКОНОМИКИ
НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ

Rationality in Action: ***Intentions, Interpretations and Interactions***



Санкт-Петербург

2015

УДК 16
ББК 87.4

*The research leading to these results has received funding
from the Basic Research Program at the National
Research University Higher School of Economics*

Rationality in Action: Intentions, Interpretations and Interactions / Отв.
ред. *Е.Г. Драгалина-Черная*. СПб.: Алетея, 2015 — 208 с. ISBN
978–5–906823–22–9

Издание представляет собой публикацию трудов Международной конференции «Rationality in Action: Intentions, Interpretations and Interactions» (Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», 26–28 октября 2015 года). «Рациональность в действии» — научная программа, объединяющая не только актуальные направления в логике и computer science, ориентированные на формальный анализ взаимодействующих интеллектуальных систем, но и аналитическую феноменологию, постструктурализм, теорию аргументации, теорию речевых актов, акторно-сетевой анализ, постграйсианскую прагматику. Конференция посвящена разработке интегративных подходов к построению общей теории рационального действия. Сборник предназначен для широкого круга читателей, интересующихся логикой, историей философии и методологией науки.

УДК 16
ББК 87.4

ISBN 978–5–906823–22–9

© Издательство «Алетея» (СПб), 2015
© Национальный исследовательский университет
«Высшая школа экономики», 2015
© Коллектив авторов, 2015

Contents

Sergey Astakhov. <i>The Critique of Modern Rationality in Actor-Network Theory</i>	6
Jean-Cassien Billier. <i>Collective Intentions, Shared Cooperative Activity and Moral Responsibility</i>	10
Vladimir Brodskiy. <i>The Theme of Action in Mordecai Kaplan's Philosophy: Pragmatic Foundation and Role in The Reconstructionist Project</i>	14
Anne Devarieux. <i>Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904). Logic and Dynamics of the Affects</i>	24
Vitaliy Dolgorukov. <i>Rationality in Formal Pragmatics</i>	41
Elena Dragalina-Chernaya. <i>Act-Rationality, Rule-Rationality and Goal-Rationality in Reasoning</i>	47
Diana Gasparyan. <i>Absolute Imperatives of Rationality in Transcendental Pragmatics and Communication Theory</i>	54
Bart Geurts. <i>Speech Acts and Conventions</i>	68
Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter. <i>Thinking about Action: Keckermann on the Description and Interpretation of Agency</i>	78
Aleksei Kislov. <i>Logic of Norms: Deontic and Teleonomic Aspects of Semantics</i>	89
Anastasia Kopylova. <i>Ockham's Reductionist Ontology, the Notion of Intentionality and the Ideas of Pierre d'Ailly</i>	100
Elena Lisanyuk. <i>Euathlus is Virtual in the Dispute about Protagoras's Tuition Fee</i>	102

Tatyana Lifintseva. <i>About the Interpretation of Interpretation: Dionysos and Dionysism in Nietzsche's Philosophy</i>	105
Lolita Makeeva. <i>Rationality and Probability: The Bayesian Approach</i>	110
Ivan Mikirtumov. <i>Compositionality and Non-Compositionality: an Approach From Pragmatics</i>	114
Alexander Mikhailovsky. <i>Why Participate in Projects? Towards an Ontology of Funding</i>	127
Alexander Mishura. <i>Rationality in Action</i>	132
Ilya Pavlov. <i>Is it Necessary for Practice to be Interpreted? Wittgenstein, Putnam and the Problem of Scientific Cognition</i>	143
Vladimir Porus. <i>Rationality and «Transdisciplinarity»</i>	149
Henry Prakken. <i>Argumentation, Probability and Justified Belief</i>	156
Fabien Schang. <i>A Generalized Referential Theory of Truth-Values</i>	157
Zinaida Sokuler. <i>The Mundane Life of the Philosophical Rationality</i>	179
Allard Tamminga. <i>On the Relation between Collective and Individual Obligations</i>	183
Ekaterina Vasilyeva. <i>The Nexus of Agency: Body and The World</i>	190
Vladimir Vasyukov. <i>Formal Aspects of Intentionality</i>	200

Anastasia Yastrebtseva. <i>Condorcet's Interpretation of Probability Theory: Application of a Mathematical Construct to the Field of Social Action</i>	204
---	-----

sights into the logical modelling of the strategic mistakes in reasoning. Logical norms considered as artefacts may navigate a safe way between psychologism and essentialism in the theory of “belief biases”.

Absolute Imperatives of Rationality in Transcendental Pragmatics and Communication Theory

Diana Gasparyan

Higher School of Economics, School of Philosophy
anaid6@ya.ru

Abstract: *In this article, I am offering some critical comments on two of the most important programs of modern social and political philosophy: transcendental pragmatics and communication theory. These considerations will cover two main problems: justification of rational prerequisites of activities, that would be common and universal for all of humanity and universal, and transparent communication, that is common for all representatives of intersubjective commonality. The first problem is the difficulty of removing the fundamental contradiction between «ones» and «someone else's», and the second is the difficulty of simulation of communication unity, that despite its universality, may serve as different packages of values.*

Key words: *Transcendental Pragmatics, Communication Theory, Rationality, Intersubjective Commonality, Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas, Kant.*

Introduction The leading representatives of social and philosophical thought are clearly traced back to Kant, and it was his *philosophy of judgment*, from which all necessary methodological resources for building various theories of

communication are successfully extracted⁷³. However, it is worth mentioning another reason why theoretical sociology appeals to practical philosophy of Kant. This factor could be called political. The gist of it is that from the discussions of the 80s to the present, the legacy of Kant has been seen as a *reasonable* alternative to the dialectical programs, namely Hegelianism and Marxism that for a long time have been the intellectual vanguard of social sciences. To a great extent, this is due to the fact that following to, in particular K. Popper, the dialectical concepts of history are often accused of being accused of unethicallness. Such charges are provoked at least by historic process, which according to Hegel is structured by «cunning of the World Reason», hiding an even more cunning, the truth that in the end, any historical event can be vindicated, as well as any crime against history or in the name of history can be declared the law and necessity, or in Marx's terms, the result of an objective view of history⁷⁴. Consequently, where the principle of a historical selection works automatically, the subjects are exempt from the burden of responsibility for the duty *to judge*, and thus cease to be subjects. It is this ability to make moral judgments that the revival of transcendental philosophy hopes to reanimate. Two prominent theorists of our time *Karl-Otto Apel* and *Jürgen Habermas* put this intention into the base of their research projects.

In this article, I will consider some aspects of these programs. Furthermore, I will make an attempt to analyze the

¹⁹. *Searle, J. R.*, 2010. *Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization*. Oxford University Press, USA.

²⁰. *Popper, R. K.*, 1971. *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Vol. 2: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath. Princeton University Press.

following problems: 1. the question of rational prerequisites of action that are common for all members of humanity, and therefore, as it seems, resolving the fundamental contradiction of the extended mind («ones» and «other») and 2. the question on communication or «communicative action» as a possibility of positive rather than negative (dialectical) relationship to the world of social and historic fact.

Rationality as the ability to communicate First, we will show that modern social theories oriented to the primacy of rationality are largely the reception of «practical reason» of Kant, who lays intellect into the basis of any practice. Transcendental and pragmatic philosophy and socially oriented Neo-Kantianism are based on an unconditional assumption of rational, fusing any positive activity. Kantian cognitivism in social matters is based on his normative view that knowledge requires universality and necessity, and on the related position that practical theory requires knowledge. The action that is not lighted by intellect is either meaningless or destructive. For instance, Kant's «Critique of Judgment» is in a sense the first *communication theory*. The ability of human beings to communicate is not always theoretically explainable but practically it is a fact. Apart from being a fact, it is also some idea which essence is that every agent of speech addressing his message to another agent is based on the prerequisite of possible successful communication. Accordingly, the counterparty can understand him provided that its formulation meets the standards of logic and rhetoric of communication. Kant calls these norms «allegations of common sense». He distinguishes between three allegations: 1. allegation of prejudice-free thinking («independent thinking»); 2. allegation of extended thinking («to think putting oneself to someone else's place»); 3. allegation of consistent thinking («always think in accordance with

oneself»⁷⁵. The second statement, as we see, is a transcendental version of extended rationality that, however, for the thought tempted by dialectics is merely reduplication (replication) of ratio and is deemed repressive. Nonetheless, it is this version (Kantian's) that is applied by contemporary researchers to reconstruct the rationalist philosophy as capable of explaining the nature of society. Rationality is defined in this case not as an ability to reach obvious truths, but as the ability to communicate. The action is equally effective and successful to the extent at which it is rationally built or correlated with the requirements of intellect. In this sense, the categorical imperative is a conclusion of the analytically solved problem, the prescription to verify someone's deeds with the majority of people may be formulated without reference to a particular social life. Then, the mind guiding the practice of operating subjects is the main guarantor of accordance to the law and optimality of deeds. This approach is to a great extent preserved by modern socially oriented Neo-Kantianism⁷⁶.

So, in his justification of productive power of communication Habermas is based *on the Apel's theory of transcendental pragmatics*: the speech affirms itself through its own performative acts. Apart from them, there are no competent instances that are destined to support the arguments. And that's also why the speech is devoid of repression; in the discourse of argumentation there are structures of such

⁷⁵Kant, I., 2001. Critique of the Power of Judgment (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant). Cambridge University Press.

⁷⁶Ryan, M., 1982. Marxism and Deconstruction: A Crit. Articulation. Baltimore, XIX, 232 p.

speech situation that can neutralize the effects of repressiveness and inequality⁷⁷.

The followers of such transcendental pragmatics devote a large part of their works to the problems of communication especially because they hope to find there the counterbalance to two extremes of «dialectical» version of the order: either the irrationality of private interest or dictatorship of administrative power. So, in this way Habermas uses the key notion of «*public*», around which the sphere of research, which is the most important for socio-philosophical thought, has been organized from the beginning of the 60ies and until recently⁷⁸. The analytical mind, as opposed to dialectical reason, is structured dualistically, i.e., the original coordinates of its possible location are preset by pairs of oppositions. These are the prerequisites that are followed by transcendental pragmatics since social order in it is understood in the light of the private-public opposition. Further, it is «public» and, in a more specific sense, «community» becomes an independent subject of analysis. For civil society, the fundamental is separation between, first of all, private and public, as well as between society and state. But this means that within the public (non-private) sphere the important disengagement and confrontation appear. The «public authority», first of all the power of the state, is opposed to the public that is not directly involved in the performance of governmental functions. This is the point of growth where free unofficial critical «public» is analyzed by mod-

⁷⁷*Habermas, J.*, 2001. *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action: Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought). The MIT Press.

⁷⁸*Habermas, J.*, 1990. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought). The MIT Press.

ern pragmatists especially carefully. The very position, as it is easy to notice, is directly opposite to the concepts that, sprouting out of Hegelian absolutism, express the known skepticism about critical opposition. According to a number of post-Hegelian programs, the production of critical discourse cannot develop an indeterminate language for world description and speak in the space of sovereign speech breaking off relations with authorities⁷⁹. However, Habermas and Apel, for example, are rather optimistic in this issue — for real deterrence of negative influences of private interests and authoritarian and totalitarian pretensions of power the civilized democratic structures were established. Among them there are structures of civil society, i.e. nongovernmental public associations, where Habermas distinguishes informal unofficial mobile structures of «public», which in his opinion successfully cope with induction of critical senses⁸⁰.

Instrumental and communicative action Two-volume work of Habermas «Theory of communicative action» published in the beginning of the 80ies continuing and developing the concept of «public» is a theory uniting rationality and activity, being a kind of modern critical (in post-Kantian sense) version of «intellect and rationalization sociology». The efforts were centered on one more opposition — differentiation or, more correctly, contraposition of *instrumental and communicative action*. The embodiment of instrumental action is the sphere of labor. In such opposition, we can trace the intention to bind the Hegelian idea on subjects»

⁷⁹*Foucault, M.*, 1980. Power/Knowledge: Sel. interv. a. other writings, 1972- 1977. Ed. with an afterword by Gordon C. N.Y., XII, 200 p.

⁸⁰*Habermas, J.*, 1985. The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Beacon Press.

activities with instrumental action deriving from two distinctive features of instrumental action — orientation to success and transformation of givenness (labor and struggle). When performing an instrumental action in accordance with the criterion of efficiency and control over reality, the forecasts related to the consequences of this action are realized. The communicative action is understood as such interaction of at least two individuals that is ordered according to the norms accepted as obligatory⁸¹. If the instrumental action is oriented to success almost in Hegelian sense, then the communicative action is oriented to the understanding between the operating individuals, the consensus. Hence, the instrumental and communicative rationalities may be distinguished. The notion of instrumental rationality is found already in Max Weber. It should be noted that at that, action typology was significantly transformed in the 20th century. So, for transcendental pragmatics of the 60ies, the main pair of notions was the above-mentioned instrumental and communicative types of action. Later Habermas, using somewhat different criteria for differentiation, distinguished between the following four types: strategic, norm-regulating, and dramatic and communicative action. Furthermore, strategic concept includes instrumental and «proper strategic» action⁸². Orientation to success and usage of means meeting the set objectives remain the general distinctive signs. But

⁸¹*Habermas, J.*, 2001. *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action: Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought). The MIT Press.

⁸²*Habermas, J.*, 2001. *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action: Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought). The MIT Press.

now the purely instrumental action is in accordance with the approach to human's action, where the material, instrumental and pragmatic criteria are set foremost, and social context and coordinates remain out of context. The strategic action in a narrow sense is what place social interaction between people, processes of solution and rational choice. In communicative action, as beforehand, the focus of agents was on mutual understanding, search for consensus and overcoming of difficulties.

The following important stage in developing the concept of transcendental pragmatics was the investigation of action types in relation to respective types of rationality. Based on Weber concept of «rationalization» (elimination of religious and mythological pictures of the world), we may perform «desubstantialization» and «demythologization» of intellect first of all in the struggle with the concepts of Hegelian type. However, in the struggle with substantialism the transcendental pragmatics is not ready to sacrifice the gains of traditional rationalism. The problem is rather the salvation of intellect. Any progress of traditional rationalism either towards the development of action theory, or towards activeness and sovereignty of actors — individuals, and (or?) towards investigation of interaction, intersubjectivity, i.e. cognitive moral and practical, socio-historical aspects of human interaction, are taken into account. The final objective of transcendental pragmatics consists in interlacing of «activity approach», in the investigation of intellect as a specific rationality of activity, and in the investigation of particular intersubjective, communicative measurements of being.

For supporters of transcendental pragmatics and communicative action, as for Kant, the right actions are based on the truth, since, according to the line of arguments that goes back to antiquity (Socrates), the good proceeds from the

truth. Kant builds his moral theory, considering the rational behavior of autonomous subject and generalizing the principle determining this behavior. If the idea is universal and if it is potentially suitable to everyone, it should be accepted as a principle of action for all rational beings. This is why Kant's procedure is related to the fact that is right *in general*, rather than to what is useful to everyone. In contrast to Kant, the transcendental pragmatics and communication theory hope to justify ethics based on the dialogue or consensus, where rational consensus replaces the categorical imperative. In communication theory, the just is understood as useful, but not quite in the utilitarian sense. The point is that we can accept the norms as justified only if others, who consider all kinds of possible consequences, can accept them as such. Such an approach is based on the principle of rational consensus, where the process of solving the utilitarian component is important, but not in a selfish and altruistic sense.

«**The world is too irrational?**» So, despite the fact that transcendental pragmatics partly inherits the Frankfurt School, namely its critical spirit, it remains a defender of rationality, against which the other members of this school opposed. Habermas and Apel share the critique of instrumental reason, but keep the distance from the dialectical rationality. This distance, not in the least, means that the relationship to the world is determined not by a negative, but, on the contrary, by a positive mode built through communication. The ratio of the character to the world relates to its relationship to other people, especially with such an important factor, as the processes of «speaking», speech, expression of certain linguistic proposals and hearing of counteragents of activity. This, in turn, results in the conclusion that the concept of communicative action requires to consider actors as speaking and listening subjects that simultaneously highlight

certain claims to the significance of what they say, think, and what they believe. Therefore, the ratio of individual subjects to the world is always mediated and related by the opportunities to communicate with other people, and their disputes and the ability to reach an agreement. These claims on the importance (and the related processes of recognition — non-recognition) are proposed and realized in the process of discourse.

However, Hegel's famous setting of the 20th century «attitude to the world is realized through the world denial» is subjected to a separate analysis of transcendental pragmatics. In his work «The Philosophical Discourse on Modern» Habermas in general paints a picture of philosophic possibilities of rationality that opened for the intellect after the death of Hegel ⁸³. However, he identifies three main branches, which are graded according to the motivation of the critics of our time: Old (right) Hegelians reject the modern world because of remaining and worsening problems of alienation, lack of integrity and consolidation of society, mechanistic, technocratic and atomized fragmentation of ration; Young Hegelians (left) do not accept this, because, in their opinion, the true accession of intellect has not yet come, the world is too irrational, and finally, Habermas distinguishes the third branch (post-Nietzsche), which can be briefly described by Nietzsche's aphorism: «We logicalized the world to explain it». This is the last direction, to which Habermas refers primarily Foucault and Derrida and Bataille then guiding by the following consideration: the reality should be criticized not because it lacks rationality, but because it is over-rational.

⁸³*Habermas, J.*, 1990. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought). The MIT Press.

This third branch is the most consistent with the concept of extended rationality: if rationality appears as a totality, then nothing can be opposed to it, it blocks the critical mechanisms and becomes dangerous in its invulnerability. This interpretation of dialectical rationality was accepted by many critics of Hegelianism in the 20th century. It is likely that Habermas opposes to a meaningful name of this last variant of Hegel's philosophy reading. But in reality his objection only reproduces the argument that this is part of the concept of rational totalization. This objection states that the critical arguments against intellect should be reasonably arranged, otherwise they will lose their active force, but if they are rational, then they are fighting against themselves. As such, the critical argument of Habermas seems to be doubtless, but it misses a very important aspect. This omission is a key for Habermas, and in particular, for Apel, because it structures the theory of the «forced» the rationality of the actors. Both theorists are convinced that, in order to oppose the intellect, the opponent must engage in rational communication (always and already rationally aligned), and thereby become a member, not the opponent (dangerous, at least). The famous «performative paradox» of K.-O. Apel is in favor of this mechanism; it is designed to justify its transcendental-pragmatic approach. The performative paradox in transcendental pragmatics is that I do not indulge in real contradiction with myself, that I can neither argue, nor at the same time justify deductively without formal pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation, which always has to be recognized so that the argumentative language game could retain its meaning⁸⁴.

⁸⁴ *Apel, K.-O.*, 1984. *Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective* (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought). The MIT Press.

To speak in the name of reason The essence of the transcendental-pragmatic approach is that universal principles can not be deduced, as they are the conditions rather than the results of the system deductions. That is why they can not be left out — being only formal, they can not be formalized. Just at this point the «omission», which we have mentioned above, is localized. Its meaning is that the submitted evidence is self-substantiation, as pronounced in the name of reason. Folly is either devoid of its own language, or agrees with the arguments of rationality not because it is a rational game, and has already agreed with the precepts of logic but because it is always playing the game. The rules of this game are not subject to a simplified version of illogicality, where «no» serves as a «yes» and vice versa. Its trick is that it is no different from the formal rationality, it just does not want to obey its political imperatives, and in this first disobedience the mismatch of logic and politics can be disclosed — the truth that hides the power. Rationality is a formal rather than meaningful education. The very transcendental pragmatics agrees with this. But its supporters believe that this fact is enough to make a rational universal, and communication — understandable to all participants. However, this is not the case, since we can act rationally to achieve irrational goals, or use a form of intelligence to justify the irrational forms of beliefs — beliefs or prejudices. Rational may serve to our unconsciousness (principle of rationalization) and the unconscious can carry anything: conflicting desires, destructive impulses, irrational motives, etc.⁸⁵. Irrationality can not be reduced to a breach of the Spotless Mind, it can be completely indistinguishable

⁸⁵*Freud, S.*, 1990. Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (The Standard Edition) (Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud). W. W. Norton & Company.

from rationality in the form and means of expression — its difference lies at the level of goals and objectives, i.e. strategic content. But can a strategy be irrational? Whether we are dealing with a situation, where as a result of the struggle of ideologies, and as a consequence rationalities, one of them seizes power by proclaiming itself the only true carrier of rationality? The answer of the supporters of transcendental pragmatics to this question is no. According to their logic, normal communication complies with the following rules: it is impossible to criticize (the arguments put forward against reason) and speak on behalf of something other than reason. But it is easy to see that in this argument, its supporters from the start do not go beyond a rational discourse and, in addition, try to speak in the name of reason. This, in turn, leads to two problems.

The first problem is that the thematization of intellect as an object requires indicating some out-of-reason area, which can be addressed to the experience of the mind on the meta-descriptive terms. The second problem is the opposite claim — it is impossible to leave the area of reason, not even to mention the fact that if that happened, we would have nothing to prove. Here it is a statement of Habermas that contains impossible combination of the first difficulty with the second one; it, first of all, speaks of the mind (in its limits), and, secondly, asserts its totality (the inability to go beyond its limits.) However, it is this contradiction that remains a kind of «blind spot» in the theory of transcendental pragmatics, as this is the «opacity» that organizes the integrity of this discourse.

The belief of rationalists is that, in their opinion, in the mind of every individual there is a universal communicative vocabulary, the same for all sentient beings, that should be used in the preparation of management solutions. It is this vocabulary that will be in the public opinion, freely generat-

ing in the process of communication between personalities. In such circumstances, the philosopher must explicate the vocabulary of the human mind and ensure the correctness of its use in discussions.

Conclusion Proponents of transcendental pragmatics believe in the ideal of a universal, transparent communication for all members of the intersubjective community. When Habermas uses the concept of «subject», despite all the reservations and clarifications, he still has in mind the classical subject of transcendental reflection, because it is ready to abandon the fundamental properties of the subject, namely: 1. the ability to be a part of the universal community (universal ethical principles to practice, and considering them good) and 2. the ability to be one and indivisible integrity and to coincide with itself. However, these properties are just taken for granted and can be challenged. But then it is not so much important as the surface communication flows — even if it succeeds in eliminating the external contradictions, the contradiction arises much earlier, in the internal structure of the subject, whose «subjectivity» is undermined by the inclusion of the principle of opacity and by the subject's inability to relate to himself without irreflexive balance.

In conclusion, we can say the following. In the transcendental pragmatics universality of the transcendental subject is obviously given on the ownership of all agents to the base of transcendence. However, this provision not consider one important inferential consequence, namely the one to which post-Kantian history of philosophical thought has inevitably come. This elevation of the subject, that starts with Descartes and reaches its apotheosis in Hegel, referring to the absolute, finds some difficulty. This difficulty relates to such absolutized subject or subjectivated absolute which necessarily implies dominance, sovereignty and autonomy

— the trinity of its consistent existence. The main condition of existence of such subject is unconditional solitude, which means in practice its *absolute domination*. If the absurdity of existence of more than one absolute is obvious, then in relation to the subject it is not obvious. If in the event of a second occurrence of the absolute both appear to be disqualified, then for the subject, his claim for unlimited sovereignty, not violated by meeting with similar in kind, results, at least, in the situation not compatible with the real one, where the set of empirical subjects are carriers of finite minds.

But then, what the proponents of transcendental pragmatics and communicative action state, namely, that the subjects are initially united by universal understanding of the good, rationality and communication, can make sense only in relation to one of the absolute subjects or recognizing diversity, they will have to be deprived of absoluteness and, hence, understanding of a single good. And if we assume that the appearance of a universal subject should serve the «public», we find that this public is the very majority against the minority.

Speech acts and conventions

Bart Geurts

University of Nijmegen

brtgrts@gmail.com

The classical debate on the conventionality of language, immortalised in Plato's *Cratylus*, was focused on words and their meanings. That issue has long been settled in favour of the view that the pairing between lexical forms and their contents is conventional. In more recent times, Austin (1962) sparked a debate on the conventionality of speech

Rationality in Action: Intentions, Interpretations and Interactions

Издание подготовлено на факультете гуманитарных наук
НАЦИОНАЛЬНОГО ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКОГО
УНИВЕРСИТЕТА «ВЫСШАЯ ШКОЛА ЭКОНОМИКИ»

Ответственный редактор *Е.Г. Драгалина-Черная*

Главный редактор издательства *И.А. Савкин*

ИД № 04372 от 26. 03. 2001 г.

Издательство «Алетейя»,

192171, Санкт-Петербург, ул. Бабушкина, д. 53.

Тел. /факс: (812) 560-89-47

Редакция издательства «Алетейя»:

СПб, 9-ая Советская, д. 4, офис 304,
тел. (812) 577-48-72, aletheia92@mail.ru

Отдел продаж:

fempro@yandex.ru, тел. (812) 951-98-99,

www.aletheia.spb.ru

*Книги издательства «Алетейя» в Москве
можно приобрести в следующих магазинах:*

«Историческая книга», Старосадский пер., 9. Тел. (495) 921-48-95

«Библио-Глобус», ул. Мясницкая, 6. www.biblio-globus.ru

Дом книги «Москва», ул. Тверская, 8. Тел. (495) 629-64-83

Магазин «Русское зарубежье», ул. Нижняя Радищевская, 2.

Тел. (495) 915-27-97

Магазин «Фаланстер», Малый Гнезниковский пер., 12/27.

Тел. (495) 749-57-21, 629-88-21

Магазин «Гилея», Тверской б-р., д. 9. Тел. (495) 925-81-66

Магазин «Циолковский», Пятницкий пер., 8, стр. 1.

Тел. 8 (495) 951-19-02

«Галерея книга “Нина”», ул. Бахрушина, д. 28. Тел. (495) 959-20-94

ISBN 978-5-906823-22-9



Интернет-магазин: www.ozon.ru

Подписано в печать 01.10. 2015. Формат 60/88 1/16.

Усл. печ. л. 17, 04. Печать офсетная. Тираж 600 экз.