

Managerial Ideologies: A Russian and British Comparison

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Introduction

The long term research project "Managers of Different Countries" was established in October 1991 in Russia and the UK. The project is designed to determine the comparative attitudes of business people of different countries in terms of a range of basic political, social, economic, ethical and business issues. Such a survey has a number of uses, including enhancing mutual understanding between managers from different cultural environments and facilitating their work in different countries. Most importantly, the project was initiated at an early stage in Russia's post-Soviet transition and therefore future surveys can map changes in managerial values over time. The project now includes a Japanese sample and it is hoped to expand the survey to include other countries. However, this paper is essentially an initial exploration of the data obtained from the Russian and British surveys.

The Sample

In Russia the questionnaire was administered to the delegates of executive courses at the Academy of National Economy, as well as to the participants of congresses and seminars devoted to business problems. In the UK those surveyed to date include the delegates of executive courses at the Sundridge Park Corporate Development Centre and at the University of Bradford Management Centre. By April 1993 responses had been collected from a population of 558 Russian and 209 British managers.

The breakdown of the Russian sample was as follows: 202 respondents from the private sector; 202 from State owned companies; 52 from Public Service institutions or authorities; and 96 from other organizations (non-profit foundations etc.). The British sample included 163 respondents who work for private firms; 10 from nationalized industries or from companies where the Government is a major shareholder; 16 from Public Service institutions or authorities; and 20 from other organizations.

The remainder of this article explores the findings of the survey based on a comparison between three groups: (a) Russian private business managers; (b)

The Project is being Sponsored by the Sundridge Park Corporate and Executive Development Centre in the UK and is led by Dr Mark Urnov, Programme Director at the Gorbachev Foundation. Hafiz Mirza and Dr Richard Butler, who were involved in collecting the British sample, are Senior Lecturer and Reader, respectively, at the University of Bradford Management Centre.

Russian government sector managers; and (c) the total British sample.* Having said this, Table 1 demonstrates some serious structural gaps between the Russian and British samples. Given the obvious drawbacks of the sample formation procedure these gaps force us to be exceedingly careful in our comments and conclusions. To reduce the influence of structural disparities, and thus make our comparisons a bit more reliable, the Russian data have been adjusted by way of restricting the structures of the two Russian samples to make them as close to the British sample's structure as possible. The remaining tables are based on these restructured samples. For the research team this process clarified two important points: first, the elimination of structural disparities between the Russian and British samples changes the basic picture very little — this is determined primarily by differences in the socio-cultural contexts of Russian and British business life. Secondly, the strongest discrepancies between the adjusted and non-adjusted data occur in the Russian private sector sub-sample. This is largely due to the fact that of the 202 respondents in this sub-sample the prevalent influence is that of senior managers/co-owners of small and medium-size firms.† Compared to the other Russian and British respondents this cohort has a much stronger affection for the ideology of economic liberalism and rates much higher the values of independence, power, and social status in their professional life. Moreover, this group is somewhat less authoritarian than other Russian private sector respondents, not to mention those belonging to the government sector. While discussing the findings of the study we will refer mostly to the adjusted figures. The main distinctive traits of the private senior managers belief system will be discussed in the appropriate parts of the article.

The Scope of the Project

The survey has been conducted by applying a detailed questionnaire containing about 300 questions. The main topics covered are:

- political orientation;
- social comfort/discomfort;
- work motivation;
- the organizational culture of the firms the respondents work for.

This article will chiefly analyse the political orientation and work motivation of Russian and British respondents.

Political Orientations

The principal objective of this part of the research project was to specify locations of the groups under study in the multi-dimensional space of political ideologies. The term "ideology" is used here as according to H. Eysenck, who regarded it as a constellation of attitudes or a "super-attitude" (Eysenck, 1968,

*The belief profile of the total sample does not differ statistically from that of the UK private business sub-sample.

†This is also the general situation in the current Russian private sector.

Managerial
Ideologies

	Russia %		UK %
	Private sector <i>n</i> = 202	Govern sector <i>n</i> = 208	Total sample <i>n</i> = 209
Sex			
Male	86	85	80
Female	14	15	20
Age			
30 or younger	12	4	33
31-40	37	38	36
41-50	39	41	24
51 and older	12	17	7
Diplomas/degrees			
Tech. College or similar	26	30	19
Under graduate (bachelor)	None	None	28
Master degree or similar	88	96	29
PhD or similar	9	15	7
None of these	3	1	15
Present position			
Senior managers	78	60	13
Middle managers	9	19	26
Junior managers	5	12	25
Professionals	5	9	31
Others	2	0	4
Time in present position (years on average)			
	2	5	3
Sector			
Primary	24	34	4
Secondary	44	40	31
Tertiary, quatern, etc.	69*	28	65
Size of the organization (Number of employees)			
25 or less	34	6	3
26-100	31	8	4
101-1000	24	37	30
1001-5000	10	30	23
5001 and more	2	20	39
Time in the present organization (years on average)			
	5	7	6
Work time (hours per week on average)			
	55	52	50
Lost time: time spent on tasks one might regard as outside of one's own role (hours per week on average)			
	19	18	8

*Although requested to circle one industry out of 24 options, basing the response on whether resources are mainly invested by their organizations, many representatives of Russian private companies marked several options, arguing that their firms are extremely diversified and are involved more or less evenly in many industries.

Table 1.
Russian and British
Respondents: Some
Personal Details

pp. 111–113, 265). As for the term “attitude” it is understood in line with Eysenck’s and Rokeach’s interpretations.* Eysenck was among the first who applied a multidimensional approach to studying ideologies (a system of two orthogonal co-ordinates: “radicalism/conservatism” and “toughmindedness/tendermindedness”). Since that time this research method has become standard practice. It was used in this study for analysing the political orientations of our respondents mainly, with two balanced scales: “right-wing/left-wing” and “authoritarianism/non-authoritarianism”.

Any sociological scale is an end result of the blending of a priori and empirical approaches. Each of these approaches has its own strong and weak points, and their relative importance varies from situation to situation. It would be naïve to assert that one approach is better than the other: a “profits and losses ratio” depends here primarily on the research objectives. In this study an a priori component is decidedly predominant. This is justifiable given the current turmoil in Russia and other countries.

The “Right-wing/Left-wing” Scale. The use of poly-semantic and not well defined couples like “right- wing/left-wing”, “conservatives/liberals” etc. has already created a lot of confusion. To ameliorate the situation it is worth clarifying the meaning and the limits of application of the “right-wing/left-wing” scales from the outset:

- (1) The scale can only be applied to democratic ideologies. It is not suited to the realm of totalitarian doctrines. This limitation is principal. Attempts to regard totalitarian ideologies as entities “framing” the democratic spectrum on both sides are probably incorrect. Totalitarian ideologies are in no way extreme extensions of a democratic continuum. They are not only a rejection of this continuum, they are of a different nature. They ask different questions and give different answers. For example, within the democratic spectrum a problem of “the government and the economy” is read normally as a question of how, and to what extent, free market mechanisms should (or should not) be supplemented by the government. To totalitarian ideologies this problem is construed in terms of the type of government (state) economy required to replace market mechanisms. One more example: for modern democratic ideologies, the problem of intergroup political conflicts is focused mostly on the possible forms of social consensus and on the ways to achieve it. For totalitarian ideologies, the key issue here would be what segment of society (“capitalists”, or Jews, or dissidents, or all of them) should be eliminated. Thus, the

*Eysenck described an “attitude” as an individual’s inner disposition to act, as one’s psychological position toward an object or issue. This position cannot be observed directly. Attitudes are measured by means of uni-dimensional scales and can be identified through a set of relatively constant, reproducible opinions (for instance, anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, patriotism etc.). Rokeach repeats Eysenck’s definition, saying that “an attitude refers to an organization of several beliefs that are all focused on a given object or situation. A Likaert scale, for example, consists of a representative sample of beliefs all of which concern the same object or situation. When summed, it provides a single index of a person’s favorable or unfavorable attitude toward an object or situation” (Rokeach, 1973, p. 18).

approaches essential to democratic ideologies seem to be unimportant or even meaningless to totalitarian ones and vice versa. Furthermore, a set of questions conceived to distinguish the differences among the ideologies of one group will not work well among the ideologies of the other group.

- (2) The scale purposely deals solely with economic issues. This is mainly due to the fact that in today's political reality, economic problems make the distinction between right-wing and left-wing syndromes most apparent. Furthermore, in the public opinion, as well as in the minds of politicians, right-wing (left-wing) economic beliefs are not inseparably tied up with right-wing (left-wing) views on other aspects of social life. In reality economic views and ethical, political and other convictions quite often co-exist autonomously so the linking up of such views within one scale could complicate the identification of ideological groups rather than facilitate it. Of course this does not mean that ethical and political aspects of ideologies should be neglected. The problem is that they need an adequate tool for analysis and comparison.

The process of establishing the scale consisted of two steps: First, an a priori selection of the scale components. This was done through systematizing the views of existing political practices of Western Democracies in terms of the differences between economic doctrines located "not further right" than Thatcherism and Reaganism and "not further left" than the concepts of Scandinavian social-democrats. Secondly, there was an empirical selection of the items chosen a priori. This procedure was based on the results of two of Urnov's earlier research studies,* as well as on the preliminary analysis of data collected in this study. The items included in the scale are shown in Table 2.

"*Authoritarianism/non-Authoritarianism*" Scale. The version of the "authoritarianism" concept used here is based on, but is not identical with, the classic concept of authoritarianism as it was expounded by Fromm (1964) and the "Berkeley group" (Adorno *et al.*, 1951). The basic dissimilarities are:

- (1) It is known that Fromm and Adorno regarded authoritarianism as a psychological precondition of an individual's propensity to nothing but right-wing radical (fascist) ideologies. This was the reason why the Berkeley group's authoritarianism scale was named "F(fascist)-scale". In other words, authoritarianism existed for them only as "right-wing authoritarianism" only. In contrast to this approach, and in full conformity with "Eysenck's hypothesis",† as well as with the facts of Russian history, this scale in this research project is conceived to deal with both "right-wing" and "left-wing" authoritarianisms. This is why there is no inclusion

**Russian Parliamentarians*, 1990, No. 446, see Urnov, 1991; and *Russian Scientist*, 1992, No. 1077, unpublished.

†Four years after the publication of "The Authoritarian Personality", Eysenck raised the problem of "left-wing authoritarianism" arguing that communists made almost as high scores on Adorno's F-scale as fascists and that consequently this scale had best be called "the authoritarianism scale" (Eysenck, 1968, p. 149).

	Priv. sector <i>n</i> = 202§	Russia % Gov. sector <i>n</i> = 208	Total sample <i>n</i> = 209	UK % Cons.† <i>n</i> = 80	Soc.‡ <i>n</i> = 71
Private initiative/public welfare — priority in stimulating					
Private initiative	53 (69)	45	42	63	25
Public welfare	14 (8)	13	27	10	45
Social inequality					
For	52 (58)	41	44	58	30
Against	3 (1)	0	16	9	21
System of social guarantees					
Selective (only to those who cannot work)	22 (25)	33	17	25	13
Universal (to <u>all</u> citizens)	22 (11)	23	57	48	69
Right-wing response average	42 (51)	40	34	49	23
Left-wing response average	13 (7)	12	33	22	45
Right/left-wing response ratio	3:1 (7:1)	3:1	1:1	2:1	1:2

Table 2.
Right-wing/Left-wing
Scale: Results after the
Structural Correction
of Russian Samples
(Consistent Support for
a Particular Position)*

*“Consistent support” means “agree” or “somewhat agree” with the appropriate statement accompanied by “disagree” or “somewhat disagree” with the opposite statement.

†Cons., those declaring themselves as conservative supporter (*n* = 80).

‡Soc., those declaring themselves as socialists and social-democrats supporters (*n* = 71).

§Numbers in brackets = senior managers of private firms (*n* = 156).

of any item which could be viewed as a specific attribute of only “right-wing” or only “left-wing” authoritarianism.

- (2) Fromm and Adorno analysed the authoritarian syndrome in its structural integrity — not discerning its “routine” and “passionist” components, i.e. not specifying the differences between, let us say, the authoritarianism of an elderly bureaucrat and that of a young SS-man. This can be easily explained. The “right-wing authoritarianism” of Nazism they focused on was too short-lived to make this kind of distinction meaningful from a scientific or political viewpoint. Nearly the same could be said about the “left-wing authoritarianism” of the early 1950s in Russia. Today we are in a different situation. The decades of Russian history which have ensued since the concept of authoritarianism first appeared make it possible to appreciate the differences between, for example, Stalin’s authoritarianism, overfull with “passionism”, and Brezhnev’s version of “routinized” authoritarianism. By the “passionist” elements of authoritarianism we mean primarily intolerance and high aggressiveness. As for “routine” components, these can be exemplified by rigid hierarchy, double standards for “us” and “them”, excessive collectivism etc. — all commonplace, quotidian, trite, deprived of any strong emotional militancy. The scale employed is fitted to measure routinized

authoritarianism only. The main reason for not including indicators of “passionarist” components in this scale is the fact that in Russia today routine elements of authoritarianism exist, more or less autonomously of “passionarist” ones — and are much more strongly expressed. In this situation joining them together on one scale would have inevitably distorted the picture.

- (3) Unlike the famous F-scale and most of its derivatives, the scale employed in this research does not pretend to analyse personal qualities of respondents. As well with the “right-wing/left-wing” scale, it does not go beyond the “space of ideologies”. Authoritarianism measured within this scale is an ideological rather than a psychological phenomenon. The indicators used in this scale are shown in Table 3.

Motivations

This part of the questionnaire was aimed at revealing some crucial elements of the respondents’ value system to the extent that this was apparent in the domain of their professional life. The term “value system” is used here according to Rokeach, who described it as “an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conducts or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance” and wrote that the long-range function of values is “to give expression to basic human needs” and that “values have a strong motivational component” (Rokeach, 1973, pp. 5, 14).

When determining the question on motivations a number of concepts were employed. These included the individual needs set developed by Maslow (1943), Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) and McClelland (1961); the “corporate character types” expounded by Maccoby (Maccoby, 1977, 1990); and Schein’s Complex Model of motivations (1980). Also of value were statements and ideas taken from the research instruments of Hofstede (1984, pp. 283–286, “values survey”), Nickolson (London Business School), as well as Sundridge Park Executive Development Centre’s Research Group which is headed by P. Herriot. The value set proposed to respondents for scoring is shown in Figs 3 and 4.

Preliminary Results

Political Orientations

“*Right-wing/Left/wing*” Scale. Table 2 discloses one important trait of the Russian respondents’ political mood — their belief systems are shifted to the right border of the ideological spectrum employed in this study. In both Russian groups the right-wing views dominated and were notably stronger than those of British respondents who declared themselves as supporters of the Conservative party. Among senior managers of Russian private firms “the rightism” (or, perhaps, “the economic liberalism”) was even tougher: here the “right-wing/left-wing response ratio” was broadly 7:1. It may appear bizarre that Russian respondents — despite their well articulated orientation “to the

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My country/freedom — what is more important: my country	29 (21)	33	6	9	4
freedom	35 (51)	38	85	82	85
Loyalty to my country/justice — what is more important: loyalty to my country	21 (16)	30	9	13	7
justice	39 (56)	49	76	71	82
One should always respect one's parents: regardless of whether they are good or bad, right or wrong	67 (78)	84	35	35	35
if they have earned such respect through their own attitudes and behavior	8(6)	3	40	37	41
In relationships with others, one should strive more to be: needed than independent	37 (40)	46	28	22	38
independent than needed	30 (26)	24	43	43	38
Authoritarian response average	39 (39)	48	20	20	21
Non-authoritarian response average	28 (35)	29	61	59	62
Authoritarian/non-authoritarian response ratio (average)	1.4 : 1 (1 : 1)	2 : 1	1 : 3	1 : 3	1 : 3

Table 3.
"Authoritarianism/Non-
authoritarianism"
Scale: Consistent
Support for a
Particular Position*

*"Consistent support" means "agree" or "somewhat agree" with the appropriate statement accompanied by "disagree" or "somewhat disagree" with the opposite statement.

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
§Numbers in brackets = senior managers of private firms, (*n* = 156).

right" — almost never use the term "right-wing" for their political self-identification. Because of the former Communist regime this term, along with the term "conservative", still has a strongly negative connotation in the Russian political vocabulary. The ideological bias "to the right" described above is not only a trait of the Russian sample in the survey. The situation seems to be typical of Russian society as a whole. According to Urnov's research study of Russian scientists almost the same feelings now prevail among Russian intellectuals.

As for Russian public opinion, there are few strong left-wing sections. VCIOM's (All-Russian Public Opinion Research Centre) polls show that today's ideological profile of the Russian population as a whole is quite

similar to that of British respondents in this survey who are socialist supporters. Russian public opinion is also exhibiting an apparent weakening of its attachment to key words of socialist ideology (socialism, government control of economy etc.) and a steady growth of positive stance toward the private sector and entrepreneurs. According to different sociological polls, the idea of a "socialist society" was trusted by more than 80% of the Russian population in 1985, by 30% in 1990, and by only 15% in November 1991 (The *Democraticheskaya Gazeta*, 1992, No. 1). The Russian referendum of April, 1993 has indicated that more than a half of the country's population support the ideas of radical reform and of fast transition to a market economy based on private initiative. VCIOM's data allows a better understanding of the structure of this support: in 1992 about 10% of Russians fully embraced the new "rules of game" (they considered "ladies and gentlemen" as a most natural form of address, they held "new wealth" in high esteem etc.); roughly two-fifths of the population believed that entrepreneurs should get maximum freedom and that the role of the government should be reduced to a minimum; one-third favored the idea of social inequality; one-third approved of the privatization of large-scale industries; and approximately two-fifths of the population favored the privatization of banking, wholesale trade and large-scale agriculture.

The main reason for the "asymmetry" in the Russian ideological spectrum (i.e. a shift to the right among business people and intellectuals, weak socialist feelings in public opinion) is obvious enough. It is a psychological reaction to the decades of Communist dictatorship: a reaction proving itself, apart from anything else, by a sharp rejection of left-wing (socialist) ideas and by an absorption of some chief values and attitudes of "early industrial society": excessive materialism, stress on wealth as the most important — if not the only — criterion of status and so on. The presence of this "early industrial society" syndrome among Russian businessmen can be easily noticed when comparing the Russian and British answers to the questions, "How would you



Notes: The British sample is split between those voting Conservative and those voting Labour/Liberal Democrat (= "Socialists"). Score value (%) = $\{[X(i) - X(\text{average})] / X(\text{average})\} \times 100$.

Figure 1.
Some Responses to the
Question, "How
Would You Like to
See Your Country
Compared to Others?"

like to see your country compared to others?" As can be seen from Fig. 1, Russian respondents are much more inclined to see their country as "the most wealthy" rather than "having the best level of education"; British respondents (including Conservatives) take the opposite view. It is noteworthy that Russian intellectuals (the respondents in Urnov's study *Russian Scientists*) when answering this question take a similar position to Russian business people.

There is certainly a strong revealed asymmetry in the Russian ideological spectrum and it is likely to remain quite a stable, tenacious feature of political life, at least in the short to medium-run. From this point of view, political movements and parties based on economic liberalism have some advantages in Russia. They have better opportunities to dominate in the groups of influence than in the West where to be a "right-winger" is not too prestigious, especially among intellectuals.

"Authoritarianism/non-authoritarianism" Scale. Though the economic beliefs of Russian respondents are much more liberal than those of the British, in ethical terms the situation is reversed. As can be seen from Table 3, non-authoritarian beliefs definitely prevail among the British respondents compared to the Russian samples. On the other hand, Russian business executive's appear to be relatively non-authoritarian compared to the Russian public (see Fig. 2). It is interesting to mention that the senior managers of Russian private companies show themselves to be less authoritarian than their subordinates. For private senior managers "the authoritarian/non-authoritarian response ratio" was equal to 1:1 compared to approximately 2:1 for the rest of the private sector sample. There may be quite a simple reason why. According to almost all career studies of Russian business people, the vast majority of private senior managers have previously worked as research fellows for




Figure 2.
The Political Ideologies
of Different Russian
and British Groups

Notes: UK respondents, Russian private and public sectors: this project Russian scientists — based on Urnov's study of Russian scientists (see text); Russian public opinion — based on VCIOM Public Opinion Polls, 1992.

academic research centres or universities. They therefore appear to have brought into business some crucial elements of academic organizational culture, including a relatively low level of authoritarianism. By way of support, Urnov's research study of Russian scientists shows that this group has the same authoritarian/non-authoritarian response ratio as senior managers of Russian private firms.

The locations of the groups under study within the two-dimensional space of ideologies is shown in Fig. 2. In this space the "right-wing/left-wing" scale plays the role of X-axis and the "authoritarianism/non-authoritarianism" scale is represented by the Y-axis. The figures are based on the data presented in Tables 2 and 3. The location of a group on the X-axis is calculated as the difference between this group's "right-wing" and "left-wing" response averages; and its location on the Y-axis as a difference between its "authoritarian" and "non-authoritarian" response averages. A strong routinized authoritarianism in Russian respondents need not be read as a sign of their propensity toward political extremism. In spite of a severe moral, political and economic crisis the "passionist" aspects of authoritarianism are quite weak in the Russian sample — approximately as weak as in the British one. Some illustrations may be useful. About 72% of Russian business people (both in the private and government sectors) found it "perfectly acceptable to make close friends with someone of the opposite political viewpoint". The contrary position was shared by only 11% of respondents. In the British sample the respective figures were 89% and 3%. The death penalty for those people convicted of a pre-meditated murder was favored by 84% of Russian businessmen compared to 74% of British respondents supporting the Conservative Party. (However, the idea of the death penalty was notably less popular among British respondents who declared themselves to be socialists or social democrats — here it was favored by only 30% of people.) Russian public opinion is inclined against extremism and aggression. A good indicator of it is the fact that nationalist ideas are rejected by the vast majority of the Russian population. According to VCIOM's data a "hard" ethnocentrism and anti-Semitism in Russia today is spread no more widely than in Western Europe.

Interdependence between the "Right-wing/Left-wing" and "Authoritarianism/Non-authoritarianism" scales. An examination of the types of interdependence between the "right-wing/left-wing" and "authoritarianism/non-authoritarianism" scales can serve as important pointers to the political mood of a group or society. A lack of a correlation (or a weak one) between a location within the right-wing/left-wing spectrum and the propensity to authoritarianism can be deemed to be a key indicator of cultural homogeneity of political space, which in its turn is one of the preconditions of political stability. In all the mature democracies this homogeneity alleviates a process of alternation of right-wing and left-wing governments, by retaining changes more-or-less within the limits of the same state management style.

Table 4 shows the differences of authoritarian/non-authoritarian response ratios between groups having consistent right-wing and consistent left-wing

	Russia %		UK %	
	Right- wing <i>n</i> = 332*	Left- wing <i>n</i> = 85	Right- wing <i>n</i> = 50	Left- wing <i>n</i> = 53
My country/freedom — what is more important:				
my country	23	49	6	6
freedom	50	9	90	83
Loyalty to my country/justice — what is more important:				
loyalty to my country	20	34	6	6
justice	54	29	82	83
One should always respect one's parents: regardless of whether they are good or bad, right or wrong	79	81	28	42
if they have earned such respect through their own attitudes and behavior	6	6	46	36
In relationships with others, one should strive more to be:				
needed than independent	39	48	26	30
independent than needed	29	15	42	49
Authoritarian response average	40	53	17	21
Non-authoritarian response average	35	15	65	63
Authoritarian/Non-authoritarian response ratio (average)	1:1	4:1	1:4	1:3

Table 4.
"Right-wing/Left-
wing" and
"Authoritarianism/Non-
authoritarianism"
Scales
Interdependence:
Consistent Support
for a Particular
Position

sets of beliefs.* In the British sample any interdependence between the two scales is very weak: both "right-wingers" and "left-wingers" have almost the same low level of routinized authoritarianism. In contrast, in the Russian sample there is extremely tight interdependence, with "left-wingers" generally more authoritarian. The discussed interdependence can be readily quantified with the help of many different indexes. For instance, a linear equation linking an increase/decrease of authoritarian responses (dependent variable) with an increase/decrease of right-wing responses (independent variable) yields a coefficient of +0.03 (very weak correlation) for the British sample and a coefficient of -0.35 for the Russian sample.


The negative coefficient is indicative in the latter sample of the left-wing authoritarianism in Russia mentioned earlier. This type of authoritarianism is not typical in Western European societies and can be explained by a rather close interconnection between routinized authoritarianism and a psychological conservatism in Russia (i.e. a devotion to, and a defence of, the things which in Russian society are regarded as an expression of

*To be classified as having a consistent right-wing or left-wing set of beliefs a respondent had to chose simultaneously all the right-wing or all the left-wing positions listed in Table 2.

social and political traditions). This interconnection is well depicted in the works of McClosky (1958) and Tompkins (1963). In the West, today, traditionalist belief systems play a role in right-wing ideologies of economic liberalism.

Work Motivation

Some strong differences between the two Russian samples and the British one are shown in Figs 3 and 4. For British respondents the best job is one which gives them an opportunity to be proud of their expertise, to keep up with a challenging task, allowing them to improve their professional skills and, at the same time, letting them maintain a proper balance between work and private life. An enriching life-experience is a core feature. Using the terms coined by Maccoby, the British respondents personify a "craftsman/self-developer" mixture par excellence (Maccoby, 1990). In Russia the image of the "ideal job" is very different. For those belonging to the private sector the opportunities for personal development and balanced life are of little concern. For them a job's attractiveness depends mainly on the work itself (interesting, complex tasks one has to be fully involved in) and the lack of excessive control and restrictions ("opportunity to do things one's own way"), combined with a democratic, friendly and supportive work environment ("a superior is a



Score value (%) = $\frac{[\text{"Very important"} (i) - \text{"Very important"} (\text{average})]}{\text{"Very important"} (\text{average})} \times 100$.

Key to responses: A, interesting task; B, opportunity to do things one's own way; C, atmosphere where a superior is a colleague rather than a boss; D, work requiring one's full involvement; E, atmosphere of mutual aid; F, high living standard; G, work in which one feels oneself performing better than others; H, being self employed; I, opportunity to improve one's professional skills; J, work/private life balance; K, opportunity to expand one's mind; L, prestigious firm; M, stability of one's position; N, challenging tasks which give results of which one can be proud; O, variety of job activities; P, opportunity to determine organizational policies; Q, opportunity to take full responsibility for a task; R, opportunity for advancement; S, risk-taking tasks.

Figure 3.
Responses to the
Question: "How
Important Do You
Consider the
Following
Characteristics in
Relation to Your Ideal
Job?"

colleague and helpmate rather than a boss”, “atmosphere where people feel interdependent and give mutual aid”). Among Maccoby’s types “the company man” is the closest fit in the Russian case (Maccoby, 1977, 1990).

Comparing British and Russian motivations (Fig. 4) makes clear some other important difference: compared to the British, Russians consider self-employment as being much more important, as well as “work in which one feels oneself performing better than others”. They are also very concerned about social status, assisting each other and having a stable position. As for Russian private senior managers, their leading priorities for the job are: independence (“opportunity to do things one’s own way”, “being self-employed”), interesting tasks, high social status (“prestigious, highly regarded firm”) and power (“opportunity to determine organizational policies”). Applying once again Maccoby’s classification they could be called “junglfighters”. The representatives from Russian public sector can be placed somewhere in between the British and Russians working for the private sector. Though less intent than the British on professional pride and variety of job activities, they — compared to the Russian private sector — look more British in their will to have a balance between work and private life and to improve their professional skills. The thing making them different from both samples is the exceptional attention they pay for the opportunity to have a high standard of living. It is quite possible that this preoccupation with the living standard and professional skills mirrors the deep crisis affecting the public sector of the Russian economy: many managers of government




Figure 4.
Relative Importance
Compared to the UK of
Responses to the
Question, “How
Important Do You
Consider the Following
Characteristics of Your
Idea of an Ideal Job?”

Score value (%) = $\frac{[["\text{Very important"} (i) - "\text{Very important"} (\text{average})] / ["\text{Very important"} (\text{average})]}{["\text{Very important"} (i) - "\text{Very important"} (\text{average})] / ["\text{Very important"} (\text{average})]}_{\text{appropriate sample}} - \frac{[["\text{Very important"} (i) - "\text{Very important"} (\text{average})] / ["\text{Very important"} (\text{average})]}_{\text{UK}}$

Key to responses: A, being self-employed; B, work in which one feels oneself performing better than others; C, prestigious firms; D, atmosphere of mutual aid; E, interesting tasks; F, stability of one’s position; G, atmosphere where a superior is a colleague rather than a boss; H, work requiring one’s full involvement; I, high living standard; J, opportunity to do things one’s own way; K, opportunity to determine organizational policies; L, risk-taking tasks; M, opportunity to take full responsibility for a task; N, opportunity for advancement; O, opportunity to expand one’s mind; P, variety of job activities; Q, opportunity to improve one’s professional skills; R, work/private life balance.

	Russian private sector	Russian public sector	UK
Economic ideology	Liberalism For senior managers: "Hard" liberalism	Liberalism	From "mild" liberalism to "mild" socialism (something in between on average)
Personal ethics	— Routinized authoritarianism (according to British "standards") — Individualism (according to Russian "standards")	— Routinized authoritarianism (according to British "standards") — More individualism than authoritarianism (accord to Russian "standards")	— Individualism (according to British as well as to Russian "standards")
Ideal job: main distinctions in approaches to this concept	— Interesting tasks — Autonomy — Mutual aid For senior managers: — Independence — Interesting tasks — High social status — Power	— Interesting tasks — High earnings — Autonomy — Work/private life balance	— Professional development — Personal development — Work/private life balance

Table 5.
Distinguishing Traits
of the Managerial
Ideologies of British
and Russian Managers

companies see themselves losing their position in the income hierarchy and as being ill-fitted professionally and psychologically for the new "rules of the game".

One of the few traits common to all three samples and worthy of mention is the extremely low propensity to risk-taking.

Summary of Major Findings and Conclusions

An overview of the distinctive traits in the managerial ideologies and attitudes of Russian and British managers is shown in Table 5.

This paper has described a study of differences in the beliefs and ideologies of managers from two countries, namely, Britain and Russia. Present ideologies are central to the form of organization that develop in the future (Beyer, 1981). Ideology impinges directly upon the mode of decision making, the kinds of structures utilized and the way in which the environment is interpreted (Butler, 1991). Brunson (1989) argues that organizations need to find a commonality of ideology between members and supports the notion that decisions on their own do not lead to action. As Butler (1991) argues, the contribution of decisions and an appropriate ideology is needed for effective action. National cultures are a major source of organizational ideologies and Bendix (1956) has previously shown how the managerial ideologies found in Britain, the United States and Russia are products of the historical, cultural, political and economic characteristics of each country. For example, Western

entrepreneurial ideologies came to be replaced by bureaucratic ideology with the advance of industrialization. Russia provides a critical experiment through the attempt to reverse authoritarian bureaucratic structures* of the Soviet era. In this respect, we might expect a convergence between the ideologies, and hence the eventual forms, of American, Western European and Russian organizations (Hickson *et al.*, 1974). This notion must not be taken for granted, however, and this is why this project, as a continuing exercise, can be of future value. Nevertheless, though further analysis has to be performed, this paper has presented some data to support the view that Russia and Britain are not, after all, worlds apart in terms of espoused ideologies.

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*"Bureaucratic Individualism" as one of the authors has previously labeled the phenomenon for want of a better expression.