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In This Issue:

E. Pain: “In the 2000s, the ethnopolitical situation in Russia started changing. The traditional problems of the empire, namely the relationship between ethnic territories and the imperial center, as well as the ethnic separatism of autochthonous colonized peoples and anti-Semitism, have been replaced by new problems created by migrants and other ethnic minorities... who are poorly integrated into the emerging national community... I have relied on Russian examples to show that populism has many faces and that its impact on the dynamics of xenophobia is ambiguous.”

O. Martyshin: “The concept of a secular state become an object of intensifying public confrontation... Lawyers should make their contribution to this discussion by offering legal arguments and by proving that the secular state both at the conceptual and practical levels demonstrates clear and commonly accepted content... It should no longer be identified with the antidemocratic atheist variant of secularity that took shape in the Soviet Union... A secular state is not an anti-religious instrument. It merely deprives religion of its state status, creating conditions for unimpeded exercise of the freedom of conscience.”

N. Arbatova: “A revision of Russia’s former policy toward the Commonwealth states should be based on a more diversified approach. Russian national interests should be formulated clearly and specifically with regard to each CIS and Baltic country... In spite of previous setbacks, Russia’s integration with its CIS and EAEC partners has great potential. In principle, regional integration projects based on common interests, good will and equality of participants can only be welcomed... Possessing as it does a huge scientific-technical and resource potential, Russia should project its influence in the post-Soviet space not by force of arms, but by offering an attractive model of socio-economic and political development.”

O. Buklemishev, Yu. Danilov: “The Bank of Russia, while not denying the benefits that accrue from internationalization of the ruble, has so far given a guarded assessment of its prospects, warning that macroeconomic conditions for addressing that task are not yet in place. Along with the Bank of Russia, we understand that an international currency performs all the standard monetary functions... outside the national borders... Let us try to answer the fundamental questions that constantly crop up in discussions about internationalizing the Russian currency.”

V. Zorkin: “The modern world is at a bifurcation point from which humanity may develop in one of several ways, some representing highly negative scenarios.

The existential choice of humanity's path for the foreseeable future depends to a large extent on what idea of justice is adopted as the main worldview benchmark. This makes the discussion of the problem of justice in relation to law exceedingly relevant. The notion that the ideas of justice and law inscribed in their time on the banners of the Enlightenment ideology have entered our lives forever (think of the recent popularity of 'the end of history' thesis) has proved to be wrong. All of humanity must exert massive efforts to keep within the mainstream of value and normative orientations corresponding to these ideas."

A. Nikandrov: "The history of doctrinal-theoretical elaboration of the principles of the Soviet state, the directions of its development, the vagaries of the theoretical-political thinking of Soviet leaders, ideologists and social scientists, the travails of making choices that were often difficult and building a case for the best form that suited the Soviet state, their intense work on political terminology—all this is of considerable interest both for the theory of state and law and for the philosophy of politics and law... One of the main things that makes historical research on the creation of the Soviet doctrine of the socialist state extremely complicated is the fact that the theory of the Soviet state and law was developed by the Communist party, which was the main (and sole) theoretician in the USSR."

A. Seryogin: "To simply believe in the truth of theistic normative standards would mean, among other things, to believe that what I cannot actually see as evil at all is the true radical evil (for example, the 'original sin,' which is not anti-humane at all) and that, on the contrary, what is evident to me by intuition as monstrous evil is a manifestation of absolute good (the sanctioning of all world suffering). I do not see how such an attempt to believe that fair is foul and foul is fair could lend added meaning to my life."

A. Polunov: "'Live' autocracy ideologies and related foreign policy constructs played an ambiguous role in Russian history. At a certain stage, they met the requirements of the upper crust and part of the public. But later, for lack of containment, both these ideas and their proponents inexorably lost touch with reality. Increased international rivalry and growing complexity of the political situation at home left no room for glamorous but unrealistic concepts that used to draw the attention of Alexander III, Nicholas II and their advisers. Failure to understand this led to dire consequences at the turn of the 20th century."

I. Bendersky: "It makes sense to look at the conditions that offered Tolstoy an opportunity to convey 'the story of God's love that is coming to be in this world' through the narrative of 'a journey of discovery'... in *Master and Man*, the story of two wayfarers who lost their way at night during a snowstorm, Tolstoy managed to encompass within one artistic statement almost the entire landscape of his life and creative path. However, how does this narrative structure, which combines personal experience, an artistic image and religious revelation, frame the space of the author's encounter with the reader? How did Tolstoy structure the interaction between the created artistic world and the reality that he experienced and portrayed?"

Ethnic Negativism in the Age of Populism: The Case of Russia

Emil PAIN

Abstract. This article was born while I was working on my contribution to the Second Moscow International Conference on Opposition to Anti-Semitism, Racism and Xenophobia (October 29-30, 2018). The subject of the conference suggested greater emphasis on antisemitism among other outcrops of xenophobia. The article is based on the materials of the Levada Center 2018: reports on quantitative and qualitative studies of the state and dynamics of public opinion carried out on order of the Russian Jewish Congress to be quoted at the conference. What is even more important is the fact that I completely agree with the theoretical approaches used in the studies mentioned above and the definitions of xenophobia and anti-Semitism found in the reports of the Levada Center. At the same time, “forecasting trends and crises” (which is one of the three aims of the conference) might provide far from identical results; this depends on specific scientific approaches.

The article carries out macro-analysis that takes into account the impact of historically long stages or cycles of ethno-political processes on the dynamics of xenophobia. This analysis allows me to specify assessments based on sociological polls that cover comparatively short historical periods. I have arrived at a comprehensive interpretation of the results of sociological ranking of different ethnic phobias of Russians based on my analysis of the fundamental changes of ethnopolitical situation in Russia in the 1990s vs. the early 2000s. This article covers the ethnopolitical trends that cropped up in Russia and that are connected with the global processes we can observe here and now in the age of populism, to use one of popular definitions.

E. Pain, D. Sc. (Political Science), professor, Faculty of Social Sciences at the National Research University Higher School of Economics. E-mail: epain@hse.ru. This article was prepared as part of the research project on the grant from Russian Science Foundation (No. 15-18-00064) at RANERA. It was first published in Russian under the title *Dynamics of Xenophobia in the Era of Populism: An Attempt at Macro-Social Analysis* in the journal *Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniya* (The Russian Public Opinion Herald, Levada Center; 2018, no. 3-4 (127), pp. 17-32).

I have also analyzed the essence of populism and its impact on the dynamics of xenophobia.

In the 2000s, the ethnopolitical situation in Russia started changing: the relationships between the ethnic territories and the center as well as ethnic separatism of the autochthonous colonized peoples and anti-Semitism were pushed aside by new problems created by migrants and other isolated ethnic minorities (Gypsies, for example). The rise of national-populism as one of the political movements in Russia and in other countries of the global North is explained by the changes in the basic characteristics of ethno-political situation and the resultant dynamics of xenophobia. I have relied on Russian examples to show that populism has many faces and that its impact on the dynamics of xenophobia is highly ambiguous. National-populism may be responsible for the growth of xenophobia while social populism might transform ethnic, racial and religious phobias into civic protests.

Keywords: ethnic negativism, xenophobia, ethnic minorities, antisemitism, migration, populism.

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Global Changes in the Settlement of Jews and Geography of Anti-Semitism

In its report on the studies of manifestations of anti-Semitism the Levada Center pointed to the gradually decreasing intolerance of Jews in Russian society and a weaker perception of anti-Semitism as a real threat. This positive dynamics is very different from what is going on in Western Europe where anti-Semitism is much more obvious than in Russia and where a much bigger share of population is very much concerned with the threat of anti-Semitism [17]. I should say that the mounting concerns of the Jews with the growth of anti-Semitism in some of the EU countries are accompanied by the growth of Jewish population. In Russia, on the other hand, verbal statements about decreasing anti-Semitism did not stop the outflow of Jews from the Russian Federation. I will discuss the riddle below. Here is a question: What is behind the different dynamics of xenophobia in Russia and the West?

Changes in the settlement of the world Jewry in the 19th—early 21st centuries are one of the most important, deeply rooted and long-term causes of waning anti-Semitism in Russia and its shift to other regions of the world. By the 19th century, the Russian Empire became the main home of world Jewry with the total numerical strength of 5.2 million according to the population census of 1897 [43]. Depending on different expert assessments, this was half or even two-thirds of the total number of Jews scattered across the world. The last Soviet population poll of 1980 registered only 1.48 million Jews (about 10% of their total number in the world). According to the 2010 census, Russia is home of fewer than 158 thousand Jews, that is, about 1% of the total. The decrease was even more radical in

the other post-Soviet states; some of them (Tajikistan, for example) lost all their Jewish population [49].

World history knows cases of anti-Semitism in the countries with negligibly small Jewish populations. Russia is not one of them. The level of anti-Jewish hostility dropped considerably together with the dramatic (nearly four times) post-Soviet drop of the number of Jews. This is suggested by the materials of polls conducted by the Levada Center among urban dwellers. They explained the phenomenon with “there are no longer Jews among us,” “probably there are Jews but they are less noticeable” and “there are fewer Jews” [18].

The opposite, with certain reservations and specifications, processes confirm the conclusion that the dynamics of xenophobia (anti-Semitism in our case) is closely connected with the changes in the numerical strength of the Jewish population in any country. Here I refer to the inflow of huge numbers of Jews to some of the European countries accompanied by the flows of other ethnic and religious groups of migrants that competed with the Jews in the cultural-symbolic sphere. In Germany, for example, after the Holocaust the Jewish community practically totally consisted of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet republics. According to the Moses Mendelssohn Zentrum, in the 2000s Germany outstripped Israel and the United States by the rates of Jewish immigration [20]. By 2009, there were 118 thousand Jews living in Germany; by 2020, this country will push Russia away from its 7th place among the top ten countries with the biggest Jewish populations.

Here is a certain logical gap: in Russia where the position of Jews according to the standard system of assessments is improving their number is decreasing at an unprecedentedly fast pace, while in Germany in which anti-Semitism is rising (according to the same system of assessments) the Jewish population is rapidly increasing. It seems that the system of assessments should also include the inflow/outflow of Jews.

Rich Germany is attractive not only for Jews. In the postwar years, starting with the 1960s, Muslims were pouring into Germany in unprecedentedly huge numbers. Today, the country's Muslim population is assessed as from 3.3 to 4 million [42]. The relationships between these two communities of newcomers create a field of tension and explain the lion's share of hate crimes of 2004-2014. Germany and France lead in the OSCE responsibility zone by the number of such crimes [1].

France had its share of Holocaust experience and renewal of its Jewish community, mainly by the Jews from the former French colonies driven out by decolonization of 1950th-1960th. While in the early 20th century European Jews (Ashkenazim) determined the historical and cultural image of the Jewish community of France, in the early 21st century the Sephardim (Jews from the Maghreb) dominated the Jewish community of France together with the Mizrahim from the Middle East [26]. They are mostly immigrants or descendants of immigrants who left the former French colonies (Algeria in the first place) when they became independent Arab states. It was at the turn of the 21st century that France received Arab Muslim migrants in considerable numbers. Today, there are 3 to 4 million Arabs per 500-550 thousand Jews in France (in an absence of

ethnic statistics the figures are approximate). There are 6 to 8 times more Muslims in France than Jews. Both Jews and Arabs in France are marked by the unyielding and sustainable image of “culturally alien.” They are highly emotional about the more than fifty-year long Arab-Israeli conflict, the level being much higher than in Russia (with its weak anti-Zionism [18]). This is why the symbolic repercussions of the conflict promptly reappeared in France to intensify xenophobia in different forms (anti-Semitism, Arabphobia and Islamophobia, hatred of migrants, etc.).

The Hierarchy of Xenophobia in Russia: Old Stereotypes and New Conditions

In the countries with high parallel Jewish and Islamic immigration flows, different types of xenophobia become superimposed to multiply and fan each other. In Russia, on the other hand, *anti-Semitism is pushed out by other phobias*. By the mid-1990s, anti-Caucasian (anti-Chechen, in the first place) phobias suppressed anti-Semitism on the scale of cultural distance from the ethnic majority [11, pp. 239-240]. The increasing inflow of Central Asian migrants pushed the Caucasians from the top places in the hierarchy of xenophobia to become the targets of ill feelings (they reached their peak in 2013). In 2014-2016, these phobias were overlaid by anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western feelings ignited by the “Crimea syndrome.” In 2018, Africans and Gypsies reached the highest levels at the scale of xenophobia. This is suggested by the studies of the Levada Center (see Fig.) [17]. Sociologists relied on the methodology of scaling social distance tested by world practice; social distance was measured by the questionnaire with seven-position scale of indicators ranging from high tolerance to extreme rejection of the “Other” in the form of “a rejection of an access to the country.”




Fig. The strongest distance to... (the share of respondents in July 2018 who agreed with the statement “I would not let them into Russia”, %).

This hierarchy of cultural negativism in Russia exhibits many interesting and unexpected elements. Africans (33%) and people from Central Asia (30%) occupy the second and third places. The high degree of xenophobia in relation to people from three Central Asian republics is easily explained: as the biggest group of labor migrants in Russia, they are the target of migrant-phobia, one of the variants of xenophobia. It remains to be seen why Africans, whose share in Russia is tiny, are among the leaders. In fact, the numerical strength and the relative share of any ethnic group in the population of any country do not necessarily correspond to the degree of ill feelings to it. Declining anti-Semitism in Russia is explained not only by the declining numerical strength of the Jewish community in Russia, but also by the disappearing external differences between its members and the population majority, with the urban population and the polyethnic and multi-cultural milieu of big cities, in the first place. Those Russian-speaking Jews from cities and towns who remained in Russia after several waves of Russian Jewish exoduses to Israel, the United States and Western Europe have proved their readiness and ability to integrate into the emerging Russian political nation. Africans, on the other hand, stand apart in Russia by their physical and anthropological descriptions and their unattractive social status. In the Soviet Union, Africans in big cities were students: in 1989, there were nearly 30 thousand African students in Soviet higher educational establishments [36]. Today, there are African students in much smaller quantities in 42 universities of the largest cities and thousands of illegal migrants in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhniy Novgorod and five other biggest Russian cities. As a rule, they cross the Russian border as students or tourists and disappear from sight to become illegal migrants. According to human rights organizations, in 2015 there were about 5–6 thousand citizens of Nigeria illegally living in Moscow; in all there were about 11–12 thousand Africans in the Russian capital. They arrived from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and some other countries [51]. Without a visa and Russian documents, they are short of slaves and stir up fear and rejection rather than compassion in other population groups. It should be said that in the Soviet Union with its deliberate and superficial love of the subjugated Black Americans and the peoples of “fraternal Africa” occupied by white colonialists racism cropped up in different forms, Blacks being no exception. According to Victor Shnirelman, “racist attitudes in contemporary Russia are rooted in the Soviet past” [46]. No wonder, in the 1990s many of our compatriots used the obviously derogative and racist nickname “Blacks” when talking about Central Asian and Caucasian migrants. In Russia, Africa-phobia is a variant of migrant-phobia typical of the majority of the biggest countries of the global North. This fact legitimizes migrant-phobia in Russia directed against the Africans that prevail among the migrants in the West. This much is clear yet there is no fully acceptable explanation of the high level of Africa-phobia in the total hierarchy of phobias in Russia. The phenomenon calls for further analysis.

Chechens, who for a long time, from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, had occupied high places on the scale of ethnic negativism, dropped to the fourth place.

The general ethno-political situation in Russia changed in the 2000s: the acute and topical problem of migrants pushed aside the traditional problem of ethnic separatism in Russia, while in the last five years (at least after 2013 when a passenger bus was blown up in Volgograd) there was no mention of terrorist acts in Russian cities associated with North Caucasians.

In 2018, Chinese found themselves at the same fourth level in the hierarchy of resentment. Official argumentations in favor of friendship with China have not persuaded the Russians: one out of four “would have kept Chinese outside Russia.” In some of the eastern regions, Chinese have already pushed Caucasians away from their place in the hierarchy. According to Viktor Dyatlov, well-known expert in the problems of ethnic minorities of Siberia and the Far East, the anti-Chinese phobias and intimidation of the local population with the “yellow threat” are rooted in distant past. They are connected with the conspiracy, racist myths about the “Zionist plot” that promised “Chinese invasion” of Russia [3].

According to the sociological materials gathered by VTsIOM (now Levada Center) in 1990–2002, until quite recently, Russians did not separate Ukrainians from Russians and had all reasons to talk of them as “brothers” and “ours” [11, p. 240]. Today, they are treated slightly better than the “alien” Chinese are. Significantly, the political order on demonstrative friendship with China has not defused massive anti-Chinese phobia typical of Russia’s ethnic majority while the politically charged hatred of Ukraine destroyed (I hope for a short time) the positive stereotype of “Ukrainian brothers” in Russians.

Russian respondents (they constitute over 80% of the sampling) spoke of Jews as “nearly ours” and as being much closer than Ukrainians. This interesting phenomenon deserves detailed comments. Here, however, I’ll dwell in detail on two ethnic communities that occupy the lowest and the highest levels of the hierarchy. I have in mind Jews and Gypsies.

In July 2018, Gypsies occupied the highest level of Russians’ ethnic hostility: 43% of the polled said that “they would never let them into Russia.” This new place of Gypsies in the scale of ethnic phobias (never earlier registered in our country) and the wide gap between the indices of the anti-Gypsies phobias and the phobias related to six other assessed communities might look strange. At the same time, the image of Gypsies, together with the images of Chechens and Azeri, accumulated the biggest share of negative assessments in the already mentioned sociological polls of 1990–2002. It was on the strength of these data that in 2004 I included these phobias into one group on the scale of cultural distances, which I conditionally called “absolutely alien” [11]. These terms are applicable to the stereotypes of the perception of Gypsies by mass consciousness in many European countries.

Between 2008 and 2018, anti-Gypsies sentiments in Europe increased partly due to mass migration of Gypsies in 2008 from the places of their habitual settlement (Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovakia, in the first place) to the most developed EU countries. In 2009–2010, a wave of popular protests against the recently arrived Gypsies swept France and ended with their mass deportations in

2010 [35]. Anti-Gypsies protests were also stirred up in places, which Gypsies were leaving. This happened in Bulgaria in September-October 2011 [19]; in the same year, local people from the Sagra Settlement, Ekaterinburg agglomeration [32] clashed with Gypsies for the reasons similar to those that ignited protests in Bulgaria. In August 2016, about 300 people from the village of Loshchinovka, Odessa Region, Ukraine, organized pogroms of the houses of local Gypsies.

Back in 2000, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights drafted a joint report. They pointed to the highly disturbing situation in which the European Gypsies found themselves: 90% of them of employable age had no jobs; the jobs of those who had them required low qualifications [31]. No studies of the situations in which Gypsies lived across Europe were carried out in the last ten years; information gathered in the countries, which are homes for over one-third of all Gypsies of the world showed that the situation was slightly better than a decade ago. In Hungary, 70% of Gypsies have no jobs; in some places, 100% of the able-bodied population is unemployed. In Rumania, out of its nearly 3 million-strong Gypsies community (there are 10 million Gypsies in the world) “60% are unemployed; the rest engaged in unqualified work” [39]. The same can be said about Gypsies of Russia [47].

According to the UN documents, the documents issued by international human rights organizations and the majority of publicist writings on the subject, the current highly dramatic situation is rooted in racism, xenophobia and undisguised discrimination at the labor market. I am convinced, however, that this is a one-sided approach based on external circumstances and ignoring the internal truth: the community’s majority simply does not want to integrate into contemporary European societies. To prove my point, I will rely on *a contrario* reasoning, viz. one of the episodes from the history of Jews in New Times that fully reveals the process of overcoming the traditionally closed nature of their communities (Qahals).

Very much as Gypsies, Jews for a long time lived as diaspora communities. In fact, today two-thirds of them live outside their national state. The languages of both communities have terms used to describe aliens: *goi* for non-Jews and *gaje* for non-Gypsies. Both communities survived the Holocaust; today, their numerical strengths are approximately equal: there are about 15 million Jews and about 10 to 12 million Gypsies in the world. Their lifestyles differed in ancient times; in New Times (at least, starting with the mid-18th century) the differences became especially obvious. It was at that time that the ideas of the Haskalah movement, the Jewish Enlightenment of sorts, gained enough popularity among the Jews to start changing the relationships between Jews and non-Jews; the traditional Jewish isolation from the non-Jewish milieu was overcome through secular education, in the first place. Since that time on, outstanding representatives of the Jewish spiritual elite of whom the Jews of the world are proud, the no less prominent leaders of the Jewish public opinion in all regions and countries have been formulating the values of accessibility of Jews in the most prestigious among Europeans spheres of activities: finances and business, medicine, jurisprudence,

sciences and arts. Their values were accepted and became traditional in Jewish families that ensure the Jews' high integration potential. While unemployed and low-qualified workers predominate in the social structure of Gypsies in the majority of the countries all over the world, the share of highly qualified and well-educated persons among Jews is as a rule much higher than the country's average.

Gypsies can profit a lot from the historical experience of the Jewish Enlightenment. They cannot gain better positions in Russia or in any other country without an all-Gypsies movement of the Haskalah type. This experience can be spread far and wide: today, in the conditions of large-scale global migrations, there appeared many new diaspora groups of ethnic minorities unable or unwilling to integrate. They stir up xenophobia among the locals and, not infrequently, initiate it. According to Jérôme Fourquet who studies the problems of the French Jews, anti-Semitism mainly starts in the banlieues of big cities (Saint-Denis and Montreuil can serve pertinent examples) populated by weakly integrated Arab and African migrants [41]. This is the result of politics of multiculturalism that encouraged ethnically uniform settlements in which the life of the first and later generations was archaized.

There is no strict territorial distribution of ethnic and religious communities in Russia's cities that helps prevent ethnic conflicts. What is even more important is one of the specifics of Russian mentality in which there is no historically confirmed image of a "culturally alien." It is never the same; it is changing all the time. *Diffused unspecified xenophobia* predominates in Russia rather than deeper rooted and weakly recognized forms of dissatisfaction of the individual and atomized society with the fundamental life conditions. In Russian society, the "culturally alien" are frequently perceived as a less painful phenomenon than social inequality, corruption, raising retirement age, etc. This makes it possible *to canalize the negative energy of xenophobia into the sphere of civic protests* and can be described as one of the most promising methods of opposing xenophobia. In fact, this is one of the foundations of civic consolidation.

This transformation of public consciousness is very probable and does not need additional encouragement that was confirmed by the 2018 elections of governors. Having analyzed the results, a group of experts whom I highly respect concluded that Russia "was vulnerable to unexpected escalations of protests typical of the 'color revolutions.'" So far, no revolution is on the horizon. The sustainability and the safety margin of the political regime are overestimated, whereas the potentials of protest consolidation are greatly underestimated" [53]. The repercussions of such consolidation are unclear now: much will depend on the political forces that will capitalize on such activity. More about this I shall say below.

On the Cyclic Nature of Ethnopolitical Processes and the Impacts of the New Cycle on Xenophobia

Migration of the bulk of the Jewish population from the territory of the former Russian Empire to new places of settlement, in Israel, the United States and

the EU in the first place, is an example of a lineal process with a clearly identified beginning, stages and trends. There are cyclic processes and periodically repeated historical collisions. In the ethnopolitical sphere, for example, we can point to the repeated alternation of localization and globalization, nationalism and cosmopolitanism. In the Middle Ages, man was expected to demonstrate his loyalty to the world religions and dynasties (we can cite the Habsburgs as an example) and the elite of conquerors boasting of their alien origins (the Normans in England, Vikings in Russia, Mongol-Genghisides from Central Asia to India, etc.). In New Times, nationalism gradually pushed universalism to the side. First in the post-Reformation European countries and later in the rest of Europe, loyalty to the state, national monarch and people's religion that used national tongues came to the fore. Early in the 19th century after the French Revolution, nations started moving away from the sovereignty of the national monarch to the sovereignty of people, from state and ethnic to civic nationalism within which people (citizens) identified their national interests. The 20th century revived the demand for universalistic cosmopolitan ideologies. There were a lot of them; communism with its idea of a world revolution as well as Islamic fundamentalism striving toward the worldwide Islamic ummah are two out of many cosmopolitan doctrines that perceived the idea of withering away of nations and national states as an ideal aim. By the early 21st century, the idea of a gradual shift of the world to a new post-national era came to the fore among the intellectuals. Today, however, it is growing abundantly clear that the conception of "post-national world" is in crisis. Anthony Giddens, an outstanding sociologist, has pointed out that the world is suffering from "cosmopolitan overload" [30]. The Brexit, Donald Trump as President of the United States, the Eurosceptics in power in Italy, national separatism of Catalonia and a wave of national-populism all over the world are clear signs of another retreat of cosmopolitanism and rebirth of the idea of a nation. The studies carried out so far have demonstrated that even in the EU members, that is, in the most integrated alliance of states in the contemporary world, everyday activities and the main interests of people are concentrated within the borders of their states and that the national agenda comes before the common European [13]. Theoretical analyses have left no doubts that the hypothesized "post-national era" was poorly substantiated: in the contemporary world, only more archaic political forms (empires and tribes) can serve real alternatives to the nation-states [2].

The revived idea of a nation stimulates the growth of nationalism in two opposite forms—ethnic nationalism (that insists on the principle of domination of certain ethnic groups in a polyethnic society) and civilian-political that rests on the principle of people's sovereignty and envisages the civic society's great role in the political system. It goes without saying that the rise of ethnic nationalism leads to an upsurge of xenophobia while civilian nationalism creates long-term prerequisites for lower threats of xenophobia. Some positive shifts of the new rise of civic nationalism can be already seen in the economically developed countries of the world such as, for example, critical revision and elimination of the policy of multiculturalism or, rather its negative side, communitarianism, that divides

society into isolated and frequently hostile communities. Some of the analysts, Michel Maffesoli being one of them, defined this policy as neo-tribalism [5] with no negative connotations. In several of the EU countries, it is replaced with a policy of integration of different cultural communities into a single national-civic community. The new law passed in Germany in June 2016 that took into account the problems created by the world migration crisis of 2014-2015 conditioned the migrant's continued presence in Germany on his/her obviously successful integration into the national community and stimulated good results in this sphere. The law presupposes that a "man who came to get education can remain in the country during the entire period of his studies. After that, his residence permit depends on his successful integration. To help migrants become tax payers, the government subsidizes their employers" [50]. At the same time, those who have failed to integrate are encouraged to return to their homeland; in 2017, the out-flow increased by 50%.

The re-interpretation of the idea of a nation and cultural variety revived the intellectual legitimacy of one of the classical ideas of the modernization theory: inevitable movement of society from the empire to the nation. This aim is vitally important for Russia, which has so far preserved numerous signs of the "imperial syndrome" [9; 12]. The authors of the report of the Levada Center have pointed out that "the process of rehabilitation and restoration of the imperial consciousness or ethnic hierarchy" is underway in Russia, while the "claims of Russians to domination" are being consolidated [17]. I agree with the above and will point out that the post-imperial system is not sustainable at all: it is confronted by numerous new social, economic and political challenges, which will inevitably plunge the imperial order or, rather, what will be left of it, into a crisis.

Social and territorial population mobility the radical increase of which was registered in the post-Soviet years interfered, to the greatest extent, in the reproduction of the traditional imperial situation. In the era of classical empires, both colonized and metropolitan peoples preserved their ways of life for centuries since the majority of them was born and died within the borders of their ethnic territories. According to the population census of 1926 (that is, after the melee of the Civil War), only 25% of the population of the Soviet Union lived outside the places of their birth. According to the latest Russian census of 2010, there were over half (53.8%) of them [16, p. 462].

Territorial mobility in the Russian Federation is different than it was in the Soviet Union where free movement of people was limited by resettlement rules, registration in places where people lived, shortage of housing and lack of the right of property on it. Nowadays, mass migrations crumple the "imperial body," stirred up the population, and lead to a number of fundamental changes in people's behavior. Studies have already confirmed that the behavior of the second generation of migrants from national (non-Russian) republics whose parents settled down in Russian cities differs very much from the behavior of those who stayed behind. The process of cultural adaptation, however, to new conditions is very long, very

painful and is fraught with conflicts between those who “poured into” in great numbers and the local population [8].

New ethnopolitical processes launched changes of the very essence of Russian nationalism. From the very beginning, that is, from the times of the first nationalist party (The Union of the Russian People, 1905), this nationalism remained imperial and geared at widening the imperial territory. In 2011–2013, however, at the height of clashes with Caucasian migrants, Russian nationalists closed ranks around the anti-imperial slogan “Down with the Caucasus.” This new, anti-imperial sentiment in the ranks of Russian nationalists lost much of its vigor in 2014–2015 when popular masses switched their attention to Crimea and Donbass. At the same time, the political pulse of public opinion in Russia is highly uneven. Russian nationalism might revive amid the growing dissatisfaction of the masses with the Russian political elite shared even by enthusiastic supporters of the reunification of Crimea. Representatives of the formerly numerous cells of Russian nationalists will inevitably look for new forms of their self-realization; different political forces will try to capitalize on this political resource.

In the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the number of Russians in the colonized areas was increasing. Today, their number is decreasing in the majority of the republics of the Russian Federation, which creates in the ethnic majority of Russia (especially obvious among those who live in the republics) not so much imperial, as defensive, nationalist consciousness (similar to that of the nationalism of minorities). This strongly affects state policies, which become increasingly contradictory: imperial in its declarations and anti-imperial by its results. For instance, by declaring that the goal is to preserve or even strengthen Russia’s influence in the CIS countries, the Russian authorities are achieving, in many cases, the opposite result. Migration policy can serve as an example. Under pressure of the Russian population requirements to limit the inflow of migrants of other nationalities, Russian power is pursuing an increasingly restrictive migration policy in relation to ethnic minorities of the former Soviet republics. The number of work quotas is steadily decreasing. In 2007, the involvement of migrants in retail trade was limited, while punishments for violations of migration laws increased. As a result, ten years later, in 2017 the growth of the number of migrants dropped by nearly one-fifth [44]. Therewith, one of the main channels of Russia’s impact on the CIS countries contracted, for money transfers of labor migrants constituted a considerable share (up to one-third in some countries) of their GDP.

The Russian Federation’s position on the national issues inside the country is likewise ambiguous. While talking about the country’s unity as its main aim Russian power under pressure of Russian defensive nationalism in some republics passed, in the summer of 2017, a decision on the new rules of studying national tongues. On 20 July 2017, speaking at the meeting of the Council for Interethnic Relations in Yoshkar-Ola, Vladimir Putin said: “Forcing a person to learn a language that is not his or her native language is just as unacceptable as lowering the level of teaching Russian.” The president instructed the procurator office to check whether the studies of the tongues of the titular peoples in the

republics of the Russian Federation were voluntary. The state tongues of the republics lost their status of obligatory school subjects which caused a lot of irritation in the republican elites. In some republics (Chuvashia and Komi) this irritation surfaced in the early 2000s [23; 24]. Today, these feelings are flowing into a much more obvious spontaneous grass-root displeasure with the pension reform and numerous and obvious outcrops of social injustice. The defeat at the 2018 regional elections of heads of four regions demonstrated that spontaneous protests bring political results. Here is a question: Who is the main political beneficiary? Judging by the results of the regional elections, so far only the national populist parties, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), which have even greater potential for imperial ambitions and xenophobia than the current authorities, have benefited. This statement calls for explanations and an answer to the question about the essence of populism and the reasons why very different political subjects—parties and public figures—may be identified with it.

The Age of Populism and Its Heroes in Russia

In the not so distant past, populism was defined by political science as a marginal phenomenon typical of Latin American countries. In the last few years, however, it has become obvious practically on all continents as movements and sentiments tagged by observers as “populist.” Some experts announced the beginning of the age of populism [33], others are talking about the emerging populist spirit of the times [7]. Several approaches can be identified in defining the essence of populism, which compete with each other in some aspects and are mutually complementary in others. An analysis of these definitions and a wide circle of theoretical questions related to the identification of “populism” as a concept among numerous phenomena typical of the contemporary political culture deserve special publication [14]. Here I will limit myself to the enumeration of certain specific features used to identify populism.

The main typical feature identified by the majority of experts is correlation between populism and the idea of confrontation of two parts of society—the “righteous people” and the “unrighteous elite” [7, p. 543]. Two main types of populism differ in the terms used to describe the good people and the bad elite: (a) social (toiling poor and fair people and corrupt, exploiting, unfair, etc. elite); (b) national-populist (people as true representatives of “our” faith, ethnicity, national culture and the elite either “culturally alien” or supporting “cultural aliens”).

Robert Jansen has pointed to another very important distinctive feature: he has conceptualized “populism as a mode of political practice—as populist mobilization” of marginal social groups for political protests [4, p. 82]. Mobilization of passive social groups presupposes manipulations with mass consciousness: lavish promises (most of them unrealizable) or exploitation of their phobias.

Applied to Russia’s realities, it is not difficult to identify the LDPR and CPRF as national-populist parties. Their leaders—Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Gennady

Zyuganov—who for over twenty-five years now have been leaders of these two pillars of the “systemic opposition” in Russia can be described as national-populists. Both parties claim that they represent people’s interests and blend social and nationalist rhetoric in their propaganda. Since 2003, Zhirinovskiy and his closest circle have been saying, “We are for the poor, we are for the Russians.” The CPRF, likewise, speaks of itself not only as the “party of the toiling masses,” but also as the “patriotic party” by which they understand support of the idea of political domination of the ethnic majority, i.e., Russians. Kirill Nikolenko identifies Zyuganov’s book *Vernost (Fidelity)* as the first step toward this interpretation of patriotism: the author formulated the idea of Russian national consciousness as a shield that protects the country. According to the Communist leader, self-awareness of Russians is the “main adversary of the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist forces” [38].

In fact, the LDPR and Zyuganov in his book formulated this slogan simultaneously. The debates about the CPRF priority in defending national-patriotism and the Russian people are going on. In the Foreword to his book, Zyuganov spoke plainly: “Recently, many politicians and public movements have begun to talk about patriotism. The term ‘etatists’ (*gosudarstvennik*) came into fashion in the corridors of power; people at the top like to speak of themselves, from time to time, as zealous guardians of the Russian people. At the same time, it is carefully concealed that the CPRF and its leader have an undeniable priority in defending the interests of Russians and all peoples of Russia” [54]. As early as 2004, the 10th Congress of the CPRF passed a resolution The Communists and the Russian Question, which defined protection of the Russian people as the party’s mission. In 2007, in its resolution On the Tasks of the CPRF to Protect Russian Culture as the Foundation of the Union of Multinational Russia, the party offered a program of imperial hierarchy of inter-ethnic relationships and placed the “state-forming” Russian people on the top of it. Rhetoric of political domination of Russian majority occupies an important place in the party’s propaganda and can be found both in the party documents and in Zyuganov’s statements and speeches (see [25]).

The CPRF and the LDPR are two different and mutually complementary fragments of imperial national-populism. The Communists insist on the Stalin concept of a Soviet empire, and this ideology is close to “red” imperialists Zakhar Prilepin, Maksim Shevchenko, Aleksandr Girkin (Strelkov), Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov, and others. There is a fairly popular opinion that this detachment of “red” national-patriots profess anti-Semitism of Stalin type that from time to time crop up in their public comments [28; 52; 48].

Zhirinovskiy and his followers have united another detachment of Russian imperial nationalists. Very much like the CPRF, they insist on political domination of Russians and hail all types of Russia’s territorial imperial expansion no matter how utopian. In May 1993, Zhirinovskiy said, as if in passing, “The Russian soldiers will wash their boots in the warm waters of the Indian Ocean!” Today, it is even more popular among the “imperialists” than in the 1990s. The newspaper

and TV Channel *Tsargrad*, the main vehicles of the ideas of Russian ultra-right national imperialists, quote it as a prophesy [20]. They belong to a well-known and very rich person, Konstantin Malofeev, who spends his money on a dozen of similar structures that formulate and spread the ideas of Orthodox fundamentalism, militant monarchism and nationalism typical of the Black Hundred of the past. The forces rooted in the extreme right monarchist anti-Bolshevik movements can be described as “white” imperial nationalists. So far, they have been grouping largely around the Kremlin, but as a “backup political airfield,” they have become increasingly close to the LDPR. It takes no wisdom to guess that this party is closer to the “white” imperial nationalists than the “red” CPRF. The Zhirinovskiy party will eagerly expand its social base at the expense of the “white” Russian nationalists and other extreme right political forces. On 7 June 2018, in the building of the RF State Duma, the LDPR organized a conference *The World-wide Congress of Peace-Loving Forces* attended by delegates of ultra-right movements from Russia (The Slavic Unification and Revival) and the West (the National-Democratic Party of Germany and the Northern Resistance Movement). The Slavic Unification and Revival inadvertently disclosed on its page in social networks that foreign and fairly odious organizations took part on the event carried out in the Duma and boasted that the congress helped Russian ultra-right forces establish “friendly relations and agree on cooperation” with North European and German National-Socialists [34].

In the Russian political discourse, the greatest number of accusations of populism (as a negative phenomenon) is addressed not to the “systemic opposition” but to Aleksey Navalny both by Kremlin and the liberal opposition. Vladimir Putin repeatedly compared Navalny with Mikhail Saakashvili, ex-president of Georgia and, later, Ukrainian oppositionist, whom he despises [27]. In this comparison, a hint at the danger of a repetition of the scenario of “color revolution” in Russia, similar to what happened in Georgia and Ukraine, is easily guessed.

In the ranks of the Russian democratic opposition, Navalny is not a great favorite either. Some criticize his populism understood as mass manipulation with empty promises [37], others point to his leader-mania [45]. From time to time, the opposition media raise the question: Will the new leader of the popular masses become a more authoritarian leader than Putin? Back in 2013, journalist Stanislav Belkovsky offered a formula: “Better Putin than Navalny” [22].

Regardless of these assessments, Navalny’s figure can indeed be classified as a populist, and there are several good reasons for this. First, he attracts the masses with the help of a classical populist instrument—an opposition between “good people” and “bad (corrupt, authoritarian, egoistic and amoral) elite.” He coined the famous “party of crooks and thieves” related at first to the functionaries of the United Russia Party. Today, it is tagged to the Russian ruling class as a whole.

Second, the slogan Navalny coined during the mass protests of 2011–2013 “We are the power here” is a typically populist formula that juxtaposes the sovereign people to the political order that violates the Constitution and the principle of people’s sovereignty it proclaims [15, p. 4].

Third, Navalny is almost the only liberally minded oppositionist who not only appeals to the public (and, above all, to young people and the urban middle class), but also succeeds in their political mobilization by accumulating dissatisfaction of various social groups with the injustice of the existing social order in Russia. Navalny offers his own program of changes potentially attractive to the wide masses of Russians that perfectly fits the rhetoric of social populism. It contains the usual set of a populist activist: anti-corruption struggle, suppressing inequality, raising the standards of living, increased funding of education and medicine, de-bureaucratization and decentralization of state power, political liberalization and reforms in the judicial system and law and order structures [40].

Those of the liberals who accuse Navalny of populism and leader's ambitions never miss the chance to criticize his (ethno)nationalist ideas [21] which deserve special analysis.

I have already written that practically none of Navalny's statements marked as "nationalist" are xenophobic. He never discusses the specifics of any ethnic group to say nothing about demands of collective responsibility typical of ethnonationalist xenophobes. Between June 2010 and July 2013, the share of discourse that could be described as nationalist constituted about 3% of all his posts in his blog in LiveJournal [10]. In April-May 2012, it rose to its maximum of 5% and sometimes was absent. In these three years only in 40 of its public speeches, he discussed ethnopolitical subjects; in 34 of them, he spoke about the Northern Caucasus and certain republican leaders who embezzled budget money and lost what remained of their respect to law and morals. None of his statements carried traces of Russian ethnic or cultural superiority. He concentrated at his main subject, opposition to corrupt power of "crooks and thieves," and condemned corruption and embezzlement using the North Caucasian republics as an instance. The share of social populism in his rhetoric was gradually increasing; spearheaded against people in power, it reached its peak during the presidential campaign [40]. Finally, we should take into account the evolution of his ideas about nationalism. In 2007, he founded the movement he called *Narod* (People) and promoted the idea of defending the interests of the Russians as the titular nation. But in 2015, when talking to Polish dissident Adam Michnik, he described his ideas as "civic nationalism" [6]. His strategy in relation to Russian nationalism also changed. He no longer joins Russian Marches. In March 2014, when Crimea was reunified with Russia, he, as distinct from the majority of Russian nationalists and certain national-democrats, did not share the position of Russian power and was dead set against the war in the East of Ukraine and the Novorossia project.

In the strict sense of the word, Navalny is a populist. He is a charismatic leader of the anti-elite movement. He operates in the name of the people and is seeking more and more supporters who are drawn into political protests against the corrupt elite. It is a movement of social populism. What can I say about this movement from the point of view of the requirements of political modernization and opposition to xenophobia?

In the modern literature, there are ambiguous assessments of the influence of populism on democracy. Some authors insist that populism is essentially anti-democratic; others defend or even laud populism as a “genuine voice of democracy.” I tend to agree with those who say that populism does not oppose democracy per se (if understood as the idea of people’s sovereignty and the principle of the majority) but does not correspond to the developed liberal democracy model (for more detail see [14]).

This model is limited to certain political conditions; it needs a certain, even if minimal, level of institutional-political pluralism and the corresponding tradition of political culture. In the societies where the culture of political involvement is not firmly rooted and the ruling elite is not accustomed to follow democratic rules, populism might help make the first steps toward democracy. For example, in the late 1980s Poland withdrew from the Communist system to start moving toward democracy thanks to Lech Walesa who as the leader of the protest movement and the elected president of Poland (1990-1995) demonstrated obvious penchant toward populism while rallying around himself representatives of different social groups. Post-Soviet Russia started moving toward democracy when populist Boris Yeltsin was President. Successful liberal reforms and anti-corruption successes in Georgia in the 2000s are connected in large part with the name of its populist President Mikhail Saakashvili. The same I can say about the peaceful revolution in Armenia in the spring of 2018 that cannot be imagined without its informal people’s leader Nikol Pashinyan.

In Russia, too, there are politicians who are moving away from national-populism of the early 2000s to the present protest, civic (but not ethnic) anticorruption and anti-elite populism. This is probably the only real alternative to populism rooted in xenophobia.

* * *

Let me sum up the above. In the 2000s, the ethnopolitical situation in Russia started changing. The traditional problems of the empire, namely the relationship between ethnic territories and the imperial center, as well as the ethnic separatism of autochthonous colonized peoples and anti-Semitism, have been replaced by new problems created by migrants and other ethnic minorities (Gypsies, for example) who are poorly integrated into the emerging national community. The rise of national-populism as one of the political movements in Russia and in other countries of the global North can be explained by the changes in the basic characteristics of ethnopolitical situation and the resultant dynamics of xenophobia. I have relied on Russian examples to show that populism has many faces and that its impact on the dynamics of xenophobia is ambiguous. National-populism may be responsible for the growth of xenophobia while social populism might transform ethnic, racial and religious phobias into civic protests.

One way or another, but the ability to counteract the growth of xenophobia will depend largely on the choice of a strategy by responsible representatives of

Russian society to support certain political forces that have already made themselves known in modern Russia.

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On the Discussion of a Secular State in Russia

Orest MARTYSHIN

Abstract. This article presents a range of opinions about a secular state offered in Russia and outside the country in the post-Soviet period when religious conscience was revived and religious organizations got a new lease on life. Everybody involved in the public discussion (secular people, including jurists and state figures, as well as representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and Muslims of Russia) deny, doubt or insist on the revision of the principle of a secular state, one of the basic provisions of Russia's constitutional order. Some of them call for accepting Christian orthodoxy as a state ideology and establishing a concordat between the state and the church, etc. The author has analyzed *The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church* (2000) and its interpretation of the relationships between the state and the church. Much attention is paid to the theoretical legal efforts to "revise the concept of the secular state" to adjust it to contemporary condition which, in fact, boils down the rejection of its accepted content.

Keywords: secular state, separation of church and state, freedom of conscience, legal equality of religions.

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In February 2013, speaking to the members of the Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), President Vladimir Putin said that "we are a secular state, of course, and cannot allow state life and church life to merge, but at the same time, we must also avoid a vulgar and primitive interpretation of what being secular means" [11]. This was a response to the new relationships taking shape between the state and religious organizations in post-Soviet times that do not necessarily coincide with the traditional ideas about the secular nature of political

O. Martyshin, D. Sc. (Law), Professor at the Kutafin Moscow State Law University. E-mail: martyshin.o@mail.ru. This article was first published in Russian in the journal *Gosudarstvo i pravo* (The State and Law. 2019, no. 3, pp. 74-84; DOI: 10.31857/S013207690004427-1).

power. This problem appeared long before February 2013 and President Putin's speech. Today, the attempts to resolve it created certain thought-provoking trends.

Not infrequently, the very principle of secularism defined by Article 14 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation as one of the pillars of its constitutional order is rejected or doubted. This position is becoming more and more common even if it contradicts the Constitution.

As early as April 2007, at a round table on religious pluralism and civil society in Russia, the well-known television journalist Mikhail Leontyev, famous for his ardent support of the official line, commented: "Perhaps, the concept of a secular democratic state, in which all religions and confessions are equal not only legally, but also in terms of their positions in society, is not sufficient from the point of view of purely political tasks of the state? I think it is not tactically expedient to assign the status of the state church to the ROC now, but it is expedient to move towards this. The ROC should not acquire exclusive privileges, should not infringe on the rights of other religions and confessions. It should merely stop fighting for what belongs to it by the right of birth" [13].

In his monograph published in the same year, Vitaly Sorokin was more radical: "Orthodox Christianity should be recognized as the state ideology in Russia; this will make orthodoxy a state religion while the Russian Orthodox Church will be given the status of the dominant with all corresponding legal consequences" [7, p. 475].

Father Vladimir (Nezhdanov), a priest from Solnechnogorsk, said about the formula "separation of church and state" that it should not be accepted as absolute or even as absolutely correct because the Russian Church could not remain indifferent to what affected everyday life of common people. He referred to what practically all hierarchs had said at the Bishops' Council [10, p. 2], and this position could be ascribed to corporate interests. Gennady Maltsev, widely known as a legal theoretician, however, asserted more or less the same: "Now, the supposition that the West, having created a secular state and having liberated its legal system of religious elements, reached the cultural heights that will remain unattainable for the rest of the world for a long time to come is doubted and contended." "The Christian church, whether Orthodox or Catholic, cannot be reduced to the general concept of 'corporation' or 'public association' not only for the reasons used by theologians ('the church is not of this world, it is theandric since it was established by God')," says Maltsev. "Christian church is a universal phenomenon with flexible and informal organizational framework; it is the vehicle of spiritual power able to rule by the idea of law under certain historical circumstances." Hence the conclusion: "There are serious reasons to consolidate the public-legal status of the church through a normative agreement between the Russian Federation (RF) and the ROC on the fundamentals and principles of their relationships and their cooperation in reviving Russian spirituality" [3, pp. 474, 515, 516, 524]. The author has opposed the Western idea of a secular state (which he finds doubtful) with the concordat between the state and the church. We should bear in mind that

if the state and the church are of the identical opinion about Russian spirituality and its revival then the state cannot be defined as secular.

Certain representatives of Islam, likewise, find it hard to accept the principles of a secular state. In 2011, Magomedrasul Salduev, Imam of the Jumah Mosque of Makhachkala (Dagestan), who heads the Council of the Imams of Makhachkala, believed that “it is necessary at the level of state policies, in the first place, to keep raising the level of religious conscience among the young people” (said in the context of struggle against terrorism that relied on extremist Islamic trends). He offered the following arguments: “I wonder whether our republic has the right to religious identity within the frames of the democracy of law. Indeed, why do we hear from all sides: ‘the secular state, secular universities’; you (religious figures—*O. M.*) and we are separated?” We should exclude these words from our vocabulary... In our republic, nearly 100% of its population are Muslims... Tell our people that our republic, praise be to Allah, is a Muslim republic” [15, p. 2].

This approach is not alien to the ROC. Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin has written that “we should admit that the secular project in the Caucasus failed in its Soviet and post-Soviet variants. We should discontinue the ritual reverence of the sacred cow of secularism supported by about 10 to 15% by inertia, mainly by the majority of the Western elites (still treated with trepidation in this country). If people prefer to live according to the rules of religion nobody can force them to live differently either by force or brainwashing (excuse me, I wanted to say ‘education in the spirit of tolerance’). It is a mistake to ignore that Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan rely on many norms of Islamic law. It is equally wrong to say that this is bad because the ‘Great’ French Revolution and the current European and Russian law pointed to another vector of social development” [14, p. 2].

Protopriest Chaplin is convinced that “there is no principle of separation of church and state in this country... that the church as a worldview, religion as a phenomenon cannot be separated from the state... it is religious associations that are separated from the state. I have in mind organizational structures of religious communities. They are not state structures which means that the state has no religious functions” [16, p. 2].

In some of the CIS countries, state figures were quite open about their critical attitude to the separation of church and state. In an interview he gave in 2008, the then Prime Minister of Armenia Tigran Sarkisyan said: “The principle of separation of church and state has become obsolete” [5, p. 59]. President of the Republic of Belarus Aleksandr Lukashenko stated: “We have never separated ourselves from the church, since the state and the church are coping with one and the same task” [8, p. 84].

Many people refuse to accept the principle stated in the Constitutions of the post-Soviet states as indisputable. Victor Sheynis, member of the Constitutional Commission in 1990-1993 who attended the Constitutional Conference of 1993, has every reason to say that if the text of the Constitution is changed “the secular nature of the state will be immediately doubted. In fact, expansion of the

church into the army, school and politics is under way and proceeding along a wide front" [12, p. 14].

The comments of the President at the Bishops' Council could have disappointed the opponents of a secular state. Today, however, there are wide spaces of its interpretation in the course of overcoming the "vulgar" ideas about "what being secular means." Certain fruits of such interpretation are highly symbolic.

Hegumen Philipp (Ryabykh), candidate of sciences (theology and political science), who represents the ROC at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, believes that the tradition of a secular state was not born by "the French or Russian revolution. It dates back to the 6th century" when "Emperor Justinian formulated the principle of the symphony of powers," that is, separation of competences of cooperating, rather than conflicting, secular and spiritual powers. "While in the East this system remained an unchangeable norm, in the West it had been rejected only to be accepted through bloodshed and many victims. The European states had to stand opposed to the Two Swords Theory that presented the Papacy as the focus of spiritual and secular powers. While fighting for its autonomy, secular power in the West imbibed a strong spirit of anti-Christianity and anti-clericalism. There appeared the principle of separation church and state, the very formula speaking not only about separation of the institutes and functions of two powers but also about confrontation of sorts or even mutual isolation of two orders of public life" [9, p. 5]. Hegumen Philipp has passed over in silence the fact that Emperor Justinian conducted his symphony as head of the church, the status demanded by his descendants and by all monarchs of the Orthodox countries, Russia in the first place. He accused, without strong reasons, Peter I of "integrating the church into the state apparatus." In fact, Peter the Great merely brought the Byzantine tradition of caesaropapism, which had stuck root in Russia and consolidated under Ivan the Terrible, to its logical end. Nikolay Alekseyev has written that the church represented by the Josephites "went into the hands of the state on its own free will" [1, p. 87]. It remained part of the state machine until the downfall of autocracy in Russia. In the West, caesaropapism was not and could not be realized because the church was an independent, extra-state organization headed by the Pope who claimed, very much like the emperors of Byzantium, full power (papocaesarism).

The fairly contradictory deliberations of Hegumen Philipp are summed up with the question: "Has not time come to restore justice and replace the fairly discriminately 'separation of church and state' with the friendlier to the church term 'symphony of church and state' while preserving the ideologically balanced term 'secular state'?" He has added to the "formula of a secular state" of Byzantine Emperor Justinian the suggestion to expand the formula of symphony of powers to other "traditional" religions and society as a whole [9, p. 5].

Layman Igor Ponkin demonstrates a different approach to the task of filling a secular state with religious content. His paradoxical approach is fully revealed in the typology of secular and non-secular states that drastically contradicts the widely accepted ideas. He writes about "four types of secular states (preferential,

exponential, contaminatory and identification) and two types of a non-secular states (theocratic and authoritarian-ideocratic") [6, p. 248]. The general criteria of these definitions remain vague: they might be related to the real state of affairs or to the legal status of religions in any country. Let us try to figure out this typology that claims to be scientific and innovative.

Let us start with indisputable provisions. According to Ponkin, theocracy is a "state that depends on religion for sanctioning and lives under its pressure (?), in which the highest state and political power belongs to its religious leaders (leaders of religious organizations), spiritual (religious) leaders, the Deity and in which religious-legal injunctions serve the source of law and regulate state-legal, political and public relationships" [6, p. 248]. It goes without saying that a theocratic state is not, and cannot be, a secular state. The fact that the Vatican is presented as the only contemporary theocracy cannot but amaze. Indeed, as distinct from Christianity, Islam does not separate spiritual and secular powers. This means that the states that officially describe themselves as Islamic, even if by intentions and ideology, are theocratic.

It is equally unconvincing to speak of all authoritarian-ideocratic states as non-secular. In fact, fascist Italy belonged to this category. In *The Doctrine of Fascism* (1932) Benito Mussolini wrote that "in the Fascist state religion is considered as one of the deepest manifestations of the spirit of man; thus it is not only respected but defended and protected." He had in mind, primarily, "that particular and positive faith which is Italian Catholicism," that was reflected in the Lateran Accords of 1929 with the Vatican even though the leader of the fascist state insisted that "the state professes no theology" [4, pp. 244, 243]. But what are the reasons for classifying the atheist Communist regimes as non-secular? The ideologies, which are the basis of so-called ideocracy, as well as authoritarianism or totalitarianism, in their own right, are neither secular nor non-secular. They might be religious, anti-religious or neutral, to different degrees.

The attempt to describe, "in a certain respect," the United States as we know it today as an authoritarian-ideocratic state on par with the Soviet Union, North Korea and Hitler's Germany because of the "civic religion" that dominates there, is no more convincing than the refusal to accept the secular nature of the Soviet system. "Civic religion" is a state ideology, and it might be far removed from true religion. Igor Ponkin, however, does not insist that the United States is identical to the Soviet Union or North Korea for that matter. He merely pointed out that the United States also shows signs of an equipotential type of Soviet state [6, p. 249]. Since he points at the Vatican as the only example of a non-secular state, all others are pushed into the category of secular states. The typology mentioned above confirms this.

The state of the preferential type has "one of the 'softest' regimes of separation of religious associations from the state in comparison with all other types of secular state. Such a state singles out one or more religions... for which preferential conditions of existence and activity are provided, the basis for such choice being the position of a religion in the state, which has been established in the

course of historical development.” Ponkin thinks that “this type is characteristic of the majority of European states and of many countries of the world,” where privileged religions might be identified “by registering in the Constitution (written or unwritten) of the official status of the state church” [6, pp. 251, 252]. What serves the legal basis of this definition? Can we relate to the category of secular states the states that established preferences for certain religions or proclaimed one of them the state religion? Before Ponkin, the secular state was associated with an absence of a state religion. In fact, he himself writes of an absence of an obligatory religion and separation of religious associations from the state as one of the important features of a secular state [6, p. 248]. But how can structures of the state church be separated from the state?

The equipotential type is “marked by the desire to achieve the maximally possible extra-religiosity and isolation of religious associations from state and public life, to create an illusion of the *de facto* equality... of all religious associations in their relations with the state, a ban on any signs of preference by the state of any of the religions in any form.” The author cites Japan, China and South Korea and partly the United States as examples. The latter has realized a mixed type of state “with the features of the equipotential and authoritarian-ideocratic types” [6, p. 250]. It follows that this type prevails in Asia. Yet, in Japan there are religions that became dominant for historical reasons. Indeed, is it much more logical to relate China, like all other formerly socialist states, to the autocratic-ideocratic type? How does American equipotentiality correlate with the authoritarian-ideocratic type? Is the regime of religious organizations in the United States radically different from that in the UK and close to the order that existed in the Soviet Union and is alive in the DPRK?

The “contaminatory” type is a mixed variety that “demonstrates the maximally vague borders between the religious and the secular and considerable impact of the norms of religious law on the legal system of the state. This is defined by the specifics of ‘Eastern’ civilization... the specifics of the state-legal system and the system of religious and moral values rooted in the past.” This is typical, in the first place, of countries of the Islamic World, Israel and the Buddhist and Hindu states. The states of contaminatory type are divided into four sub-groups. These are (a) the borderline state between a secular state and theocracy; (b) the authoritarian secular regime (it remains unclear why it cannot be related to the authoritarian-ideocratic type of a non-secular state); (c) the liberal variant of Islam; and (d) a group of countries living under considerable impact of the West and insisting on the secular nature of their states (see [6, pp. 252-254]. Despite the registered and real differences, Ponkin defined Iran and Saudi Arabia as secular states while quoting, with a great deal of compassion, an opinion of Gasym Kerimov, author of *The Teaching of Islam about the State and Politics* (1986) that “in the Muslim countries (including the ‘Muslim’ republics of Russia) there was always a desire of Muslims to live in an Islamic state while the secular states will remain under fire of Islamic criticism” [6, p. 253]. Ponkin missed the contradiction and placed the states that have officially proclaimed themselves Islamic among secular states.

And, finally, the last of the types discovered by Igor Ponkin—the identification type of secular state. It is characterized by a “wider cooperation between the state and several religious associations on the basis of partnership between the state and its citizens where the guarantees, protection and realization of the rights of citizens to their national-cultural and religious identity are taken into account as well as partnership between the state and religious associations, which represent traditional religions.” The author has deemed it necessary to point out that this is related to cooperation with “specially identified” religious associations and that it is realized in state and municipal educational establishments. “States of the identification type have already left behind the historical stage of struggle... against religion and religious organizations; historical traditions in such states were partly lost or reconstructed (France, Russia, the Baltic countries, Ukraine, etc.).” In which way do they differ from the states of preferential type? Their shared feature is obvious—they cooperate with several specially identified religious organizations. The loss of historical tradition by the identification type is the only difference between the two types. As for the “separation of religious associations from the state which is stricter than in the preferential type” [6, pp. 255, 256, 257], the vagueness of this criterion is typical of Ponkin. He cites the impossibility for the head of state to govern the state religious organization as an example of sorts. In fact, in the countries of the “preferential” type the head of state is not, as a rule, head of the church. The fact that France, one of the pioneers of the promotion of the principles of a secular state, was related together with Russia to the identification type is a case of sheer arbitrariness. It had never been plunged into as deep-cutting and protracted crisis caused by the rupture with tradition as Russia. France could be referred to either equipotential or preferential, but much more clearly defined, types. It looks as if the identification type was invented specifically for the contemporary Russian state to justify the obvious retreats from secularism.

Igor Ponkin has successfully diluted the concept of a secular state, which can be described as the highest achievement of his typology. This was probably what he wanted: at least he spares no effort to prove that the non-secular states are, in fact, their opposites, that is, secular states.

The offered typology has a rational point: indeed, the relationships between the state and religious organizations are varied to the greatest extent and cannot, therefore, be clearly divided into secular and non-secular. The majority of the contemporary states fill the vast zone between the two poles even if tending to one of them. The balance between the two types (or their peaceful coexistence for a long time) is logically and historically impossible; in this context, only compromises and mutual concessions are possible while it is very important to identify their development trends.

A secular state, like a law-governed social democratic state, is an ideal. It is supported by the authority of contemporary legal awareness that took shape in the struggle for freedom of conscience, and in some countries, including Russia, by the authority of the current Constitution. This ideal has been hardly realized

in its full form in any of the contemporary states. An analysis of the relations between the state and the confessions suggests some differentiation. We should distinguish between the law and the real state of affairs. Formally, the UK is not a secular state. The British monarch is the supreme governor of the Church of England. Georgia is a secular state according to its Constitution, yet we can hardly insist that the principles of a secular state are realized in Georgia to a greater extent than in Great Britain. Should retreats from the principle of separation of religious organizations and the state be regarded as violations of the secular nature of the state or are they a normal phenomenon? Ponkin considers such retreats specific to a secular state. "The state has the right to independently choose the model of secularity on the basis of which relations with religious associations are built" [6, p. 50]. This is correct from the formal-legal point of view; the choice of the nature of the relation to religion and religious organizations stems from the very essence of sovereignty. But this should be specified by the following consideration: the state as a sovereign can push aside the principle of secularism even if it contradicts its earlier obligation assumed in full conformity with the norms of the contemporary international law.

Ponkin has dissolved the commonly accepted definition of a secular state yet his ideas about what does not contradict the secular state (see (1)-(4)) are clear enough.

(1) "Identification of the secular nature of a state with its completely extra-religious nature is not fully justified"; a completely extra-religious state is impossible, whereas "the attempts to set up such a state turn it into an anti-religious, undemocratic state" [6, pp. 17, 46].

(2) "The constitutional norm of the legal equality of religious associations does not mean the demand of an absolute legal and actual equality of all religious associations among themselves in everything, in their relationships with the state in the first place" [6, p. 160]. (It should be said that there are no demands that the dominant or traditional religion and a small religious group or a new religious movement should be "actually equal." In this case, "actual equality" is reduced to the demand that their legal equality should not be fictitious, that the state is impartial in respect of religions and does not create privileges or patronize one of them).

(3) It is not entirely reasonable to regard "protection of the system of state and municipal education against the influence of religious associations" as a feature of a secular state, and such a separation "is not realizable since Russian culture took shape within Orthodoxy" and it is, therefore, wrongful (see [6, p. 29]). The requirement of extra-religious state and municipal education "is equal to the requirement of an extra-cultural and extra-national education," and it is therefore either a utopia or a "deliberate discrimination and violation of the rights of citizens on the basis of their attitude towards religion" [6, p. 86].

(4) "It should be said that certain authors identify, without clear grounds, the demand to 'recognize freedom of atheism' as one of the characteristics of a secular state." Ponkin thinks that atheism is acceptable as a personal conviction but deems it necessary to point out that "if atheism is regarded as a possibility of

unlimited (?) criticism of religion, religious associations and the believers” the state “should take all measures to limit the right to atheist convictions in this form on the strength of Article 29, Part 2 of the Constitution of the RF that bans ‘the propaganda or agitation instigating... national or religious hatred and strife’ ” [6, p. 65].

Ponkin believes that his ideas about a secular state will help replace “anti-religious secularism” and “aggressively indifferent secularism” (!) with “understanding secularism” and “constructive secularism” (see [6, p. 221]). This could be seen as an attempt to evade the vulgar understanding of secularism called for by Vladimir Putin, if the solution proposed by Ponkin were not to deny the most important principles of a secular state: separation of religion from state, freedom of conscience, legal equality of religious (and atheist) convictions and organizations. Any violation of these principles means a retreat from the secular nature of the state, not a choice of a model of secularism, as the quoted author believes.

We should retreat from a primitive understanding of secularism in Russia since so far many of our citizens still associate a secular state with the Soviet, that is, atheist state. There is an opposite approach: the Soviet Union and the other socialist states were not defined as secular because their official ideology was elevated to the rank of absolute truth and, as such, could not be criticized. Ponkin who classed the socialist states as authoritarian-ideocratic is of the same opinion. This can be accepted as a metaphor, but not as a scholarly or legal description. A non-secular state presupposes a union with religion realized either in the form of a state religion or clericalization. There is no reason for a state to be declared secular if it aims to wipe out religion from the consciousness of the population and adheres to a consistent atheistic ideology. We are talking about totalitarian states or, at best, those that are hesitantly moving toward authoritarianism. In fact, they reject freedom of conscience and equality of religions. On the other hand, religion is completely separated from the state. The socialist countries were a variant of militant atheist secular states. But there is another, earlier, variant of a state that is not atheist; it is neutral in its relationships with religion, it makes no efforts to uproot it, guarantees freedom of conscience and equality of its citizens irrespective of their religious convictions.

In other words, there are two forms of secular states: antireligious and non-religious. Those of the opponents of secularism in Russia who ignore a moderately secular state based on religious neutrality insist that neutrality is impossible and that any secular state is anti-religious by its nature. This is not true. Contrary to what Ponkin thinks, the United States is accepted as the first and most developed secular state. By the same token, it is the most religious among the countries of the West; by the level of religiosity of its citizens it has outstripped Great Britain, a formally non-secular state. There is no state anti-religiosity in the United States yet the principle of separation of religion and state in education in particular is consistently observed and from time to time discussed in courts according to citizens’ complaints.

While rejecting the commonly accepted ideas about “secularism” as an opposition to religion, Ponkin has formulated the idea of a “contemporary secular

state,” of “understanding or constructive secularism” of which I have written above and which is nothing more than an attempt to dilute the very clear concept and move toward it complete distortion. This is a variant of negation through interpretation. Chronologically, Ponkin is the first who applied this method to the discussed issue. He, however, is not alone.

The roots of this approach are clear. According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the secular nature of the state is one of the pillars of its constitutional order. Changing its first chapter would require an extremely complex process. Furthermore, the revision of Article 14 is not politically feasible not only as an encroachment on freedom of conscience; it is fraught with the great danger of a violated balance between the followers of different religions in the poly-confessional state. Development, so to speak, of the Constitution through its interpretation is much simpler, albeit slower. In the final analysis, however, it might prove efficient. This project is gaining popularity.

Indicative in this respect is the change in position of the ROC. The well-known theoretical document *The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church* adopted by the jubilee Bishops' Council 2000 offers a weighted, mainly objective and frank exposition of the views on the relationships between the church and the state: “The Orthodox tradition has developed an explicit ideal of church-state relations. Since church-state relations are two-way traffic, the abovementioned ideal could emerge in history only in a state that recognizes the Orthodox Church as the greatest people's shrine, in other words, only in an Orthodox state.” The document further states that the attempts to arrive at an ideal form were made in Byzantium and that “the principles were described as symphony between church and state. It is essentially cooperation... The state in such symphonic relationships with the Church seeks her spiritual support... while the Church enjoys support from the state in creating conditions favorable for preaching and for the spiritual care of her children who are at the same time citizens of the state” [2, pp. 19, 20]. The document further stated: “This symphony... did not exist in Byzantium in an absolutely pure form,” “relationship between the Church and the state authorities was more harmonious in Russian antiquity” even if “there were also deviations from the canonical norms.” The Synodal Period is assessed as “the evident distortion of the symphonic norm.” The Local Council of 1917-1918 is seen as “an attempt to assert the ideal of symphony in the new situation when the empire collapsed.” The document further says: “Subsequent Local Councils were held in situations when history made it impossible to return to the prerevolutionary principles of Church-state relations.”

Here are the most important provisions: The ROC looks at symphony as the ideal of the state-church relationships while its assessment within the theory of the state and law is correct and precise. Symphony is not a secular, but an Orthodox state; it is admitted that it was impossible or unreal to return to the symphony of the prerevolutionary order and based on that understanding, the relationships between the ROC and the political system were building.

The Basis of the Social Concept further says: “In the contemporary world, the state is normally secular and not bound by any religious commitments” and stresses that “the principle of the secular state cannot be understood as implying that religion should be radically forced out of all the spheres of the people’s life, that religious associations should be debarred from decision-making on socially significant problems and deprived of the right to evaluate the actions of the authorities” [2, p. 16].

Proceeding from its philosophy and its tasks, the ROC does not approve secularization as a whole and secularization of the state, in particular: “This process in itself indicates that the spiritual value system has disintegrated and that most people in a society which affirms freedom of conscience no longer aspire for salvation. If initially the state emerged as an instrument of asserting divine law in society, freedom of conscience has ultimately turned state in an exclusively temporal institute with no religious commitments” [2, pp. 23, 24]. The church that spiritually condemned secularism accepted that “this principle has proved to be one of the means of the Church’s existence in the non-religious world, enabling her to enjoy a legal status in secular state and independence from those in society who believe differently or do not believe at all” and that “the religio-ideological neutrality of the state does not contradict the Christian idea of the Church’s calling in society” [2, p. 24].

To sum up: not an ideal model in the eyes of the church, a secular state is accepted as a reasonable model of existence in the contemporary world. It is not identified with anti-religious activities: neutrality of the state in faith-related issues is interpreted as a real manifestation of secularism. This was a scientifically and politically correct position of the ROC at the dawn of the 21st century.

The situation changed in the second decade. This has been confirmed by the statement of Hegumen Philipp (Ryabykh) quoted above to the effect that the symphony of powers formulated by Emperor Justinian laid the foundations of secularism and that we should restore fairness by pushing aside the discriminatory “separation of church and state” for the sake of “symphony of church and state.” Hegumen Philipp has pointed out that this does not contradict to the slightest degree the ideologically balanced “secular state” concept [9, p. 5].

This approach is very close to that of Igor Ponkin. A secular state is not pushed aside; it is interpreted in a very special way that turns it into its opposition. Hegumen Philipp was not confused by the obvious contradiction between the ROC program document of 2000 in which the symphony of powers, in full conformity with historical realities, is described as an Orthodox state. Indeed, the ROC is strictly centralized and highly disciplined organization. The clergy normally do not permit themselves improvisations on the issues that greatly affect worldview or politics. There are reasons to believe that Hegumen Philipp has offered not only his personal opinion on the issue.

In an attempt to harmonize Hegumen Philipp’s statement with *The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church*, we can surmise that the symphony of powers presented in the document as an ideal form of the relationships

between the church and the state that in 2000 was considered to be unrealizable today looks like a possible variant of development.

In July 2017, Head of the State Duma Committee on the Development of Civil Society and Questions of Public and Religious Associations Sergey Gavrillov made an important step toward further interpretation of the constitutional principle of a secular state. He said: “We need an interpretation of the secular state concept since we have no such interpretation by the Constitutional Court. In its absence, anti-Church and anti-patriotic actions become possible, and I am convinced that they seriously compromise the system of spiritual and moral traditional values” [17, p. 10].

The statement made by one of the leaders of the State Duma, member of the CPRF faction and the inter-factional group of defense of Christian values attracted a lot of attention. *Nezavisimaya gazeta* published a set of statements on this issue ([18, p. 14]; all statements quoted below were taken from this source).

The opinions of the experts were divided. Those of them who belonged neither to the structures of power nor to religious organizations or affiliated structures but represented the academic community (dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University Vladimir Mironov, professor of the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics Ruslan Khazbulatov, head of the Teaching-Scholarly Center of Religious Studies of the Russian State University for the Humanities Nikolay Shaburov, professor of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, political scientist Oleg Matveychev who sided with Gavrillov was the only exception in this choir) believe that the commentaries by the Constitutional Court were not needed in this case: Article 14 of the Constitution of the RF proceeds from the commonly accepted principles of a secular state and, let me add, defines its principles: “No religion may be established as a state or obligatory one” and “Religious associations shall be separated from the State and shall be equal before the law.” Khazbulatov connected the suggestion made by Gavrillov in which he has detected “no positive principles” with the fact that in the Russian Federation “clerics are demonstratively moving against secularism,” that “the ruling circles have moved the clerics so close to themselves that they began to unceremoniously dictate their ideas about state policies and interfere in education and science.”

The experts connected with the State Duma and the leading religious organizations supported Gavrillov. This was the position of Head of the Coordinating Center of the Muslims of the Northern Caucasus Mufti Ismail Berdiev; Member of the Presidium on the World Russian People's Sobor Aleksandr Rudakov; Deputy Chairman of the Expert Group for the Improvement of Legislation related to freedom of conscience and religious associations of the State Duma Mikhail Shakhov. The latter insisted that “the principle of secularism with its legal definition... is highly vague”; that even if the term is present in the Constitution, “nobody knows what it means.” (Rudakov disagreed by saying the “the principle of secularism is exhaustively described in the Constitution and in legal science”). Shakhov specified: “Anybody can use an unspecified term for their own purposes.

As a rule, they are people with anti-clerical ideas.” Rudakov agrees: the idea of a secular state might be falsely interpreted, therefore, “for political reasons this commentary (specifications by the Constitutional Court—*O. M.*) is necessary since in recent years the principle of secularism has been arbitrarily interpreted in social networks, in the Internet.”

The position held by Shakhov, Rudakov and others means that the statement of Gavrilov was not private initiative of a Communist who defends Christian values to suppress remorse for his party's theomachy. (After all, the CPRF presents itself as the descendant of the CPSU). This looks as an agreed and well-substantiated action. Shakhov was quite open about its real aims: “We should either preserve the principle of equality of religious associations before the law and get rid of this formula (he had in mind ‘the secular state’—*O. M.*) since it is not legally specific or, taking into account that Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be redacted, supply the term ‘secular state’ with a legal ‘interpretation’.” The task is a simple one: either destroy or “neutralize” the secular state concept in its legal capacity. This is a tactical solution since any changes in the text of Article 14 presupposes a very complicated procedure; the attempt to receive an interpretation of the Constitutional Court would look as a rejection of what Shakhov does not understand and what he and like-minded people reject as highly unpleasant. Head of the Coordinating Center of the Muslims of the Northern Caucasus Berdiev sided with Gavrilov, Rudakov, Matveychev and other “defenders of Christian values” and pointed to the religious policies of President of Turkey Recep Erdoğan as an example to be followed: “There is no need to change the constitutional formulas to protect Russia's spiritual security. According to its Constitution, Turkey, too, is a secular state, which does not prevent Ankara from building up its relationships with the religious institutions. Recep Erdoğan does precisely this. What we need is desire, willpower and understanding to defend our spiritual and moral values. Order is where people understand that religion is a source of good.”

Gavrilov's initiative was not fully realized, but it showed all of us once more that in Russia there are political forces ready to push aside Article 14 of its Constitution. If people empowered by the State Duma, among other structures, formulated an official demand that Article 14 should be interpreted, the fate of the secular state in Russia would have been placed in the hands of the Constitutional Court. Let us hope that it would have protected it without the smallest doubt. Since in the final analysis this demand was rejected as inexpedient, at least for the time being, defense of the one of the pillars of Russia's constitutional order remains within the sphere of socio-political life.

On 31 August 2017, the problem of secularism was raised, once more, at the high, even if non-state or not completely state, level. The Commission of the Civic Chamber of the RF on the harmonization of international and interregional relations together with the Council on Cooperation with the Religious Associations of the President of the RF organized a round table on the topic *A Secular State and Spiritual and Moral Development* [19].

Iosif Diskin, the Commission chairman, admitted that there was no alternative to a secular state and deemed it necessary to point out that the Law On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations in force since the 1990s was based on liberal ideas and, therefore, did not take into account a new stage of transformation which Russia was entering. This stage is marked by religious renaissance and appearance of “new communities of people who orientate themselves at the meaning of life and religious values, first and foremost.” He has offered to accept a new variant of the Federal Law in which the state should clearly explain that it considers religious organizations as active participants in the process of spiritual and moral development and will assume obligations to support this development in different forms, in particular, by making the state program *Support of the Spiritual and Moral Development of Russian Society* part of the state budget.

Vladimir Legoyda, who chairs the Synodal Department for Communication with Society and the Media of the ROC, believed that the term “secular” understood in its Western variant could not be applied to Russian realities. He, however, said that it was enough to introduce amendments and additions to the current Law rather than revise it. Albir Krganov, Deputy Chairman of the Commission of the Civic Chamber, Mufti of the Spiritual Assembly of the Muslims of Russia, Mufti of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Moscow and the Central Region “Moscow Muftiat” and Mufti of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the Chuvash Republic, called on the conference to tread carefully on the “thin ice” of this issue. He described the current Law as one of the advantages of the Russian model and invited all those present to preserve it and soften their rhetoric.

One can agree with one of the speakers at the round table who said that the concept of a secular state has become an object of intensifying public confrontation. The discussion is ongoing. Lawyers should make their contribution to this discussion by offering legal arguments and by proving that the secular state both at the conceptual and practical levels demonstrates clear and commonly accepted content, that a rejection of vulgar ideas about secularism is achieved not by diluting this concept. It should no longer be identified with the antidemocratic atheist variant of secularism that took shape in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. A secular state is not an anti-religious instrument. It merely deprives religion of its state status, creating conditions for unimpeded exercise of the freedom of conscience, and is therefore an inevitable component of any democratic regime ruled by law.

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The CIS Factor in Russia-West Relations: Origins of Conflict

Nadezhda ARBATOVA

Abstract. This article is devoted to the role of the CIS factor in the relations between Russia and the West (USA/NATO and the EU). The causes of the current crisis are rooted in the evolution of these relations in the previous two decades, which were marked by differences in two interconnected spheres. These are diametrically opposite views of the two sides on the post-bipolar system of European security and on the place of the CIS countries in this system. As the Caucasus crisis of 2008 and the conflict around Ukraine in 2014 showed, the post-Soviet space has become an apple of discord and an arena of rivalry between Russia and the West. The analysis of the causes of this phenomenon, primarily the mistakes of Russia and its CIS partner countries, as well as of the West after the collapse of the USSR, is the main objective of this article. Looking into the sources of the current crisis has intransient significance for the future of Europe. The Ukrainian conflict has demonstrated the danger of new dividing lines appearing in Europe. Russia's policy in the post-Soviet space has been and remains the main factor that will influence the development of Russia's relations with the West. Conversely, West-ern policy on the territory of the CIS will determine its relations with Russia.

Keywords: CIS, Russia, GUAM, European Union, European Neighborhood Policy, Eastern Partnership, Caucasian crisis, Ukrainian conflict, NATO expansion, the USA, models, scenarios, security strategy, defense, foreign policy.

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N. Arbatova, D. Sc. (Political Science), Head of Department at Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IM-EMO). E-mail: arbatova@imemo.ru. This article has been prepared within the project "Formation of a Polycentric World Order: Risks and Opportunities for Russia", Program of Fundamental Research of OGPMO RAN No. 22 "Analysis and Forecast of New Global Challenges and Opportunities for Russia." It was first published in Russian in the journal *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya* (World Economy and International Relations. 2018, no. 8, pp. 77-87; DOI: 10.20542/0131-2227-2018-62-8-77-87).

The Soviet Union ceased to exist in December 1991 in Belovezhskaya Pushcha. Its dissolution was followed by the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This decision was taken by the leaders of the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.¹

Both events took place simultaneously at the stroke of a pen, so to speak, without serious negotiations on the problems the new independent states had inherited from the Soviet past. This circumstance went a long way to determine Russia's relations with its closest neighbors and the differences with the West and ultimately the nostalgia of a large part of Russian society for the lost empire and the status of a great power equal to the United States.

CIS: Structure for Divorce or Integration?

Unlike the majority of other empires, including tsarist Russia, the USSR was not defeated or mortally damaged in a major war. Its dissolution did not involve debilitating low-intensity colonial conflicts in spite of the quagmire of the war in Afghanistan (1979-1989) and unrest in the Soviet national republics (1989-1991) [3, pp. 21-22]. It was a free choice of the union republics in which the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) played the decisive role.

Initially, the creation of the CIS met with approval on the part of the world community, which was concerned about the fate of the Soviet nuclear weapons deployed outside Russia. Thus, the West saw the newly formed Commonwealth mainly as a structure called upon to solve the problems connected with the Soviet military legacy. Besides, the CIS came to play an extremely important role as a structure that ensured a more or less civilized "divorce" of the former Soviet republics because it offered the necessary mechanisms for achieving compromises and easing tensions. In that respect the post-Soviet republics were luckier than the states formed in place of the former Yugoslavia. Arguably, if a similar structure had been set up in Yugoslavia the conflict there might have been prevented.

Nevertheless, the CIS was created as an institution called upon to contribute to the economic and political integration of the former Soviet Union states with the exception of the three Baltic republics—Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, which embarked on the path of integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. It has to be admitted that this was a situation the Russian leadership had not been accustomed to. On the one hand, the New Independent States (NIS), the former Soviet republics were recognized by the UN thus gaining the same rights as Russia. On the other hand, they shared a common past with Russia when all the post-Soviet republics were part of the USSR, which was then a unitary state with a highly integrated economy and a inflexible one-party political regime, a single defense system and border, communication infrastructure and energy system, and clear-cut administrative and symbolic internal borders. They shared decades of common history, common achievements and mutual grievances although more than 60 million citizens lived outside their native republics (including 26 million Russians) [2, pp. 131-132]. All this lent the relations between the post-Soviet NIS and

Russia a very special character compared to other foreign states, and from that point of view, the recognition of the special links between Russia and these states had nothing in common with the "Russian imperial syndrome." Obviously, regardless of various assessments of the breakup of the Soviet empire, the disintegration of the Soviet Union was a personal tragedy for millions of people who saw their kinship and professional ties severed by the new reality. These people had to live not only through economic difficulties of the transition period, but also bloody conflicts, which flared up in the post-Soviet space. Unfortunately, "the human aspect" of the dissolution of the USSR was (and remains) unknown to the West.

Speaking about the integration processes on the territory of the former USSR, one has to agree with American political scientist Leon Aron, who said that "the correct sequencing involves economic integration first and 'political military' integration much later" [5, p. 36]. This thesis is confirmed by the history of European integration where integration in the sphere of common policy, security and defense policy remains the biggest challenge to the EU to this day.

Attempts to integrate into the CIS started with the military-political sphere. Undoubtedly, the undeveloped borders of the former Soviet republics, the task of protecting them and the existence of conflicts in the post-Soviet space demanded coordination of the efforts of the former Soviet republics in this field. However, there is a huge difference between integration and simple cooperation. The Kremlin should probably have started with assessing the situation, identifying the prevalent trends within the CIS, which was marked by rapid regionalization and fragmentation. With the elimination of the former power center, which controlled the union republics what were once a single space split up into sub-regions, which found new centers of attraction in the adjacent regions. Moscow, however, continued to regard the post-Soviet space as a single whole where all the connections could be restored by organizing a new coordinating center. Besides, after the collapse of the USSR, the leaders of all the republics were preoccupied with dividing up the Soviet legacy, a process which by definition could not have contributed to unification trends. Yegor Gaidar remembers that at a meeting of the Inter-Republican Economic Council held in late 1991 (before the formal dissolution of the USSR) nobody wanted to discuss coordination of budgetary and monetary policies and everyone was concerned with just one thing, the sharing of the union gold reserves [7, pp. 144-145].

Agreements on joint armed forces and border troops were signed in Minsk in late 1991. One of the first working bodies of the Commonwealth was the Defense Ministers' Council with a secretariat and military cooperation coordination headquarters. However, the plan was never put into practice and on May 15, 1992 in Tashkent Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed a Collective Security Treaty, which came into force after its ratification by all the participants on April 20, 1994. In 1993, it was joined by Azerbaijan, which was at the time in a virtual state of war with Armenia, by Georgia and Belorussia.²

The building of the collective security union took place against the background of national privatization of the former Soviet defense infrastructure. "The bulk of

the armaments that became part of the national armed forces,” wrote Yuri Bondarev, Deputy Russian Airforce Commander-in-Chief, “were soon disbanded and were therefore decommissioned. By the early 1991, the air defense potential on the borders of the Central Asian region (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia) was non-existent. And the potential in Trans-Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia) had been significantly weakened” [4, p. 41]. Simultaneously the Russian leadership sought to strengthen economic ties. The idea of economic integration in the CIS framework took shape in the Treaty on creating the economic union signed in Moscow in September 1993 by 11 states with only Turkmenistan abstaining. Many spoke of the model of the European Union for the CIS overlooking the main prerequisite: integration is only possible among countries with similar levels of economic and socio-political development. Besides, the collapse of the command-and-administer system and introduction of market reforms put into question the rationale of the links between the former republics of the USSR and raised the question of competitiveness of the national industry. The markets of Russia and the other CIS countries were flooded by the vastly superior goods from the far abroad. “The danger arose,” noted Shishkov, “of the loss of entire sectors of the processing industry with all the negative geo-economic, social and internal political consequences that entailed” [13, p. 93].

The most radical solution of this problem in which all the Commonwealth states were interested was the creation of a single Customs Union with a common customs barrier in the way of exports from the far abroad on the perimeter of the CIS while preserving free trade within the CIS. In March 1992, heads of governments of all the CIS countries with the exception of Ukraine, signed in Moscow the Agreement on the Principles of Customs Policy, which envisaged the creation of the Customs Union. In the same year, in Tashkent the Agreement on Cooperation in the foreign economic activity sphere was signed and, in September 1993, the Framework Agreement on Economic Union for a term of 10 years which envisaged step-by-step creation in the CIS of a free-trade zone, the Customs Union, a common market of goods, capital, labor and the currency union. Ukraine acceded as an associated member. In 1994, further attempts were made to step up integration processes within the CIS: an agreement on a free trade zone was signed in April and an agreement on a Payments Union was signed in October.

However, in spite of all these efforts, it became clear that even a free-trade zone could not be created in the 12-state format. It failed also in 1995, when a smaller format was attempted, initially the “troika” (Russia, Kazakhstan and Belorussia) and then the “five” format (the same three countries plus Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) later renamed EAEC (Eurasian Economic Community 2001-2014). In 2015, a new integration group, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was formed.

The setbacks in the area of economic integration within the CIS were due to the Russian leadership, which was the driving force behind this process but ignored the actual economic situation in the proposed member states. By 1995, the share of the non-state sector in Russia was 65%, in Kazakhstan 25%, and in

Belorussia 15%. "It was patently unrealistic to try to squeeze the legislation of such different economic organisms into a single pattern," Shishkov wrote [13, p. 102].

In the late 1990s, it became abundantly clear that the Russian leadership attempts to attach the other commonwealth states to Russia economically had failed. The CIS states or groups of states were drifting away not only from Russia, but also from each other. The volume of trade between them dropped by 2.3 times within nine years. The share of mutual exports within the CIS in the total volume of their export dropped by 3.5 times and the share of mutual export in the total GDP dropped by 4.7 times.

The development of economic ties within the CIS failed to solve also one of the key tasks facing the Russian economy in the post-Soviet period, i.e., integration in the processes of economic globalization. Yury Borko, a noted Russian scholar, observed: "Integration within the CIS, in principle, does not solve the problem of Russia's integration in the world economy because its Commonwealth partners are much less involved in world economic ties than Russia." Moreover, the success of economic reforms in Russia, which is a precondition for its inclusion in the world economy, paradoxically, would have become a serious obstacle for integration within the CIS because it would have widened the gap between Russia and the other Commonwealth countries [6, p. 21].

Meanwhile, in addition to objective economic difficulties between Russia and the Commonwealth countries, there were problems of a different kind. Throughout the 1990s, Russia's policy vis-à-vis the CIS was marked by the divide within the Russian leadership which could not resolve the overarching problem in the "near abroad." How to find an optimum balance and work out a reasonable compromise in the relations with the other Commonwealth states? Should they be treated as independent foreign states by setting prices at the world level for the supply of energy, servicing of infrastructure, military assistance, etc.?

Or should "special relationships" with them be preserved by granting economic benefits in exchange for recognizing a certain status of Russian military and civilians abroad, the use of industrial and military facilities, the preservation of a single defense system, interference in the event of internal conflicts on the territories of these states, protection of the former Soviet borders, etc.?

Compounding the Russian dilemma was the fact that, on the one hand, it could not ignore the problems in the CIS space and, on the other hand, its potential and resources for addressing them had shrunk dramatically. The euphoria over the dissolution of the USSR in 1992 gave way to a sense of loss and defeat in 1993, defeat not on the far approaches but in the immediate surroundings. An awareness of the interests and conditions required to ensure them caused the elite to pay more attention to the real position of the RF in the CIS. "To assume an isolationist attitude," stressed Aleksey Arbatov, "would have meant leaving these republics at the mercy of the spontaneous process of economic decline, territorial and ethnic conflicts, civil wars and social chaos" [2, p. 134].

"Gathering" the CIS under its aegis and tackling of concrete problems (borders, drug trafficking, organized crime, pipeline transit, etc.) prompted the Russian

leadership to establish “special relationships” with CIS states. Furthermore, the post-imperial syndrome—the loss of superpower status—nudged the Russian leadership toward reviving at least some kind of coalition of satellite countries to boost Russia’s prestige in the world. Instead of differentiated relations within the CIS and identifying priority partners, Russia in fact took on board a model of “hanger-on” relations with its closest neighbors who put all the responsibility for the arbitrary rule of the Soviet government at Russia’s door arguing that the real mechanisms of governing the USSR and the RSFSR had been merged into one. Russia became a natural target of various kinds of complexes, suspicions, negative assessments and emotions (whether or not they were grounded is beside the point), on the one hand, and ambitions, expectations, claims—often selfish and exorbitant—on the other [8, p. 22]. Apparently, the Russian leadership considered this the inevitable price of preserving Russia’s political influence in the CIS. However, there again the real situation differed from the Kremlin’s calculus.

After the collapse of the USSR, nationalism in the NIS became the driving force in the formation of national identity and statehood. The rejection of the Soviet past had a marked anti-Russian thrust because Russia was the biggest union republic that allegedly suppressed the national aspirations of the other Soviet republics and because Moscow was the capital not only of the RSFSR, but also of the USSR. At the same time, the new countries, faced with massive economic problems on the way toward independence, could not renounce the benefits Russia could offer in exchange for political loyalty. Clearly, this model of “special relationships” which Russia’s CIS partners reluctantly adopted was the worst model in terms of integration. Russia’s attempts to guarantee a favorable environment in the “near abroad” by asserting its dominant position in the CIS inevitably met with resistance on the part of Russia’s closest partners. This was highlighted by the creation in 1997 of the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldavia) group as a counterweight to Russia’s dominance in the CIS space. The Commonwealth was practically split into the anti-Russian GUAM and the pro-Russian CSTO.

The key role in the former group was obviously played by Ukraine, the most important CIS country for Russia. The relations between Russia and Ukraine in the first decade of their independence evolved through the same stages as the entire Russian policy in the CIS: disintegration and aggravation of contradictions over the sharing of the Soviet assets (1991-1993); Russia’s emphasis on multilateral mechanisms in the CIS and the establishment of a donor model of economic relations with Ukraine (1994-1996); gradual transition from stagnation to pragmatism (1996-1999).

It is important to note that the CIS had split not on ethnic, religious or geographical grounds. The former coalition included all the countries that saw Russia as an existing or potential threat to their territorial integrity and all of them (except Moldavia) had applied to join NATO. The latter group included the states which sought Russia’s help in the face of external threat and (or) internal opposition and relied on Russia’s economic support. An exception in the second group is Kazakhstan, which shares with Russia important economic interests and has

a large Russian diaspora while pursuing a fairly independent line for cooperation with the USA and China [1, p. 17].

The political loyalty of Russia's CIS allies was probably superficial constituting the pay for economic injections on Russia's part. It was only when the internal political situation in some Commonwealth states threatened the ruling elites they turned for help to the Russian leadership and demonstrated pro-Russian sentiments. At other times, CIS countries often used tensions in the relations with Russia, sometimes artificially fomented, to solicit assistance from the West, which feared the neo-imperial ambitions of the Russian leadership.

The absence of a clear-cut Kremlin position on the issue of territorial integrity of the multinational NIS in the 1990s was due to the underlying wish to keep them within Russia's orbit. This was achieved by encouraging separatism in these states through support of loyal regimes and by imposing the military presence remaining from the times of the USSR and using economic levers, notably energy supply.

In retrospect, one has to admit that Moscow's policy in Ukraine and Moldavia as well as in the Trans-Caucasus region in the early half of the 1990s when the foundations of the relations among the new independent states were laid was shortsighted and counter-productive. The miscalculations of the Yeltsin-Kozyrev course were most manifest in the relations with Georgia, which was by definition Russia's priority partner in the Caucasus region. Moscow's policy there was even more misguided than in Ukraine and the other Commonwealth states. Owing to Russia's support of the Abkhaz separatists and the civil war that flared up, Georgia found itself on the brink of collapse and disintegration of the nation state. Georgia's President Eduard Shevardnadze had to back the idea of Georgia joining the CIS and asked Russia to introduce its troops as a result of which his main rival within the country, Zviad Gamsahurdia, suffered a defeat and a status quo was achieved on the Abkhaz front. President Shevardnadze sincerely counted on Moscow's help in the peaceful solution of the problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, the personal hostility of the Russian military-political leadership toward the Georgian leader and the wish to maintain Georgia's dependence on Russia through unresolved territorial problems resulted in the negotiating process stagnating for years.

The Kremlin's wish to use the problems of national minorities in the CIS neighbors to further its own ends boomeranged against Russia during the war in Chechnya causing a new spike of tensions between these states and Russia. For its part, Russia's military actions in Chechnya (although they took place on Russian territory) had a negative impact on its relations with the "southern near abroad," mainly Azerbaijan and Georgia. Looking back, we can say today that Russia's support of separatists in Abkhazia, Transnistria and the Crimea in the 1990s was counter-productive. The anti-Russian GUAM coalition consisted precisely of those states (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldavia) where serious conflicts of this kind arose and in which Russia interfered directly or indirectly during the course of these conflicts.

The setbacks of Russia's integration policy which became obvious in the second half of the 1990s made the Kremlin revise its former CIS policy which acquired a more pragmatic and realistic character. "[Moscow] abandoned ephemeral imperial projects in relations with its neighbors," writes Arbatov, "and turned its attention instead to the transit of energy exports, the acquisition of promising business assets and infrastructure, investment in natural resources exploration and production, maintaining genuinely important military bases and facilities" [1, p. 18]. While publicly pledging allegiance to the goals of integration in the CIS space, Russia laid emphasis on bilateral relations with the Commonwealth countries. Russia introduced market prices for energy not only for some GUAM member countries, but also for its traditional allies, Armenia and Belorussia. This was a correct, albeit belated, turn in Russia's foreign policy, but it failed to bring qualitative changes to Russia's relations with its closest partners.

The political elites in the CIS were not prepared for a radical revision of privileged relations with the Russian Federation in the energy and other spheres. On the one hand, the dilemma of these political elites—the wish to be independent from Russia and still enjoy the benefits of cooperating with it—consolidated the former model of relations with Moscow and on the other hand, introduced an element of polemics, if not actually conflict, in these relations. The Russian scholar Andrey Suzdaltsev noted that "numerous declarations and treaties on partnership and friendship concluded with Moscow made no difference to the diversified foreign policy of young states and did not slow down the trend of 'distancing' of the post-Soviet countries from Russia" [14].

The West's Attitude to the CIS Project

Like the Kremlin's policy in the CIS space, which is the main factor influencing the development of Russia's relations with the West, the latter's policy towards the former Soviet Union countries has been, and remains, a kind of litmus test for the Russian political elite to understand the true goals of the post-communist strategies of both the EU and NATO/USA. As noted above, the creation of the CIS initially met with approval in the world community, which was concerned about the spread of Soviet nuclear weapons deployed outside Russia on the territory of the former Soviet republics. Thus, the young Commonwealth was seen by the West mainly as a structure for solving the problems of the Soviet nuclear inheritance. However, after the issue was settled, it saw the centrifugal trends in the CIS as a key condition of democratization of these countries and a guarantee that the USSR would never be revived in the post-Soviet state in whatever form. The approach was just as erroneous as "the gathering" of the CIS by Russia for the sake of "gathering" without clearly formulated interests and goals in the region. Initially the European Commonwealth countries were not included in the post-communist strategies of the EU and NATO whose leadership was preoccupied with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and integration of the more prepared countries of Central and Eastern Europe into Western structures.

Practically from the moment the CIS was created, Russia's integration efforts were closely watched by the West which soon began to fear that a new Russian empire would be restored, all the more so because Moscow started claiming that it had special interests in the post-Soviet space. By putting the stake in the relations with the West on the disintegration of the USSR, the Russian leadership in the early 1990s believed that the formal break with the Soviet past was sufficient to harmonize Russia-West relations. Analyzing the Western attitude to Russia's policy on the territory of the CIS, some Russian scholars noted that whatever that policy was the European countries and the USA would still react negatively to it. Russian political scientist Nikolay Kosolapov stressed that "any attempts by Moscow to pursue an integration policy invariably provoke accusations of neo-imperialism" [8, p. 22]. We believe this statement to be excessively categorical and subjective.

It is undeniable that Russia's claims to have special interests in the CIS region were accompanied by serious setbacks of the Russian leadership in introducing democracy in Russia—the October 1993 crisis, which caused a wave of nationalist sentiments and the first war in Chechnya. Growing Western fears concerning Russia's role in the CIS were fueled by the massive invasion of neo-imperialists in the sphere of developing Russian policy in the former USSR space. They took advantage of the mistakes of the Yeltsin team, especially the fact that it thought a strategy for Russia in relation to the near abroad unnecessary and confined itself to the sharing of Soviet property. As American scholar Leon Aron wrote, "from 1992, the Near Abroad has been an attractive platform for ambitious domestic players such as Sergey Stankevich, who sparred with Andrey Kozyrev over the Dniester Republic and ethnic Russians in the Baltic states; Aleksandr Lebed, who was launched into national politics as the commander of 14th Army, which 'defended' the Dniester Republic; and, of course, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy in the 1993 parliamentary campaign" [5, p. 35]. The wish of various politicians and even some military commanders to take advantage of the problem of Russian-speaking communities in the near abroad and use it as a bargaining chip in the political games, in the absence of a coherent policy of the leadership, merely increased the West's mistrust of integration processes in the CIS. It has been argued for some time that the CSTO and the EAEC are a new version of the Warsaw Treaty and the COMECON, symptoms of a new Russian mini-empire. However, as Dmitry Trenin rightly pointed out, the new alliances³ have no shared ideology, no sense of a common threat and in most cases no sense of a common destiny [15].

Russia's peacekeeping functions in the CIS states gave rise to particular suspicions concerning Moscow's intentions. The West's attitude to the Russian peacekeeping operations was influenced by the past actions of the Soviet leadership in Afghanistan, Tbilisi, Baku and Vilnius and by the presence of former Soviet military units, which were concerned primarily about their own survival because the central authorities had lost control over some military commanders. The most vivid example were the actions of the 14th Army in the Transdnister region of

Moldova. The West was also confused about the participation of the warring sides in joint peacekeeping operations.

The diplomatic mechanisms of peacemaking operations were determined by the Kiev Agreement of CIS states signed in March of 1992. And yet not a single such operation observed all the terms of the agreement. Each time Russia took part in conflict resolution, special terms were developed. Moscow wanted the CIS to be regarded as an international organization with observer status at the UN General Assembly seeking to enlist Western support of the peacekeeping operations conducted by Russia and other CIS states in the post-Soviet space. Another attempt was made at a meeting of the OSCE leaders in Budapest. It prompted suspicions in the Western countries that Russia sought to regain its historical role of the "big brother."

At the same time, neither the leading European countries nor the USA had evinced the slightest desire to take part in solving the numerous problems on the territory of the former USSR whereas Russia could not afford to stand aside and watch the goings-on in Tajikistan and other hot spots. On the whole, it has to be noted that the West, which had concerns about CIS integration projects and structures, did not turn it into a stumbling block in the relations with Russia because in all other ways Moscow's external and internal policy suited it [1, p. 17].

The fears of the EU and NATO concerning the revival of the Russian empire on the CIS territory became obsessive. Any miscalculations or hiccups in Russia's policy with regard to the CIS countries—and there have, unfortunately, been many—were interpreted by the Euro-Atlantic partners of Russia as attempts to recreate a new version of the USSR. If more attention had been paid to the problems of the Commonwealth it could have acted as a regional partner of the UN and above all the OSCE. In 1994, attempts were made to organize cooperation of Russian and NATO servicemen in units deployed in peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former USSR and joint Russian-American military exercises on the Totskoye test range. Such interaction could have yielded tangible fruit and pioneered a new model of peacemaking applicable throughout the post-communist Europe. However, instead of becoming the kingpin of the European order in the new post-bipolar Europe, OSCE began to be sidelined on key security issues yielding its functions to other institutions. In effect, in the 1990s the OSCE functions began to be taken away or duplicated by other institutions, in the first place, NATO as well as the EU and the Council of Europe.

The post-communist space was swiftly divided between the two institutions. NATO was responsible for the countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and the OSCE for the post-Soviet states, with emphasis on humanitarian issues, which later provoked an ideological confrontation between Russia and the West. These novelties led the Russian leadership to suspect that the OSCE was an organization for "second-rate" states and its main aim was to limit Moscow's reach on the territory of the former USSR. Apparently, the West's thinking went like this: the OSCE is a child of the Cold War created for dialogue between East and West, but while the East fell apart, the West did not. This means

that NATO's policy was right and should therefore become the basis of European security while the OSCE should be left to its own devices.

The main distinctive feature of Russian peacemaking operations, compared to the "classical" UN practice, was that the Russian peacemakers were prepared to separate the warring sides before the ceasefire agreement came into force. At the same time, the experience of some states—members of the EU and NATO—in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief (for example, Britain's experience in Northern Ireland) would have been very valuable for Russia, which is facing similar problems. However, these initiatives failed to translate themselves into practical cooperation. The plans of eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union traditionally presented by Brussels as mutually complementary processes,⁴ were not conducive to the development of such relations.

The main principle of the regional strategy of NATO and the EU was to push the Commonwealth countries as far away from Russia as possible. This proved to be an erroneous and counter-productive policy, which confirmed Moscow's worst fears concerning the West's goals and fueled nationalist and revenge-seeking sentiments in Russia. The regional strategies of NATO and the EU consistently sidelined the Russian Federation and made it suspicious of the West's intentions in the "near abroad." If Russia had initially been included in the NATO enlargement policy as a key partner, the Caucasus crisis might never have happened. It is probable that the conflict around Ukraine would not have happened if it had been invited from the beginning in 2008 to take part in the Eastern Neighborhood, which sprang up as a regional dimension of the European Neighborhood policy.

American political scientist Michael Mandelbaum wrote in 1998: "Russian military intervention to the west (CIS—*N. A.*) would trigger a new Cold War, or worse" [9, p. 9]. The Ukrainian conflict in 2014 and the events that followed, above all, Russia's takeover of Crimea, although bloodless, provoked an unprecedented sharpening of contradictions between the Russian Federation and the European Union/NATO. Thus, Mandelbaum's prediction came true. However, he could not have predicted the whole chain of prerequisites that led to a new Cold War—neither NATO's military operation against former Yugoslavia in 1999 launched without the UN Security Council mandate which was a turning point in the relations between Russia and the West, nor the recognition of Kosovo independence, nor the support of "orange revolutions" in the CIS space.

NATO's military intervention against Yugoslavia greatly devalued the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 which, in spite of all Russian grievances, still offered certain guarantees that additional conventional and nuclear forces and weapons would not be deployed on the territory of new NATO member states. From Russia's point of view, the NATO expansion strategy strengthened control over sea and air space in the Black Sea region and ran counter to its security interests aimed at preventing the appearance of new dividing lines in the region and expansion of military coalitions of which Russia was not a permanent member.

The West's support of "orange revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine to promote democracy were rejected in Russia because that support quickly acquired an anti-Russian character. The pro-Western leaders of GUAM states, notably in Ukraine and Georgia, proceeded from the assumption that their anti-Russian rhetoric would buy them early admission to Western institutions. American journalist Eric Margolis in an article titled "Ukraine: The Orange Revolution Devours Its Young" noted that the Western media presented "orange revolutions" in black-and-white colors, as the struggle between good and evil, which Western-oriented democrats waged against vile pro-Moscow communists. However, it was in fact a very complicated struggle for power and for control of economic resources among various conflicting factions [10].

In recognizing the independence of Kosovo, Western politicians repeatedly stressed that this was a one-off case because the conflict leading up to the emergence of the Kosovo problem was different from other post-communist conflicts. In other words, Kosovo was to become an exception. Meanwhile what has already happened is a precedent by definition. Besides, in spite of the regional and local differences, all the conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the former USSR had three common dimensions—internal, post-imperial and international. The latter two were inseparably bound up: the West's attempts to fill the vacuum in "no man's land" inevitably turned the post-imperial dimension in the policy of the former "mother countries" into a neo-imperial one, breeding new conflicts and problems. Properly speaking, this is nothing new. Ethno-religious and territorial conflicts have always occurred on the ruins of fallen empires, with external forces seeking to grab the imperial legacy readily pitching in.

Russia's interference in the conflict around South Ossetia in August of 2008 to protect Russian peacemakers and civilians and all the following events in the region, which culminated in Russia recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, were perceived by many in the West as Moscow's renunciation of the status quo policy in favor of expansion in the region. From Russia's point of view, it was the policy of NATO toward the post-Soviet space, which sought to fill the security vacuum formed after the collapse of the USSR, was an instance of expansionism and, what is more, expansionism of a military alliance. The Western countries were the first to violate the status quo established after the end of bipolarity.

Setting forth Russia's position on the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, President Dmitry Medvedev said it was a difficult decision: "Ignoring Russia's warnings, the Western countries hastened to recognize the unlawful declaration of Kosovo's independence from Serbia. We have constantly argued that after that it would be impossible to tell the Abkhaz and Ossetians (and dozens of other peoples across the world) that what suited Kosovo Albanians did not suit them. In international relations you cannot have one rule for some and another rule for others" [12]. In other words, the Kosovo precedent got an adequate response from Russia and this probably accounts for the fact that Russia-West relations were not unduly impaired by the Caucasus crisis.

The August 2008 crisis revealed two polar positions in the West with regard to the post-Soviet space, which have a direct bearing on Georgia and Ukraine. One of them was that NATO expansion to the CIS, contrary to the Russian position, engenders dangerous conflicts and must be put off. The other is that such expansion should be speeded up to prevent Moscow from using force to subdue neighboring countries and revive the traditional strategy of Russian imperialism. In Russia too there were two approaches concerning the CIS. One approach was that it had already drawn "the red line" in the South Ossetia conflict clearly warning NATO of all the risks of expansion to the CIS countries. Therefore, the events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia should be seen as an exceptional episode, like the Kosovo one. The other line was based on the conviction that the prospect of NATO expansion to the post-Soviet space gave Russia and the CIS a free hand.

In other words, the Caucasus crisis of 2008 and the Ukrainian conflict of 2014 were the logical consequence of rivalry and mutual suspicions between Russia and the West in the post-Soviet space, suspicions whose roots go back to the 1990s. In both cases, Russia had drawn a "red line" for the West's advance to the zone of its special interests.

In Lieu of a Conclusion: Russia's Tasks in the CIS

For the first time since the end of bipolarity, the conflict in and around Ukraine brought the Russia-West relationship to the brink of a direct clash due to unpredictable escalation of tensions. At the end of the day, the conflict became the quintessence of mistakes and miscalculations both for Russia and for the West. Obviously, in the near term Russia's key task is to stop the slide toward a showdown with the USA and NATO. Contributing actively to the establishment of peace in Ukraine is the immediate task of the Russian leadership, and this calls for initiative and consistency. Peace in Ukraine is not only a prerequisite for normalizing Russia-West relations, for working out new rules of behavior in international relations that would rule out dangerous rivalries within the CIS, but a precondition for a rethink of Russia's strategy with regard to its closest neighbors.

The dissolution of empires is a painful process in principle. It involves getting rid of political and psychological stereotypes, hindering the establishment of new relations between independent states, which have left the bosom of the empire. If Russia fails to shed its neo-imperial syndrome and abandon attempts to recreate the Soviet empire, this would further alienate its CSTO and EAEC partners. The Kremlin's concept of "the Russian world" and especially the Crimea precedent has put Russia's allies on their guard. There is no question that the decision to take over Crimea has the broadest support of the Russian public opinion. The fact has gained legitimacy in public consciousness and there is hardly a more popular slogan than "Crimea is ours." Addressing the Munich Security Conference, the Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said: "For Russia, the question of the status of Crimea is closed forever. The question does not exist for Russia. Crimea is part of Russian territory" [11].

However, in taking the decision on Crimea the Russian leadership proceeded from its own interests and notions about the legitimacy of that decision. It probably gave no thought to the fact that the Crimea precedent would be very attractive for Transdnistria, Nagorny Karabakh, Northern Kazakhstan, Republika Srpska, the Croatian part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kaliningrad (whose population gravitates toward the Baltic region) and many countries. While Turkey's claims to Crimea which, under the 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji, had no right to independence or to being handed over to a third party can hardly be taken seriously, pro-Turkish sentiments in Tatarstan and other Russian regions is a very real challenge. China, having recognized the demarcation of borders with Russia, has not given up its claims to the territories in the Far East which it considers to be historically its own. China is not raising this question today because it has other preoccupations in the south and east, but the situation may change over time. In other words, the danger of setting precedents is that the state sets it up for itself without thinking that others may take advantage of such precedents. It is a grave delusion for a state to believe that history ends with the setting of a precedent. That is why Russia should foresee probable dangerous repeats of the precedent and proactively take measures to prevent them in the field of its security and relations with the neighboring countries.

A revision of Russia's former policy toward the Commonwealth states should be based on a more diversified approach. Russian national interests should be formulated clearly and specifically with regard to each CIS and Baltic country taking into account the regional aspects of security on the entire perimeter of the external borders of the former USSR [3, pp. 103-104].

In spite of previous setbacks, Russia's integration with its CIS and EAEC partners has great potential. In principle, regional integration projects based on common interests, good will and equality of participants can only be welcomed. For all the criticism of the shortcomings of the EAEC, this project has become an institutional, normative and economic reality. In the future, given normalization of Russia-West relations after the Ukrainian conflict is settled, joint functional projects of the EAEC and the EU in the CIS space are possible.

Possessing as it does a huge scientific-technical and resource potential, Russia should project its influence in the post-Soviet space not by force of arms, but by offering an attractive model of socio-economic and political development, achievements in science and culture, in other words, everything that makes a state truly great in the 21st century.

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Notes

¹ The RSFSR, the Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus were the co-founders of the USSR in 1922.

² Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan later left the organization. At the time the Treaty came into force in 1994, the CSTO had nine members, today it has six. The supreme governing body is the Collective Security Council (CSC), which appoints the organization's General Secretary.

- ³ This fully applies to the Eurasian Economic Union whose members have no shared ideology like that which existed in the USSR. Moreover, Russia and its EAEC partners pursue different goals through integration in this union.
- ⁴ Although NATO membership is not written down in the Copenhagen Criteria as a mandatory condition of EU membership, the latest waves of European Union expansion to the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe attest that it has become a *de facto* mandatory condition. This circumstance prompted Russia to change its initially positive attitude to European Union expansion and its Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership.

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

Internationalization of the Ruble: Myths and Economic Policy

*Oleg BUKLEMISHEV,
Yury DANILOV*

Abstract. Internationalization of the ruble has lately become an issue of intense professional debate, partly due to the progress of the integration process within the Eurasian Economic Union and corresponding increase of the ruble's role supported by the monetary policy of the Central Bank of Russia. In line with these discussions, this article poses three major questions: (1) Does the current international role of the ruble correspond to the fundamental characteristics of the currency and the national economy? (2) Is there any room for strengthening this role and how big the potential benefit might be? (3) Should economic policy be expressly aimed at the ruble's internationalization? The answer to the first question is broadly "yes": while "factors of size" favor an increase of the ruble's role, several structural factors (mainly the level of development and liquidity of the national capital market) restrict its potential as a store of value. Secondly, the role of the Russian national currency could be strengthened. However, on the one hand, this requires creative reforms to improve the structural characteristics of the national economy; on the other hand, the benefits are not that large as the ruble's potential progress is limited due to fierce currency competition and the advantages of the leading reserve currencies. Finally, economic policy should be mainly targeted not at internationalization of the ruble itself but at improvement of fundamentals which would make these gains possible. Corresponding reforms would involve, primarily, more intense and diverse integration within the Eurasian Union as well as expansion and qualitative development of the national financial market.

O. Buklemishev, Cand. Sc. (Econ.), associate professor, Lomonosov Moscow State University. E-mail: o.buklemishev@gmail.com. **Yu. Danilov**, Cand. Sc. (Econ.), senior research fellow, Lomonosov Moscow State University; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. E-mail: ydanilov@rambler.ru. This article was first published in Russian in the journal *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya* (World Economy and International Relations). 2018, no. 12, pp. 26-34; DOI: 10.20542/0131-2227-2018-62-12-26-34).

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Considering the active development and reform of the Russian economy and financial market in the beginning of this century, it would be logical to expect that, in the absence of major crises, the ruble would achieve the level of reserve currency values within a decade [12, pp. 91-92]. Although this has not happened due to several objective and subjective reasons, there has lately been increased interest in the problem of increasing the international role of the Russian national currency in trade and investments.

Some experts are already advocating renunciation of the use of reserve currency in favor of the national currency, citing the need to minimize the damage from sanctions [20]. Others think a stronger ruble to be desirable both in the interests of economic agents and for addressing macroeconomic tasks [14]. Measures are being proposed for proactive state policy in this sphere [26].

The Bank of Russia, while not denying the benefits that accrue from internationalization of the ruble, has so far given a guarded assessment of its prospects, warning that macroeconomic conditions for addressing that task are not yet in place. Along with the Bank of Russia [19, p. 1], we understand that an international currency performs all the standard monetary functions (legal tender, store of value and a universal value measure) outside the national borders.

The question of the future role of the ruble within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) remains open. Progress in creating it was not accompanied by vigorous actions of the member countries (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia) aimed at promoting currency integration. While being aware of the need for it, the partners have been putting off practical decisions, having failed to reach a consensus on what the common currency unit should be (from the pragmatic point of view that role should naturally be performed by the ruble and not some artificially created currency) or on determining the stages and terms of its introduction [9].

Let us try to answer the fundamental questions that constantly crop up in discussions of the problems of internationalizing the Russian currency.

Does the current international role of the ruble match the fundamental factors?

Is it possible that its internationalization will yield some gains, including in the post-Soviet space, and if so how great would these gains be?

Should special measures be taken toward internationalization of the Russian currency?

Theoretical Context

Scientists and experts have long studied the regularities of the processes involved in parallel use of various monetary units. In accordance with the Gresham-Copernicus law discovered back in the 16th century, “bad” (overvalued) money pushes out “good” money. However, that conclusion, as Friedrich Hayek believed, is implicitly based on the assumption that a fixed exchange rate is established for various reasons (for example, bimetalism or a joint currency policy of various states) [16]. In this case, rational economic agents would seek to pay nominal prices in the “worst” money and exchange it for “good” money.

But the picture changes for flexible exchange rates: preference would then be given to the currencies with which operations (including long-term possession) enable the economic agents and states to minimize their costs and risks. To fulfill the functions of international (world) money a currency must be competitive in terms of transaction costs. The existence of the corresponding advantages led to the emergence in the second half of the 20th century of the phenomenon of “dollarization,” i.e., the use of the dollar by private agents as a measure of value, payment and circulation instrument as well as an instrument for accumulating foreign money instead of the national currency [22].

The use of the national currency in international trade involves not only advantages but also certain risks (see Table 1). The conventional wisdom is that for the emitting state the advantages of currency internationalization outweigh the costs. It is not by chance that China is closely watching the use of the yuan abroad, resorting to various means to promote it. These include granting loans in its own currency and the signing of corresponding swap contracts between the People’s Bank of the PRC and other central banks [14; 13; 5]; organizing interstate settlement systems (jointly with Hong-Kong, Taiwan and Macao) that ensure the dominance of the yuan in settlements [24]; easing restrictions on the acquisition of Chinese financial organizations by foreign investors and on Chinese financial organizations transferring businesses and investments to these countries [4, p. 55]; and introducing of the institution of qualified foreign institutional investors which are allowed to carry out transactions in yuans through offshore zones (*Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors, RQFII*) [7, p. 89].

Although the yuan was included in the basket of key reserve IMF currencies to calculate the value of SDRs in 2016, its role in world trade still falls short of the size and significance of the Chinese economy. The inclusion in the IMF basket by itself does not automatically turn the yuan into a reserve currency, but imposes on China an obligation to speed up the reform of the financial system and introduce convertibility not only in trade transactions, but also in capital accounts [25, p. 26].

Table 1

Advantages and risks of the use of national currency in international trade

Advantages	Risks
Elimination of currency risks	Reduced efficiency of the national monetary policy (limited independence; problems with marketing)
Cuts of transactions costs for national business	Increased volatility and likelihood of sudden exogenic shocks (greater dependence on foreign financing)
Lower barriers for entering foreign economic activity	Increased likelihood of excessively strong currency
Currency stability and greater internal financial stability	The emergence of the “burden of responsibility”
Broader range of the sources of investments due to external demand for instruments denominated in the national currency	The emergence of prerequisites for a “debt overhang”
Development of the national financial sector	
Seigniorage	

Compiled by the authors on the basis of [26, pp. 18-21; 19, p. 4; 36; 28; 3; 10; 32; 21].

Only a few monetary units stand a real chance of becoming international. There are five main groups of factors that predetermine the possibilities of internationalization of currency.

1. The factors of scale (size of economies and their mutual influence, the volume, structure and direction of trade and investment flows).

2. Macroeconomic factors (economic growth rate, inflation level, change of the nominal rate of the national currency and its volatility, interest/profitability rates on investments of various degrees of reliability, the current balance of payments).

3. Regulatory factors (transparency and predictability of the Central Bank's monetary policy, the currency rate regime, degree of liberalization of trade and capital transactions, use of currency control measures, asymmetry of regulatory treatment of foreign currencies against the national currency, etc.).

4. Market factors (diversity and liquidity of the currency market, possibility of currency risk hedging; diversity and liquidity of financial markets, including monetary, stock and government bonds market; reliability of the financial infrastructure and financial mediation institutions; business practices, etc.).

5. Geopolitical factors [13; 11].

All the above groups of factors enable the currency, to varying degrees, to perform the main functions of money at the international (global) level. As part of further classification, factors related to volume and structure of currency internationalization are distinguished [34]. The volume factors reflect the size of the economy of financial markets (currency, securities and derivatives), and the structural factors characterize the quality of management (financial market regulation, state interference, monetary policy as well as the existence of trade and capital restrictions). While the first group

of factors measures the potential “capacity” of international use of this or that currency, the second group stimulates or, on the contrary, restricts the fulfilment of the existing potential.

Thanks to the economies of scale, externalities, uncertainty and asymmetry of information the use of currencies in international trade is marked by multiple equilibrium states. Nevertheless, many authors believe that a change of the status quo is only possible as a result of a powerful shock (see, for example, [13]), noting the important role of market expectations (see, for example, [1; 29]), which imposes serious restrictions on changes of the international role of individual currencies in the short and medium term.

Fundamental Factors and the Role of the Ruble in International Trade

To assess the international role of the national currency unit a number of indicators are used, including especially the share in international settlements and transfers, the share in official currency reserves, the number of states using the currency in official reserves, its share in the currency market. Let us try to use these indicators to assess the potential for internationalization of the ruble.

Share in international settlements and transfers. According to SWIFT data, in December 2017 the ruble was in 18th place among the currencies used in international settlements accounting for 0.27% of all payments (by comparison: the share of the dollar is 41.27%, of the euro 39.45%, and the yuan slightly less than 1%) [30]. The performance in trade settlements with neighboring countries was significantly better: within the EAEU, the share of ruble payments in the export of goods and services varied from 13% to 40%, and in the import from 15% to 48% (data for 2016) [33]. The share of the ruble in total payments to Russia was 15.9% (9.4% coming from the far abroad countries and 60.3% from EAEU countries). The share of cross-border transfers from Russia was estimated respectively at 19.8, 7.3 and 78.2% (according to Bank of Russia data for 2017).

Share in official world currency reserves. The bulk of world currency reserves today is in dollars and euros representing the largest economies and the most capacious financial markets in the world (Table 2). The currencies of several other countries form “the second echelon,” at about one-sixth of the volume of the leaders while the share of all the remaining currencies is at the statistical error level. Among the BRICS currencies, only the yuan today claims a place in the second echelon whereas the currency units of other countries in that group occupy more modest positions. The Brazilian real and the South African rand in 2014 accounted for 0.05% of world currency reserves each and the Russian ruble and the Indian rupee for 0.01% [18].

The number of states using this or that currency in official reserves. The share of a currency in world currency reserves correlates with the number of countries holding it in their currency reserves. Thus, according to the IMF data, as of 2014 the US dollar was present in the currency reserves of 127

out of the 130 countries surveyed, the pound sterling was used in 109 states and the euro in 108 states. The yuan is included in the reserves of 108 countries, the South African rand in those of 12 countries, the Russian ruble in 8, the Indian rupee and the Brazilian real in 6 [18].

Share of currency market. In recent years the ruble has been gradually yielding ground to many “soft” currencies in transactions in the world currency market and not only to the Chinese yuan, but also to the Korean won, the Mexican peso, the Turkish lira, i.e., the currencies of countries which do not have very large economies (Table 3).

The size of the national economy is exceedingly important if a currency unit is to gain international status. In 2016, Russia’s share in the world GDP in current prices was estimated at 1.7%,¹ in world trade in goods: 1.8% in the volume of world exports and about 1.2% in the volume of imports [37, p. 102]. The contribution to the world financial market is even more modest: our share in the stock market capitalization is 0.71%, in IPO/SPO volume 0.06%, insurance premiums 0.37%, the value of net assets of mutual funds 0.004% [6, p. 109].

Table 2

Share of selected currencies in the currency reserves of the world’s countries, %

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017 ¹
US dollar	61.24	65.14	65.73	65.34	63.50
Euro	24.20	21.20	19.13	19.13	20.04
Yuan	0.67	1.11		1.08	1.12
Yen	3.82	3.54	3.75	3.95	4.52
Pound sterling	3.98	3.70	4.71	4.34	4.49
Australian dollar	1.82	1.59	1.77	1.69	1.77
Canadian dollar	1.83	1.75	1.77	1.94	2.00
Swiss franc	0.27	0.24	0.27	0.16	0.17
Other currencies	2.84	2.83	2.86	2.37	2.38

¹ As of Q3.

Source: [17].

The volume of internal debt market capitalization is also comparatively small. Although this market is growing rapidly, it accounted for 21.1% of GDP in the late 2017 (for comparison, in the eurozone corporate bond debt alone amounts to 80% of the GDP). The absolute value of capitalization of the Russian debt market is extremely low by international standards. And its segment most closely linked with currency internationalization (trade in state securities) is also small by international measure—7.9% of GDP as of late 2017. On that count, Russia is still well behind developed and major developing economies which substantially limits the investment attractiveness of the ruble.

Table 3

Share in currency circulation (net-net basis), %¹

	1995	1998	2001	2004	2007	2010	2013	2016
US dollar	83.02	86.80	89.86	88.01	85.60	84.86	87.05	87.58
Euro			37.91	37.41	37.04	39.05	33.41	31.39
Yen	24.60	21.72	23.53	20.83	17.25	18.99	23.04	21.62
Pound sterling	9.27	11.02	13.05	16.50	14.87	12.88	11.81	12.80
Swiss franc	7.20	7.06	5.98	6.03	6.82	6.31	5.15	4.80
Australian dollar	2.64	3.03	4.32	6.02	6.62	7.59	8.64	6.87
Canadian dollar	3.42	3.53	4.49	4.20	4.29	5.28	4.57	5.14
Other currencies ²	69.86	66.84	20.85	21.00	27.52	25.04	26.34	29.79
of which:								
Russian ruble		0.30	0.35	0.63	0.75	0.90	1.60	1.15
Chinese yuan		0.01	0.01	0.10	0.45	0.86	2.23	3.99
Indian rupee		0.09	0.23	0.32	0.71	0.95	0.99	1.14
Brazilian real		0.22	0.48	0.27	0.39	0.68	1.10	1.00
Rand (SAR)	0.30	0.40	0.94	0.72	0.91	0.72	1.11	0.97
Korean won		0.15	0.80	1.14	1.16	1.57	1.20	1.65
Mexican peso		0.46	0.83	1.40	1.31	1.26	2.53	1.92
Turkish lira			0.04	0.11	0.18	0.74	1.32	1.44

¹ The Bank of International Settlements traditionally measures these indicators once every three years in April. Each transaction involves two currencies, which is why the sum of the percentage shares of individual currencies is 200%.

² The sharp drop of the share of "other currencies" in currency transactions in 2001 is due to the introduction of the euro and withdrawal from circulation of the Deutsche mark, the French franc, and other European currencies, which were included in this category in 1995 and 1998.

Source: [35].

Russia's national financial market is behind the markets of other countries not only in quantitative, but also in qualitative terms. The Financial Development Index, which is very important in the overall rating of global competitiveness by the World Economic Forum, Russia ranks 95th out of 140 countries. So far, success in creating world-standard financial centers is also very modest: in the *Z/Yen Group* index of global financial centers Moscow occupies 84th place out of 87 [6, pp. 104-105]. It has to be noted that underdeveloped financial markets are a serious obstacle to the internationalization of currencies not only in Russia. To varying degrees, this is characteristic of all the countries with developing financial markets, including China [38; 23].

Thus, the analysis of the factors that determine the role of the Russian national currency in international trade prompts the following conclusions.

(1) The ruble remains a regional currency [12, p. 2], which is one of the factors limiting its use as a value measure. Accordingly, the prospects of its cross-border expansion are associated mainly with Russia's neighbors.² But even in this case, the internationalization of the ruble faces restrictions in terms of market liquidity. For example, direct conversion of EAEU currencies would cost between 1 and 5% of the cost of the deal whereas indirect conversion via the US dollar as an intermediate conversion instrument would cost less than 1% [9, p. 50]. This diminishes the motivation to use the Russian currency unit as an accumulation instrument, as witnessed by the low ruble turnover in the international currency market (Table 3).

(2) Increased share of settlements in rubles in the EAEU space in recent years reflects the overcoming of the consequences of the 2014 financial crisis, a transition to inflation targeting and a tough monetary and fiscal policy. At the same time, the risks involved in using the ruble are still fairly high. Expansion is mainly possible through reducing the share of the currencies of neighboring states if integration links with them expand and deepen [9; 15];

(3) The weakest link today remains the use of the ruble as an instrument of accumulation. If an economic agent gets a sum in rubles and there is no need to use it at once, this money should be invested in order to preserve its value. However, the limited depth, diversity and liquidity of the national financial sector fail to meet even the "index" demand of global investors aimed at international diversification of their investments. Moreover, an increased inflow of foreign portfolio investments may form macro-prudential risks (in the spring of 2018, non-residents controlled over 1/3 of the Russian internal state debt market).

Obviously, a currency can only become global if it fully meets all the three functions of money at the international level. In the meantime, the fact that it is impossible to perform the function of accumulation instrument even within the EAEU is the main obstacle in the way of internationalization of the ruble. The yuan, as noted above, is in a similar situation.

Thus, considering Russia's place in the world economy and its underdeveloped financial market in terms of quantity and quality, the active use of the ruble in international transactions is problematical. At the same time, the international role of the ruble today on the whole corresponds to the fundamental factors and there is potential for its growth,³ above all in the neighbor countries with which Russia has the closest trade and investment relations.

Gains from Internationalization of the Ruble

Active use of the national currency in international trade and investment is a component of the "leader's rent" (for more detail see [2]). It may confer massive advantages. The USA gains an estimated 100 billion dollars plus a year or about 1% of the country's GDP from the emission of reserve currency [31]. However,

such significant gains can only be made by countries that emit leading reserve currencies. What gains can be expected from internationalization of the Russian national currency? They can be roughly divided into three groups: trade and entrepreneurial; financial-investment; and political-image.

Clearly, in terms of the current state of the Russian economy the gains would be above all for the development of trade and entrepreneurship when the elimination of currency risks and easing of restrictions on entry into external markets are of paramount importance. Indeed, because of transition to the targeting of inflation and the floating of the currency rate by the state in the absence of effective market mechanisms for hedging the corresponding risks national businesses would be vulnerable. Simultaneously, in spite of the improved position of the Russian Federation in the *Doing Business* rating the barriers for enterprises in entering foreign economic activity, judging from the value of the sectoral indicator, are still extremely high. Thus, more intensive use of the ruble in international transactions and accordingly currency risk reduction could give a new impetus to the foreign economic activity of the Russian business.

A similar result in the financial investment sphere is more difficult to achieve. The Russian banking system today is 70% nationalized and, considering sanctions, has no room for expansion. The non-banking financial sector is actually in a deep state of depression, which leads to degradation of some markets [8, pp. 30, 32]. In this situation, it is practically unrealistic to make any gains through internationalization of the ruble in the medium term. Such an opportunity may only arise after profound and systemic reforms of the financial sector as part of an overall strategy of Russia's socio-economic development (for more detail see [8, pp. 40-44]).

Another obstacle in the way of gaining financial and investment benefits from internationalization of the ruble is the disparity between the "quantity" and "quality" of participation of the state in the economy, unsatisfactory state of the investment climate and institutions. In other words, to parlay the international status of the ruble into material benefits along with profound transformations of the national financial sector there need to be macro-reforms that go well beyond its framework.

Finally, one should not forget the political and image factors that enhance the status of the national currency. However, in considering the possible practical benefits from internationalization of the ruble such factors should not be given priority.

Thus, it is evident that enhancing the international role of the ruble in itself does not guarantee significant gains. They can be made only through consistently reforming the key sectors and institutions of the Russian economy when internationalization of the ruble would not only be an indicator of progress but an instrument of increasing the corresponding positive effects.

Making the Ruble More Active in External Markets

Internationalization of the Russian national currency calls for various measures that involve fundamental factors for ensuring currency competitiveness. For the most part these are non-specific measures (see, for example, [27]), aimed at

ensuring sustained economic growth, increasing competitiveness of the economy, curbing inflation, developing financial markets, deepening integration, specializing and diversifying links and broadening investment cooperation. All these measures are aimed at modifying the fundamental factors that form the basis not only for internationalization of the ruble, but also for overall increase of efficiency of the Russian economy and the economies of Russia's closest partners (above all, the EAEU countries).

As for "specific" measures that contribute to the internationalization of the Russian national currency the priorities are as follows:

- developing the stock exchange infrastructure and "gateway" agreements in the first place between participants in the EAEU integration processes;
- setting up multilateral currency clearing systems, including currency swaps by central banks;
- increasing cross-border crediting in rubles (including by the state), granting of easy terms to the participants in such transactions (in particular, subsidies of the ruble interest rate);
- creating currency hedging mechanisms in the framework of ruble currency pairs;
- switching cross-border budgetary transfers to national currency;
- more active ruble transactions by development institutions;
- spreading the tax regime of internal government bonds to the government bonds of EAEU countries, stimulating crediting and formation of authorized capitals of economic entities in the national currencies of the EAEU.

The implementation of these measures requires outlays in the first place on the part of the state. The gains may result for weaker economic agents, who are not fit to compete in the global market and the losers, on the contrary, may be more efficient producers. This is a major deterrent for the government and the Bank of Russia in "paying for the internationalization of the ruble," which in turn slows down the growth of cross-border transactions in the Russian national currency. Indeed, it is hard to persuade the agents of other countries to use the ruble if the transactions of the Russian government itself (overseas spending, loans to foreign states and investments in authorized capitals of international organizations, including in the EAEU space) use leading reserve currencies.

A recent study of the positions of businesses, the expert community and the regulators on ways to increase the role of national currencies in the process of Eurasian integration has revealed two approaches in terms of the choice by respondents of targets for enhancing the role of national currencies, including the ruble [9]. The first approach can be defined as "normative." It proceeds from the need to "protect against sanctions," limit the influence of developed countries and pursue an independent policy. This approach puts the stake on proactive measures while their cost and the associated risks are of secondary importance. The second approach proceeds on the basis that enhancement of the role of national currencies should be underpinned by

fundamental economic factors and should be aimed at improving the environment for economic agents in the EAEU countries. As part of this approach, which the authors share, priority is assigned to measures aimed at creating objective prerequisites for economic integration, which would naturally entail increased demand for the national currencies [9].

It has to be borne in mind that the role of the ruble may be enhanced not by diminishing the share of reserve currencies, which are still of higher quality than the ruble (above all, in terms of capacity, diversity and liquidity of the financial markets denominated in these currencies) but at the expense of the share of other national currencies of the EAEU countries. Therefore, the efficiency of the policy aimed at internationalization of the ruble may be impaired also because of counteraction on the part of these countries.

In any case, measures that do not launch profound changes in the economy can yield only a minor and short-term effect. In the absence of fundamental prerequisites for a changed status of the ruble, measures to enhance it artificially (for example, by hastily introducing ruble settlements in export deliveries) would not only be futile, but would increase the risks for further internationalization.

* * *

The current international role of the ruble as a whole corresponds to the fundamental factors that characterize the overall development of the Russian economy. More active internationalization of the ruble may provide some benefits, but they should not be exaggerated. The scale and endurance of these gains would depend on the emergence of objective prerequisites for the expansion of the national currency. Measures to promote ruble settlements would only make sense if they were part of comprehensive programs to develop the national financial market and deepen foreign economic integration within and outside the EAEU.

It is important that the ruble has displaced and will be able to displace mainly those currencies, which do not match it in terms of quantitative and structural characteristics. Not fully performing the functions of money even in the zone of its commodity dominance, the ruble is consigned to compete on the global level only with currencies of comparable quality. However, it would lose out the competition not only with the Chinese yuan but also with other national currencies, which are shored up by higher-than-the-world-average growth rates and by actively developing financial markets.

In the medium term, it would be naïve to count on the ruble replacing the main functions of the leading world reserve currencies on any significant scale. Thus, the issue of its future role should be considered not in the normative format but in close correlation with the current state of the Russian economy, its real place in the global economy, the prospects of the development of foreign economic ties as well as the structure and dynamics of external demand for the Russian currency.

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Notes

- ¹ The case for using absolute GDP values instead of purchasing power parity assessments for financial comparisons is presented in [2].
- ² This is partly due to the impact of external sanctions and response counter-measures that limit integration with the far abroad countries.
- ³ Surveys show that 59% of respondents representing business (production, trade, banks, investments), regulators and the expert community in the EAEU countries believe that the share of payments in the national currencies of EAEU countries (which means mainly in rubles) will increase in the medium term, with only 17% thinking that it will go down [9, pp. 29-30].

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Justice—the Imperative of a Law-Based Civilization

Valery ZORKIN

Abstract. Humankind's ability to meet the challenges of the modern era will depend on what idea of justice (if any) it will adopt as the main worldview benchmark in the historically foreseeable future. Is justice a legal phenomenon, which sums up the universally relevant result of rational and logical interpretation of social realities, or is justice a moral phenomenon that depends on the concrete historical and socio-cultural features of a particular society? This article argues that renunciation of the universally relevant legal approach to the interpretation of justice as equality in freedom is fraught with the imposition on the whole world (notably through modern information technologies) of one-sided ideas of justice anchored in Western moral values and meeting the interests of the most influential actors in the system of global relations. The author believes that the emerging dangerous trend toward ideological unipolarity in interpreting justice can be overcome through a synthesis of the values of individualism and solidarity. The concept of European consensus underlying the decisions and legal positions of the European Court of Human Rights is examined in the context of this approach.

Keywords: justice, law, trust, human rights, moral universals, European consensus, ideological unipolarity, individualism, solidarity values.

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The modern world is at a bifurcation point from which humanity may develop in one of several ways, some representing highly negative scenarios. The existential choice of humanity's path for the foreseeable future depends to a large extent on what idea of justice is adopted as the main worldview benchmark. This makes the discussion of the problem of justice in relation to law exceedingly relevant.

V. Zorkin, D. Sc. (Law), professor, President of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. This article is based on the lecture delivered at the 8th Petersburg International Legal Forum on May 18, 2018, and was first published in Russian in the journal *Voprosy filosofii* (2019, no. 1, pp. 5-14; DOI: 10.31857/S004287440003612-8).

The notion that the ideas of justice and law inscribed in their time on the banners of the Enlightenment ideology have entered our lives forever (think of the recent popularity of “the end of history” thesis) has proved to be wrong. All of humanity must exert massive efforts to keep within the mainstream of value and normative orientations corresponding to these ideas. Hence the need for a new Enlightenment proclaimed by the authors of the Club of Rome report *Come On!* (2017), published to mark the Club’s 50th anniversary and expressing the consolidated position of its members [7]. Failing that, we may one day wake up to discover that the world we live in is no more. Instead, there is a different world rejecting everything that we live by. A world where nations, states and individual people try to survive amid the waves of universal chaos.

The problem of justice is the key problem of law. Justice is the key category of social philosophy and especially the philosophy of law. Therefore, without purporting to give even a short review of the topic, I would like in very general terms to say that the majority of scholars share the view that within any politically organized community justice is the value-normative basis of social order and, as John Rawls rightly pointed out, is the key virtue of social institutions. This view, of course, is not universally shared. For instance, the advocates of economic neo-liberalism believe that in the economic sphere efficiency which contributes to a bigger “common pie” is more important since everybody stands to gain from it—both the rich and the poor. Some communitarians believe that justice suppresses the higher values of brotherhood, solidarity, etc., which should form the basis of human community. Leaving aside these extremes, I would like to single out just one and the most relevant aspect of discussions of justice. I mean the question of whether justice is a *legal* phenomenon, which sums up the universally relevant result of rational and logical interpretation of social realities, or whether justice is a *moral* phenomenon based on the concrete historical and socio-cultural features of a particular society.

It may look as a thoroughly theoretical approach, but it has important implications for practice, which merit particular attention in the current political context. Present-day value relativism brings to the post-modern world ever more diverse particular notions of justice. The question that is gaining ever greater relevance is whether it is possible to combine these different notions of “justice” in common and universally binding international law? I think it could be possible only if all the subjects of interaction manage to keep within the boundaries of the legal principle of equality. Meanwhile the past decades have seen this principle more and more often removed from international law undermining its very foundations.

Studying the works of great Western philosophers, we have seen the West as the proponent of the rational interpretation of justice as equality going back to the ideas of ancient rationalism. Unlike the moral-religious interpretation of justice that prevailed in Russian philosophy, the Western notion of justice was largely rational and *legal* in character and claimed to have universally human relevance. When we cast aside the communist ideology in the 1980s, we proceeded from the assumption that the interpretation of justice as equality, as correspondence of the

deed and the requital, as a link between labor and remuneration, between guilt and responsibility, etc., a link that is predictable and understandable for every reasonable person and that provides a maximum degree of freedom for man. We were told that the present-day West lives according to these principles and considers them universal.

However, a whole series of political events in last quarter of the 20th century shows that Western political leaders and Western public opinion have traveled a long way from the initial ancient concept of justice as *justitia*. Ancient Romans whose ideas underlie the Western philosophy of law referred to justice by the term *justitia*, which meant simultaneously the administration of justice with its attributes of equally just approach: presumption of innocence, adversarial process and equality of the sides, impartiality in delivering judgments, the right to legal defense, impossibility of direct accusations based solely on circumstantial evidence, fake news and even banal falsifications (think of the dubious “oratorical method” used by Colin Powell, who brandished a test tube with white powder before the invasion of Iraq).

How has it come about that we have suddenly found ourselves in a world, which is drifting farther and farther away from justice and law? I will not even attempt to answer this extremely complicated question—it is rather the task for philosophers and sociologists. I would like to stay within the range of problems that pertain to practical jurisprudence and share with you some thoughts on the modern world, above all European political and legal realities.

Paradoxes of the European consensus. In today’s rapidly changing world, ideas of the specific content of those human rights, the catalogue of which is considered to be universally recognized in the international community, are also changing (and often in a very fundamental way). Therefore, the most significant and relevant spheres of practical application of the idea of justice today includes the processes of law-making, i.e., the processes of the formation and introduction into legal practice of a new interpretation of legal values that underpin human rights. In the legal space of the Council of Europe, the main burden of performing that function rests with the European Court of Human Rights, which, in addressing specific disputes about law, also performs law-making functions because it increasingly seeks to reveal the structural flaws of national legal systems that necessitate changes in legislation.

The democratic legitimacy of the European Court decisions, which is the main guarantee of their justice, is supported by two “pillars,” the election of judges by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the established practice of the court in proceeding from what is called “the European consensus.” I say “so-called” consensus because we are dealing here not with the legal concept, which has become established in international law, but rather with a very convenient political metaphor. Recalling Aristotle’s words to the effect that a metaphor is a “strange term transferred by analogy” in this case we should be speaking about an analogy with international-legal consensus which creates a semblance of a solution that is legitimate politically and well-grounded legally.

At present the doctrine of European consensus is chiefly used in decisions that have to do (and this is a matter of the utmost importance) with the most complicated issues that affect very sensitive strains of the national identities of individual states. I stress that I am referring not to the overwhelming majority of routine decisions of the Court based on the established interpretation of human rights, but to the formulation of new legal values and ideas ultimately seeking to introduce new approaches to understanding the concept of justice in the modern world. Although such novelties form but a small part of the total body of the court decisions it is exhibiting a clear trend of growth in the current era. Such problems, which call for a legal solution, often involve a revision of fundamental cultural traditions connected (if it is really connected) with moral improvement of society, technological progress or other social changes. With regard to the European consensus achieved in such situations, a legitimate question suggests itself: what exactly is meant by consensus and are we not here looking at a substitution of a concept already established in the glossary of jurisprudence?

What is called European consensus is not the kind of consensus clearly defined in international law. Simply, the expression is used to denote an agreed position of several states, typically the founding states of the Council of Europe, a position expressing a certain trend in the development of law. As I have repeatedly noted earlier, a loose interpretation of the concept of European consensus has already prompted several states, including Russia, to work out their own doctrine of constitutional identity that draws the “red lines” which they cannot cross under the pressure of the “consensus.” And today, I have to add that the accession of the remaining members of the Council of Europe to the consolidated position of this “European vanguard,” which increasingly goes beyond the framework of initial legal agreements among the Council of Europe member states, rests in many ways on trust in this position and respect for those who adhere to it. But how can we talk about trust and respect on the part of Russia if since 2014 (from the moment Russia was stripped of its right to vote at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe) it has had no opportunity to take part in the election of judges of the European Court of Human Rights and of the Council of Europe human rights commissioner?

As trust, which is the key factor of modern law creation, weakens the states seeking to preserve their constitutional identity will increasingly have second thoughts about the interpretation of law that underlies the doctrine of European consensus. I am referring to the understanding of the law as a normative system based on some moral universals interpreted as being innate and inalienable human rights. I would like to make it clear that this is not quite (or perhaps not at all) the interpretation of the law referred to by those who cite the well-known formula of the Roman lawyer Celcus from the Digest of Iustinianus: “Law is the art of kindness and justice.” For Celcus, justice is not some amorphous *moral* universal, but a very definite principle of equality. He says *Jus est ars boni et aequi* denoting the concept of justice not by the word *justitia*, but by the word *aequi*, which means equality, equity.

In terms of this interpretation of the law as the art of justice defined through equality, law is a just outcome of a contract between equal peoples. All those under the jurisdiction of this law and not just some of “the most equal” subjects of the so-called European consensus are equal parties to this contract.

Moral universals and law. Next we face another and equally important question: can morality have a universally relevant character in principle? Does the interpretation of the fundamental human rights as moral universals derived from strictly moral ideas of justice, disguise the desire to have law based on European (i.e., regional) moral values declared to be universal? We agree a bit too easily that the European moral and legal values based on the interpretation of justice as a moral or (which is the same) moral-legal category has a universal character. This position pays tribute to Western Europe, which has made the definitive contribution to the formation and development of human rights and recognizes the merits of the doctrine of natural law in a bid to limit the arbitrariness of the lawmaker by drawing some moral boundaries, which no one is allowed to cross. Besides, we remain under the impression of the values the Enlightenment epoch brought to Europe. However, the West has already departed from the Enlightenment values and from Christian (above all Protestant) values of the modern period, which could claim once to be universal. I am referring to the values of equality of people, the work ethic, honesty, moderation in consumption, family values, etc.

Modern society has long embarked on the path of escalation of inequality. According to the latest report of the World Inequality Lab at the École d'Economie de Paris, the gap between the rich and the poor, i.e., wealth inequality, is widening practically all over the world. The argument that the growth of the total wealth ultimately benefits everyone turns out to be a “tale for the poor”: the current social stratification is fraught with irreversible social degradation both of individual groups of the population within states and of entire regions in the global space.

With the intensification of globalization processes this injustice is constantly growing threatening to finally split the world community into the winner countries which gain the main benefits from globalization processes and what Jürgen Habermas calls “loser countries” [3, p. 12]. This leads to marginalization and deprivation of the broad masses in many (in the first place, developing) countries, the increase of the number of “superfluous people” who are susceptible to extremist ideas and are ready to join the ranks of terrorist organizations. Social inequalities grow not only at the expense of previously accumulated wealth, but also through an increased income inequality. Unfortunately, Russia has been one of the leaders on this count in recent years.

In addition, many economists (and those on the liberal flank) conclude that the current post-industrial stage of capitalism, increasingly referred to as “financial capitalism,” has some fundamental flaws. The ability of financial capital to make money (huge and quick money) “out of thin air,” from financial speculations, trade in “brands,” historical rent obtained due to the benefits of the world division of labor, etc.—increases injustice in the distribution of wealth both at the domestic national level and in the system of global relations. As follows from

the above-mentioned Club of Rome report, 98% of incomes derived from financial transactions have a speculative character [7]. Financial capitalism, notes the French economist Thomas Piketty, lives off the sphere of real production because owing to a number of reasons incomes from capital grow faster than the real sector of the economy. Easy money of financial players is thrown into whipping up a consumer rush through advertising and other methods of manipulating mass consciousness. All this erodes the work ethic and ethics in general as a system of ideas of good and evil. The destruction of traditional family values deserves special mention. It too, is influenced by the market, which has no use for individuals included in the system of social links, of which family links are the most stable. The market needs masses of atomized consumers who espouse individual consumerist preferences.

Under the current conditions, the claims of Western values to being universal are deprived of ethical grounds. Awareness of this circumstance does not mean that Russia should become isolated in its legal uniqueness. On the contrary, the task is to propose a relevant universal human legal worldview based on the principles of justice as equality and seeking to revive the fundamental values that distill the ethical potential of the whole humanity.

Restoring trust between individuals, nations and states is the way to assert justice and law. The dramatic collapse of trust that we observe today, above all trust between Russia and the leading Western countries, has a direct bearing on the absence of a common understanding of justice. At a recent Legal Forum at St. Petersburg we discussed the problem of trust from a different angle: in 2016, our Forum had the motto “Trust in law is the path toward overcoming global crises.” But today we have to say that restoring trust is the path toward returning to justice and law.

What happened to our relations with the West is much worse than a confidence crisis: a crisis is a state, which implies the possibility both of a catastrophic scenario and of a positive turnaround. What happened is the destruction of trust. The main current task is to restore whatever trust remains between us before it is too late. But first it is important to understand that the current situation did not come about by accident: it is merely the most vivid manifestation of the overall trend of diminishing trust in the modern world. It is an extremely dangerous trend. It only seems that trust is an ephemeral phenomenon and that real life, still more the so-called “real politics,” is based on mutual calculations, on rational weighing of possible benefits and losses, etc. In reality, because social life is extremely complex, is influenced by many factors and has many variants, it is impossible in principle to calculate and control the behavior of social actors. That is why a lot in such interaction hinges on trust, which is the basis of mutual understanding and therefore the basis of human communication at all levels beginning from family and ending with communities that belong to various civilizational and socio-cultural types. It is in this significant sphere that the modern world is obviously drifting in the negative direction. At any rate, a whole number of sociologists and philosophers express concern over this matter.

Sociologists warn that the expansion of the area of mistrust is a characteristic feature of society in the late modern era. The inherent processes of universalization and globalization of risks diminish trust in the social system and its institutions, which are unable to ward off the growing threats. This leads to the destruction of the basis for social interaction, makes the future less predictable and creates prerequisites for the transition from risk society to a society of catastrophes. Specialists have been expressing particular concern about the widening opportunities for manipulating public consciousness through the mass media because of which society with its meaningful value approach to life turns into an easily swayed crowd deprived of value orientations. Philosophers discussing the problem of trust also note that in the conditions of present-day post-modernist relativism trust for the Other, formerly based on a common interpretation of certain initial, fundamental ideals and values, is losing this foundation. As a result, the Other more and more often becomes not just strange, but ontologically alien and hostile. On the strength of the above, I think there are grounds for fears that humanity at this turn of the civilizational spiral may revert to the situation of a pre-Axial time with its lack of a common spiritual culture.

Of all the eternal spiritual values worked out by humanity, such as Justice, Truth, Good, Freedom, Beauty, etc., Justice is most closely tied with trust. For trust is essentially an expectation of reciprocity, a belief that the partner in a relationship will respond with good to good, show solidarity and act in accordance with accepted rules. Justice too is oriented towards reciprocity, commensurability and reward because, as Zygmunt Bauman noted, it is the most “socializing” of all human values. Yet justice is more prone to being interpreted in different and often contradictory ways than other values. “It may,” writes Bauman, “engender the wildest confrontations, but in the end it is justice that smooths and removes all the differences” [1]. That is why it is important for all of us—individual people, nations and humanity as a whole—not to lose the common socializing idea of justice.

The idea of universal salvation is the main antithesis to the current “ideological unipolarity.” The destruction of international law that is happening before our eyes is often accompanied by exaggerated criticism of the former bipolar Yalta-Potsdam system with its “confrontational stability,” its “ideological hostility,” its “rigid bloc discipline” ensured by force, etc. etc. However, life has shown that all the defects of the bloc-based world order pale against the background of the catastrophes the unipolar world has already brought about. We see that unipolarity is not only the least just, but also the least stable and the least secure structure. It is in obvious contradiction to the law of dialectics whereby the unity and struggle of opposites is the main driver of all development. It is highly indicative that after the disappearance of the socialist camp as a pole in the global dialectical unity of opposites, the vacated place started to be filled by the darkest forces of regress who preach an extreme totalitarian quasi-religious ideology that justifies the practice of terrorism.

Moreover, if one compares the Yalta-Potsdam model of the world with the preceding modifications of the Westphalian system, one has to admit that it

consisted not just in the struggle of geopolitical interests, but competition for the hearts and minds of people: competing with each other were different models of social order, different visions of the desired future and, accordingly, different underlying concepts of justice. This competition implied not only a focus on coercion, but also on support, solidarity, assistance to the development of countries and peoples belonging to one or the other rival camp. Besides, it gave great room for maneuver for the countries, which followed the strategy of non-alignment. By contrast, when competition in the global space was replaced by monopoly, it turned out that the global monopolist does not need a common concept of a “bright future,” or a common idea of justice. It cynically demonstrates to the whole world that the bright future is the lot of the select few and that not everyone would be taken on board. These benchmarks underlie the political practices based on the doctrine of control as well as uncontrolled chaos intended for those who do not deserve “a bright future.”

The theoretical basis of this unfair and inhumane policy is provided by quite respectable philosophical and legal theories. Take the concept of justice developed by American philosopher and legal scholar John Rawls, which, as specialists admit, has exerted a considerable influence on the US foreign policy. His 1971 monograph *A Theory of Justice* already contained the main propositions that justified inequality between those who espoused different socio-cultural values, something for which communitarians have rightly criticized the author. However, Rawls was still more explicit in formulating these theses in his 1993 article *The Law of Peoples*, in which he divided humanity into “well-ordered liberal societies,” “well-ordered hierarchical societies” and “tyrannical and dictatorial regimes” [6]. He refers the first two groups to full-fledged members of well-ordered (presumably justly ordered) established rational community of peoples, while the third to the peoples who are in a pre-law “outlaw” state. Proceeding from this, he claims that well-ordered societies, which interact based on law can declare war on “dictatorial regimes” because they allegedly constantly break the law inside and outside their states. The new US foreign policy started to grow out after the collapse of the USSR from this concept of international justice which, I have to stress, is a particular and not “universally human” concept. As part of this policy it turned out that it is enough to declare the regime in any country to be tyrannical or dictatorial, i.e., non-legal, amoral and unjust in order to have moral justification and unleash any types of modern wars against that country ranging from economic to diplomatic, from propaganda to shooting wars. Disregarding international law and without a UN sanction.

Therefore those who today try to oppose these hegemonistic aspirations, those who are trying to overcome the unipolarity of the globalizing world (and Russia is not the only such country) must first overcome their ideological one-sidedness. Ideological and not military confrontation underpins the concept of the multipolar world. It is highly indicative that Washington decided to assert the unipolar world order in practice through its unilateralism doctrine. The US President’s National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice declared that multipolarity is

a theory of rivalry, of competition and, in its worst manifestation, a competition of values. Yevgeny Primakov reminded the world of this in his book with a telling title *A World Without Russia? Where Political Myopia Leads* [5, p. 7]. Primakov was well aware that these words expressed the heart of the matter which was that the West is highly reluctant to embark on the path of competition of values.

What values are competing? I think that as in former times, we are looking at different interpretations of the great idea of justice, which takes on a new meaning in the light of the challenges of globalization fraught with serious threats to the very existence of humanity. These challenges highlight the main internal strain of the idea of justice, i.e., the conflict between its individualist and solidarity interpretations. The communist ideology sought to formulate a collectivist ideological platform of justice beyond the framework of the legal approach. Although the real socialism, which has embodied this idea, proved that such non-legal justice did not correspond to social realities, the underlying juxtaposition is still there. Its essence lies much deeper than the meaning space in which the socialist and capitalist ideologies compete. I think this underlying meaning has been captured in its time by the Russian religious-philosophical thought whose spiritual experience was expressed by the philosopher Arseny Gulyga as a “premonition of a common catastrophe and the thought of universal salvation” [2]. From the point of view of law, this Russian idea of universal salvation is transformed into the recognition of the equal right of all the peoples and states to a stable and secure development: not the right of the select few (the so-called “golden billion”) to a better life, but the equal right of all to a decent future.

I am sure that the values of solidarity inherent in the Russian legal mentality will become ever more relevant in the world as the ideology of militant individualism prevailing in law increasingly displays its bias, its commitment to protect the selfish interests of the strongest global actors. I hope that the Russian juridical science will manage to adapt these ideas of the Russian philosophy of law to the extremely complicated legal reality of today and to inscribe them in the legal world-building project. Incidentally, the last report of the Club of Rome, which consistently upholds the position of responsible globalism, has put forward the concept of “a new Enlightenment” which directs humankind toward achieving a balance between individual and collective principles. A balance which, as shown in the report, has been violated to suit the selfish interests of the powers that be.

In conclusion, I would like to stress one more point. When in the years of the Cold War the USSR was controlling the ideological pole in the planetary confrontation, it derived much of its political authority from the fact that power inside the country proceeded from the same ideology. For all the inevitable discrepancies between doctrine and practice, the reality of Soviet socialism, in the final count, did not contradict the ideology that the country declared in the international space. This commanded respect and trust on the part of the states and peoples, which did not like the Western ideology of individualism. Modern Russia, which claims to have equal relations with its international partners, has no such advantage.

We are among the leaders in the world anti-rating of social stratification. This situation is aggravated by conspicuous consumption, on the one hand, and excessive scale of poverty on the other. The existence of a large number of so-called “working poor,” a large share of who are families with children, is particularly unjust. According to the Russian Government’s Analytical Center, one sixth of all the workers in Russia are unable to provide for themselves and their families. In 2016, their incomes were below the living wage of able-bodied citizens [8]. In the coming years, this may be aggravated by the world trend of dramatic hemorrhaging of jobs because of automation, robotization and, informatization of production. The problem of corruption is still relevant and, as demonstrated by the fire at the Winter Cherry shopping mall in Kemerovo where 60 people died, has become life threatening.

All this shows that Russia does not yet have a development strategy that meets the expectations of Russian society and its ideas of justice and corresponds to the new place in the world, which Russia is claiming today.

If I were to formulate the outlines of such a strategy, I would put it this way. We have to be able to combine the inherent collectivism of the Russian people, which has been formed, one might even say forged, by the harsh climate, interminable defensive wars, the need to unite many peoples, large and small, “by a common destiny on their land” (as the preamble to our Constitution says), with the creation of a competitive economic and political environment. Fair competition in the sphere of economic and, equally important, political relations is the modern guise of the main principle of dialectics, which considers the unity and struggle of opposites to be the source of all development. Without it, the country is threatened by another period of stagnation whose dangerous consequences we have already found out at our own cost.

Obviously, such a strategy must be based on a corresponding national ideology. Of late, numerous critics of the Russian Constitution from the left and from the right of the political spectrum have been increasingly challenging the provision in Clause 2 of Article 13, whereby “no ideology can be established as state or obligatory ideology.” Countering such criticism, I would like to stress the following. This constitutional-legal ban applies to all party ideologies, but not to constitutionalism. On the contrary, asserting constitutionalism as a state, supra-party ideology and integrating national idea is particularly relevant to modern Russia in the absence of universally meaningful value and ideological benchmarks [4, pp. 6-8]. Our task is to invest the national ideology of constitutionalism with a legal meaning, which meets the expectations of the nation, its ideas of justice and the needs for *law-governed* development of Russia.

As Aristotle said, justice in the relations between people is a supreme virtue, more wonderful and shining than an evening or morning star. I sincerely believe that if not we then our descendants, proceeding from the principle of justice, will create a genuine *civilization of the rule of law* in which humanity will acquire the highest degree of freedom in its history.

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Failed Res Publica Restituta 1948: The Origins of Changes in the Basic Principle of the USSR's State System in the Soviet Political Discourse of the 1930s

Aleksey NIKANDROV

Abstract. This article analyzes the theoretical origins of the concept of the “state of the whole people” presented in the 1947 Draft of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (AUCPB) Program. The concept, a brain-child of Stalin, was included only in the Third Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) adopted in 1961. The article argues that the following conceptual innovations introduced gradually as early as the 1930s formed the basis of the new supreme principle of the Soviet state: theoretical elimination of the dictatorship of the proletariat, assertion of the classless society, redefinition of the party as the vanguard of the people (not only of the proletariat), and the introduction of the concept of the “bloc of Communists and non-party people” into political practice as the new principle of the Soviet people’s unity.

Keywords: proletarian dictatorship, republic, CPSU, 1947 Draft AUCPB Program, Third CPSU Program, working people, the people, the state of all the people, the state of the whole people, USSR Constitution of 1936, classless society, the bloc of Communists and non-party members.

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The history of doctrinal-theoretical elaboration of the principles of the Soviet state, the directions of its development, the vagaries of the theoretical-political thinking of Soviet leaders, ideologists and social scientists, the travails of the often difficult choice and of building a case for the best form that suited the

A. Nikandrov, Ph. D. (Political Science), associate professor, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Politics & Law Department. E-mail: bobbio71@mail.ru. This article was first published in Russian in the journal *Gosudarstvo i pravo* (State and Law. 2019, no. 2, pp. 120-132; DOI: 10.31857/S013207690003857-4).

Soviet state, the intense work on political terminology—all this is of considerable interest both for the theory of state and law and for the philosophy of politics and law. This is all the more so because these sciences have sometimes been timid in entering the spheres considered to be the turf of historians, especially historians of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). One of the main things that makes historical research on the creation of the Soviet doctrine of the socialist state extremely complicated is the fact that the theory of the Soviet state and law was developed by the Communist party, which was the main (and sole) theoretician in the USSR.

The Party and the Problems of the Theory of State and Law

The accepted wisdom of research practice is that because of the essentially monocratic position of the ruling party of the USSR—the *party-princeps*, or, in Russian political vocabulary, the autocratic party—profound analysis and reconstruction of its doctrinal-theoretical legacy in the field the theory of the state and law can be dismissed as unhelpful and unpromising. For the party ruled from the start from the position of *legibus solutus* (or “*guiding the dictatorship* of the proletariat,”¹ to use “party” language), and the same principle applied to theory. The party could afford to disregard (and often—probably as a rule—did disregard) reality, logic and the needs of theory which was declared to be Marxism-Leninism, i.e., a political conceptual system that did not imply a coherent conceptual reflection of Soviet reality so that looking back on Soviet reality was problematical.

The party, above all its leaders, adjusted “the solely true doctrine” to the exigencies of political practice and geopolitics acting in the interests of the state and not of Marxism-Leninism, which was used as an auxiliary tool—propagandist, ideological, partly legitimizing, etc.—but not as a tool of state theory, not as a “guide to action.” The political and theoretical lines, given this state of affairs, do not coincide and the link between theory and policy is either is absent or is in any case not the determining factor in developing political concepts and notions. Therefore research has to be focused exclusively on the practical and institutional aspects (i.e., *leaders, elites, institutions*, and not *concepts, theories and doctrines*). However, there was an inner logic and a purpose of consistent deployment of cascades of doctrinal-theoretical innovations in Soviet “theoretical development.” Reconstruction (not *deconstruction*) of this logic, i.e., the search for the causes of innovations, analysis of the grounding of these innovations (including those that never took place) is not only a fascinating task in the field of “theoretical archaeology,” but a highly relevant task for the modern theory of the state and law and the philosophy of politics and law. After all, the fundamental provisions of the *Soviet science of state* became part and parcel of our *state* so that without knowing the foundations laid down in Soviet, mainly Stalinist, times, it is difficult to judge about the present state and prospects for Russia, the heiress of the USSR. This problem takes on added relevance as the modern polemic about the “new

ideology,” the new conceptual vision of Russia’s place and role in the world, and in history acquires ever-greater urgency.

Obviously, theoretical-political representation of the state born of the October Revolution was a major challenge for Soviet politicians and ideologists. How to combine the Marxist tenets and the political realities of the new “proletarian state”? How to combine Marxism, which recognizes that after the socialist revolution in “civilized countries” (according to the founders of Marxism, Russia was not one of them) the substantially united proletariat would spread its power across the “old” borders and national distinctions—and the tasks of building socialism in the Soviet state (“a single country”) in the absence of a “world revolution”? How to escape the trap of the contradictory formula “republic of the Soviets is the political form of the dictatorship of the proletariat (republic is a form of dictatorship)” and combine Soviet etatism with Marxist internationalism? How to modify the concept of republic while remaining loyal to the fundamental principles of Marxism? How to shoehorn in a doctrinally correct “*official*” way a supra-state, supra-legal and supra-societal force—the party—into theoretical-political constructs? Neither Marx nor Engels, nor even Lenin left a “road map” for theoretical development of the principles and forms of the “new type of state” other than the constructs of “the dictatorship of the proletariat” and the “proletarian dictatorship state” which, as it turned out, are prone to become obsolete. Joseph Stalin and his associates had to grapple with the task not only of putting socialist principles into practice but of developing the theory,² and it is the “history of theory” that presents researchers with some surprising discoveries.

New Facts from the History of Soviet Political Ideas

The new facts and documents on the history of the development of the Third Program of the Bolshevik Party brought into the scientific domain in 2016–2017³ bring substantial changes to the optics of the history of Soviet ideas of state and law and to the perspective on the evolution of Soviet political institutions. As a result of the publication of the text of the 1947 Draft Program of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (AUCPB) and the associated documents, it turned out that all the key political innovations and unexpected solutions contained in the Third Program of the CPSU adopted by its 22nd Congress (1961) had actually been developed on Stalin’s directive and under the supervision of Andrey Zhdanov by a team of Soviet scholars, government and party officials who presented the draft program in the autumn of 1947. The draft was reworked (mainly in terms of vocabulary and style) by another team on the directive of Nikita Khrushchev and under the supervision of Boris Ponomarev in 1958–1961. What is more, the same persons were members of both “academic and government” teams. The three main innovations are the introduction of the state of all the people (of the whole people) as the fundamental principle of the Soviet state system; declaring the party to be the vanguard *of the whole people*; and the building of communism within a very short period (within 20–30 years).

This was how the concept of the state of all the people is formulated in the 1947 Draft: "Socialist society has achieved a unity of the state and the people that is impossible under an exploitative system. The Soviet state expresses the strength, the will and the reason of the people. With the liquidation of the exploitative classes, the victory of socialism and the establishment of complete moral and political unity of the whole people, the proletarian dictatorship has fulfilled its great historic mission. The Soviet state has become truly a state of the whole people" [20, p. 176]. The 1961 Program uses a different language to formulate this new principle: "Having secured a complete and final victory of socialism—the first phase of communism—and a transition of society to full-scale building of communism, the proletarian dictatorship has fulfilled its historic mission and ceased to be necessary in the USSR in terms of the tasks of its internal development. The state, which arose as the state of proletarian dictatorship, has at the new, modern stage turned into the state of the whole people, the body expressing the interests and will of the whole people" [17, p. 396]. The "Khrushchev" Program and Khrushchev's speech⁴ stressed that the working class has voluntarily given up "its" dictatorship: "The working class is the only class in history that does not seek to perpetuate its rule... In the conditions of victorious socialism and the country entering the period of full-scale building of communism the working class of the Soviet Union, on its own initiative, has transformed the state of its dictatorship into the state of the whole people" [17, p. 185].

Since the "proletarian dictatorship has fulfilled its mission" and the state of all the people (of the whole people) has become established, the role of the Party increases. Owing to its enhanced significance it must, first, compensate for the absence of proletarian dictatorship and, second, erect a barrier in the way of those who, logically developing the idea of the state of the whole people, would question the very principle of the party and the need for party leadership of the "absolutely sovereign people."⁵ The 1947 Draft Program defines the party as the vanguard of the people: "During the years of Soviet power the AUCPB has vastly strengthened its links with the masses of the people, has blended with the people and grown into a multimillion organization. The AUCPB is the guiding nucleus of all the working people's organizations—social as well as state. The Communist party is the vanguard of the Soviet people" [20, p. 176].

The 1961 Program, while retaining the designation of the "vanguard," enhances the role and status of the party to the level of the "party of the whole people." "As a result of the victory of socialism in the USSR, the strengthening of the unity of Soviet society the Communist party of the working class has turned into the vanguard of the Soviet people, has become the party of the whole people, has broadened its guiding influence on all aspects of public life" [17, p. 423]. In principle the declaration of the CPSU as "the party of the whole people" is logical: if the state is of the whole people then the party must be of the whole people (needless to say, the concept of party is far removed here from its Western meaning, but the CPSU has never been a party in that meaning). The 1961 Program is unduly bold in setting the timeframe for the advent of communism: "The party solemnly

declares that the present generation of Soviet people will live under communism." However, unlike the 1947 Draft, it is more insistent and detailed in linking the advent of communism with increased and broader participation of the people in state affairs, with the development of "democratism of the whole people." Such were the main innovations of the 1961 party Program compared to the 1947 Draft.

In the light of the new disclosed facts, the famous enigmatic statement of Yury Andropov made on behalf of the party at the June 1983 Plenum acquires special significance: "The party strategy in improving the development of socialism must lean on a solid Marxist-Leninist foundation. However, frankly speaking, we have not yet sufficiently studied the society in which we live and work, we have not fully discovered its inherent regularities, especially economic ones" [4, p. 294]. There is a tinge of irony in this statement meaning: how can we talk about economic regularities if there are huge gaps even in the history of the political ideas of "the society in which we live and work" (note that Andropov himself was an adherent and advocate of the principle of the state of the whole people). Besides, if the Party leans "on a solid Marxist-Leninist foundation," but does not lend itself to study this prompts doubts about the "Marxist-Leninist foundation."

It may appear that the principle of the state of the whole people sprang into being in 1947 as a conceptual twist, as Stalin's brainwave, which was instantly introduced into the logical structure of Soviet statehood by sycophantic ideologists and theoreticians. However, this was not the case. As will be shown elsewhere, this principle was prepared and pre-formed by the preceding period in the development of Soviet political thought being the result of joint work of Stalin and the Soviet political leaders and thinkers, and was not *merely* Stalin's inspiration concerning ideas "of the whole people."

"Regime of Working-Class Dictatorship" Remains in Force

The AUCPB was planning to adopt a new, Third Program at its 19th Congress to be held in 1948. As has already been said, its main innovation appeared to be unusual and unexpected: the form of the state was to undergo a drastic change, which inevitably would bring serious changes to the whole system of political institutions of the USSR, the transformation of its state system. The state of the whole people, it was implied, was a republic of a higher type compared not only with the ancient and modern Western republics, but also with the Republic of the Soviets as a form of proletarian dictatorship.⁶ The formula of the state of the whole people was readily perceived as showing respect for the Roman republic, especially if one recalls that Stalin was fond of Roman history. The Republic, which up until then was merely "a form of proletarian dictatorship," became a genuine form of state with the abolition of the latter.⁷

The impression Stalin meant to convey was apparently as follows: the leader of the Soviet people, like Emperor Augustus, was establishing—or *re-establishing*—the republic by returning it to the people, liberating it from the shackles of proletarian dictatorship and overcoming this dictatorship—thus establishing

what was essentially *res publica restituta* in its true meaning of *res populi*. Stalin presents himself as Augustus—*Orator rei publicae*, *Pater Patriae*, who performs an act of restoration: *rem publicam* and thereby *leges et iura—restituit*. From now, the Soviet people would have *its own* state, a property that matches its grandeur. The concept of the state of the whole people, although it did not overtly put the figure of the leader at the top of the vertical power structure “the people—party—state—leader,” clearly implied this structure. The concept of the state of the whole people carried “Stalinist rule of the people” (Aleksandr Zinovyev) to its logical conclusion. For Zinovyev, there is no contradiction between Stalin’s etatism and rule of the people. Indeed, one cannot exist without the other: “The thing is that in spite of all the horrors of Stalinism it was genuine rule of the people in the profoundest (though not the best) sense of the word and Stalin himself was a true popular leader. Rule of the people is not necessarily a good thing” [24, p. 17].

The “state of the whole people” formula, in addition to having allusions to Rome and Rousseau, clearly carried overtones of the concept of the “old” concept of “autocracy of the people.” The latter was introduced in the first Program of the Russian Social Democratic Worker’s Party (RSDWP). It is polysemantic and remarkably suited for many, even incompatible political forms of “autocracy of the people,” a notion that first Lenin and then Stalin became very attached to. Georgy Plekhanov first introduced it into one of the drafts of the first program, but it was conceived by Lev Tikhomirov who invested it with a meaning similar to that of the Bolsheviks (autocracy of the people as a counterweight to the “autocracy of the tsar”). The unusual concept had an unusual fate. For example, it was used by the noted Russian and later Soviet law expert, Yakov Magaziner, author of the book *Autocracy of the People* (1907) [15]. That scholar attempted to formulate a Marxist concept of sovereignty of the people (he used it as a synonym of “autocracy of the people”), i.e., to lend a Marxist form to a patently non-Marxist concept. The tsarist government ordered the book to be burned in 1913 and exiled its author because the term struck the bureaucrats as revolutionary and seditious. Such are the surprising collisions that crop up when one delves into the conceptual history of the Communist party.

Of course, the eulogies prepared for the occasion of the adoption of the new program at the proposed 1948 19th Party Congress did not have such unusual references. All the panegyrics were thoroughly Marxist: the Third Program, presented 100 years since the publication of the Communist Manifesto, was to be a new Manifesto adopted as if to mark the jubilee. These panegyrics were partially included in the 1961 Program.

The 19th Party Congress was not held in 1948, and for reasons that are not quite clear the ambitious draft sank into oblivion. The dictatorship proved to be stronger than the republic. Stalin the dictator proved to be stronger than Stalin the republican. The issue of drawing up a Third Program was raised in 1952 at the 19th Congress as if the 1947 draft had never existed. That Congress adopted a new name of the party, the CPSU. An unusual name—the Bolshevik Party became the party of the state itself, the state party—was the only thing that

remained of the logic of the conceptual and political development of the Soviet theory of state under Stalin. So long as no change of the form occurred, the USSR remained "the state of proletarian dictatorship." One could apply Stalin's words from his report *On the Draft Constitution of the Union of SSR* (1936), that the draft constitution "leaves in force the regime of the dictatorship of the working class and equally leaves unchanged the current leading position of the Communist party of the USSR" [20, p. 523], to the late 1940s, especially considering the unusual in 1936 cited name for AUCPB.⁸

If one proceeds from facts then instead of "the state of the whole people" (or the concept of "autocracy of the whole people" transformed to suit the bipolar scheme of the world) beginning from around the fall of 1948 Stalin was gradually introducing the structure based on a different set of principles. Three "centers of state power and governance" were emerging: the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Each of these power centers had something like a collective leader: the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In Stalin's construction, the critical point was that each center was presided over by a collegium. Stalin probably believed that such power structure was more suitable for the USSR as a superpower in a relatively stable bipolar system (but it is inconceivable that Stalin saw *this* system as the implementation of the idea of the state of the whole people).

Stalin's 1947 draft was adopted in a somewhat reworked shape but preserving all the new premises and principles as the party Program at the 22nd Congress, often referred to as the "anti-Stalin" congress. It is fair to assume that the party leadership headed by Khrushchev was unwilling and unable to reveal the name of the man who really stood behind the Program: authorship was attributed to the party as a whole and was hailed as a contribution to Marxist theory. Thus, Stalin's bold innovations came to be regarded as being Khrushchev's, and profoundly grounded "etatism of the whole people" turned into Khrushchev's "theoretical voluntarism." In that capacity the innovations of the 1961 Program were criticized by some Soviet leaders as well as the communist parties of China and Albania, not to speak of Western bourgeois critics. So, up until 2016 it was practically "obvious" to everyone that the "state of the whole people was introduced by Khrushchev." What was hardly a secret initially became a secret due to unusual circumstances. Khrushchev's supporters did not want to see the primary source disclosed for obvious reasons. His opponents—because the state of the whole people became closely associated with "Khrushchev's" Program—also did not want it to be disclosed because then one would have to admit that "anti-Marxist," "voluntaristic" exercises that behooved Khrushchev were really the products of Stalin's laboratory of thought. It is interesting that when Vyacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich, the two "main Stalinists," mention the idea of the state of the whole people in their memoirs, the idea that they reject, they do not mention the original source of Khrushchev's Program.⁹

The principle of the state of the whole people clearly conceived by Stalin not just to be declared, not just to be “committed to paper,” was “implemented” in the 1960s-70s only in rhetoric. The Soviet leadership obviously did not intend to implement the provision of the state of the whole people and the related thesis on gradual transfer of power from the state to public organizations and, apart from rhetoric, confined itself to creating token new institutions and renaming old ones. No full-scale logical “theory of the state of the whole people” was created and anyway it was impossible because Marxist internationalism and Rousseau’s etatist ideas could not be combined in the same theory (while the theory of the state of the whole people was as far removed from Marxism as it was close to Rousseauism). An illustration of the gap between intentions and deeds was the fate of the draft constitution of 1964 (see [9]), which along with all the other related documents, was buried in archives and became an object of study and wonderment of historians only in the 21st century. The wonderment was prompted by the fact that the text of this draft could well put into question the claim that the “official ideology” of the USSR was Marxism-Leninism and not Rousseauism.¹⁰

State Theory and Geopolitics

Considering the time when it was drafted and the spirit of the 1947 party Program project, it is hard to resist the temptation to “geopoliticize” the main innovation in theory of the state—the state of the whole people—non-Marxist construct presented as the result of creative development of Marxism. Indeed, by 1947 and even a little earlier the Soviet leadership had a clear idea of the future development of world politics: the confrontation of two blocs led by superpowers, quasi-imperial centers approximately equal in terms of the main “superpower” parameters. It was logical that in the new *superpower world order* it did not behoove the Soviet Union to be “a state of *proletarian dictatorship*”: this form was clearly obsolete and did not do justice to the influence and stature achieved by the USSR. Stalin realized that dictatorship should not be part of the definition of a state (therefore, he refers to it as “regime” in 1936). Dictatorship is a temporary state but not the name of an established state. Furthermore, because the world order which later came to be known as the Yalta-Potsdam order, had practically been put in place and was getting finishing touches, the USSR could no longer declare, still less implement the idea of expansion through proletarian revolutions (and the concept of “the state of proletarian dictatorship” carries this meaning). One has to add another important consideration to this: the “state of the whole people” carried a positive connotation for the countries in the socialist bloc (this aspect was also important for Khrushchev).

The name of the form of the state had to be understandable, acceptable, not threatening to the West and more respectable to match the might achieved by the country. The “state of the whole people” formula ideally met this requirement. Its Roman subtext stressed the grandeur of the state and the Rousseauist message which was not, on the face of it, at odds with Marxism, made it acceptable as

self-representation of the USSR among the “Western democracies,” especially in the USSR—USA pair: if the USA, the global vis-à-vis of the USSR, was a democratic republic, then the Soviet Union was even more entitled to wear the republican garb. The “state of the whole people” formula also stressed the superiority of the Soviet republic with its genuine rule of the people over Western republics with their formal democracy and abiding split of the people into hostile social classes.

“The people instead of the proletariat,” “the state of the whole people” instead of “the state of proletarian dictatorship”—this drastic change must have world significance. According to Marx, the proletariat is substantially one in the world, so that the future world order after a victorious anti-capitalist revolution is a proletarian world quasi-state (world dictatorship of the proletariat). This scary rhetoric was dropped. The Soviet state of the whole people did not intend to stage “proletarian revolutions.” Besides, there was no one to stage it: while revolutions have a certain “theoretical legality” for the proletariat, they would rather look like expeditions of conquest for the people. The sovereign Soviet people and *their* state are a construct well suited to represent the Soviet superpower in the world. The “proletariat—proletarian dictatorship—the state of proletarian dictatorship—the party” hierarchy was replaced by a new hierarchy with the state at the top. Party-centrism was replaced by state-centrism, which is quite compatible with the “triumph of rule of the people” (for the state is the property of the whole people, *res populi*). The new concept also implied self-restraint of the state: the world communist revolution together with the messianic actor—the world proletariat—was being gone down in history firmly and reliably, proletarian internationalism was becoming rhetoric *par excellence*, the communist parties became outposts of Soviet influence losing their role of “revolutionary fuses.”

The above-mentioned geopolitical considerations and consequences are evident, but they are not the causes and sources of the principle of the state of the whole people, which was thought up by Stalin and his ideological associates around the early 1930s. It is from that time that a number of party and other documents, including the text of the 1936 Constitution, sought to theoretically justify the principle of the state of the whole people and devise elements of the future structure. This is a series of important, logically interconnected concepts and provisions that carry on the line of building socialism in a single country.

From Proletariat to People: The Concept of “Working People” in the 1936 Constitution

In the proletarian dictatorship state, the main force (or “actor”) is the proletariat led by its vanguard, the Bolshevik party. According to the Marxist-Leninist theory, the proletariat is the dictator, that is, undisputed ruler in the state not constrained by the law. It acts in alliance with the peasantry, which as a class is becoming ever friendlier so that as socialist construction proceeds they merge into one political entity, “the working people.” Under the same scheme, the intelligentsia also becomes part of the “working people.” Political divisions and

barriers among sections of the “working people” recede into the past; classes are transformed so that the very concept of “class” that stresses political fragmentation of the people becomes less and less relevant. The proletariat is dissolved in “the working people” and this being so, “its” dictatorship becomes less and less needed in the state and its formal representation. This is the underlying Stalin logic of tweaking the meaning of proletarian dictatorship to the point where it becomes irrelevant in the text of the 1936 Constitution.

The concept “working people” was far from new, moreover, it was widespread and frequently used, especially by the Bolsheviks. It crops up in the constitutions of 1918 and 1924. Article 7 of the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic of 1918 stresses that “power must belong entirely and exclusively to the working masses and their plenipotentiary representation—the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies” [8]. However, the “working masses” is politically and theoretically (and still more legally) a diffuse concept and for that reason Article 10 seeks to flesh out the concept of “masses” creating still more confusion (“all power belongs to the entire working population of the country”). These formulas leave it unclear to whom “all power” belongs because “the entire working population of the country” is as vague a concept as “the working masses” who do not yet hold power but to whom *it must* belong. True, both “holders” of power are united in the Soviets, which however does little to clarify who are the “working masses” and “the working population.” The same text also uses the word the “working” without the word “masses” and it is clearly not a given concept (as “working people” in the 1936 Constitution) but simply an *ideologeme*, an ideological and propagandist construct. It has no final definition and no meaning for state theory and only has meaning in rhetoric to counter it to “bourgeois” (“non-working,” parasitic elements).

The conceptualization of “working people” as the holder and source of power takes place in the 1936 Constitution. In this text, the concept of “working people” is clear because it is a *transitional concept* temporarily replacing “the people.” One can easily trace the source of power and the only and final reference of the ruling party to the concept of “the people.” As regards the form of state and characteristics of the state system, the text of the 1936 Constitution is extremely laconic, a clear sign of Stalin’s caution because he did not want to introduce something new prematurely. As a matter of fact, in all his later works, when it comes to the principles of the state, Stalin obviously seeks to be reticent using vague constructs such as “state system,” “social system,” etc., without spelling them out.

Aleksandr Yeliseyev rightly notes: “The text of the Constitution more often than not speaks about the dictatorship (of the proletariat only) in the past tense. Under Article 2 the political foundation of the USSR was the Soviets of working people’s deputies which have ‘grown and became stronger’ as a result of the establishment of proletarian dictatorship. This suggests the conclusion that after it has grown and became strong the dictatorship is not needed all that much. And indeed, the following article goes like this: ‘All power in the USSR belongs to the working people in the cities and rural areas through the Soviets of working

people's deputies.' Under Article 1 'the USSR is a socialist state of workers and peasants.' Thus, no dictatorship, no proletariat, no working class" [22, p. 144]. Soviet scholar Aleksandr Kositsyn writes in the same vein: "It is significant that the Constitution did not have a single article establishing the political dominance of the working class, i.e., proletarian dictatorship... the only article in which the term 'proletarian dictatorship' is used referred to it as a factor pertaining to the period of the emergence of the Soviet state... Thus, the concept of dictatorship of the proletariat referred to the past" [13, p. 212]. Years later Molotov admitted: "If you read our Constitution thoroughly, Stalin was somewhat guarded about the dictatorship of the proletariat. Actually, it was quite transparent on that point. It says something like this: Soviet power was born in 1917 as the dictatorship of the proletariat and became the power of all the working people. Already 'of all the working people.' Therefore our country is run by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies. The Soviets existed and continue to exist, but they used to be the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. Now there is no division into classes. In my opinion, this is a veiled revision: not the dictatorship of the proletariat but the power of the working people" (quoted by [6, p. 354].

Stalin was well aware that if the proletariat and "its" dictatorship were to be dropped, it had to be done gradually, little by little. An abrupt "abolition" would automatically raise the issue of the *raison d'être* of the Party. Therefore, his report on the Constitution, in addition to the famous clarification on the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat remaining in force, Stalin stresses that Article 1 "leaves in force" also the class composition of the state: "Can we, Marxists, sidestep in the Constitution the question of the class composition of our society? No, we cannot" [19, p. 526]. However, on the issue of power "the class composition" no longer means anything because "all power in the USSR belongs to the working people of the city and countryside." The working class is dissolved in "working people" in transition from Article 1 to Article 2 of the Constitution. In the same report Stalin "delatinizes" the proletariat renaming it into the "working class" and the proletarian dictatorship into the dictatorship of the working class respectively.

Stalin's theoretical operations with the dictatorship of the proletariat were evident to foreign critics of the 1936 Constitution who, according to Stalin himself, spoke about a "shift to the right," and about "renunciation of the dictatorship of the proletariat." The leader responded to the criticism by explaining the introduction of "the working people" as "the broadening of the base of the proletarian dictatorship and the transformation of dictatorship into a more flexible and therefore more powerful system of state management of society" [19, p. 522]. In other words, in his characteristic style, Stalin dialectically described the actual downgrading of the proletariat to being part of the "working people" as "broadening of the base of proletarian dictatorship," and the leveling down of proletarian dictatorship as its strengthening.¹¹ This is how purely verbal fiddling adjusts the theory detaching it from reality. Stalin's *rhetoric* which "leaves in force" proletarian dictatorship, in fact, puts this *provision* into question, even though the *reality* of

the second half of the 1930s does not give reason to doubt that the dictatorship of the proletariat will not only endure, but will also grow stronger.

Thus, according to Kositsyn, “by enshrining the full power of the working people exercised through its representative bodies, the Constitution thereby ruled out the political dominance of one class” [13, p. 213]. The changes in theoretical representation rob the proletariat of its all-embracing role, status and power. It ceases to be the fundamental reference point of the party’s power; this role passes to “working people” and then to “the people.” Let us note that the “anti-proletarian” logic of the 1936 Constitution, although developed at the 18th Congress, was not carried to its conclusion (the 1947 Draft was shelved) so that the “regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat” remained in force until 1961 but when the state of the whole people was “introduced” there was an outcry among critics over the “disappearance of the proletariat.” Aleksandr Bovin cites such remarks as “the proletariat has disappeared. We keep saying: the people... We ended up, comrades, by dealing a moral blow at the revolution. We have removed the words ‘dictatorship of the proletariat.’ The working class has suffered a defeat” [5, p. 131].

The non-Marxist operation of “diminishing the status of the proletariat” whose results can easily be seen in the text of the 1936 Constitution was the result of partly Marxist and partly quasi-Marxist theoretical operations of “liquidating classes” and establishing a classless society.

Classless Society and Phases of Communism

It is a Marxist axiom that the building of a classless society is the goal of proletarian dictatorship, which, as Marx wrote in a letter to Joseph Weydemeyer (March 5, 1852), “itself constitutes no more than a transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society” [16, p. 65]. However, if one follows the economic, political and geopolitical realities of the 1930s raising the question of a classless society was premature, to put it mildly. However, constructing a state of the whole people as one of its fundamental prerequisites *demand*ed such an approach so that the postulate of classless society is forcefully and specifically put on the agenda beginning from the 17th party Conference (1932). Obviously, before introducing the concept of “working people,” almost totally emasculated of its class content as a transitional stage to the “people,” this provision had to be theoretically prepared and the postulate of the “transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society” serves this purpose ideally.

The 17th Party Conference rules that the “main political task of the Second Five-Year Plan Period is final elimination of capitalist elements and classes in general, total elimination of the causes that engender class differences and exploitation and overcoming the survivals of capitalism in the economy and in people’s consciousness, turning the entire working population of the country into conscious and active builders of a classless socialist society.” It was stressed that “the party considers that its task during this five-year plan period is real, practical building

of a classless socialist society in order to continue to work on this basis toward a communist society" [1, pp. 143, 206].

The 16th AUCPB Congress (1934) lends a dynamic to the issue of building a classless socialist society by linking this goal with the strengthening of class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Stalin's report to the Congress reads in part: "The 17th Party Conference has shown that we are moving towards creating a classless socialist society. Clearly, a classless society cannot come into being by itself. It has to be gained and built through the efforts of all the working people by strengthening the bodies of proletariat dictatorship, by unfolding class struggle, by eliminating classes, by liquidating the remnants of capitalist classes, battling both the external and internal enemies" [2, p. 28]. This thesis, which vividly manifests Stalin's mode of thought, contains an important principle of conceptual liquidation of proletarian dictatorship: in fact, it liquidates itself by developing to the highest point of tension, and this is the dialectic of class struggle. Everything here is in the spirit of "Marxist-Hegelian" dialectics: the proletariat is called upon to destroy classes and hence to destroy itself as a class; the dictatorship of the proletariat sublates itself by strengthening itself. Thus Marx's premises are brought in to eliminate the Marxist construct, the proletariat.

The essence of classless society is elimination of classes as political divisions of the people, establishing political equality, which is the basis of moral-political, ideological and social equality. So that way the state attains unity in itself and the unity of the people becomes the principle of the unity of the state unheard of and impossible in the conditions of antagonistic society.¹² However, a united people does not need anyone's dictatorship. The 18th party Congress (1939) advances political thought along the path of overcoming class differences and of uniting the people. It states that "as a result of successful fulfillment of the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937), the USSR has solved *the main historical task* of the Second Five-Year Plan: all the exploitative classes have been finally eliminated, the causes that engender the exploitation of man by man and the division of society into the exploiters and the exploited are totally eliminated... The country 'has by and large introduced the first phase of communism, socialism' (*Stalin*). The victory of socialism has been legislatively sealed in the new Constitution of the USSR." As a result, "the USSR in the Third Five-Year Plan Period entered a new phase of development, the phase of *completing the building of a classless socialist society and gradual transition from socialism to communism*" [7, pp. 879, 883].

At the 18th Congress Stalin put forward the concept of two phases of communism: "From the time of the October Revolution our socialist state has passed in its development through two main phases. The first phase is the period from the October Revolution until the elimination of exploiting classes... The second phase is the period from the liquidation of capitalist elements in the city and countryside until final victory of the socialist system of economy and the adoption of a new constitution... As you can see, we have today a completely new, socialist state, which has not been seen in history and differs significantly in its form and functions from the socialist state of the first phase" [3, p. 35]. Stalin's words imply in

principle that the adoption of the Constitution crowns the second phase ("passed in its development through two main phases") and ushers in a third phase, the building of communism, however, the second phase is diluted in the vague expression "transition from socialism to communism" spanning the period from the adoption of the Constitution and beyond.

Ilya Trainin rightly suggested that "with the gradual transition to communism the state enters the third, new phase in its development" (quoted by [21, p. 363]).¹³ However, Stalin had to prolong the second phase without allowing the third phase for reasons that were perhaps clear only to the author of the two-phase concept. Apparently, the third phase, to be announced in the future, was the state of the whole people. In addition, thanks to this confusion the dictatorship of the proletariat could conveniently be squeezed between the two phases or within one of them; if it had to be "consigned to history" for good, then it should be contained within the first phase. If it would be needed for a some period, then within a similarly elastic second phase. Similarly, one could diffuse "the building of classless society" in "transition from socialism to communism," which implicitly coincides with the second phase thanks to the elegant verbal construct "the period of completion of the building of classless socialist society."¹⁴ The dictatorship of the proletariat and classless society are diluted in transitions, completions, in short, in movement; this vagueness was a sure sign that a far more definite concept was in preparation, a concept that would dispel doubts and set clear benchmarks.

As will readily be seen from this example, Stalin believed that the theory of state needed not always be clear-cut: it was necessary to allow some leeway, the possibility for "reconceptualization." Moreover, "the two-phase teaching" highlights the fact that Stalin, who had consummate command of Marxist language and inclined toward clear formulation of questions and rigorous formulas, often exerted serious efforts to fudge an issue in order to propose, if necessary, other interpretations.

A New Relationship Between the Party and the People

As has been said, the 1947 Draft Program refers to the party as the vanguard of the people and the 1961 Program as a "party of the whole people." It would be wrong to say that the party—after the reconstruction of its status in 1961—was theoretically detached from the proletariat. However, one can note that in the 1960s the rhetoric of the "party of the whole people" was stronger than it became later. The theoreticians of the 1970s, as if reinstating the proletariat in its rightful place, combined the "two references" so that the party was portrayed simultaneously as the party of the working class and of the whole people and this "congruence rhetoric" was persistent not to say annoying. In fact, the concept "the party of the whole people" was not fully developed; though, the principle of the state of the whole people also was increasingly rhetorical.¹⁵

Clearly, in the state of the whole people there is no point in referring to the party of any particular class even if that class is the proletariat. There should be

no intermediate elements and forces between the party and the people. It is also clear that the classless society precludes political *dominance* of one class (it does not envisage *the existence* of classes, at least in the political dimension). The unity of the people is built through the party and created by the party. While the unity of the people is the principle of the unity of the state, the party is the principle of the unity of the people. The party *knows* how to lead people toward unity: it permeates the whole people holding it together like cement. Mikhail Kalinin elaborates the "building" metaphor: "Figuratively speaking the sand is the multimillion-strong peasantry; the stone is the working class and the cement is the Communist party. The blend of sand, stone and cement yields a strong and indestructible mass" [12, p. 40]. Note that this metaphor leaves out the builder, the demiurge though his presence is not open to question.

"Classless society" does not mean "unstructured society" or "an absolutely homogeneous society." The logic of Stalin's theoretical modeling of the structure and dynamics of the Soviet state had to offer the scheme "first the party as the vanguard of the working people, then as the vanguard of the people." This was indeed the case: the political rhetoric in the second half of the 1930s increasingly refers to the party as "the party of working people," and "the vanguard of the working people." The emphasis is increasingly on greater and stronger unity of the party and the people: for example, a speaker at the 18th AUCPB Congress notes that "an unheard-of unity of the whole Soviet people with its party, with its power" has been achieved [3, p. 166]. The preamble to the party Charter adopted at that Congress reflects the transition state: the party is still "the party of the proletariat," but already also the party "of the working people" and equally "the party of the people."¹⁶ However, the changes were not confined to the preamble: the Congress introduced a cardinal change in the Charter. It established uniform rules of admission to the party for all irrespective of their class affiliation: the democratic logic of the 1936 Constitution was at work here (although it might have affected the party as well). In this way the proletariat, the "dictator class," *magister populi*, was deprived of its last legitimate privilege.

In order, on the one hand, to make it clear that the party was no longer just a proletarian party and represented all the working people (the whole people), but on the other hand, to preserve its "proletarian identity" for some time yet, Stalin uses all the opportunities offered by the wealth of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. He demonstrates, as has been noted, mastery of "dialectics" (i.e., sophisticated rhetoric) in "establishing" the unity of the people. Theoretical building of the unity of the people was achieved not only by "dissolving" the proletariat into working people, but also conversely, "proletarianization" of the peasantry and the intelligentsia. There is a telling passage in the party Charter adopted at the 19th Congress. "The Communist party of the Soviet Union is a voluntary militant alliance of like-minded communists comprising people from the working class, the working peasantry and the working intelligentsia" [7, p. 1122].¹⁷ All the three "estates" of Soviet society are linked to labor, which is a unifying substantive attribute of the whole people, one of the principles of its integrity.

Rhetorical “erasure” of class differences had to be expressed in the political sphere. However, in addition to class differences a no less important difference existed between the party members and non-party citizens. It also had to be “erased.” To this end, the principle of the “bloc of communists and non-party members” was invented and tried out at the first elections of deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in December 1937. “The results of the December 12 elections, a deputy of the first Session of the Supreme Soviet of 1938 said, have shown that the population of our Union does not consist of disparate groups each pursuing its own interests, but of a single closely-knit great collective consciously following the path, under the leadership of the party of Lenin-Stalin, of building a classless society, building a new, just and happy life.” Another deputy stressed that “the Bolshevik party in the elections has formed a BLOC, a UNION with non-party workers, peasants, civil servants and the intelligentsia” [10, pp. 8, 65].

The concept of “bloc of communists and non-party members” presupposes a different structure of society than its division into two friendly classes and a “layer,” the intelligentsia, a division that becomes ever more relevant with the establishment (even if only rhetorical) of classless society. Simply put, “the bloc of communists and non-party members” is a new method of conceptualizing the integrity of the people: “the bloc of communists and non-party members essentially unites the whole Soviet people because we have no antagonistic classes with their irreconcilable contradictions” [12, p. 434].

Thus, in a masterly way, often by deft and barely noticeable touches, without an apparent confrontation with Marxist ideology and phraseology, a theoretical base was created for what amounted to a revolutionary replacement of the principle of proletarian dictatorship with a more relevant but “less Marxist” principle of the state of the whole people. The impression that was created seemed to suggest that theory was developing in this direction by itself, without party nudging, but following “its own” inherent logic (which on the whole leads to the adoption of Rousseauist political intuitions). In this way the state theory transforms Marxism in accordance with the imperatives of state development and its own theoretical imperatives.

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Notes

- ¹ "The party," writes Joseph Stalin, "is the primary force in the system of proletarian dictatorship"; also the following: "Party guidance is the main thing in the dictatorship of the proletariat if one has in mind a strong and complete dictatorship" [19, pp. 120, 128]. Thus, the party puts itself above proletarian dictatorship.
- ² A caveat is in order here: Lenin has scattered through his works some very important ideas and passages concerning republicanism, people's rule, phases of communism, etc. Stalin used many of them in creating a new concept of the Soviet state.
- ³ The text of the 1947 Draft party Program in its final shape (signed by Pyotr Fedoseyev, Mark Mitin, Lev Leontyev and Dmitry Shepilov) and commentary were published by the scholar and political activist Viktor Trushkov in 2016 in several issues of the CPRF newspaper *Pravda*. In 2017, the draft, along with other materials, was published by historians Valery Zhuravlyov and Larisa Lazareva (see [20]).
- ⁴ We see that here Khrushchev uses a 1947 term. Interchangeable use of the terms "the state of the whole people" and "the state of all people" in relation to the new Program was characteristic of the political lexicon in the early 1960s.
- ⁵ As Svetlana Zgorzhelskaya rightly notes, "the authors envisaged that the full power of the people was to go hand-in-hand with the guiding role of the CPSU, which is the legal heir of the institution of proletarian dictatorship" [23, p. 76].
- ⁶ One cannot help recalling Lenin's passage on the "hierarchy of republics": "A republic with a Constitutional Assembly is above a republic with a pre-parliament. A republic of the Soviets is above a republic with a Constitutional Assembly. A republic of complete socialism is above the republic of the Soviets. Communist society is above the socialist republic" [14, p. 427].
- ⁷ In principle, the political state described by the 1936 Constitution is "a republic without proletarian dictatorship." But first, initially the Supreme Soviet was too obviously decorative (though it cannot be said that this institution was nothing but token later); second, the role and place of the party were described in exceedingly vague terms; and, third, the geopolitical situation in the 1930s hardly permitted any serious movement toward "real democratism" (hence Stalin's provision on "leaving in force the regime of the dictatorship of the working class," of which more will be said further on).
- ⁸ Aleksandr Yeliseyev [22, p. 144] notes in this regard: "In his report to the 'constitutional' Congress Stalin touched upon the party declaring that the new Constitution 'preserves unchanged the current leading position of the Communist party of the USSR.' Let us note the strange way in which Stalin refers to the AUCPB. It is very similar to the future name, CPSU. Perhaps, he was already planning to rename the party. Here Stalin's adherence to statehood is again noticeable. The CP of the USSR is a party that seems to 'belong' to the state."
- ⁹ Thus, Molotov says: "As regards the Program I believe that the main responsibility for it rests with Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Kuusinen, Suslov and others" (quoted by [6, p. 628]).
- ¹⁰ However, the text of the 1936 Constitution might have given the same impression, albeit to a smaller degree: thus, G. Shmavonyan finds in it the sources of "radical 'Rousseauization' of the Marxist concept of proletariat dictatorship" (see [18, p. 151]).
- ¹¹ One cannot but agree with Yeliseyev: "Stalin... juggled concepts in a masterly way. At this stage dictatorship becomes a more 'flexible system of leadership,' while at the same time remaining a dictatorship. It is the 'regime' of dictatorship that 'remains in force.' One gets the impression that in this way he simultaneously

- confused and reassured the hardliners who did not want to give up ideological dogmas" [22, p. 143].
- ¹² The authors of the 1940 textbook on the theory of state and law addressing the problem of sovereignty stress that it is impossible to raise the question of the people as a single whole in pre-socialist societies: "As long as society is divided into hostile classes... there can be no question of people's sovereignty. In antagonistic society there is no people as a single whole, there are only hostile classes"; "the theory of people's sovereignty cannot be implemented in an exploitative society if only because the people does not exist as a single whole" [11, pp. 40, 41].
- ¹³ Tsolak Stepanyan "corrects" Trainin: "The second phase of the Soviet state does not end with the adoption of the Stalin Constitution. In reality, the development of the second phase of the Soviet state continues under the banner of the Stalin Constitution" [21, p. 363].
- ¹⁴ Vyacheslav Molotov succinctly sums up in a sentence the synthesis of transitions and gradual changes, movement and stillness: "The Soviet Union has entered a new period, the period of completion of the building of a classless socialist society and gradual transition from socialism to communism" [3, p. 312].
- ¹⁵ Analyzing the party documents and Soviet theoretical works one gets the impression that beginning around the 1970s (i.e., with the establishment of the power of Leonid Brezhnev) the principle of the state of the whole people becomes ever less "relevant" in ideology because the party's policy could hardly match society's expectations in this way. Apparently, the cascade of concepts of real and developed socialism was necessary to "deconceptualize" the principle of the state of the whole people.
- ¹⁶ "The party guides the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia—the whole Soviet people—in the struggle to strengthen the dictatorship of the working class, to strengthen and develop the socialist system and bring about a victory of communism. The party is the guiding nucleus of all the working people's organizations, both citizens' and state, and ensures successful construction of communist society" [3, p. 677].
- ¹⁷ The change in the name of the party at the 19th Congress necessitated a change to Article 126 of the Constitution. The update of August 8, 1953 is symptomatic. The passage in the initial edition, which reads "the more active and conscious citizens from the ranks of the working class and other strata of the working people unite in the All Union Communist party (Bolsheviks) which is the advance unit of working people in their struggle for strengthening and developing the social system" now reads as follows: "The more active and conscious citizens from the ranks of the working class, working peasants and working intelligentsia voluntarily unite in the Communist party of the Soviet Union, which is the advance unit of working people in their struggle for building communist society" (available at: <https://base.garant.ru/3946712/>).

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

On Axiological Atheism

Andrey SERYOGIN

Abstract. In this article written for the collection of philosophical essays on topics of the contributors' own choosing the author presents his personal grounds that make it impossible for him to believe in God. These grounds are primarily axiological and boil down to the following argument. Because from the point of view of theism God is absolutely good by definition, negating his goodness means negating his existence. There is no universally recognized and rationally valid concept of goodness in general or moral goodness in particular. On the contrary, the content of this concept varies substantially depending on various normative standards from which different subjects proceed. At the level of direct intuition the author shares a certain version of consequentialist normative standards whereby the moral significance of any activity depends on whether it increases or minimizes the suffering for other sentient beings. According to these standards, which the author describes as "humanistic," God cannot be seen as morally good. This is probably possible from the point of view of various theistic normative standards, but the author does not share them intuitively and does not see any decisive rational arguments in their favor that would lead him to renounce his own "humanistic" intuitions. Accordingly, the author cannot perceive God as absolutely good (in the moral sense) and therefore as God. It is this position that can be described as "axiological atheism."

Keywords: antitheism, atheism, God, humanism, theodicy.

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...ἐκότεροι ὁμοίως ἀρνοῦνται τὸν ἀγαθόν·
ὁ μὲν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν λέγων,
ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι διοριζόμενος.¹

Basil of Caesarea

1. In this essay I propose to discuss a variety of atheism that makes it impossible to believe in God for me personally, but may probably be of some theoretical interest to others. I will designate it with the term “axiological atheism.” If by atheism one understands a position which denies the existence of God axiological atheism denies above all his goodness, but insists that logically this amounts to denying his existence. By “God” here is meant above all the God of “classical theism,” i.e., the metaphysical Absolute which in one sense or another (for example, creationist, emanationist, etc.) is recognized as the ultimate source of the rest of reality and is characterized at least as being omnipotent, absolutely wise and absolutely good. Accordingly, precisely if one proceeds from these traditional theistic criteria it is enough for me to merely not recognize the goodness of such an Absolute in order to be completely unable to regard him as God. It does not matter whether I recognize his factual existence and the remaining divine attributes besides goodness. For even if I admit all this I would not agree thereby that there is a true God who, by definition, must be absolutely good. Hence my position in any case could justifiably be qualified as atheistic.

2. The advantage of this fairly obvious² strategy for building a case for atheism consists in that it is the most economical one. From this point of view, it does not particularly matter to what extent various components of the traditional theistic picture of the world (in all its possible versions) correspond to reality. For instance, I have little interest in the discussions on whether there exists a “spiritual” or “ideal” reality in addition to the physical Universe, whether there is any meaning in the theory of “intelligent design,” whether the cosmological proof of God’s existence is valid, whether one or other scenario of the “sacred history” is being played out in reality, whether the “miracles” and “supernatural” phenomena described in this or that religious tradition actually exist, whether the so-called “soul” is immortal, etc. Even if somebody proves to me beyond any doubt that this or that version of the theistic view on all these issues is factually true, this cannot have decisive significance for me if I see nothing good and right in such a factual state of affairs in axiological terms. But within a theistic worldview the axiological correctness of the actual structure of reality in all its concrete details can ultimately be justified only by referring to the already admitted absolute goodness of God, who is the foundation of this reality at the metaphysical level. Accordingly, if one negates his goodness all the axiological positiveness of this picture of the world simply evaporates or, at least, cannot be presented as being self-evident.

3. It may be said therefore, that the main issue tackled by axiological atheism is not whether God exists but why it is good if he exists. From the perspective of the theistic worldview, the question may seem to have little meaning. If God is by definition the absolute good raising this question essentially means asking what good is there in the existence of the absolute good. It is, however, fairly evident

that the question of what good there is in the existence of God is quite meaningful. At the more superficial level, it is so simply because when asking this question we are actually asking whether God is *really* the absolute good. This last question is undoubtedly quite relevant because in practice the absolute goodness of God is simply presumed in theism rather than proven. In other words, the thesis that God is absolutely good by definition is a dogmatic statement whose truth is by no means evident by any universally valid rational criteria. And to the extent that theism has to deal with the problem of theodicy and try to rationally reconcile the absolute goodness of God with the evil existing in the world one can state that it is problematic even in its own context. However, for all its relevance this question is not radical to the ultimate degree because it assumes that we know in advance and for sure what good and evil are and that these terms have the same and indisputable meaning for all the sides discussing this problem. But this is simply not true because in reality there are no universally accepted, let alone rationally agreed upon, concepts of good and evil and even the arguments on whether it is possible to solve the problem of theodicy in a satisfactory way are ultimately based on the fact that the different sides in the argument approach it proceeding from fundamentally different conceptual ideas of the essence of these concepts. From that point of view, the idea of God as the absolute good is debatable not so much because it is unclear how God corresponds to some prefabricated and universally recognized idea of good as because the essence of good itself is debatable. Axiological atheism thus insists on the primacy of the problem of good with regard to the problem of God: in order to meaningfully claim that God is absolutely good, one should first understand what good is. Without answering that question, the traditional theistic thesis that God is absolutely good becomes a hollow declaration, i.e., contains nothing more than a vague statement to the effect that this is the case.

4. For starters, I will make two clarifying remarks on the problem of good and its possible correlation with the question of the goodness of God. First, it has to be mentioned that the question “What is good?” may be raised in the most general and, if you like, formal sense. In this case, we are not asking what objects are covered by the notion of good but rather what is the essence of this concept or what it means in the first place to call an object good.³ For instance, George Moore in his time proposed an influential version of an answer to the question “What is good?” by declaring that it is a “simple notion” or “quality” which is perceived intuitively and therefore, does not lend itself to a definition in principle (Principia Ethica, I, 6-10; see [8, pp. 58-62]).

Since to justify this approach, one must appeal to the universally valid intuitions all I have to do to reject it is to state that I am not aware of having such intuitions and therefore they are at least not universally valid. In any case, such an approach would not be very helpful in solving the question of God’s goodness. In order to intuit God’s goodness, God himself should become the object of direct intuition, something we can hardly count on (at least in this life and as a rule). I consider more promising an alternative answer to this question, which has

become popular in post-Moore analytical tradition whereby good can be defined or at least described as a fitting object for a positive attitude (or “pro-attitude”) on the part of the subject.⁴ That description is totally formal as it says nothing as to (a) what exactly such an object can be and (b) on what grounds, i.e., essentially what is the normative standard proceeding from which we could judge whether or not something is a fitting object for a pro-attitude. I propose to designate such a description as a *formal* concept of good and to regard it as relatively problem-free (meaning that each time somebody refers to something as “good,” there is no problem in assuming that she recognizes it to be a fitting object for a pro-attitude on the part of at least one subject). I propose to refer to a particular set of fitting objects for a pro-attitude as *material* concept of good and to a normative standard on the basis of which these objects are pronounced as fitting as *normative* concept of good. The above mentioned problem of good arises, in my opinion, precisely because among all rational beings there is no actual, let alone rationally based, consensus on the material and normative concepts of good, i.e., on exactly what is a fitting object for a pro-attitude and why. Thus, if different subjects proceed from different normative concepts of good they may formulate different and sometimes fundamentally opposite material concepts of good. In other words, when somebody recognizes *x* (for example, God) as a fitting object for a positive attitude,⁵ proceeding from normative standard A, another subject proceeding from normative standard B may not only disagree with this but see in *x* a fitting object for a negative attitude, i.e., in fact not only fail to see it as good but even to see it as evil.⁶

5. My second clarification is that when we ask the question “What is good?” in the most general way, we apparently do not differentiate various types of good, which, as we know from tradition, can be distinguished from one another (for example, moral, physical or metaphysical good, etc.). In this regard, I would like to make it clear that I am here concerned solely with God’s moral goodness. Historically, I think it is fairly obvious that when classical theism speaks of God’s absolute goodness it often means also so-called metaphysical goodness. I for one find the concept of metaphysical goodness to be artificial because I see no need to attribute any value status to purely ontological characteristics such as “the quantity of essence” (to borrow a term from Leibnitz). However, so as not to delve into this theme here, I am prepared (for the sake of argument) to agree that God is the absolute metaphysical good. The issue is of no particular significance for me because I continue to deny the other thesis typically implied by classical theism when it refers to God as absolutely good, namely, that God is absolutely or at least simply good in the moral sense. In order to make more concrete the formal concept of good and evil proposed above in relation to *moral* good and evil, one has, first, to point out that the fitting object for a positive or negative attitude in this case can be mainly external and internal activity of rational agents and also perhaps various factors that influence it (character, principles, laws, etc.). Secondly, one may try to specify this attitude by saying that when somebody *morally* approves or disapproves of a certain activity he invariably considers it to be

proper and very important that other rational agents share this approval or disapproval and manifest it by means of a “moral sanction,” i.e., various emotional and behavioral reactions that (unlike the legal sanction) do not assume institutional forms.⁷ Accordingly, in this case, various subjects initially proceeding from different (historically given) normative concepts or standards of moral good and evil (for example, God’s will, objective perfection of nature, the social contract, logical universalizability of the maxim of action, maximum happiness of a maximum number of people, etc.) may end up with different and sometimes opposite material concepts of moral good and evil, i.e., the notions of various concrete sets of different types of activity that merit approval or disapproval (in the sense implied by the formal concept of moral good and evil). Owing to this it is possible that God’s activity interpreted as morally good from the viewpoint of a theistic standard of moral good and evil would not only not seem morally good but would inevitably appear morally bad if I consider it in the light of a certain alternative standard of moral good and evil.⁸

6. I will now proceed to describe such an alternative standard that I personally consider to be evident at the intuitive level. Reflecting on my direct moral intuitions, I come to the conclusion that at the end of the day I can consider a given activity morally bad only because it contributes to the sufferings of sentient beings (i.e., on the basis of its being *anti-human*) and I can consider it morally good only because it eliminates the sufferings of sentient beings and perhaps also gives them pleasure (i.e., on the basis of its *humaneness*). In this case, I define suffering and pleasure in the broadest possible sense that spans diverse forms of corresponding physical, psychological and, if you like, spiritual states as well as what in contemporary analytical tradition is sometimes referred to as attitudinal pleasure and pain (see, for example, [3, pp. 58-63]). It will readily be seen that my intuitions correspond to a certain type of normative ethical theories, which can on the whole be described as universalist or altruistic consequentialism based on the hedonistic theory of non-moral values. From the historical point of view, one can apparently state that the theories of this type formulated in the 18th-19th centuries by the Scottish and French enlighteners, utilitarianists and positivists have had an immense impact on the formation of modern moral consciousness. I will refer to all such theories as *humanistic* meaning that (given specific nuances and accents) they consider humaneness and anti-humaneness as the ultimate normative standard of moral good and evil. All other normative theories are thus *non-humanistic*.

7. My thesis is that from the viewpoint of humanistic normative standards God cannot be recognized to be morally good. As for absolute goodness, it seems obvious to me. In the humanistic sense only absolutely humane activity that gives sentient beings nothing but pleasure and certainly does not cause any suffering can be absolutely good in the moral sense (cf. Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Ethics*, I, 15, 101; see [14, pp. 260-261]). But from the standpoint of classical theism, the consequence of God’s activity is the whole objective reality, which contains a huge amount of suffering (including suffering in hell typically envisaged by the theist worldview). To assert the latter thesis it does not matter whether God

himself (wholly or partially) inflicts this suffering or whether he simply allows it to exist. Various versions of theism may put different accents in this issue,⁹ but it is enough for us merely to agree that the omnipotent God in one way or another fully controls objective reality and sanctions its existence in the shape in which it exists. (Elsewhere when saying that God “sanctions” all suffering in the world, I mean that he produces and/or permits it).¹⁰

To be sure, if a certain activity is not absolutely humane it may theoretically turn out to be the most humane under a given set of circumstances. Would it be fair to suppose that in sanctioning all the suffering in the world God chooses the most humane mode of action out of all possible modes so that his activity is after all morally optimal from the point of view of humanistic normative standards? In my opinion, this assumption is at all thinkable only if one proceeds from the most straightforward form of utilitarianism whereby anti-humane activity can in principle be morally justified if it indirectly maximizes positive pleasure for all the subjects. In this case, we would have to assume that the omnipotent and absolutely wise agent is for some reason capable of producing a maximum of pleasure possible in this world only by sanctioning all the world’s suffering (including punishment in hell). This is a very strange assumption that probably cannot be absolutely ruled out at the purely logical level,¹¹ but this is not very important because somebody who adheres to humanistic normative standards is by no means obliged to share the above mentioned form of utilitarianism which is an object of nearly universal and usually quite justified criticism. I personally am inclined toward a certain form of negative altruistic consequentialism whereby moral obligations consist in not causing suffering to other subjects and the moral ideal consists in eliminating others’ suffering that exists in reality irrespective of my will. From that point of view, maximizing positive pleasure is not a moral task at all.¹² But even though we may recognize some moral significance in multiplying positive pleasure, we can reject the above form of utilitarianism if we agree that it is morally more important not to inflict suffering by definition than to bring pleasure, and it is therefore only morally permissible to simply multiply positive pleasure if it does not inflict suffering on anybody. Even these variants of humanistic normative standards of course do not rule out that some anti-humane activity can be morally justified if it indirectly minimizes the suffering in the totality of agents. Sometimes a moral agent has no choice but to cause suffering in order to avoid still greater suffering. There is no need to discuss here the problems connected with this thesis,¹³ because it cannot be used to morally justify God’s activity in any case. Indeed, otherwise we would have to make a still more weird admission that the omnipotent and absolutely wise agent is in an impasse, where only by sanctioning all the actually existing suffering (including punishment in hell) he could avoid still greater suffering which for whatever reason would exist otherwise. However, the omnipotent God cannot be in an impasse of this kind because he has at least one other obvious alternative, i.e., not to create the world.

8. These purely logical considerations, in my opinion, show why some theists who have actually tried to interpret God’s goodness in the humanistic way

(see, for example, Francis Hutcheson, *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty And Virtue*, II, 7, 5, and [5, p. 181]), cannot be right. However, from a historical point of view, it seems quite obvious to me that, as a rule, supporters of theism simply did not share humanist moral norms and appealed to various non-humanist normative standards to determine the moral significance of any activity (for example, the divine law, the sovereign will of God, moral ideas contained in the divine mind, etc.). The inevitable antagonism between these standards and humanistic ones can be illustrated by analyzing one of the fundamental tenets of theistic worldview practically in all its varieties, i.e., *retributive-pedagogical interpretation of suffering* as such.

As is well known, while explaining the fact that absolutely good God sanctions all the suffering in the world, theists argue that it is, on the one hand, just retribution for moral evil already committed by suffering agents and, on the other hand, a means of morally reforming and improving them (at least in some cases). However, what is usually overlooked is that this explanation becomes meaningless as soon as we admit the validity of humanistic moral norms. Indeed, from the viewpoint of the latter, moral evil by definition can only consist in an activity that causes suffering to some agents. Clearly, in this case suffering is a precondition of the possibility of moral evil as such, because for an agent to be able at all to commit moral evil, subjects in general must be capable of experiencing suffering. If they were inherently incapable of that, the existence of moral evil would have been unthinkable, so that, from the humanistic point of view, by creating a world in which suffering is impossible God therefore would automatically rid the world of moral evil. However, this logic is obviously incompatible with the retributive-pedagogical approach, which, on the contrary, presents moral evil as a precondition for suffering as such. In this case, suffering arises in the world only as a result of God's just reaction to the moral evil that has already been committed, so that if the latter had not been committed, there would be no suffering. But precisely for this reason, moral evil should be interpreted in a non-humanistic way: its essence cannot consist in causing suffering as long as suffering is at all possible only as a retributive-pedagogical reaction to it. Indeed, it is clearly impossible to attribute the possibility of world suffering to individual moral sins of empirically given subjects because all these subjects are from the very start susceptible to suffering. Quite logically, theistic discourse attributes the possibility of suffering to some archetypal moral evil committed by this or that mythological subject (for example, progenitors in the Garden of Eden or the soul in the pre-existence world). Even if one admits that such myths have something to do with reality and agrees that the mythological subject has indeed committed archetypal moral evil freely and empirical subjects have for some reason to bear the responsibility for his actions, by humanistic standards this explanation would be of no avail, simply because the activity of such a mythological subject cannot be anti-humane at all and hence does not carry any moral evil.¹⁴ For example, whatever the "sin" of Adam and Eve consisted in, it clearly did not consist in causing or intending to cause suffering to anyone (which would have been objectively

impossible in paradise). Accordingly, if we look at the Christian “sacred history” based on this myth from the humanistic angle, we would arrive at the following picture: in response to some moral evil understood in a non-humanistic way which is absolutely imaginary by humanistic standards because it does not contain anything anti-humane, God sanctions all the suffering in the world including punishment in hell, i.e., performs an anti-humane act which from the humanistic point of view is, of course, true moral evil of an absolutely limitless scale. *Mutatis mutandis*, similar results can be obtained in analyzing other concrete versions of the theistic worldview (for example, other Abrahamic religions, various versions of Platonism, the esoteric traditions, etc.). This means that from the humanistic perspective God not only cannot be considered a morally good agent but should rather be seen as basically evil.

9. Thus if I share humanistic moral standards at all I cannot in principle see God as a morally good agent and therefore inevitably am an axiological atheist. Accordingly, if I am to even allow for the possibility of his goodness I should have given up humanistic morality and adopt a version of non-humanistic moral norms of a theistic nature.¹⁵ The question therefore boils down to which of these norms (if at all) are true and how we could establish this. On that issue, in my opinion, one can only state that there is no rationally satisfactory method of establishing this. The closest possible justification for any normative standards of morality could be sought either through universally valid moral intuitions or through rational discourse and argumentation. As for intuitions, as I have said, I personally adhere to humanistic moral standards because their validity is intuitively evident to me. However, I am aware that this type of intuitions, although quite widespread (especially in our era), is not universally valid. Thus it seems not to be shared neither by the likes of Genghis Khan or Hitler, nor by the likes of Plato or Augustine.¹⁶ As for rational discourse and argumentation, all the attempts to justify morals at that level (for example, of contractalist or “dialectical” type,¹⁷ etc.) are not only debatable in themselves but are essentially particularistic in character. By this I mean that they presuppose rational procedures that are fit to justify only some types of morals¹⁸ and there does not exist any convincing rational procedure that would make possible a universally valid choice among all the historically given versions of moral standards. For instance, I have no way of *rationally proving* to a theist that some kind of activity can be a moral evil only because it is anti-humane. Similarly, the theist has no way of *rationally proving* to me that some activity can be a moral evil only on the grounds that it contradicts the will of God.¹⁹ We end up, if you like, in a relativist impasse concerning which I would like to make two remarks. First, in a situation of a relativist impasse I find it rational to stick to my intuitions. If I am presented with the choice between normative standards A and B, there being no decisive rational arguments either in favor of A or in favor of B, but I have intuitions in favor of A and no intuitions in favor of B it would be rational for me to opt for A. In other words, I have no motives to prefer theistic normative standards, which in my case “speak neither to my mind nor to my heart,” to humanistic standards, which in my case

at least “speak to my heart.” Second, I believe that stating the fact of a relativist impasse is sufficient for me not to be able to avoid axiological atheism. Indeed, to avoid it I would at least have to see some concrete and coherent meaning in the term “absolute (moral) good” which theistic discourse applies to God. As I have shown, the only concrete and coherent meaning I can intuitively associate with the term “(moral) good,” i.e., humanistic meaning, is clearly unfit in this case. As for alternative theistic standards of moral good, on the one hand, I have no immediate intuitions that reveal their content and, on the other hand, because of the relativist impasse no universally valid rational proof can be adduced in their favor. But then I simply do not understand what theism has in mind in describing God as absolutely good.²⁰ Without understanding it, I obviously cannot see him as absolutely or just simply good, and this is tantamount to accepting axiological atheism. Thus, to recognize the theistic thesis on the goodness of God as a hollow declaration, I do not need to actually solve the problem of good (for example, positively prove the validity of humanistic moral standards), it is enough for me to state that it remains objectively unsolved.

10. Theists may tell me that in addition to direct intuitions given in experience and rational argumentation, there is a third possible way to establish the truth, and that is faith. I would not argue here whether this is actually the case. Let me just remark that in practical terms, if faith has not been initially imposed on a person by the social milieu, that person may in principle seek it only because in her opinion it somehow meets her fundamental existential need for “the meaning of life.” If the assumed content of faith merely makes reality look still more absurd than it appears then it is not very clear why one should seek faith. But obviously, this is my case. It follows from the above that to simply believe in the truth of theistic normative standards would mean, among other things, to believe that what I cannot actually see as evil at all is the true radical evil (for example, the “original sin,” which is not anti-humane at all) and that, on the contrary, what is evident to me by intuition as monstrous evil is a manifestation of absolute good (the sanctioning of all world suffering). I do not see how such an attempt to believe that fair is foul and foul is fair could lend added meaning to my life.

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Notes

- ¹ “[B]oth alike deny the Good One, the one saying absolutely that he does not exist, while the other concludes that he is not good” (Bas. Caes. Quod deus non est auctor malorum, PG 31, 332; cited from [1, p. 66]).
- ² It can of course be seen as a specific version of what is currently called “antitheism.”
- ³ Let me note in passing that it does not matter in this case whether we believe that God has goodness as a *predicate* or, as classical theism often assumes, God is good *per se*. The question in any case is what does the term “good” mean?
- ⁴ This is the “fitting attitude account.” Strictly speaking, the name of this approach points to the fittingness not so much of the object as of the positive attitude to it, but I proceed from the assumption that recognizing a positive attitude as being fitting for *x* or recognizing *x* as a fitting object for a positive attitude is one and the same thing. I simply find the latter formula more convenient. Besides, I personally am inclined to accept an alternative version of this approach usually referred to as “buck-passing account,” but this is immaterial for my argument. More on these approaches see [11; 10].
- ⁵ With reference to God one has to add: for all rational agents.
- ⁶ I take it for granted that the concept of evil in this case is formulated by analogy with the concept of good with the obvious difference that instead of the “positive” attitude we have to put in “negative.”
- ⁷ In other words, I think it is very convenient in passing from the formal concept of good *in general* to the formal concept of *precisely* moral good to specify the fitting attitude account, which I used in the first case, in terms of the “attitudinal conception of morality.” By the latter I mean both the corresponding theory of David Copp and the formal definition of morality proposed by Timothy Sprigge (from whom I borrow the term “moral sanction”) which, to my mind, anticipates this theory. See [2, pp. 82-95; 15, pp. 119-145].
- ⁸ For the idea that in discussing the problem of theodicy one has to take into account various normative standards of moral good and evil see [13, p. 76].

- ⁹ I will just point out the fact that recognizing God to be the Creator or “cause” of physical evil as such is a common and quite normal position in traditional Christianity. For example, according to Thomas Aquinas, “ad ordinem autem universi pertinet etiam ordo iustitiae, qui requirit ut peccatoribus poena inferatur. Et secundum hoc, Deus est auctor mali quod est poena, non autem mali quod est culpa” (Summa Theologiae I^a q. 49 a. 2 co; cf. “The order of justice belongs to the order of the universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above,” translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province). Cf. similar statements by Tertullian (Adversus Marcionem II, 14, 2) and Anselm of Canterbury (De concordia I, 7; II, 258, 22-27 Schmitt). In connection with the retributive function attributed to physical evil, see Section 8 in this article.
- ¹⁰ This statement of mine implies among other things that I do not accept “the doctrine of double effect,” i.e., I do not believe that the agent bears no moral responsibility for those consequences of his actions which he merely *foresees* but does not *intend* to produce. I cannot afford here to delve into a detailed discussion of this debatable doctrine. Let me just note that even if it has some sense with regard to finite agents who sometimes find themselves in an impasse, I do not think it is relevant in the case of the almighty and omniscient agent when he arbitrarily creates the world, which he might have chosen not to create.
- ¹¹ The argument in favor of this (which I for one consider to be problematic) should have for starters clarified whether or not such maximization of pleasure implies minimization of suffering. If not, this leads to what I consider to be evidently absurd conclusions. For example, it means that if *the only* means to achieve maximum pleasure is to *allow* suffering that exceeds it *many times or even infinitely* then the choice in favor of such a mode of action is still morally correct. If yes, the most consistent method of minimizing suffering is to *prevent it altogether* and accordingly to seek the maximum pleasure compatible with total absence of suffering. (One may question the metaphysical feasibility of pleasure without at least the possibility of suffering, yet theists should allow for that possibility inasmuch as they allow for the possibility of paradisiacal existence). This is all the more logical because there is no quantitative maximum of possible pleasure as one can always imagine still greater quantity of pleasure. On the contrary, the quantitative minimum of suffering, i.e., its total absence, is something quite definite and thus theoretically attainable (for an all-powerful entity).
- ¹² On the whole, in that respect I share the position of Bernard Gert [4, pp. 91, 123-129] except that I proceed from the purely hedonistic theory of non-moral values. For example, “the trolley problem,” etc.
- ¹³ There is no reason to object that this activity can still be seen as anti-humane and therefore morally reprehensible from the humanistic point of view *precisely* because it indirectly leads to the existence of suffering as such. Suffering is seen here as *punishment* for the same activity and believing that some activity can be amoral on the grounds that it indirectly leads to punishment is absurd because it *already* should be amoral *in itself* to be punishable in principle. Cf. Immanuel Kant’s *Critique of Practical Reason*, bk. 1, ch. 1, § 8, note 2; see [6, p. 151].
- ¹⁵ At least, as applied to God if one admits that his own “morality” may justifiably differ from that of humans (see a recent version of this argument in [9]). But in that case too I would have to agree that God is “good” from the point of view of some normative standards, which I absolutely do not share myself, i.e., essentially do not see anything really “good” in them.
- ¹⁶ One might also question whether the factual universal validity of certain intuitions is irrefutable proof of their truth, but in the absence of such universally

valid intuitions concerning the most general normative standards of morality, one could dispense with discussing this problem.

¹⁷ For example, in the spirit of John Rawls or Alan Gewirth. For representative review of such attempts see [7].

¹⁸ For instance, the whole point of the latest monumental project of Derek Parfit (see [12]) boiled down to an attempt to reconcile just three types of normative theories (contractualism, Kantianism, and consequentialism).

¹⁹ Using as an example this particular version of theistic moral standards.

²⁰ To be more exact, I can understand this statement only in the sense corresponding to the *formal* concept of moral good (see here, section 5). In other words, when the theist calls God absolutely good in the moral sense, I understand this only as an indication that he thereby qualifies God as an absolutely fitting object of specifically moral approval for all rational agents, but I absolutely do not understand on what *substantive* grounds he is doing so and *why* he is right in doing so.

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“Live” Autocracy, Africa and Asia: The Interconnection Between Russia’s Domestic and Foreign Policy in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries

Aleksandr POLUNOV

Abstract. This article focuses on insufficiently studied aspects of interaction between domestic and foreign policy in the Russian empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and the impact of popular ideas in society on the foreign policy activities of the state. The article shows that in the 1880s, the ruling upper echelon and conservative circles believed that so-called “live autocracy,” a system based on the autocrat’s personal authority, the activities of his trusted advisers, and the tsar’s direct contacts with the “ordinary folks,” should prevail in Russia. These ideas became popular at the same time as the public developed a growing interest in remote and unknown countries, specifically Ethiopia, where, as many conservatives held, a patriarchal monarchy predominated, with its people sharing many features inherent in Russian commoners (religiosity, loyalty to the monarch, etc.). In the 1890s, they began to look for new “younger brothers” in Asian countries that presumably gravitated towards Russia (India, China, Tibet, Mongolia, etc.). In their perceptions, the ruling classes were increasingly divorced from reality. Exposed to “live autocracy” influences, the administrative system was simultaneously eroded by voluntarism and arbitrariness, which eventually made Russia become involved in a disastrous war with Japan.

Keywords: “live autocracy,” foreign policy, Slavs, Ethiopia, Konstantin Pobedonostsev, Mikhail Katkov, Alexander III, Nicholas II, Esper Ukhtomsky, Pyotr Badmayev, Buryats, India, China.

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A. Polunov, Dr. Sc. (History), professor, School of Public Administration, Lomonosov Moscow State University. E-mail: apolunov@mail.ru. This article was first published in Russian in *Russia and War: International Scientific Collection in Honor of Bruce Menning’s 75th Anniversary* (Russian Collection. Vol. XXVI. Moscow: Modest Kolerov, 2018, pp. 245–262).

In late 1888 and early 1889, Russian and Western (particularly French) press publications were immersed in an earnest discussion of an unusual international incident that involved one Nikolay Ashinov, the self-styled "ataman of free Cossacks," who made an attempt to build a village, New Moscow, on the Red Sea coast and establish ties with the "co-religious Abyssinia" (Ethiopia). The "ataman" wanted to raise an Abyssinian Cossack army and then invite Russia to launch large-scale economic development projects in northeastern Africa and help the "Black co-religionists" in their fight against Muslims and Western colonizers.¹ For all their fantastic nature, these plans did not remain just a funny incident or a fleeting episode in Russian history. Many people took Ashinov's initiative seriously. He was given encouragement by popular journalists Mikhail Katkov and Ivan Aksakov, as well as a number of influential statesmen, including Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod Konstantin Pobedonostsev, Commander of the Imperial HQ Otto Richter, Minister of the Navy Adm. Ivan Shestakov, and the tsar's brother and Chairman of the Orthodox Palestinian Society Grand Duke Sergey Aleksandrovich. Emperor Alexander III himself took an interest in Ashinov's undertaking as well.

Although the Ashinov expedition smacked of a tragic farce and came to a sad end (the "free Cossack" was shelled by a French naval squadron and expelled to Russia), the course for Russian penetration to Ethiopia was continued in the 1890s, with several semi-official expeditions heading for the "land of black Christians." In 1897, an official mission led by Active State Councillor Pyotr Vlasov arrived to Ethiopia and a permanent mission was established in 1902. Thus, the "Ashinov episode" reflected some important trends in Russia's political evolution in the latter half of the 19th century, embodying many specific traits of public consciousness, spiritual life, and, in part, the official ideology in the post-reform epoch. The trends that emerged in the latter half of the 1880s persisted in the last years of the 19th and into the first years of the 20th century, influencing the Russian monarchy's fate in the epoch of wars and revolutionary upheavals.

The starting point in the processes to be analyzed below were the events in the middle and latter half of the 1870s—the Slav uprisings in the Balkans and the beginning of yet another Eastern crisis, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Congress of Berlin—which changed Russia's international standing beyond recognition. The European states' skeptical or even openly hostile response to the Slav uprisings and Russian attempts to support the rebels was accepted by a considerable part of Russian society, primarily by the conservatives, as a sign of the West's hereditary hostility towards the Russians. "The local Judaizing magazines are breathing fire of indignation towards the unfortunate Christians," Pobedonostsev, the future Ober-Procurator and mentor of the Heir Apparent, wrote to his confidante Yekaterina Tyutcheva in Austro-Hungary about the uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Politics and diplomacy are seeking to put the bursting fire out as soon as possible" [24]. The Western powers' reaction to the events in the Balkans could only strengthen the feeling that Russia was lonely and isolated internationally, which had been building up in the conservative

quarters since the Crimean War. "How long ago," Pobedonostsev admonished the Heir Apparent, "should we have realized that our entire strength is in ourselves, that we can rely on none of the so-called friends and allies, and that every one of them is ready to attack us the minute he sees our weakness or mistake?" (October 18, 1876; see [26, p. 56]).

The Congress of Berlin was a very heavy blow for the Russian public and primarily the conservative and nationalist quarters. As is common knowledge, the Western powers actually formed a united front against Russia and forced it to revise the results of its onerous war with Turkey. According to many contemporaries, the Congress was a point of bifurcation, where Russia finally parted ways with the West and came into its own as a distinct civilization in its own right. Russia's diplomatic isolation opened its eyes to the fact that its socio-cultural love affair with Western Europe was over as well. "There is no limit or measure to West's falsity and arrogance with regard to Russia and Eastern Europe in general," said Ivan Aksakov in his famous speech about the Congress of Berlin in July 1878. Sergey Yuryev, a popular columnist, said in a letter to Aksakov dedicated to his speech: "Your speech is a turning point in the evolution of Russian consciousness. It stated and proved, clearly and incontrovertibly, to the Russian consciousness that the villainous Berlin Treaty is the last word, termination and end of the St. Petersburg period of Russian history; that after this Congress, the Russian people cannot advance hand in hand with St. Petersburg" (Letter of July 19, 1878 [1, p. 385]). Claims that Russians and like-minded Slavs were "rogues" and "pariahs" (for the West) and that the European nations, blinded as they are by the imagined luster of their civilization, do not look upon them as their equals, these statements, basically characteristic of the Russian conservatives, began sounding particularly often and clear after Berlin.²

Along with rethinking Russia's role in world affairs, the conservative circles stepped up attempts to find the "hidden truth" among the "simple folk" in an environment that was poles apart with the corrupt Europeanized society. The motif of an open standoff between the "upper" and "lower" classes is present, for example, in Pobedonostsev's letters to the Heir Apparent during the Russo-Turkish War. The onus of military operations, the future Ober-Procurator preached to his pupil (Letter of September 17, 1877 [26, p. 72]) was, in effect, borne by "one earthly force, one strong chest of the masses, the chest of the Russian soldier, on which alone we are accustomed to rely." The destructive principle, in effect, permeated all the activities of the educated upper classes, including speeches and remarks by Ivan Aksakov, Pobedonostsev's ally, in which, however, the Russian arch-conservative discerned signs of improper egocentrism, isolation from the people, and a proud ambition for being a prophet and a leader. "There is just one thing retains its true aspect," he said in a letter to Tyutcheva. "I am referring to the small, hidden people... A gateway to the kingdom is open to an infant, and what is concealed from the wise and the reasonable, is open to the infant"³ [25].

All attempts to formalize and institutionalize the monarch's relationship with the people, which inspired so much hope and which were almost crowned with

the introduction of a representative system at the end of the reign of Alexander II, were accepted by the conservatives as an offshoot of "the great lie of our time." All these attempts, the conservatives thought, hit the very same people whose interests they were supposed to defend. These sentiments grew particularly powerful in 1881, when the Liberator Tsar was murdered by a terrorist. Whatever form is conceived for a representative system, Katkov declared in a *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* editorial in April 1881, it "will always prove an artificial and spurious creation and will always hide the people and their needs rather than open them to view" [20, p. 214]. The conservative speculations described representative bodies as a product of abstract, armchair social engineering, which proved pernicious for the state order. The electoral system, they claimed, was breaking power into numerous disconnected pieces, each of which was powerless by itself. Under these circumstances, real influence befell those, who managed to lay their hands on as many such fragments as possible, that is, slick demagogues, parliamentary wheelers-dealers, and shady operators, who subjected the people to an even worse diktat and exploitation than any authoritarian ruler and plunged their country in chaos.

The conservatives viewed the intelligentsia, particularly the so-called *raznochintsy* (people of all ranks other than nobility) and primarily members of the liberal professions, as the main bearers of the destructive trends described above. It was they who dreamt of playing the role of tribunes in a future parliament, a role that was highly destructive for public stability and were infected to the greatest extent with theories contracted from the West. "The foundations of our life are unshakeable and sound," Katkov wrote in 1878, "but there is an infirmity that is being introduced in our organism by artificial means. Where living forces operate in our popular life, wonders are wrought and Grace of God is felt. But we fall the moment our intelligentsia speaks up and comes into action" [19, pp. 154-155]. In the 1870s, 1880s and thereafter, the monarchists attacked the bureaucracy no less vehemently than the intelligentsia. At first sight, this could appear odd, because the bureaucracy was the pivot of the autocratic administrative system, as for that matter of any other authoritarian form of power. But there was certain logic to the conservative claims.

They criticized bureaucrats as a force that was lifeless, cut off from the vital sources of popular conservatism, and therefore capable—to no lesser a degree than the intelligentsia—of exposing the traditional, centuries-old system of society to pernicious reforms based on abstract ideas alien to behests of national history. Properly speaking, many contemporaries regarded the Great Reforms, which had been mostly promoted by the liberal bureaucracy, as precisely such—a negative—kind of transformation. Besides, the bureaucratic machine, as it operated within the framework of formal institutions and on the basis of definite norms and regulations, was able to hamstring individual talented administrators and, most importantly, *de facto* restrict or even distort the will of the tsar himself. Writings by most different conservatives from Rostislav Fadeyev, Vladimir Meshchersky and Pobedonostsev to the Slavophiles (Ivan Aksakov) and related writers were replete with attacks on bureaucrats. But this naturally prompted the

question as to how to organize the administrative process, if the power system in the country was to remain autocratic and keep constraints on any form of permanent representation, while the bureaucracy was unreliable? What were the principles upon which this process should be based?

The answer came in the form of speculations and recommendations suggesting that the monarch should introduce an administrative system that could be defined as “live” autocracy.⁴ The “live” autocracy option promoted by Pobedonostsev had the greatest practical impact on the course of government affairs. This famous conservative believed that the governance system in Russia should pivot on the tsar’s personal, unrestricted will designed to penetrate all echelons and levels of the state machine and serve as its main motive force. “The entire mystery of the Russian order and its prosperity is at the top, in the person of the supreme authority,” the future Ober-Procurator admonished the Heir Apparent. “Your work will motivate everyone to work, and your indulgence and luxury will flood the whole land with indulgence and luxury” (Letter of October 12, 1876 [26, p. 57]). The monarch and his trusted adviser (in whose role Pobedonostsev, naturally, saw himself) had to work without a lull, “devote themselves to work that ignites a man with inspiration,” directly address all kinds of administrative problems and contact people in person, both subjects from different estates and government members.

Apart from his personal involvement in governance, the monarch had to be spiritually united with his people, relying on the church and maintaining the traditional religious organization of society. He should also display concern for the nation’s moral health and have it educated in the right spirit conforming to the historical traditions. Much of what constituted the gist of foreign policy under Alexander III was derived from the concepts developed by the conservatives ahead of his accession to the throne and at the start of his reign. The influence of “live autocracy” ideas could be traced in the tsar’s attempts to strengthen his personal power, make it independent from the bureaucracy and the official institutions, and, to a degree, pursue a policy with reliance on the conservative initiative “from below.” The moves to enhance the role that the church played in society, identify the original principles of Russia’s spiritual life, ones undistorted by Western ideas, and put them at the base of the official ideology harkened back to the conservatives’ concepts (see [27, pp. 195-197, 223-239]). It is well known that the ideological innovations in the epoch of Alexander III—the subject matter of ecclesiastical and public celebrations, court ceremonies and large-scale church construction programs—focused on the era before Peter I (see [36], Part II, *Alexander III and the Inception of the National Myth*). The influence of ideas underpinning the state ideology was reflected in foreign policy and to an extent determined the formulation of objectives in this area. This intellectual atmosphere was what first inspired and later induced the upper echelon to support the plan for Ashinov’s expedition and other initiatives aimed at establishing contacts between Russia and Ethiopia.

It must be mentioned that supporters of the emerging Abyssinian vector in Russian foreign policy did much to understand and explain how Russia would

benefit—economically and geostrategically—from gaining a foothold in that far-away African country. Actually, their effort was wasted. It was clear from the start that Russia's push towards Ethiopia was dictated not so much by pragmatism as by spiritual and ideological factors.⁵ Isolated (in effect) internationally, Russia felt a keen need to find new "younger brothers" who by their national character would resemble Russians, particularly their best stratum, the plain folk. As for the Abyssinians, centuries of isolation from the rest of the world presumably helped them preserve the qualities that made them similar to the Russian ordinary folk and distinct from the "spoiled" Europeans—patriarchal simplicity of character (combined with clearly expressed dignity), piety, humility before supreme religious principles, and devotion to ecclesiastical regulations.⁶

Appealing to Abyssinia's past and present enabled the Russian contemporaries to interpret the situation that took shape after the Congress of Berlin in a new way and to some extent find a reply to the haughty Europeans who often denied that Russia belonged to the civilized world. According to Russian contemporaries, Ethiopia, like other African countries, were derided by Europe for their seeming savagery. Meanwhile, the cloak of poverty and lack of ostentation were certainly hiding spiritual riches that would make Europe envious. "Who knows, maybe, in the Abyssinian theological education, so little known to us, the shadows of this [ancient] scholarship, the shadows of Origen and Clement, the shadows of Athanasius and Cyril lurk?" queried Reverend Ioann Vukolov, a popular Church writer and priest. He added that Abyssinia accepted Christianity from the Patriarchate of Alexandria that in the epoch of the Ecumenical Councils had the reputation as one of the principal centers of theological thought [37, p. 113].⁷ Antony Bulatovich claimed that the Europeans treated Abyssinia disparagingly as a backward country and yet it had professed the Christian religion at a time when the majority of European tribes were still in a savage state [5, p. 176].

A widespread motif in Russian writings was an inner spiritual affinity of Russians and Ethiopians, a motif based largely on the belief that the two countries had the same religion. In effect, this was an erroneous view, proved as such by expert evidence, but it gained popularity in Russia, including among the official quarters, and was extremely tenacious [28]. The spiritual affinity motif was suggested by the similarity of the historical fates of Russia and Ethiopia, that is, the fact that they were both "rogues" in the modern world and that their common folk were similar in their spiritual qualities.⁸ Under these circumstances, it did not seem surprising that Russians and Ethiopians spontaneously developed a spiritual affinity despite ethnic, linguistic and even racial distinctions. According to hieromonch (later archimandrite) Efrem, who visited the country in 1894, Ethiopian warriors and nobles sought the Russian clergyman's blessing as the Russian unit made its progress through Abyssinia and the local ecclesiastics extended him a brotherly welcome. A similar picture could be observed a year later, when an Abyssinian embassy came to Russia and the African envoys prayed devoutly in Russian temples, feeling exaltation similar to what St. Vladimir's ambassadors had experienced in St. Sophia. The "black co-religionists," said Efrem, were particularly

struck by the holy places of Moscow, including the Iberian Chapel, the Kremlin, and the Assumption Cathedral (here the traditional Russian myth about the First-Throned Capital as the keeper of old righteousness joined the new myth about the far-away “younger brothers”) (see [8, pp. 38–44, 50, 73, 80, 123–153; 22, pp. 3–16]). Characteristically, gifts given to the Ethiopians—icons of revered Russian saints, vestments and church plate in the Old Russian style—were full of symbolic meaning and evoked an epoch before Peter I.⁹

Generally, Russian writers depicted Ethiopia as an exact copy of Russia during its apanage and Moscow periods, an embodiment of the civilization that the authorities under Alexander III were attempting to recreate in Russia, although it was clear to many contemporaries that these attempts missed the target. Over there, as once in medieval Russia, the tsars and the nobility, instilled with prayerful sentiment, were concerned with the religious and moral wellbeing of the people and monasteries were influential centers of public and cultural life. The clergy enjoyed prestige among the laity, while the mass of people, who were fervently devoted to the church, strictly followed all the due rituals. During Easter, according to the prominent church writer and priest Efrem Dolganyov, “joy seems to be spreading through the land. It fills the soul of the people, for whom there are no interests other than religious.” During Lent, however, “the entire country takes off the light-colored clothes and changes its joyful aspect to that of sadness. In the days of Lent, Abyssinia is one huge monastery with ten million monks” [7, pp. 251, 242].¹⁰ Thus, the moral assets of the far-away “black co-religionists” were not in doubt. What was their attitude to the autocratic principle, the basis of the ideology that was asserting itself in Russia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries? To what extent did the African Christians’ political convictions fit in with the picture of both countries’ spiritual unity painted by the Russian writers?

Supporters of closer relations with Ethiopia said that there was nothing to worry about, because reverence for autocracy in general and the Russian monarchy in particular was immense among the “black Christians.” “The ‘Cesar Moscov’ enjoyed huge popularity,” Vukolov claimed, “among all Eastern peoples as the most powerful and common lord of the world” [37, p. 103].¹¹ “In the mountains of semi-savage Abyssinia,” Russian Consul General in Cairo Mikhail Khitrovo said in a memorandum, “like throughout the Orient, there exists a vague popular legend about the powerful white tsar, who will come, sooner or later, from the far-away North to defend and liberate the entire Eastern Christendom” (M. A. Khitrovo’s memorandum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1885), see [30], p. 77).¹² Russian travelers [9, pp. 23–24; 5, p. 125] related legends, presumably of Ethiopian origin, that the Russian tsar owned half the world and one his word was able to cut short the strife among Eastern peoples and stop the European aggression; according to an ancient prophesy, the “tsar of the North” would one day liberate Jerusalem from the Muslims and meet with the Negus of Ethiopia in Egypt, whereupon they would share the power over the Universe.

The African Christians’ penchant for autocracy, as embodied in the political system of Russia, was explained not only by the influence of ancient legends or the

military might of the Northern power, but also by the sacred nature of the Russian tsar that combined both spiritual and temporal principles, or all that which had been lost by the constitutional monarchs in the West and the rulers of the young nations in South Europe, who were thoughtlessly following in their wake. "The faithless state and a 'free' church would never cross over from the realm of illusions to reality," prominent conservative journalist Mikhail Solovyov said. "It is only a Christian state that can assure a serene life for the Christian church. The Eastern Christians can visualize this church, one strongly protected by a mighty power, in Russia, rather than in a weak Romania, Serbia, or Greece" [32, pp. 207-208].¹³ Guided by this reasoning, Russian diplomats, who served in Ethiopia in the late 1890s and early 1900s, took much trouble to strengthen the Abyssinian statehood and authority of the Negus, the country ruler. They encouraged a better demarcation of the state borders, organized mineral exploration, and protected the country independence against Western states. To a certain extent, these measures helped to preserve Ethiopia's independence. As is common knowledge, Ethiopia was the only African state that did not fall under the sway of Western colonizers. As for returns from cooperation for Russia itself, any practical benefits are hard to identify. Quite likely, as indicated above, this cooperation made sense because it was in tune with the spiritual and ideological requirements of Russian society and the official "upper strata" in the 1880s-1990s, reflected Russia's political evolution at that time, and as such could not produce any remarkable tangible results.

The domestic and foreign policy trends that emerged in the reign of Alexander III had a great impact on the reign of his successor, particularly on the course that the young monarch tried to follow during the first decade of his rule. Nicholas II's attempts to impose his will, go over the head of ministers to bypass their pernicious mediation, and learn the "truth" about the state of affairs in the country from people who had nothing to do with the government, such as Anatoly Klopov, Pyotr Badmayev, Esper Ukhtomsky, Aleksandr Bezobrazov, and others were largely an embodiment of the behests that dated back to the 1880s and the early 1890s and implemented the principles of "live" autocracy, albeit in a more radical form (see [38; 3; 17]). The previous epoch likewise exerted an influence on an even more insistent striving to make a return to the pre-Petrine past the basis of the official ideology. This was expressed, among other things, in the continued construction of churches and official buildings in the "Russian" style, attempts to revive the Muscovite court ranks and make courtiers wear 17th-century costumes, etc. (see [36], Part III, *Nicholas II and the Search for a National Persona*).

Ideas of the sacred and simultaneously popular nature of tsardom were supposed to be embodied, on the one hand, in a canonization campaign that set the rule of Nicholas II dramatically apart from other post-Petrine reigns, and, on the other, in the tsar's attempts to establish direct contact with those in possession of people's piety—*startsi* and vagabonds—and reach down to the sources of the religious feeling that was accepted as true, spontaneous and alien to formalism [11; 35]. As for international relations, Ethiopia was gradually merging into the background, being replaced by countries and peoples of Central Asia and the Far

East, as contacts with these seemed to open wider spiritual, political and strategic prospects. Interestingly, the need for Russia to advance toward Asia was supported with roughly the same reasoning as the plans to establish contacts with Ethiopia. Specifically, it was claimed that the Asians instinctively held the Russian tsar in great esteem. Pyotr Badmayev, a Buryat by origin, a Tibetan physician and an enthusiast of the push to the East, said in a letter to Alexander III in 1893 that Asian peoples had for long “sought Russia’s patronage, protection, friendship and nationality. They were and are enthusiastic of the Russian Royal House and infinitely devoted to it. The whole of the East holds affection for Russia, with both non-Russian subjects [of the empire] and foreigners referring to the Russian tsar as the Mighty White Tsar” [4, pp. 58-59].

The Asian peoples—Buryats, Mongols, Tibetans, Chinese, Indians—as portrayed in their writings by enthusiasts of advancing toward the East, had as it were taken the baton from the Ethiopians and came to play the role of Russia’s “younger brothers.” Although, unlike the Ethiopians (who were Christians, if of the Monophysite persuasion), these peoples were no Christian at all, this, by and large, was not of much importance. It turned out that the Eastern peoples—adherents of Buddhism, Confucianism or even Hinduism—were akin to Russians in their spirituality and their attitude to issues of universal importance, something that was quite enough. According to journalist and Oriental scholar Esper Ukhtomsky, a loyalist of Nicholas II, “Our past and the past of the most typical Eastern country (India) are similar and kindred down to the last detail, equally vague and sad in the material respect, and contain, in an absolutely equal measure, a pledge of new future and the fight for their original rights. Over there, beyond the Altai and Pamir mountains, there lies the same boundless, unexplored and unfathomed by any thinker pre-Petrine Rus with its untapped vastness of legend and inexhaustible love for the miraculous, with its humble submission to natural and other calamities sent as a punishment for sins, and an imprint of austere grandeur lying on its entire spiritual persona” [34, p.1].

As in the case of Ethiopia, the enthusiasts of advance toward the East claimed that Russia should assume the mission of defending the Asian peoples from the Western colonizers, due to the similarity of its own historical fate to theirs and due to Russia’s traditional unselfishness in foreign policy, defense of the weak and ability to communicate with Eastern peoples as equals. On the whole, the motives for advancing to Asia were almost the same as those in the Abyssinian mission, which was a sign that both the Russian public and the upper crust had formed definite and stable mental stereotypes in response to spiritual demands and needs that had been crystallizing since the mid-1870s. The views of Asia campaigners (later dubbed Easterners) enjoyed much popularity in society.¹⁴ For their part, they (primarily Ukhtomsky) seemed to have a sincere faith in their own ideas. In the early years of Nicholas’ reign, they had much influence on the tsar, while policies they suggested, in the first place a policy towards China, were initially crowned with success [31, pp. 70-101, 190-243]. But in the long run, the course

toward Asia (like a new phase in the evolution of “live” autocracy, the source of that course) entailed dire consequences for the Russian monarchy.

In the more strained international and home policy environment of the late 1880s and early 1890s, the attempts to rule the country in the spirit of “live” autocracy, a course to which the “Easterners” made the most direct contribution, largely threw the state machine out of balance and undermined its foundations. Enlisting Badmayev and Ukhtomsky to implement foreign policy in the East led (in the case of Badmayev) to large-scale embezzlement of public funds, involved unskilled and dilettantish actions and on the whole brought no results [16, pp. 84-94; 31, pp. 83-86]. As for successors of Ukhtomsky and Badmayev in the area of “informal diplomacy” (primarily the so-called “Bezobrazov clique”), their actions (which were encouraged by the tsar) led to disastrous consequences. According to some contemporaries, Russia’s policy in the Far East broke up into the “official” and “royal” versions, with the main government agencies ceasing to coordinate their actions. The authorities proved powerless and unable to respond to challenges posed by rivals—the European powers and Japan—in the Far East [16, pp. 413-508].

The ideological constructs that were used to give substance to calls for an advance to the East were mostly fantastic and worthless as a basis for policy-making even to the modest degree, to which this kind of basis was created by a similar ideology of Russia’s rapprochement with Ethiopia.

In conclusion, it should be noted that “live” autocracy ideologies and related foreign policy constructs played an ambiguous role in Russian history. At a certain stage, they met the requirements of the upper crust and part of the public. But later, for lack of containment, both these ideas and their proponents inexorably lost touch with reality. Increased international rivalry and growing complexity of the political situation at home left no room for glamorous but unrealistic concepts that used to draw the attention of Alexander III, Nicholas II and their advisers. Failure to understand this led to dire consequences at the turn of the 20th century.

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Notes

¹ A detailed history of Ashinov's expedition is contained in unpublished memoirs of Capt. Nikolay Nesterov, an associate of the "free Cossack," which are part of

- the archive of the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts in St. Petersburg (Category III, List 3, File 36). The expedition is described in the book *The Abyssinian Mission of Archimandrite Payisiy and N. I. Ashinov*, written under the name of one L. Nikolayev [21], but, in all evidence, also compiled by Nesterov. A book by Andrey Lunochkin [18] reviews the history of the expedition to the coast of the Red Sea.
- ² Europe is “dazzled by the gilded attire of these knights of state nobility, Hungarians and Poles,” Pobedonostsev said in a letter (1876) to his trusted correspondent Olga Novikova dedicated to Russian conservatives’ actions in defense of the East Slav population in Galicia and Transcarpathia in Austro-Hungary and the Western Territory in the Russian empire. In the meantime, “the fight against the Polish and Hungarian elements is in fact a fight for freedom and against the most terrible violence, a fight for the rights of pariahs and against the caste of Brahmins” (a letter of December 3, 1876 [23]). In 1888, in reply to European public statements castigating religious persecution in Russia, Pobedonostsev claimed that Europe “proclaims freedom for all faiths and every tribe just in principle, but when it comes to the application of this principle, Orthodox believers, helots of the Western civilization, are dropped from it” [2, p. 128].
- ³ Let me note that the metaphor of childhood and the related ideas of pristine chastity and innocence, as well as a high praise for these were generally very characteristic of Pobedonostsev. “They say that with regard to knowledge and education the Russian people is an infant,” he told visitors to Mauritius Wolf’s bookstore that played the role of a political discussion society of sorts in St. Petersburg. “Let it be: What could be more charming and envious than an innocent and unspoiled infant!” [15, p. 318]. According to contemporaries, Pobedonostsev felt completely at ease only in company of children. He often chose educational establishments (usually secondary) as venues for his programmatic remarks. One of his favorite initiatives was the St. Vladimir Women’s Pedagogical School for peasant girls in St. Petersburg, where he spent much time and in whose church he, according to his will, was buried.
- ⁴ The expression “live people’s autocracy” is used in the book by Rostislav Fadeyev *Letters on the Modern State of Russia* [10], which, as Natalya Gritsenko very aptly remarked, even though it was not put at the base of the official ideological doctrine under Alexander III, it rather accurately “reflected the vector of the ideological search pursued by the top authority” [12, pp. 48, 52]. Vladimir Meshchersky and Ivan Aksakov also wrote about “people’s autocracy.”
- ⁵ A writer in *Nablyudatel* (The *Observer*) mentioned this as early as in 1886 (see [29, pp. 32-34]). For an expose on Russian-Ethiopian relations as a whole in the 19th and early 20th century, see [13].
- ⁶ The Abyssinians were portrayed in this way by many travelers who visited Ethiopia as well as authors of numerous editions for the people dedicated to that African country [8, pp. 44, 100; 5, pp. 95, 222; 39, pp. 13-14]. Of course, these writings mentioned negative traits of the Abyssinian national character as well, but said that these traits, linked as they were to the difficult circumstances of Ethiopia’s history, were being smoothed out and would soon disappear. The Ethiopians were often compared to children, a sentiment popular with the conservatives. “We should treat Abyssinia both tolerantly as we would a child and with profound respect as a Christian power performing a great mission in Africa,” Capt. Antony Bulatovich, an expert on Ethiopia, wrote in an official memorandum [5, p. 423].
- ⁷ Ioann (monastic name Iona) Vukolov, a priest later promoted to archimandrite, was a prominent church figure. He graduated from the Kiev Ecclesiastical Academy; served as prior of the Russian Embassy Church in Constantinople (1899-1913) and the Memorial Church commemorating Russian soldiers in San Stefano (1913-1914).

- ⁸ In the 1880s, Ethiopia, one of the few African countries that retained independence, came under attack from Italy backed by England, Russia's traditional enemy. Claims that Russia was morally in duty bound to help the "weak" and "suffering younger brother" were an oft-repeated motif substantiating the need for an active Abyssinia policy.
- ⁹ The tradition to give the "black co-religionists" gifts in the Old Russian style was rather stable. The 1894 expedition brought to Ethiopia a church bell cast with the money donated by Russian merchants. It was supposed to please the Abyssinians with its characteristic "Moscow chimes." An official embassy that arrived in Ethiopia in 1897, presented Empress Taytu, wife of Negus Menelik II, a dress styled after those "worn by Old Russian Tsarinas" [14].
- ¹⁰ Efrem Dolganyov (1874-1918), a priest and prominent church and public figure, brother of Bishop Germogen of Saratov. Defended a thesis on Abyssinian history (1897) at the Moscow Ecclesiastical Academy. He was due to join an expedition to Abyssinia in 1894 (the expedition did not materialize for a number of reasons). He was under a spiritual influence of Ioann of Kronstadt, served at the Peter and Paul Cathedral in St. Petersburg. Executed by a firing squad during the Red Terror.
- ¹¹ Among other things, Vukolov's treatise was based on conversations with the Abyssinian clergyman Gebre-Kristos, who moved to Russia and was converted to Orthodoxy with the name of Christodoulos.
- ¹² Mikhail Khitrovo (1837-1896), a prominent diplomat, poet and sympathizer of the Slavophiles. A supporter (and possibly an inspiration behind) Ashinov's expedition.
- ¹³ Mikhail Solovyov (1841-1901), a lawyer, amateur artist, connoisseur of Byzantine art. An active member of the Palestine Society. He headed the higher censorship establishment between 1896 and 1900. He was promoted to that post by Pobedonostsev as a supporter of stronger church influence in the life of society, but soon he chose to disobey his patron. Solovyov attempted to implement his own version of "live autocracy" by turning the censorate into an independent government body, which was supposed to control the state machine with the help of the press. This led to a clash with Pobedonostsev. See [6, pp. 151, 259].
- ¹⁴ Valery Suvorov, an expert on the life and work of Esper Ukhtomsky, notes that large print-runs of the prince's writings dedicated to Asian countries and Russia's policy towards them were sold in the 1890s. A particularly popular work was his famous description of a voyage to the East (1890-1891) undertaken by Heir Apparent Nicholas. Ukhtomsky accompanied the future emperor, and his programmatic work substantiating the need for Russia to advance to Asia was written in close contact with Nicholas II [33, pp. 24, 40-42].
- ¹⁵ All sources referenced were published in Russian.

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The Road Through a Snowstorm: “A Journey of Discovery” and Search for Sociality in Leo Tolstoy’s Prose

Ilya BENDERSKY

Abstract. This article analyzes Leo Tolstoy’s later story *Master and Man* seeking to recreate the biographical, esthetic and religious-philosophical prerequisites of the creation of this masterpiece. A certain weariness of numerous isolated studies of Tolstoy’s life, philosophy, political views, the language and style of his prose prompt an attempt at a more synthetic approach to an artistic text. Already his contemporaries in the 19th century had learned to separate Tolstoy the thinker and Tolstoy the artist. The modern reader too feels comfortable with this separation. However, in recent decades Tolstoy studies have been aimed at bringing out the constituting principles characterizing Tolstoy’s thought as a whole. This article attempts to see an art work as a form of recording and conveying the author’s experience. The experience is linked with concrete facts of the writer’s biography and the preceding literary tradition. However, this study focuses on the circumstances of the transmission of the author’s experience to the hero and finally to the reader. A scrutiny of these circumstances suggests a new reading of the Russian classic’s creative biography from the 1850s (when he wrote his early “journeys of discovery”) until 1895 (when *Master and Man* was published) as a story of dramatic relationships within the author-hero-reader triangle, where no experience is solely “literary” or solely “internal” as everything experienced and committed to paper becomes an object of their shared experience.

Keywords: Leo Tolstoy, realism, death, thanatology, sociality, experience, metaphor, journey of discovery, Russian literature.

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I. Bendersky, Cand. Sc. (Philosophy), lecturer, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Faculty of Humanities, School of Philology. E-mail: bender.beni@yandex.ru. This article was first published in Russian in *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie* journal (New Literary Observer. 2019, no. 155(1), pp. 62-80).

Love and snow forever.

Aleksey Khvostenko

Social Dimension of "Revelations of Death"

In his book *Leo Tolstoy: Resident and Stranger. A Study in Fiction and Theology* (1986; Russian translation: 2003), American Slavic scholar Richard Gustafson presented what is perhaps the most convincing interpretation of the link between the poetics of Tolstoy's prose and its religious-philosophical content. Among other things, in the framework of the concept of "emblematic realism," he singled out a recurring Tolstoy theme of a "journey of discovery" whereby "the experience is tried out in a fictional image and worked out in a theological idea" [10, p. 196]. Tolstoy interprets the road to death and the struggle with its end that renders everything meaningless as the path toward saving the soul and thus the whole world of human culture. Gustafson finds the purest embodiment of the "emblematic journey of discovery" in the story *Master and Man* (1895): "That this... work resembles an allegory or seems to be an extended parable or appears to represent a world in which characters, nature, man-made objects, and the plot event are all emblematic, embodying and revealing spiritual values and events in this world simply tells us that this work is a most clear realization of Tolstoy's quest to find a way to tell the story of God's love that is coming to be in this world" [10, p. xiii].

In the light of "simply tells us" it makes sense to look at the conditions that offered Tolstoy an opportunity to convey "the story of God's love that is coming to be in this world" through the narrative of "a journey of discovery." One can go along with Gustafson: in *Master and Man*, the story of two wayfarers who lost their way at night during a snowstorm, Tolstoy managed to encompass within one artistic statement almost the entire landscape of his life and creative path. However, how does this narrative structure, which combines personal experience, an artistic image and religious revelation, frame the space of the author's encounter with the reader? How did Tolstoy structure the interaction between the created artistic world and the reality that he experienced and portrayed?

Fyodor Stepun, reflecting on Tolstoy's religiosity, recalled Kirillov's words in *Demons*: "God is the pain of the fear of death" [26, p. 666]. Years later this was repeated almost verbatim by Harold Bloom in his book *The Western Canon*, in the introduction to his analysis of *Hadji Murad*: "The prophet-novelist's finished thought identified God with the desire not to die. Immensely courageous as he was, Tolstoy was moved not so much by a commonplace fear of dying or death as by his own extraordinary vitality and vitalism, which could not accommodate any sense of ceasing to exist" [7, p. 333].

Tolstoy expressed this awareness of *memento mori* in a "sublated form" as his spiritual credo in his *Answer to the Synod* (1901): "I need to live alone myself, and to die alone myself..." ([27], vol. 34, p. 252). Throughout his artistic career, he

tried again and again to record, re-live, fathom and communicate to others the experience of an encounter with death.

Tolstoy's thanatology almost simultaneously attracted the attention of Lev Shestov, Dmitry Merezhkovsky, Nikolay Berdyayev and then Maksim Gorky (Harold Bloom proceeded from his perception of Tolstoy) and many others. The wholeness of experience that marked Tolstoy's portrayals of death came in for category and theme breakout by his younger contemporaries in the light of their own intellectual principles and interests. What initially gave an impulse to the creative and worldview self-identification of a whole generation of literary scholars, philosophers and religious thinkers entered the overall cultural background in the form of established symbolic configurations ("the struggle between flesh and spirit," "nihilism" and "moralism," etc.). The author's initial words were perceived through normative categories of mature humanitarian thought of the 20th century (hence the arguments as to whether Tolstoy's "existential" and religious experience was "genuine" or "not genuine").

There is a comical side to what is a typical situation because Tolstoy himself deliberately tried to project his thought as universal, as challenging the boundaries between differentiated genres and spheres of experience (mundane, religious, artistic and humanitarian-scientific). The truth that Tolstoy sought defies disciplinary specialization. This truth has to be general and mandatory for all.

Yury Lotman claimed that any text "chooses" its own audience creating it "in its image and likeness" [14, p. 87]. In that case, Tolstoy's theology in his short stories seeks to include the entire humankind within the boundaries of the audience "he chooses." The desire to link the sacred and the social inherits the task of evangelical renewal of religion by "the scribes": the great commandment "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul," is accompanied in the New Testament by a "similar" commandment: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matthew 22: 37, 39).

In that sense the model of the social connection portrayed by Tolstoy in *Master and Man* does indeed appear to be the most complete metaphor of the ultimate goal of his artistic and religious-moral quests. The main character of the story, a conceited and selfish merchant, Brekhunov, caught in a fierce snowstorm while on the road, gets frozen to death trying to protect his servant Nikita from the cold with his own body. Brekhunov's act provides a metaphor for Tolstoy's moral dream: to embrace a close one, to embrace the whole humanity breaking the barriers separating "the self" from "others." But it also serves as a metaphor for the author's ambition: to enter the reader's consciousness, to be dissolved and to die in it.¹ The antagonistic relationships between "the self" and "the other," the master and his servant, the author and the reader, the exploiter and the exploited are transformed into identification of oneself with the neighbor, an ecstatic egress of the "self" from the boundaries of the individual. "Nikita is alive, so I too am alive," says Brekhunov triumphantly as he surrenders himself to death [28].

Gustafson's interpretation of this story as a "disguised manifestation of autopsychologism," "a parable made from Tolstoy's inner experience" [10, p. 202]

is basically correct. However, the questions that remain open are what are the underlying prerequisites of this "inner experience" and how is it connected with "external" experience? Where are the external boundaries, i.e., the boundaries of his claims to universality? Strictly speaking, it is hard to imagine an experience that is "internal," independent from sociality that is experienced in one way or another, from relations with real and imagined "others."

The thanatology of *Master and Man* can be seen through the optics of inter-textual connections: from the biblical and Hegelian dialectics of salvation (with corresponding figures of master and slave [20, pp. 107-111; 11]) and the Old Russian hagiographic literature to the legend of Julian the Hospitaller as rendered by Gustave Flaubert. No less interesting is the later development of Tolstoy's narrative, for example, by Ivan Bunin [2] and others and ending with Vladimir Sorokin (in his *Snowstorm*). However, it would make sense to take a closer look at the experience expressed in *Master and Man*. I propose to examine how Tolstoy in various years experienced the fear of death on the road and later expressed and "worked on" this experience in a "journey of discovery" narrative. This comparatively homogeneous creative and life material makes it possible to trace how the experience communicated by the author to the reader was transformed depending on the form in which it was conveyed and how these forms changed as Tolstoy's prose sought to address an ever broader social audience.

The genre migration of the "journey of discovery" structure reflects the search for a narrative form capable of conveying an ever more binding and universal truth addressed to an ever broader readership. The recurring motive of a "journey of discovery" traces the dynamics of creative expansion of Tolstoy's thought as a whole from the experience of a diary recording biographically specific experience—to fiction prose, to letters to like-thinking people, and to philosophical journalism and later "emblematic realism" prose. This trajectory led Tolstoy from the position of a "poet and historian" of "the middle and higher circle of nobility" (the definition by Fyodor Dostoevsky) to his hard-earned role of religious prophet of the multi-confessional global humanity. In other words, the structure of narrative statements with an abiding semantic nucleus (metaphors of the road, the snowstorm, losing one's way, death and salvation) correlates directly with the task of expanding the social horizon discovered through the interaction of author, protagonist and reader. The relations between these three get more complicated, the engagement between them intensifies and the experience conveyed acquires a universal soteriological meaning.

One would have thought that Tolstoy's attitude to death and immortality is subordinate to a certain effort of faith. Yet, one is struck by how differently Tolstoy's characters die—not only in *Three Deaths*, but almost in all other cases. The old men Bolkonsky and Bezukhov die from diseases in very different ways, the elder Kozeltsov (*Sevastopol in August 1855*) and prince Andrey, not to speak of the soldier Valenchuk (*Wood-Felling*) die from wounds in different ways. Death is shown from various angles, from within the consciousness of the dying character and as seen from the outside by other characters and the narrator. Sometimes

it is described only through plastic portrayal of an agonizing or dead body (the death of Petya Rostov, the murder of the Chechen warrior by Lukashka in *The Cossacks*). In *The Death of Ivan Ilyich* the structure of the relationship of all these angles of the perception of death is extended. What seems to be Tolstoy's universal thought of death is split by the concrete circumstances and throws each time a new light on the inner world of the unique and singular hero.

An encounter with death becomes a litmus test, which brings out the images of a shaken world order. The social dimension of this thanatological prose manifests itself not only in the portrayal of the conditions of life and mental horizon of the character who confronts death, and not so much through the typical of a moralistic writer revelation of the "ultimate truth" on the death threshold about imaginary and true nature of relations among people. Sociality understood not as a given corresponding to a particular area of knowledge but as personal duty, as a life, artistic and cognitive task permeates the fabric of Tolstoy's thanatological narratives. The sought formula of coexistence of human beings is reflected in the level of the organization of the narrative.

Obviously, a figure of a "road to salvation" represents, at least in the Judeo-Christian tradition, an instrument of cognizing and reproducing the models of collective identity [31]. Even the theoretical concept of "rational action" was introduced by Max Weber proceeding from the historical argument about the spiritual sources of capitalism referencing the Protestant path to salvation. In a certain sense Weber's metaphor of rational bourgeois salvation which configured historical experience had been earlier (and quite differently) interpreted by Tolstoy in *Master and Man*. For Tolstoy, the metaphor of the road is not an argument, but a parable. For him, the metaphor and collision of "the journey of discovery" organizes space, i.e., the "author-hero-reader" triangle where the search for social harmony is imagined and experienced as an earthly task of every mortal that is in harmony with the desired and sacred order of things.

"Snowstorm"

On January 24, 1854, Tolstoy, returning home from the Caucasus, was caught in a snowstorm. Three days later, he made the following entry in his diary: "On the 24th [of January] spent the whole night roaming having lost my way in Belogorodtsevskaia 100 [versts] from Cherk[assk]. It occurred to me to write the story about a snowstorm. My behavior was not all it should have been" ([27], vol. 46, p. 231). And further, "I behaved like a coward during the snowstorm today"². Apparently, Tolstoy found it easier to become immune to physical fear at war than to come to terms with a meaningless death on the road. It must be said that the Russian nobleman was already familiar with the instrument of understanding this kind of experience. The portrayals of snowstorms by Vasily Zhukovsky and later by Aleksandr Pushkin and Sergey Aksakov are imbued with the symbolism of mysterious all-powerful fate (with a national color: in Russia, Moyra wears the garb of a snowstorm).

The incident on January 24, 1854 provided the writer with material he would use in the story *Snowstorm* in February 1856 (published by Nikolay Nekrasov in the third issue of *Sovremennik* journal for that same year). The fact that the story has the same title as Pushkin's story and contains reminiscences of Pushkin's Pugachev is not accidental. However, these similarities rather highlight a break with the old plot structure and narrative idiom. The plot, the rhythm and the fabric of the narrative all bespeak a dramatic departure from the aesthetics of Pushkin's prose. As early as 1853, rereading *The Captain's Daughter*, Tolstoy remarked: "I have to admit that Pushkin's prose today is obsolete—not in diction—but in the narrative manner. Now in the new trend, interest in details of feeling replaces interest in the actual events. Pushkin's stories are somehow bare" ([27], vol. 46, pp. 187-188).

In the story *Snowstorm* Tolstoy rewrote "old prose" in the language of "the new trend." He managed to implement an inner impulse of one of his first artistic experiences of the distant spring of 1851. On that occasion (probably under the influence of Laurence Sterne) 22-year-old Tolstoy was only beginning to show an interest in literary work. "The story of yesterday"—an attempt to find for himself an artistic account of the experience of day-to-day existence—remained a draft. Subsequently, giving diary reflection an artistic form cannot but involve the building of more complicated plot structures [20, pp. 11-29]. Such a plot could combine several works at once (the unfinished *Bildungsroman*—*Childhood*, *Boyhood*, *Youth*). It could be reduced to the size of an essay (*The Raid*, *Wood-Felling*) or be the result of a complex blend of a war essay and a psychological novella where different points of view of an event are juxtaposed (the Sevastopol series of stories). It is only in *Snowstorm* that Tolstoy managed to return to Sterne's idea, to an uninterrupted stream of consciousness.

Snowstorm is presented "in a single chunk," a single flow of experiencing the world. The plot and storyline, the rhythm of narrative and the here-and-now perception of the world are indistinguishable. Compared to Pushkin's *Snowstorm* Tolstoy accomplished, in organizing prose narrative, what neorealists accomplished in the cinema a century later: not events in a certain time, but the perception of the temporal dimension was the object and principle of portrayal [9, pp. 1-24].

A detailed description of a perilous journey through a snowstorm focused on conveying the external (visual and audio) and internal (psychological) experience has made the writer revise the scheme of interactions between an imaginary plot and the real world. The artistic narrative does not impose on the reader's real world external images that are attractive through being remote (cf. the extraordinary fates of the characters in Pushkin's *Snowstorm*), but, on the contrary, appeals to the mundane apperceptive capacity of contemporaries. The disjunction of the artistic narrative and the surrounding reality can be particularly pleasurable when reading a realistic story. Such a pleasure was experienced by the early readers of *Snowstorm*. This powerfully affected Sergey Aksakov (despite the fact that he fretted about "too many details") who wrote to Ivan Turgenev on March 12, 1856: "Please tell Count Tolstoy that *Snowstorm* is an excellent story. I am in

a better position to judge than many: I have experienced the horror of winter blizzards more than once and on one occasion only survived because I came upon a haystack and spent the night in it" [13, p. 134].³

Needless to say, the conception of *Snowstorm* is not exhausted by the "effect of reality." The semantic horizon of the story—the hero's possible death which now comes near and now becomes more remote—is what the writer experienced in the Don steppe on January 24, 1854. The pendulum of the hero's fate swings in time with the rhythm of simple perception of the time and toward the end our weariness from the reading matches the weariness of the character from the protracted journey. Behind the façade of an innovative description of snowstorm the sophisticated reader of the mid-19th century discerns the complex of literary associations, physical pointers, landscapes and social types.

The weakness, which the author of the diary would like to get rid of, becomes the structural element of artistic narrative. However, the experience recreated in the story and conveyed to the reader, even though not in any way distorted, is understood in different ways depending on the manner in which it is recorded. Suppose we trust Tolstoy as we would trust a video recording which, on top of everything, records the thoughts and even the traveler's dreams. For the wayfarer himself the meaning of the journey is beyond the horizon, a distant goal. Only the available ways of achieving it are within view. Impressions gained along the way are external. This material can prompt a deductive entry concerning the author's behavior made in the diary during the first stop. And also later may provide material for a story under a title borrowed from Pushkin. However, for the author of the story and for the reader the meaning of the journey is framed within the artistic narrative. The meaning "is consolidated and 'bodied' not in the experience itself and not in the sphere of thought as such, but through aesthetic completion" [4, pp. 69-71]. What catches the eye by accident in real life becomes available for reflection precisely thanks to a kind of aesthetic convention.

In the story *Snowstorm*, as Viktor Shklovsky aptly noted, Tolstoy managed to pass "from this simple recording of scenes, an almost ethnographic recording, to a new construction of plot. The plot is given not as a search for something interesting, unusual, but becomes a way of seeing: seeing the structure of the universe, its terrible nature" [24, p. 176].

"Arzamas Horror"

On August 31, 1869, when the "Noah's Ark" of Tolstoy's universe had already been launched (the final volume of *War and Peace* was being prepared for publication), the writer traveled to Penza Province to buy a landed estate at a bargain price.

Judging from his letters to his wife, things went awry from the start. In Tula he met his brother-in-law, Aleksandr Kuzminsky, whom Tolstoy detested at the time ("he enjoys his meal more if he takes it away from somebody"). In Moscow in the printshop of "confounded Ries" problems arose with the publication of the last volume of *War and Peace*, and the sale of the previous volumes fetched "a mere

500 rubles" from the book seller Ivan Solovyov. On the train to Nizhniy Novgorod no decent fellow travelers could be found except that he had "an extremely interesting conversation on divine matters" with the merchant Labzin ([27], vol. 83, p. 167). But the merchant got off at Pavlov Posad, and right up to Nizhniy Novgorod the author traveled "totally alone" (true, the servant Sergey Arbutov who accompanied the count and is not mentioned in his letters recalled that some fellow travelers were politely saying goodbye to Tolstoy in Nizhniy Novgorod).⁴ Thereafter, they traveled only by horse-drawn transport, the roads were muddy and a good cart could not be found. The further journey via Arzamas and Saransk had to be by stage coach.

On September 4, Tolstoy sent an almost panicky letter to Sofia Andreyevna, something that was very much out of character:

"What is with you and the children? Has something happened? I am racked by worry for a second day. Three days ago, I spent the night in Arzamas and something extraordinary happened to me. It was 2 o'clock in the morning. I was terribly tired and in need of sleep and no pain bothered me. But, suddenly I was overcome by anxiety, fear and horror such as I have never experienced before. I will describe the details of this feeling to you later; but I have never experienced such torment before and I would not wish anyone to experience it.

I jumped up and ordered the horse to be harnessed. While it was being harnessed, I fell asleep and woke up a healthy man. That feeling, to a much smaller degree, came back to me yesterday during the journey, but I was prepared and did not succumb to it, all the more so because it was less strong. Today I feel as healthy and cheerful as I can be away from family.

During this journey, it was brought home to me for the first time how greatly attached I am to you and the children. I can be alone when I am constantly engaged, as I am in Moscow, but when I have nothing to do, I feel definitely that I cannot be alone" ([27], vol. 83, pp. 167-168).

"The Arzamas horror" can probably be described in psychiatric terms ("a fit of panic," etc.), but it would become a cultural and not a medical fact only fifteen years later when Tolstoy would describe what happened in *Notes of a Madman*. Lev Shestov considered that description to be an autobiographic record of the religious experience that in many ways determined Tolstoy's subsequent life [23]. Shestov was one of the first to link "the Arzamas horror" and *Master and Man*. Today the "Arzamas horror" is usually perceived in the context of conceptualization of such experiences in 20th-century philosophical discourse (Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, Camus). The state recorded in *Notes of a Madman* can indeed be captured in the concepts of "existential angst," "horror," "borderline situation."

However, the story *Notes of a Madman* was written in 1884-1886 when Tolstoy grappled with the task of interpreting life experience in the light of the "conversion" that occurred in his worldview. Thus, the events of that horrible night on September 2, 1869, would be included in the theological-autobiographical narrative of salvation. But at the time, hot on the heels of the event, Tolstoy, in a letter to Sofia Andreyevna, attributed the "angst, fear and horror" that overcame him

to a different cause: the fact that a loving husband could not endure being away from his family (“What is with you and the children? Has something happened?”).⁵

Before the “conversion” in 1878-1882, his earthly attachments, the immediate interests, relations with the people close to him, practically provided the soil from which all of Tolstoy’s creative projects—from *Childhood* to *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*—arose “organically” (Apollon Grigoryev’s favorite word would not come amiss here). This was the “life,” which was consistently counterposed to “reason.” The “conversion” consisted in these two concepts swapping places.⁶

The letter to his wife of September 4, 1869, in which, after giving an account of his Arzamas experiences, Tolstoy nevertheless did not forget to report the circumstances of the trip and even lament the absence of a warm leather coat and jam from Yasnaya Polyana, ended on an upbeat note: “Goodbye, my darling. One good thing is that I have no thoughts about the novel and philosophy” ([27], vol. 83, p. 168). *Notes of a Madman* is written in an entirely different spiritual, social and domestic atmosphere. He managed to relate the Arzamas episode in an unfinished work in which the relations between the author, hero and reader are treated as a life-or-death struggle for sanity, i.e., recognition “of oneself and the whole world as being mad” ([27], vol. 53, p. 129).

The hero of *Notes of a Madman* is autobiographical. Almost everything that happens to him has been lifted out of the author’s life. Even so, the “madman” is typified in such a way that the autobiographical experience invested in him is changeable and free of anything that would prevent it from blending into the imaginary reader’s life horizon. “As all the boys in my circle, which are mentally healthy,” the character finished school and university (an institutional “straightening” of biographical facts: Tolstoy was educated at home and dropped out of university). Unlike the author, the hero of *Notes of a Madman* did not write novels and did not fight in wars, he “served for a spell then met... his present wife and married” (depersonalization of the wife and marital union as such is characteristic). However, the hero decides to use “the money she had inherited” (cf. the reverse mismatch between Tolstoy and Sofya Tolstaya, with the proceeds from *War and Peace*: everything exclusive, spiritually aristocratic is ruled out, with the transferred experience retaining only selfish and mundane motives that are “common to all”) to buy an estate in Penza Gubernia. Below is a characteristic extract. The underlined parts deal with the circumstances of the trip that coincide exactly with the details of the real journey in 1869, and the parts in boldface are the places that would later “migrate” (in the form of specific circumstances or motives) to the narrative fabric of *Master and Man*:

“I wanted to buy in such a way that the profit and the forest of the estate would cover the purchase and I would acquire the estate for nothing. **I was looking for a fool who is not in the loop and once it seemed to me that I had found one.** The estate with large forests was for sale in the Penza Gubernia. **From what I had managed to find out it appeared that the seller was exactly such a fool** and the forests would recoup the value of the estate. I got ready and went. We first traveled by rail (I was traveling with my servant) and then by stage coach. **It was a very cheerful trip for me. The servant, a young good-natured man,** was as cheerful as I. New places, new

people. **We traveled and had a good time. Our destination was about two hundred versts away. We decided to travel stopping only to change horses.** Night fell and we were still on the road. We began to dose off. I dosed off, but then woke up suddenly. **I became afraid of something.** As often happens, I woke up frightened and agitated—I felt I would never fall asleep. **'Why am I travelling? Where am I going?'** it suddenly flashed through my head. Not that I disliked the idea of buying an estate cheaply, but **it suddenly struck me that I had no reason to go so far and that I would die here in a strange place. I became horrified.** Sergey the servant woke up and I took advantage of this to talk with him" ([27], vol. 26, p. 468).

Let us skip the anthological description of "horror" at the hotel, which is often taken "at face value" as an autobiographical detail. Let me just note three conditions of the transfer of the author's experience to the hero.

(1) Intimate experience is conveyed on condition of social typization and prosaization of the hero's image and that of the social and physical environment (cf. the hero of *The Kreutzer Sonata*).

(2) There is a change of the primary and secondary roles in the author's and the hero's view. Equal personalities surrounding the hero are depersonalized, this being characteristic of Tolstoy's later prose. Wife, friends, children—if it were a novel they would be potential centers, on a par with the main character, of emotional and value oriented perception of the world (like the members of the families of the Rostovs, Bolkonskys, Oblonskys, and Karenins). In *Notes of a Madman* (as in *Death of Ivan Ilyich*) the people surrounding the hero are deliberately relegated to the background. Depersonalization of the inner circle is compensated for by bringing the "outer circle" (servants, animals, casual fellow travelers) to the forestage (cf. Gerasim in *Death of Ivan Ilyich*).

(3) The experience transferred to the hero is arranged on the "top/bottom" principle, which determines the shape of the plot. This common scheme informs the "journey of discovery": mundane motives are at the bottom and religious revelation is at the top. But the role of intermediary is given not to the "good tidings," not to a "miracle" but to humdrum material surroundings: a whitewashed square room, red blinds would turn into "the same red, white, square horror." The description of horror in *Notes of a Madman* could not have been completed as it was in the letter of September 4, 1869, with a mention of the jam forgotten at home.

Thinking "for Oneself"

However, the experience cast in artistic form is not lost. The experience is only becoming conscious of as it is articulated, that is, is socially addressed ("I experienced it so vividly," Tolstoy noted in his diary when he conceived of writing *Notes of a Madman* ([27], vol. 49, pp. 75-76).

There is an equally social quality to the thinking even when, according to Tolstoy's formula, it had to be "for oneself," and not "for the public." Mikhail Bakhtin, "under the mask" of Valentin Voloshinov, and without a mask polemically challenged Tolstoy's claim to think "for himself": "The pride involved in

this solitude also depends upon 'we.' It is a variant of the 'we-experience' characteristic of the modern-day West European intelligentsia. Tolstoy's remarks about there being different kinds of thinking—"for oneself" and "for the public"—merely juxtapose two different concepts of 'public.' Tolstoy's "for oneself" actually signifies only another concept of the addressee peculiar to himself" [1, pp. 89-90].⁷

It has to be said that this peculiar "social concept of the listener" takes shape beginning from the 1880s and becomes the condition whereby "after the conversion Tolstoy abandoned the Western genres and moved to the creation of his own" [10, p. xiii]. The change marked by "the conversion" of 1878-1882 is in some ways akin to what happened to prince Andrey before his death when "an awakening from life came to... (him—*I. B.*) together with his awakening from sleep" ([27], vol. 12, p. 64; cf. [6, pp. 81-193]).

Assessment of the experience portrayed was removed from the habitual family, friendly, worldly and readers' environment and transferred to a totally different sphere. The prospect of the final inevitability of death—and assessment of one's whole life (anchored in the entire historical world) from that perspective—calls for a direct conversation bypassing, as it were, all the social conditions and conventions.

One cannot quite put them aside in a conversation with one's wife (the link to the loved person is precisely one of these conditions). For other reasons, the experience of religious shock with which the "Arzamas horror" was now connected cannot be conveyed for the same reasons not only to a loved one but to the novel's reader. This would have been the horror of an individual hero fitted into his individual plot trajectory (such are the revelations of Dmitry Olenin, Pierre, Andrey and even Levin) ranged with the trajectories of other heroes (in this novel, the previous novel, and for that matter the novels of other writers). And not the universal human horror that Tolstoy felt the need to relate. "Literature" is incapable of conveying this horror. It calls for addressing the reader directly. The look of the imagined addressee also changes. Tolstoy wrote to his daughter, Maria, on September 23, 1895: "I cannot enthusiastically write for the masters—they are impervious to everything: they have their own philosophy, theology and aesthetics which protect them like armor against any truth that demands to be followed. I feel this instinctively when I write such pieces as *Master and Man* and now *Resurrection*. And if I think that I am writing for Afanasy and even for Danilas and Ignats and their children, I feel cheerful and want to write" ([27], vol. 68, p. 186).

Now Tolstoy had to take his reader by surprise in the totality of his daily relations and drag him along with himself into a new space of religious experience. The author's consciousness should present itself to the reader as "consciousness as such" (to use the term of Karl Jaspers).⁸ Hence the painful process of getting rid of his estate, ethnic and confessional conventions. "You or I, you all, or I alone"—this is how Dmitry Merezhkovsky formulated Tolstoy's claim that pushes aside sociality criticizing him for such "self-assertion of the individual" (according to Merezhkovsky, "the religious element of every revolution"), which "caused him to reject the Russian revolution as well" [17, p. 322]. Merezhkovsky accurately

reproduces the prerequisite of yet-to-be-published *Notes of a Madman* and the diary which revolves around the same idea of proclaiming "himself and the whole world to be mad" ([27], vol. 53, p. 129).

The natural and material substantive world is socialized in Tolstoy's later prose. Objects and nature are no longer symbolic inventory (as, for example, in Gogol's *Dead Souls*), not a poetic projection of the hero's experiences (like the sky of Austerlitz over prince Andrey) but almost an equal and willful participant in human relations. The rebellious pouffe in the house of dead Ivan Ilyich, the breaking cigarette stub in the office of a ranking official in *Resurrection*, the sheath dropped behind a sofa in *The Kreutzer Sonata*—all these objects surrounding the heroes were subpoenaed by the prosecution as evidence in court where the question of the meaning of man's existence in the modern world is decided.

In *Notes of a Madman* Tolstoy goes one step further to resort to absurdist expression ("red, white, square horror"). The Judgment Seat is a mundane, prosaic reality of the hero and the reader. Tolstoy's "emblematic realism" leaves no gap between symbolic and literal meanings of what is being said. One cannot avoid judgment in the face of the universal author. Such judgment does not recognize any external authorities (scientific knowledge, political feasibility, common sense or "good taste"). Nor does it recognize the boundaries of the structure of consciousness itself. Tolstoy does not hesitate to pass on to depicting the fact of death "for himself, that is, for the dying man himself, and not for others, those who remain" [3, p. 347]. In his notebooks in 1961, Mikhail Bakhtin sketched a schematic criticism of the portrayal of death by Tolstoy: "It is only possible through a certain reification of consciousness. Consciousness here is given as something objective and almost neutral with respect to the impenetrable (absolute) boundary between the 'self' and 'the other.' He passes from one consciousness to the other as if moving from one room to another, he knows no absolute 'threshold' " [3, p. 347].

Bakhtin speaks not so much about aesthetics (comparison of the "creative method" of Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, the degree of their "verisimilitude") as about epistemology. The non-objective character of consciousness, the impossibility of "conscious (that is, concluding consciousness) beginning and end" and accordingly the impossibility of "death from within," "that is, one's conscious death,"—Bakhtin formulates in very concise terms the fundamental provisions that form the basis of 20th century "humanitarian epistemology, the social ontology of modern times" [16, pp. 7-73; 15, pp. 122-125]. "A certain reification of consciousness" and oblivion of its boundaries indeed make Tolstoy naïve from the viewpoint of humanitarian thinking. Even if one accepts the finalizing portrayal of consciousness (a view of consciousness in its ultimate limit) to be an "aesthetic convention," one has to admit that the attitude to this "aesthetic convention" remains decisive also for scientific-humanitarian thinking, for theology and for practical life. With Tolstoy, not only thinking is "for oneself," but death is "for oneself" (in effect, he is supremely indifferent to his own death and those of others" [3, p. 347]). However, it is these features of Tolstoy's poetics that turn his

prose into a powerful magnet, a kind of teasing mirror for the scientific methods that are inclined to “reify” consciousness within this or that network of categories.

“Master and Man”

The concept of this story was born on September 6, 1894, and the key details were conceived “in bed in the morning,” as witnessed by an entry in Tolstoy’s diary ([27], vol. 52, p. 137). Tolstoy got down to work immediately. By the middle of January of 1895 *Master and Man* was finished and the final corrections were made in February (this coincided with the family tragedy: on February 23, died the youngest and favorite child of Tolstoy, six-year-old Vanya). However, the “material” for *Master and Man* had been accumulated by Tolstoy beginning at least from the 1850s: think of his roaming the Don steppes during a snowstorm on January 24, 1854 and the story *Snowstorm*, which pioneered a new form of conveying life experience; and “Arzamas horror” and the religious-philosophical revision of the attitude to death that followed; and restructuring of the entire interaction with the reader since the times of *A Confession*, which enabled him to engage the reader in a direct conversation in the absolute categories of life and death. And finally, the rhetorical figures that sustain the story—the image of being lost in a snowstorm as the image of mankind which has lost its way, already used once in the treatise *What I Believe* (1884), and the “God is master and man is servant” allegory developed in letters to Vladimir Chertkov and subsequently entered in a notebook in 1891 and the diary in 1893 ([27], vol. 85, pp. 4, 64, 130–131, 210, 279–282; vol. 63, pp. 276–277, 331; vol. 52, pp. 94–95, 106–107, 166; vol. 23, pp. 400–410). Much could yet be added, mentioning at the end of the list charity activities to combat hunger in the winter of 1891–92 when Tolstoy, who had taught himself from his youth to keep his cool in the face of the fear of death, nearly perished in a snowstorm when he rode on horseback from Begichevka on a business connected with aid to famine-stricken people. The snow was too deep to ride through, he had to get off the horse and pull it after him, but the horse broke loose and went off; this detail would soon be used in describing Brekhunov’s panicky attempts to save himself riding Mukhorty [22, p. 400].⁹

To assemble all these elements in a single whole, a new hero was needed. The hero had to get used to the imaginative world being created and to complete it by his death. Such a hero was Vasily Brekhunov, merchant of the Second Guild. The writer imparted to him more of his “inner experience” (I put Gustafson’s expression in quotation marks because no experience is strictly internal) than to any character, including Pierre Bezukhov and Konstantin Levin. How this transfer of experience took place deserves to be discussed in more detail.

The split of the biographical “self” into two or several independent characters unconnected with one another is a known phenomenon. Pierre and Andrey Bolkonsky in *War and Peace* and Levin and Vronsky in *Anna Karenina* are examples. In both cases, difference of appearance cannot mislead the woman (Natasha

and Kitty) who is capable of loving both one and the other. It is worth discussing the logic of such doubleness.

It's not enough for a hero to reason through the author's voice in order to be the inheritor of his creator. The author's "self" is not confined to speeches to which the author would subscribe. The author's personality projects itself onto the personality of the hero not only through the self-portrait of thought; it is also inseparable from the reaction of others, including desired reaction ("the world of my active dream of myself," according to Bakhtin). Prince Andrey Bolkonsky and count Aleksey Vronsky are reflections (one-sided, but very concrete) of Tolstoy's "active dream of himself." Contrary to Tolstoy, who was painfully aware of his plain look, both men are handsome. More importantly, both have an innate gift of concentration of the will, which enables them to be faithful in love and friendship, to succeed in their affairs and look danger in the eye. In what way is Bolkonsky's bravery different from Pierre's? The latter simply forgets about danger while the former, like Tolstoy himself, constantly thinks about it and enjoys suppressing his fear by an effort of will. Put simply, such heroes are supposed to meet the requirements that Tolstoy set himself in his diary as early as 1847. Pierre and Levin will wrestle with other tasks of spiritual and cognitive search.

While classical "autobiographic" characters receive body from within by virtue of author's voice, his doubles are given body from the outside, through assessment by potential others. Obviously, the images of the second type of heroes embody the values that the author found in social reality and not invented himself. Vronsky goes much farther than prince Andrey. Resisting the author's moral diktat, he remains unrepentant. Before Vronsky, two Fyodors—Turbin (*Two Hussars*) and Dolokhov (*War and Peace*)—withstood the pressure of the author's voice. Both have their roots in one prototype, Fyodor Tolstoy the American, Leo Tolstoy's distant relative and idol from childhood. The author was delighted to recognize the American's innate "wildness" in himself and Aleksandra Andreyevna Tolstaya ([27], vol. 61, p. 123).

While Tolstoy's social fleshing out of the image of reasoners (all these rich noblemen—from Dmitry Olenin to Pierre, Levin or Nekhlyudov in *Resurrection*, who "rusticate" themselves)—is fairly stereotyped, the heroes who preserve their integrity are diverse socially, historically and ethnographically: the hussar Turbin, the Little Russian aide-de-camp and gambler in *The Disranked*, the impoverished nobleman Dolokhov, the Cossack Lukashka, officer of the guards Vronsky and Petersburg woman Anna Karenina, and finally the mountaineer Hadji-Murat and the Polish noble woman Albina. We are presented not just with a portrait gallery of estates and social strata in the 19th-century Russian Empire. Their typological unity enables these images to get across a single motive which has no equivalent in Tolstoy's "teaching." These heroes reveal unique and incompatible moral qualities based on "self-assertion of the individual" in terms of social estate, ethnicity and gender. The assertion of the pluralism of values in the language of an artistic image is in striking contrast with the author's quest for one truth that is mandatory for all. The heroes do not cave in to the author and stay

within their own individual worlds. They stubbornly challenge the universalist, universally human aspirations of the writer-philosopher who created them. The genuine seriousness of this conflict is one of the most interesting (and least understandable) features of Tolstoy's creative thinking.

It would be wrong to say that the type of a rural bourgeois, Brekhunov, is merely "exposed" in *Master and Man*. Critique in terms of social class lies on the surface in this story ([27], vol. 29, pp. XVI-XXI). However, below this surface the "little bourgeois world" of Brekhunov, which seems to have been exposed, is exonerated at one stroke: Vasily Brekhunov rushes to save Nikita "with the same resolution with which he used to strike hands when making a good purchase" [28]. The values of a merchant have not been cast aside but invested in Christian values (the purchase is indeed "profitable" because Brekhunov essentially buys out his immortal soul).

There are no grounds for discussing the issue of how psychologically motivated Brekhunov's "conversion" is ("after he had treacherously left Nikita at the mercy of fate to save himself" [18, p. 146]): the critics, over the head of artistic concept, hastened to jump to the ideological concept. Vasily Brekhunov did not have to accept Tolstoy's faith. His path to salvation, from the very first sketches ([27], vol. 52, p. 274) did not follow the Tolstoyan trajectory of "reappraisal of values," but Brekhunov's trajectory of immediate practical action. The hero finds himself in a situation from which there is no way out when the snowstorm and inevitable fate have already shut all the doors before him. Only death and a neighbor who is freezing to death remain. The servant bids farewell to the master and the master, forgetting everything (he has despaired of saving himself, what else is there to remember?), rushes to save the servant. Nothing can be more natural. Brekhunov had lived for himself, but like any master, he lived by his business serving the values (profit in his case) that made him tick. Now that the whole world has contracted to one person, Nikita, Brekhunov gives himself to Nikita without thinking about what he was doing.

The work of great writers who have created a multitude of artistic worlds probably includes some works that are indispensable, prompted as they are by the logic of their creative path. In *Master and Man* Tolstoy managed to find a fulcrum of his ultimate truth in the alien moral world of the hero. Brekhunov's dream before he dies, the course of his thought, partly echoing the revelations of Ivan Il'yich, no longer add anything to the image of the hero who completes his life's journey by saving Nikita without any reasoning, that is, without looking back on Tolstoy and his faith.

The type of a petty bourgeois is one that Tolstoy despised more than any other. In this type the prejudices of an aristocrat blended with the ideology of negating property. Along with many other contemporaries Tolstoy desired the world of consumerist well-being ("the Anke pie," as it was called in the family jargon of the Tolstoyes) to be destroyed as soon as possible. Every word oozes the author's mocking of his hero and his merchant's view of life. All the more striking is the fact that the author makes this hero the mouthpiece of his innermost thoughts.

Putting the truths the author had arrived at through much suffering into another person's life horizon is what creates the artistic tension in this story.

It has often been noted that Tolstoy sought some universals of experience in portraying crises and catastrophes. But before *Master and Man*, it was largely the author's will and not that of the hero that tightened the "knots" that cast a "evaluating light on the entire perspective of all the events and states portrayed in the story" [25, p. 275]. The ability to put the values of one social order into another, to use the class limitations and even extraneousness of hero as a means for conveying universal experience had been prepared by the entire creative biography of the writer and has been deployed to the full in *Master and Man*. Brekhunov's heroic death and the narrative power that matches the object can only be compared with the death of Hadji-Murat, but Brekhunov's heroism is Christian.

The exceedingly dense symbolism of the story [21, pp. 153-169; 29] brings together in the "incident on the road" chronotope incommensurable methods of encoding reality. Mutual enrichment of metaphoric fields in the story engenders a strange and atypical equality of Tolstoy's theology and Orthodox tradition, political economy, psychology and ethnography.

In every detail one plane of symbolization morphs seamlessly into another. Brekhunov, taking advantage of his position as church warden, takes money from the church funds to buy timber. This is a characteristic and socially typical feature and at the same time an additional explanation of the haste with which the trip is embarked on. The same detail conveys the inner indifference to faith, the failure of the attempts of the church warden to pray. It also satirizes the hypocrisy of some church practices. However, at the ultimate metaphoric level it turns out that Brekhunov sets out on his trip in order to save his soul, and he does it with the money of the real Master of the church treasury. This is irony of the sacred over the profane and not the other way around (although at the first semantic level the opposite relationship exists). The symbolism is Orthodox in an un-Tolstoyan way, but it flows naturally from the circumstances in which the hero is immersed. The ironic remark about why the manservant Nikita,¹⁰ seemingly a thoroughly "Tolstoyan" hero of the story, has no fear of death is not easy to marry up with Tolstoy's religious-ascetic pathos: "his whole life had been not a continual holiday, but on the contrary, an unceasing service of which he was beginning to feel weary" ([27], vol. 29, p. 36; quoted by [28] with a single correction). It is admissible to mock Nikita. It is admissible and tempting for Tolstoy to mock church-office, of which there are glimpses against the background of the Christian symbolism of the story. But mocking the metaphoric meaning of life as serving God is rank blasphemy from the viewpoint of Tolstoy's "consciously religious" attitude to the meaning of life and the "mystery" of death.

Characteristically, transition to the other world both of Brekhunov and Nikita is accompanied by pointedly Orthodox symbolism. The former dreams of a church before his death and at the end of his earthly journey he does not see abstract light (as Ivan Ilyich) but goes in the direction from which comes the voice of an anthropomorphic Master, more probably God the Father (a metaphor more acceptable for

Tolstoy) than the Son. Nikita, twenty years after the events described, dies “under the icons with a lighted taper in his hands” ([27], vol. 29, p. 46; quoted by [28]). All this of course is not prompted by Tolstoy’s sudden sympathy for the Orthodox Church during the months when he was writing the story, but by the logic of artistic expression of his own soteriology. The mental horizon of a Russian rural dweller prevents him from saving himself in the Tolstoy way and prompts him his own path to salvation. The principle of social concreteness penetrates the absolute sphere.

The choice of the time of action (1870s) is apparently prompted by the need to include Nikita’s death twenty years later within the narrative. The three deaths described in *Master and Man*—the self-sacrificing death of Brekhunov, the humble death of Nikita and the perish of Mukhorty—all fit into Christian aesthetics of spiritual exploit overturning the pantheistic pyramid of accents in Tolstoy’s early story *Three Deaths*.

The artistic masterpiece seems to be complete when Brekhunov dies (many critics have perceived this story in this truncated way). However, the narrator does not stop there, and it turns out that the portrayal of “peaceful and decent” death of Nikita described in the manner of popular prints and standing in contrast with the naturalism of the preceding narrative was only a motive for a scandalous finale: “Before he died he asked his wife’s forgiveness and forgave her for the cooper. He also took leave of his son and grandchildren, and died sincerely glad that he was relieving his son and daughter-in-law of the burden of having to feed him, and that he was now really passing from this life of which he was weary into that other life which every year and every hour grew clearer and more desirable to him. Whether he is better or worse off there where he awoke after his death, whether he was disappointed or found there what he expected, we shall all soon learn” ([27], vol. 29, p. 46; quoted by [28]).

There is a sudden break of intonation at the end of the delicately structured artistic narrative. Instead of ending the story with a “literary” final showing the snow-covered sledge or with a sermon typical of Tolstoy the moralist, the author unexpectedly violates the imagined integrity of the story and addresses the reader directly only to jump up from his seat in mid-sentence and slam the door on him. And the door turns out to be the top of a coffin. With this eerie-comical break of intonation at the end of *Master and Man* the author leaves each of us face to face with own death of each of us.

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Notes

- ¹ Already the surname Brekhunov (derived from the vernacular verb meaning "to lie" and "to speak rubbish") polemically colors the author's attitude to his character in three dimensions: political-economic (anti-bourgeois), philosophical (anti-individualist), and finally confessional. In the latter case, Brekhunov's name turns out to be a mask of the repentant writer who peddled inventions. At different "metaphorical levels" of the story the distance between the author and the character shifts.
- ² The entry was made as part of the systematic work to compile accounts of "every day from the point of view of the weaknesses you want to get rid of" ([27], vol. 46, p. 47).
- ³ Characteristically, Aksakov keeps silent about the other cause why he was in a "better position than many" to judge *Snowstorm*. In 1833, he published a story titled *A Blizzard*, one of the first detailed descriptions of a snowstorm in Russian prose. *A Blizzard* could be seen as a prototext of Pushkin's description of a snowstorm in *The Captain's Daughter*, to which Tolstoy refers through the traveler's dream. One cannot rule out a direct connection between the texts of Tolstoy's *Snowstorm* and Aksakov's *A Blizzard*.
- ⁴ Sergey Arbuzov described the trip with some factual inaccuracies of dates and place names, but with all trivial details. The only thing the servant did not remember was any sign of anxiety on the part of the master. The observant servant totally overlooked the "Arzamas horror."
- ⁵ However, Donna Orwin associates the "Arzamas horror," not without reason, with interiorization of Schopenhauer's motives in the epilogue to *War and Peace*, which had just been written [19, pp. 156-157].
- ⁶ Whether the "conversion" of 1878-1882 was all that abrupt, is still a moot point. One can go along with Gustafson's formula: "In Tolstoy, just as the later clarifies the earlier, so the form elucidates the content" [10, p. 208]. However, an analysis

of correspondence makes one cast away all doubts: at the turn of the 1870-1880s, a catastrophic change of the whole worldview is evident. In 1850-1870s, the letters were written by an ironic man who embraces life and is open to its various sides. His thought turns to people who are unlike one another and who are independently-minded. At different times, they included Ivan Turgenev, Aleksandr Druzhinin, Pavel Annenkov, Vasily Botkin, Boris Chicherin, Mikhail Pogodin and Yury Samarin. For many years, his confidants were his wife Sofya Tolstaya, friend and relative Aleksandra Tolstaya, Sergey Urusov, Nikolay Strakhov and Afanasy Fet. In 1878-1882, the tone of his letters darkens and the content becomes more monotonous. There is hardly a trace left of self-irony, mischievous play with intonations ashamed of its own outpouring frankness. After writing *A Confession* Tolstoy no longer expects any revelations from his addressees. Other people more often than not interest Tolstoy only as real or possible bearers of his ideas. His new confidants are like-thinking people Vladimir Chertkov, Nikolay Ge, Fyodor Strakhov and others, and within his family, his daughters. This did not of course mean a categorical renunciation of his former friendships and family ties, but his thought revolved in a different circle.

- ⁷ Cf. his own entry: “The words of Tolstoy about thinking for himself and thinking for the public (Lev Shestov)” in the summary of *To the Bildungsroman* [5, p. 243] and Sergey Bocharov’s comment on this entry [5, pp. 776-777]. The formula “to think for myself or for the public” was articulated by Tolstoy in connection with Lev Shestov’s visit of Yasnaya Polyana [8, pp. 97-98].
- ⁸ Karl Jaspers’ critique of such a consciousness and “absolutizing of spirit” is aimed, among others, against Tolstoy. Jaspers proceeded from Max Weber, who formulated the opposition of “the ethic of principled conviction” and “the ethic of responsibility,” challenging Tolstoy’s moral imperatives [12, pp. 85-91; 30, pp. 353-359].
- ⁹ The motive of struggling with the snowstorm as an insurmountable obstacle for the wayfarer who is ready to sacrifice himself for the sake of the needy sustains the plot of Sorokin’s *Snowstorm*, in which of course all the Tolstoy’s (and Chekhov’s) characters are turned inside out.
- ¹⁰ It is not for nothing that in the modern reader’s perception Tolstoy and Nikita swap features of appearance. In Andrey Ranchin’s *Philological Essays* Tolstoy pursues the Freudian (Daniel Rancour-Laferriere?) who visits him “with easy stride of his waddling legs,” almost an exact quotation of the description of Nikita’s gait in *Master and Man* ([21, p. 636], see also [27], vol. 29, p. 5]. In the animated cartoon *Master & Man* (2014) by Canadian artist Tom Tassel Nikita’s appearance is a replica of Tolstoy’s. In Vladimir Sorokin’s *Snowstorm* the reaction to Tolstoy’s teaching and adherents is most manifest in the image of the cabman which is a copy of Nikita.

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

***People of the World: Russian Scientists Abroad.*
Ed. by Dmitry Bayuk. Moscow:
Alpina Non-Fiction, 2018. 516 pp. (In Russian.)**

Lyudmila KLIMOVICH

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The reviewed publication is a collection of essays tied together by the common subject of Russian émigrés who became outstanding scientists and realized their talents in other countries. Those who contributed to this collection have written that they wanted to “shed light on the names of those who, having been born here [in Russia] and having made their first steps here worked for the benefit of humanity even if outside this country’s borders” (p. 29). Professionally, the authors are as varied as the heroes of their narrative are—there are physicists, chemists, philologists and journalists among them. This is not a historiographical work in the full sense of the word since the authors do not claim the honor of bringing new historical sources and archival documents into scholarly circulation. They relied on already published materials, which does not belittle the results of their efforts: this is the first impressive collection of essays about Russian scientists in emigration addressed to a wide readership.

The people the authors of this book talk about left Russia at different times, and this explains why the collection is divided into two parts: essays about those who emigrated before World War II, as opposed to those who started working abroad during the war and after it. This might look strange since the émigrés of the late 19th century had little in common with those who emigrated in the mid-20th century. It would have been much more logical to use the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 as the watershed after which emigration took place for political reasons. For example, Ilya Mechnikov who in the first half of the 1880s discovered

L. Klimovich, Cand. Sc. (Hist.), assistant professor, the I. N. Ulyanov Ulyanovsk State Pedagogical University. E-mail: lusek84@yandex.ru. This book review was prepared within the grant of the President of the Russian Federation as a state program of support of young Russian scientists—candidates of science (Project MK-2144.2018.6). It was first published in Russian in the journal *Neprikosnovenniy zapas* (2018, no. 9, pp. 306-310), which is a publication of the *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie* (New Literary Observer) Publishing House.

phagocytosis and opened in Russia the first bacteriological station to fight infectious diseases was not understood by the professional community in Russia and emigrated in 1887. As distinct from an outflow of members of the academic community after 1917, he was not driven by political considerations and his life was not endangered; he emigrated in search of more comfortable working conditions.

Before the revolution, many of those who emigrated under pressure of political circumstances returned after years spent abroad. Aleksandr Lodygin, electrical engineer and *narodnik* (populist) by his political convictions, who invented the incandescent light bulb with a carbon filament filled with inert gas, left Russia during the reign of reactionary Emperor Alexander III. He came back 23 years later, in 1907. Unlike the post-revolutionary émigrés, he not only came back in 1907 but after failing to find a common ground with the Provisional Government left the country for the second time in 1917, never to return. We all know only too well that those of the misguided scholars whom Bolsheviks managed to lure back had no such chance. In other words, before 1917 émigrés (to quote what is written in the collection about the brothers Kovalevsky) could afford “to be normal Russian scientists with a habit of freely moving across the world” (p. 73). Russian scientists parted with this habit not in 1945 but after the October Revolution of 1917. This means that the materials in the collection should have been divided into the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods.

No matter what, the October Revolution of 1917 as an event of huge historic importance cannot be passed over in silence. As a rule, scientists preferred to leave the country because of ideological disagreements with the policy pursued by the Bolsheviks. Many of them conflicted with the regime and many emigrated; not all of them, however, could continue their careers in exile.

“We preserve the memories of the most successful among the émigrés and of their outstanding achievements that make them part of the history of science. It turned out, however, that the West was not heaven on earth for many of them, especially for those who left Russia under protest. Not all of them succeeded; some of them abandoned their scientific careers. And those whose research careers were truly successful, as a rule, paid the price of full integration into the scientific environment of their new homeland” (p. 193).

For instance, talented aircraft designer Igor Sikorsky who had earned his fame in tsarist Russia immigrated to the United States in 1918 and found his “niche” as designer of helicopters only in the late 1930s. He created several dozen helicopter models, the most famous of them being Sikorsky S-67 Blackhawk (1970). Practically all American presidents whose term in office coincided with his lifetime awarded him. This is a story of successes and victories. The story of naval engineer Vladimir Yurkevich is different. Having moved to France in 1922, he succeeded as a naval designer; in the early 1930s he won the competition to build the world’s biggest ocean liner, the S.S. Normandie. Having moved, on the eve of World War II, to the United States, he found it hard, if not impossible, to fit into the new scientific environment: his knowledge was not needed, “he no longer built ocean liners” and had to be satisfied with teaching jobs (p. 141).

Ivan Ostromislensky left Russia in 1921 when it had become clear that he would never get a personal patent on the production of synthetic rubber, for the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR of 1919 about inventions had declared all inventions property of the Soviet state. Ivan Ostromislensky did not like this at all. He was comparatively successful: he got American citizenship fairly soon even if complete integration in the host community took a lot of time. It was during World War II that production of synthetic rubber began. Aleksandr Ponyatov (Ponyatoff), who had served in the White Army and reached the United States in the late 1920s via China and France, needed even more time to confirm his status as a scientist. As late as 1956, when he was 65, he finally demonstrated his invention that made video recording possible with the help of rotary transformers. By that time, he had become an American; he pushed aside his Russian origins, never thinking of himself as a Russian scientist: he married an American woman and his family used English.

The so-called "non-returners" constitute another category of scientists who found themselves in emigration. Most of these people stayed in the West after scientific trips or internships. For instance, geneticist Nikolay Timofeev-Resovsky, dispatched in 1925 to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Brain Research in Berlin, remained in Germany for twenty years. In 1937, the Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs tried and failed to lure him back. On the other hand, he declined an invitation to move to the United States.

"Living in Berlin with a Soviet passport and being engaged by the Institute to which he had been dispatched in the first time, he could look at himself as a Soviet citizen who had violated the rules yet still had chances to set things right" (p. 218).

In his case "setting things right" turned into a tragedy: after 1945, he failed to persuade the Soviet authorities that he had remained in Nazi Germany solely because of his work. Tempted by the promise of studies of radiation biology he came back in the USSR only to be accused of high treason and put behind the bars for ten years. While working in the Urals in a *sharashka* (groups of scientists kept in prisons where they could continue their studies) he wrote articles and trained young scientists. He was never let to come back to Moscow, let alone travel abroad.

Theodosius Dobzhansky, another geneticist, proved to be luckier. In 1927, he was sent to the United States on a scholarship from the International Education Board of the Rockefeller Foundation; in 1937, he became an American citizen. Much luckier than Timofeev-Resovsky in his choice of a new homeland, he was not exiled to the Urals but in 1958 received the Kimber Genetics Award, the highest prize in his field of scientific studies. The life of nuclear physicist Georgy Gamov (George Gamow) was even more adventurous: he left the Soviet Union twice and settled in the United States after his second trip abroad. His studies in Germany in 1928-1931 were crowned with a work on theoretical nuclear physics that made him world famous while still a young man. Upon his return to the Soviet Union, he became one of the favorites of Soviet power and, at the age of 28, the youngest Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Science. In the corridors of power it was decided, however, that he should never leave the country

again. In 1933, he used his personal acquaintance with Nikolay Bukharin to get access to Vyacheslav Molotov who helped him get a visa to attend the 7th Solvay Conference on physics, in Brussels. He did not come back; his scientific career was hugely successful abroad, and he died in the United States in 1968.

There were no Nobel Prize winners or prominent inventors among those who left the Soviet Union after World War II. In fact, the very endeavor to remain in the West was exhausting; it left neither time nor strength for science. “Potential non-returners falsified their documents and invented new biographies” (p. 271), naturalization required many years and left no time or energy for scientific endeavors. Those who left the Soviet Union during the perestroika years had made their discoveries and embellished their names with scientific achievements during the years of Soviet power. No longer young, they were invited abroad as VIPs to add luster to academic structures and universities. In other words, unlike many of the post-revolutionary émigrés they never felt the need to prove their worth. For instance, prominent mathematician Israel Gelfand who left the Soviet Union for the United States in 1990, relied exclusively on the reputation of his mathematician seminar at Moscow State University, which he tried to recreate in the American academy.

By way of summing up, the authors touched, in passing, on the 21st century. There is a lot of sadness in what they have written about the 2003 and 2010 Nobel laureates in physics—Aleksey Abrikosov, Andrey Geim and Konstantin Novoselov, who are American citizens and former Soviet and Russian scientists: “Science was and remains profoundly national even if nationality is determined not so much by the type of blood of those who create it but by the ability of the state to offer them the best possible conditions. Creative personalities live, create and pay taxes on the territories with the best possible conditions. The gains of such states are obvious” (p. 371).

This means that we in Russia should work hard to offer similar, or even better, conditions. This is confirmed by Aleksandr Allakhverdian’s Appendix in which he relied on the latest statistic data to reveal the reasons and scopes of outflow of scientists from Russia.

ACADEMIC JOURNALS

Editorial note: We continue to inform you about the contents of the leading RAS journals specialized in Social Sciences and the humanities, which are published in Russian and confirm our readiness to help our readers order translations of any article mentioned below.

VESTNIK ROSSIYSKOY AKADEMII NAUK (Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences)

No. 5, 2018: *The Centenary of the Great 1917 Russian Revolution. The Scientific Results.* **S. Naryshkin.** Presentation by President of the Russian Historical Society S. Ye. Naryshkin; **A. Torkunov.** World Significance of the Great Russian Revolution of 1917; **Yu. Petrov.** The Great Russian Revolution: Problems of the Historical Memory; **M. Piotrovsky.** Winter Palace and Hermitage Museum as Witnesses of the Russian Revolution; **A. Artizov.** Domestic Archives and the Centenary of the Great Russian Revolution; **N. Kornienko.** Anniversaries of the October Revolution and Russian Literature of the Twentieth Century; **I. Tunkina.** The Academy of Sciences in 1917; **Al. Gromyko.** Greater Europe: Internal and External Security Threats.—Without Russia it will not be Possible. *Discussion of the Scientific Report*; **A. Guskov, D. Kosyakov, I. Selivanova.** Technique of Evaluating the Effectiveness of Scientific Organizations; **S. Pirozhkova.** Socio-Humanistic Support for Technological Development: What Should it Be Like?; **E. L. Konyavskaya.** An Integrated Approach to the Study of Ancient Rus; **A. A. Chibilyov, A. G. Ryabukha.** The Year of Ecology in Russia: the Academic Session of Geographers in the National Park Buzuluksky Bor; **A. Vorob'ev, I. Gitelson, P. Vorob'ev.** About the Northern Latitudinal Route.

No. 6, 2018: **A. Alekseev, N. Kuznetsova.** From Blind Faith in the Market to Market Planning; **M. Halizeva.** Scientific Diplomacy as an Element of “Soft Power”; **V. Kuznetsov.** The Study of Sedimentary Rock Formation Evolution as the Key to Solving a Number of General Geological Problems; **V. Makarov, A. Bakhtizin, E. Sushko, G. Sushko.** Modeling of Social Processes on Supercomputers: New Technologies; **B. Lavrovsky.** Investment Background of the Labor Productivity Acceleration; **E. Sverdlov.** Beware! High Impact Factor; **V. Rumyantsev, A. Izmailov, V. Drabkova, S. Kondratyev.** Current State and Problems of the Lake Fund of the European Part of Russia; **V. Polonsky, D. Moskovskaya, M. Arias-Vihil.** “He Was the Biography of His Epoch.” A. M. Gorky in the Context of World Culture of the XX Century; **I. Malakhova, M. Fedonkin.** 50 Years of the International Commission on the History of Geological Sciences. 1967-2017.

No. 7, 2018: **G. Korotaev.** Operational Oceanography—a New Branch of Modern Ocean Science; **N. Jurca, P. Minakir.** Methodological Foundations of Spatial Research in Economics; **V. Visotsky, A. Sarkisov.** Nuclear Accident on an Atomic Submarine in the Chazhma Bay. Reconstruction of Events and Analysis of Consequences; **V. Pisarenko.** The Concept of “Probability” and the Difficulties of Its Interpretation; **P. Trunov, N. Makhutov,**

A. Ageev, V. Zolotarev. Academic Science and Defense Are a Non-Alternative Bundle in the Interests of the State; **A. Terekhov.** Bibliometric Analysis of Publications in the Field of Semiconductor Nanostructures; **O. Bukharin.** Adaptive Strategies for the Interaction of the Pathogen and Host with Infection; **R. Shcherbakov.** Fun Game to Solve the Secrets of Nature. To the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of R. Feynman; **M. Yerokhin.** The Creator of Agroengineering Science. To the 150th Anniversary of the Birth of Honorary Academician V. P. Goryachkin; **N. Gindilis.** Academy of Sciences in the Period of Perestroika.

NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA (Modern and Contemporary History)

No. 5, 2018: **T. Chernikova.** Paradoxes of Europeanization by Peter the Great; **Zemtsov V.** Prince A. B. Kurakin and Russian Intelligence in Paris in 1812; **B. Achkinasi.** World War and Phenomenon of the National Block in France (1918-1919); **S. Knyazeva.** The Formation of Eurocommunism in Italy; **K. Belousova.** Eisenhower Doctrine and Intervention to Lebanon in 1958; **A. Savateev, K. Truevtsev, A. Vasiliev.** Middle East: The Facets of the Syrian Conflict; **A. Naumov, R. Pologevich.** “Soft Power” and Public Diplomacy of the People’s Republic of China at the Present Stage; **M. Lubart.** France in the Current Migration Crisis of 2015-2017; **G. Grebenshchikova.** Russia at the Teschen Congress; **S. Mulina.** Bar Confederates in Modern Polish Memory and Historiography; **I. Novichenko.** Standards and Society: On the Question of the History of Standardization; **I. Kremer.** The Case of the Diplomatic Dictionary; **P. Cherkasov.** Marshal MacMahon; **E. Susloparova.** Stafford Cripps (1889–1952). The Political Portrait.

No. 6, 2018: **T. Alentieva.** The Fight against Corruption in New York in the 1870s; **A. Sidorov.** Genesis of the Post-War International Trading System and the Vicissitudes of the Establishment of the ITO; **R. Simonyan.** The Birth of the Latvian State (to the 100th Anniversary of the First Republic); **V. Haifets, L. Haifets.** Between Havana and Moscow: The Cuban Revolution and the Split in the Latin American Left on the Question of Guerrilla Warfare; **E. Sherstyanoy.** Reform of the Soviet Occupation Policy in Germany at the Turn of 1946-1947; **L. Yanlik.** Left Parties and Movements of Turkey of the 1960s and 1970s and Their Relation to Armed Forms of Struggle; **N. Korovitsyna.** To Social and Class Changes in Eastern Europe after 1989; **N. Tanshina.** To the 150th Anniversary of Studying of the French Revolution in Russia: From Guerrier to “New Russian School”; **O. Romanko.** Four Years of Courage, Fortitude and Patience; **B. Petelin.** Helmut Kohl—Chancellor of German Unity; **E. Dabaghyan.** Michelle Bachelet—Twice President of Chile; **L. Ivkina.** Pages of Cuban History: Carlos Manuel de Céspedes—the First President of the First Cuban Republic; **I. Rodin.** Once in May: What do the Events of 1968 in France Mean after Half a Century.

ROSSIYSKAYA ISTORIYA (Russian History)

No. 1, 2018: **V. Kuchkin.** “Akhmat’s Word to Ivan” (On the Letter of 1480 from Akhmat the Khan of the Great Horde to Ivan III); **A. Mazurov.** Kolomna “Fun” of Ivan the Terrible in 1546: Some New Strokes to the Portrait of the Young Grand Duke; **S. Shamin, C. Jensen.** Foreign Entertainers at the Court of the First Moscow Tsars; **A. Efimov.** Peter’s I Monetary Reform in Historiography; **E. Neklyudov.** Forgotten Reform of Mining Industry in the 1860s: Conception and Implementation; **M. Mukhin.** The Financial Relationships Between the Aviation Industry and the Ministry of Armed Forces in 1945-1950; **D. Pavlov.** Russia’s Lease

of Chinese Kwantung (1898-1905): A Case of Modernizing Colonialism?; **E. Nazemtseva**. On the Threshold of War: Causes and Consequences of the Dismissal of Russian Personnel from the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1925; **V. Stepanov**. Count D. M. Solski: The Path of a Liberal Bureaucrat; **V. Kerov**. Old Believers in 1917; **V. Shelokhaev, K. Soloviev**. February in the Shadow of October (Historiography and Tasks for the Further Research); **F. Seleznev**. Revolution of 1917 in the Light of Modern Theories; **B. Kolonitsky**. The Year of Jubilee and Historians of Revolution.

No. 2, 2018: **V. Trepavlov**. A Diplomacy of Mutual Recognition: The Communication of Local Authorities and the Non-Slavic Population in the Eastern Regions of Russia; **G. Izbasarova, S. Lyubichankovskiy**. *Pristavstva* on the Outskirts of the Russian Empire in the 18th—First Half of the 19th Century: From a Single Administrator to a Management System; **E. Krestyannikov**. Judicial Reform in Siberia: Financial Aspects (Late 19th—Early 20th Century); **M. Kartashova**. General Administration of Land Use and Agriculture (GUZIZ) and the Development of Handicrafts in Eastern Russia in the Early 20th Century; **N. Burnasheva**. Transformation of the Bolshevik Economic Policy in Yakutia During the War Communism; **A. Petrov, A. Ermolaev**. The Significance of Kyakhta in the History of the Far East and Russian America; **S. Tkachev**. Koreans and Foreigners of the South Ussuri Region in the Census of V. N. Vislennov; **L. Khakhovskaya**. Gender Aspect of Social Reforms in Chukotka in the First Soviet Decades; **S. Zhuravlev**. The Great Russian Revolution and Finnish Independence: Reflections on an Occasion of Two Centenary Anniversaries; **J. Guseva, Z. Begasilova**. The Case of the “Pan-Islamic insurgent organization” in Central Asia, 1940; **A. Bachinskiy, K. Erusalimskiy, N. Kochekovskaya, M. Moiseyev**. Diplomatic Correspondence of Ivan the Terrible: Problems of Authorship, Storage and Existence; **O. Porshneva, M. Feldman**. Ascent of the Historian: S. V. Yarov and the Study of Industrial Workers in Russia.

No. 3, 2018: **S. Mironenko**. Russia on the Road to Modernization; **A. Miller**. What Kind of Modernization Should We Look for in Russian History?; **V. Zverev**. The Route of Searching, Losses, and Disappointments; **M. Davydov**. On the Problems of Russia’s Modernization; **A. Orlov**. British Influence on Ideas of Modernization in Russia in Early 19th Century; **N. Mitrofanov**. Russian Radio in 1917; **A. Golubev**. “Old Fellow, called Hearsay”: Informal Images of the External World in the Soviet Society of the 1920s; **N. Rogozhin**. Ambassadors’ Books of the 16th—17th Centuries (Composition and Content, Historiography and Publications); **B. Iliushin**. Kazan Campaign of 1506: Analysis of Preparations and Combat Actions; **K. Kochegarov**. The Artamon Matveyev Diplomatic Mission to the Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1657; **G. Kazakov**. The Trip of Pod’iachy Nikita Alexeyev to Sweden and Denmark in 1682; **G. Bibikov**. The Establishment of Gendarmerie Institutions in the Caucasus (1827-1844); **N. Mossaki**. Policy of Russia Towards the Kurdish Tribes on the Turkish-Russian Border During the Crimean War; **M. Volkhonskiy**. Abolition of the Governorship in the Caucasus in 1881-1882; **B. Karimov**. The Russian Red Cross Society and Assistance to Victims of the War in Lenkoran Uyezd in 1914-1916.

ETNOGRAFIЧЕСКОЕ ОБОЗРЕНИЕ (*Ethnographic Review*)

No. 3, 2018: **V. Gerasimova**. The Blood Libel in Jewish-Christian Relationships in the Smolensk Region in the 18th—Early 20th Centuries; **O. Belova**. Isofunctionality of the Ethnic-Cultural Stereotype (the Case of Folk Tales about “Blood Libel”); **S. Amosova**. Legends about Blood, Medical Libel: Old and New Motifs of the Blood Libel in Latgale;

I. Kuznetsov. The “Last Expedition” (From the History of US-Russian Collaboration in the Study of Indigenous Peoples); **S. Kan.** Yulia Averkieva and Franz Boas: Mutual Affection and Ideological Disagreements; **M. Hernández.** Anthropology and the Policy of Indigenism in Mexico in the 20th Century: Dialogues and Confrontations; **I. Verniaev.** The Ethnic and the Religious in the Old Believers Problem in the Mid-Late 19th Century; **T. Dronova, N. Plaksina.** The Old-Believer Icon of Lower Pechora: A Complex Study; **N. Dushakova.** Birth Rites among the Old Believers of the North-West Black Sea Region: Current Vernacular Beliefs; **E. Gudova.** “Well, That’s the Postal Service!”: How Organizations Produce Stories and Stories Shape Organizing; **N. Shutova.** “I Want to Kneel before the One Who Had Invented Pelmeni”: Issues of the Origin and Semantics of the Culinary Dish; **V. Gasilin, S. Gorbunov.** The Bear and Dog in Heathen Sanctuary Remains in the Mouth of the Agnevo River (Central Sakhalin).

No. 4, 2018: **D. Vorobiev.** Ethnozoology or the Interaction of Humans with the World of Fauna? (An Introduction); **N. Shishelov.** “When I Was a Little Pike”: Ichthyofauna in Folklore and the Fishing Magic among the Athabaskan of the Arctic Drainage Area; **A. Matusovskiy.** Pets of Indigenous Groups of Amazonia and Orinocia: Relationships between Humans and Animals; **D. Gvozdikov.** We-Alpha: Toward a Model of Social Organization of the Dog and Human; **A. Zakurdaev, I. Garri.** On the Forms of Manifestation of the National in the District Center Jinghong (PRC). Comments: **I. Garri.** Is There a Chinese Nation? Critical Comments on China-Centrism. **A. Zakurdaev.** A Response to Commenter; **M. Smirnova-Seslavinskaya.** Romani Groups Migrations and Formation of the Gypsy (Roma) Population in Russian Empire in the 17th–Early 20th Centuries; **M. Kappasov.** The Social and Economic Condition of the Nomadic Population in the Lbishchensk District of the Ural Region in the Early 20th Century; **S. Lim.** From the History of the Sakhalin Ainu—Forced Migrants, 1875–1948; **E. Kaziev.** The Concept of Bongænd in Payment Procedures for Murder in the 19th Century Ossetian Customary Law System; **I. Vinokurova, S. Minvaleev.** Commemorative Rituals of the Ludian Karelians: The Areal Characteristic among the Common and Local Traditions of the Neighboring Peoples; **A. Behr-Glinka.** Folk-Tale Type ATU411 in Eurasian Folk Tradition: Some Remarks to the “Typological Index of Folk-Tale Types” of H.-J. Uther.

VOPROSY FILOSOFII (Problems of Philosophy)

No. 3, 2018: **A. Kara-Murza, I. Prokhorova, O. Zhukova, T. Shchedrina, B. Pruzhinin.** Prince Peter Andreevich Vyazemsky and the Historical Fates of Russia (to the 225th Birth Anniversary). The Materials of the International Conference; **I. Matsevich-Dukhan.** An Aesthetics of Gesture in Creative Society: le je-ne-sais-quoi; **V. Lysenko.** To Memory of Vyacheslav Vsevolodovich Ivanov (August 21, 1979—October 7, 2017); **V. Arshinov, V. Budanov.** The Network Concept in the Optics of the Paradigm of Synergetic Complexity; **E. Grebenshchikova.** Socio-Technical Imaginaries of Techno-Science; **V. Belov.** The Method of the Infinitesimal as the Principle of the Theory of Knowledge in Systematic Constructions of H. Cohen; **L. Bertolino.** Die Infinitesimalmethode bei Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig und Gilles Deleuze; **A. Malinov.** From the Letters of V. Rozanov (Epistolary Comment). **V. Rozanov.** Some Letters; **D. Bugai.** About the New Edition of Plato’s *Parmenides*; **I. Tantlevskij.** Theological and Natural Philosophy Monism of Xenophanes of Colophon, Attested in Aristotle’s, Cicero’s and Sextus Empiricus’s Works, as One of Possible Sources of the Formation of Spinoza’s Monistic Conception; **M. Soboleva.** How Do We Read Kant, or Kant in the Context of Contemporary Epistemological Discussions in Western Analytic Kant-

Studies; **V. Marchenkov, M. Bykova.** A Dialogue between Philosophical Traditions: The Life and Work of James Scanlan; **E. Simonova-Gudzenko.** Mandala as a Source for the History of Japanese Spatial Notions; **A. Dulina.** About “Origin” of the Hachiman Deity in the Writings of Monk Nichiren; **E. Skvortsova, A. Lutsy.** On the Views of the Japanese Enlightener Nishi Amane; **A. Bertova.** Development of the Concept of the Kingdom of God in the Thought of Ebina Danjo; **A. Meshcheryakov.** Yanagita Kunio and His Ethnology in the World Picture of Post-War Japan; **V. Artemov.** Morality and Law. Ethical and Philosophical Interpretation and a Practice of Converging; **O. Masloboeva, K. Pigrov, M. Silantieva, E. Trofimova.** The National Element and Creation: Time and Transgression (The Review of an International Science Conference).

No. 4, 2018: **I. Evlampiev.** The Origins and Meaning of Russian Anarchism; **A. Pigalev.** The Metaphysics as a Structural Model of Scarcity and the Post-Metaphysical Symbolic Economies; **M. Sushchin.** In Defense of the Hypothesis of Internal Representations in Modern Research on Perception and Cognition; **V. Tomalintsev.** Consciousness: the Hidden Mechanisms of Formation and Development; **K. Antonov.** Concepts “Culture” and “Politics” in the Philosophy of Early S. L. Frank: the Problem of Their Interrelation in the Context of Spiritual and Intellectual Biography of the Thinker; **O. Ermishin.** Political Philosophy of B. V. Yakovenko; **A. Simakin, A. Surmava.** The Last Fight of the Sixtier; **A. Maydanskyy, E. Illesh.** Historism in Psychology; **N. Afanasov.** To the Understanding of Social World’s Status (Reflections on the Book); **A. Ermichyov.** On a Substantial Peculiarity of our Philosophy (Reflections on “Diversity and entirety of Russian philosophy” by M. A. Maslin); **R. Pskhu, L. Kryshchop.** The Theme of Teaching and Learning in India, China and Europe; **G. Oberhammer.** Yadava Prakasa, Forgotten Teacher of Ramanuja; **S. Pakhomov.** The Notion of Dharma in the Mahanirvāṇa-tantra; **T. Skorokhodova.** Life, Creation and Immortality: Eschatology in Philosophical Thought of Devendranath and Rabindranath Tagores; **V. Zhdanov.** The Transformation Model of Cosmogogenesis in Ancient Egyptian Religious Texts: from Becoming to Being; **I. Belaya.** Daoist’s Nuns in Beijing: the Development of the Women’s Monastery Tradition of the Quanzhen School in 13th—14th Centuries; **N. Safronova.** Interpretations of Fr. Hölderlin’s Poetry by M. Heidegger: the Quest for das Gedichtete; **K. Dolgov.** Personality of a Scientist and Philosopher (About Bonifaty Kedrov); **I. Blauberger.** The Lessons of Micro-History. About Vitaly Gorokhov and His Book; **S. Gorbunov.** Schweitzer and Gandhi: The Ahimsa Factor.

No. 5, 2018: **B. Pruzhinin, F. Azhimov, I. Bendersky et al.** Historical Reconstruction in Humanitarian Research: Methodological Possibilities and Problems. Materials of the Round-Table; **I. Kucuradi.** The Concept of Human Dignity and Human Rights; **A. Veretevskaya.** On the Danger of Political Myths for Societal Development (the Example of the Multiculturalism Myth in Europe); **S. Bochkarev.** On the Physical and Metaphysical Basics of Criminal Law Protection of Life; **V. Bychkov.** On the Spirituality in Art; **V. Pronskikh.** Big Science Collaboration as a Challenge to Transcendental Subject; **P. Galison.** The Collective Author; **G. Yudin.** Utilitarianism and Communitarianism: Two Approaches to Biotechnological Human Enhancement; **M. Sekatskaya.** Necessary and Sufficient Criteria of Personal Identity; **K. Barsht.** “The Brothers Karamazov” by F. M. Dostoevsky: Non-Euclidean Geometry and the Question of Overcoming an Evil; **G. Drach.** The History of One Report; **Vorontsov S.** Origo in De ecclesiasticis officiis of Isidore of Seville; **Tumanian T.** Treatise of al-Mawardi al-Ahkam as-sultaniyya as a Source of the Political Theory of Islam.—Laws of Power and Religious Government. Excerpts from the Chapter “On Assertion of Imam” [Translation]; **K. Karpov.** Convertibility of Transcendentals: The Paradigm of Albert the Great; **S. Liubimov.** Niccolo Machiavelli’s Religious Thought in the Modern Interpretations: Comparative Analysis.

CHELOVEK
(*Human Being*)

No. 5, 2018: **P. Tishchenko.** “What is Man?” Answering Kant’s Question; **O. Soina, V. Sabirov.** An Ordeal by Goodness: Praxeological and Metaphysical Aspects; **D. Andreyuk, E. Makhyanova.** Neuro-Physiological Mechanisms and Evolutionary Sense of the Empathy; **A. Zapesotskiy, A. Markov.** In the Midst of the Fundamental Transformation. Reflection on the Proceedings of Likhachev Readings; **I. Sledzevskiy.** In Pursuit of Redemption: New Meanings and Values of the African Religious Experience; **S. Malkov.** B. Yudin in the Perspective of the Domestic Tradition of Interdisciplinary Studies; **V. Anan’ev.** A Human Being and an Object in Contemporary Concepts of Foreign Museology: The Change of Paradigms?; **A. Lipkin, Y. Sineokaya.** Contemporary Science and Its Place in the Culture; **L. Kiyashchenko, M. Kiseleva.** The Human in a Cross-Disciplinary Space of Humanitarian Knowledge; **I. Evlampiev.** The Echo of Tolstoy in S. L. Frank’s Post-Revolutionary Ethics; **S. McReynolds.** “You can buy the whole world”: the problem of redemption in *The Brothers Karamazov*.

No. 6, 2018: **M. Frolova.** Humanist Futurology: J. Naisbitt and I. T. Frolov; **D. Andreyuk, E. Makhyanova.** Towards Homo Socialis: Information Brokerage and Social Engineering; **R. Belyaletdinov.** Biotechnological Moral Enhancement; **I. Ashmarin.** The Music and the Plastic Arts: Constants, Senses, Sensations; **A. Shipilov.** On the Parataxis and the Hypotaxis: The Structural Contrarity of Early and Later Cultures (From the Example of Antiquity); **V. Khachaturian.** Kabbalah in the Era of Post-Modern: The Tradition and Innovations; **V. Krzhevov, V. Mezhev.** Is the Philosophy of History Needed Today?; **N. Volkova, Y. Sineokaya, A. Gaginsky.** Does Philosophy Discover Something New?; **M. Korzo.** On Forms and Content of Moral Precepts in the Catholic Devotional Literature of the Early Modern; **A. Voronin.** O Sport, You Are...; **A. Nikulin.** Chayanov’s Pedagogics; **S. Shultz.** Akhmatova and Seneca.

PSYKHOLOGICHESKY ZHURNAL
(*Psychological Journal*)

No. 2, 2018: **T. Meleshko.** Andrey Vladimirovich Brushlinsky: The Line of Life; **E. Sergienko.** The Principle of Development in the Works of A. V. Brushlinsky and Its Modern Realization; **N. Kharlamenkova.** Psychology of the Subject and Its Development in Modern Researches of Social Support Phenomenon; **V. Znakov.** Theory of Mental as Process and Logical-Semantic World Picture; **M. Shchukina.** Heuristics of the Subject Approach in the Psychological Consciousness of Personal Self-Development; **A. Zhuravlev, A. Yurevich, I. Mironenko.** Psychological Science in the Global World: Challenges and Prospects; **E. Golubeva.** About Study of Reactivity, Strength and Inertia of Nervous System in B. M. Teplov—V. D. Nebylitsyn School; **A. Kibrik.** Russian Multichannel Discourse. Part II. A Corpus Development and Avenues of Research; **A. Danilova.** Mathematic Modeling of Cultural-Historic Processes Based on Data of Narrative Sources’ Analysis; **S. Kurginyan, E. Osavolyuk.** The Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (CFI): Adaptation for Russian-Speaking Sampling; **N. Chuprikova.** Prospects for Psycho-Physiological Problem Solving: Brain Activity, Psyche and Phenomena of Consciousness.

No. 3, 2018: **D. Leontiev.** Ilya Prigogine and the Psychology of 21st Century; **T. Gavrilova.** Five Death Attitudes: Age-Sex Differences and Cross-Cultural Comparisons; **J. Krasavtseva, T. Kornilova.** Emotional and Academic Intelligence as Strategy Predictors in the IOWA Gambling Task; **M. Filippova, D. Kostina, M. Mezentseva.** The Recognition Dynamics for Unnoticed Meanings of Ambiguous Figures; **M. Baleva, V. Gasimova, G. Kovaleva.** Cognitive

Mechanisms of Stereotyping the Other; **T. Berezina, V. Ekimova, A. Kokurin, E. Orlova.** Extreme Image of Behavior as Factor of Individual Life Expectancy; **T. Martsinkovskaya, E. Kiseleva.** The Problem of Positive Socialization in Modern Multicultural World; **T. Grechenko, A. Kharitonov, A. Zhegallo.** Invariant Frequencies of Biorhythms of Living Organisms of the Different Evolutionary Age; **Z. Rezazadeh, L. Bayanova, E. Gilemkhanova.** Adaptation of the Test "Attitude to Observance of Moral Standards" on the Sample of Russian Students; **A. Voronin.** Psychology of Discursive Capabilities: Vectors of Development; **E. Sergienko.** Psychology is a Science of the Future; **S. Morozova.** Threats of Isolation of Russian Psychology in the Future.

OBSHCHESTVENNIYE NAUKI I SOVREMENNOST (ONS)

(Social Sciences and Contemporary World)

No. 4, 2018: **V. Kleiner.** Systematic Corruption Requires Systematic Approaches in Combating It; **A. Kazun, M. Titova.** Fifty Shades Lighter: How Raiding in Russia Changed from 2011 to 2015?; **O. Kapinus.** Criminalization and Decriminalization of Acts: Finding the Best Balance; **A. Obolonsky.** Liberal vs. Bureaucratic Mentalities and Russian Transformations at the End of 20th—Beginning of 21st Century; **L. Byzov.** The Formation and History of "New Russia" through the Prism of Contemporary Social Contradictions; **S. Chuvashov, D. Dubrov, Z. Lepshokova, A. Tatarko.** Socio-Psychological Capital of the Person and Acculturation Expectations (the Example of Russian Muscovites); **E. Churilova, A. Puur, R. Leen, L. Sakkeus, S. Zakharov.** Fertility in Russia and Estonia: Differences among Russians in Russia and in Estonia and Native Estonians; **D. Rogozin.** Acceptance of Pain in an Older Age; **O. Bessonova.** Integral-Institutional Paradigm and the Russian Way: Overcoming the Defects of the Concepts of "Power-Property" and "X-Y matrices"; **A. Verevkin.** The 21st Century and the "Outdated Philosophy" (On the Jubilee Report to the Club of Rome); **A. Shastitko.** Structural Uncertainty and Institutions.

No. 5, 2018: **E. Mączyńska.** Role of State in Economy: From the Time of Adam Smith to the Digital Revolution; **J. Kleer.** Cultural System and Development; **A. Romashina, P. Chistyakov, M. Dmitriev.** The Role of Spatial Policy in Acceleration of Economic Growth; **V. Gel'man.** Exceptions and Rules: Success Stories and Bad Governance in Russia (part 1); **A. Sungurov.** Experts and Expertise in Russia: From "Objective Device" to Active Citizen; **A. Kazun, K. Semykina.** The Struggle of Putin and Navalny for a Media Agenda; **I. Ionov.** Transformation of Historical Theories at the Decline of the USSR and in Post-Soviet Russia; **L. Andreeva.** The Cult of Revolutionary Martyrs and the Cult of V. I. Lenin; **A. Teslia.** Spirit of University; **N. Radina.** The Phenomenon of "Closedness" in the Citation Networks of Regional Scientific Events: Scientific Schools, Invisible College, Scientific Cliques; **A. Pavlov.** Social Theory: Postmodern Turn—and Modernist Turn Out; **O. Shemyakina.** Traditional Culture in a Polycentric World. Article 1. Traditional Culture and Modernity: Possibilities and Conditions of Dialogue; **A. Davydov.** Between Pushkin and Dostoevsky: Poem "The Gypsies" and Comments on it.

POLITICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (POLIS)

(Political Studies)

No. 3, 2018: **A. Arbatov.** Threats to Strategic Stability—Imaginary and Real; **G. Fedorov.** Russian Federation in the Baltic Region: Political Relations and Economic Development in 1992–2017; **V. Kolosov, M. Zotova, F. Popov, A. Gritsenko, A. Sebentsov.** Russia's Post-

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GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO (*The State and Law*)

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VOPROSY EKONOMIKI (Problems of Economics)

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SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (SOTSIS) (*Sociological Studies*)

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VOSTOK (Oriens)

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VOPROSY LITERATURY (Problems of Literature)

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VOPROSY YAZYKOZNANIYA (Problems of Linguistics)

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