

# Russia and India in the Indo-Pacific

Sergey Lunev<sup>\*</sup>  
Ellina Shavlay<sup>†</sup>

---

The new world system endowed the biggest semi-peripheral countries, most notably India, with a special role. Along with China, India appears to be transforming into a specific subsystem of international relations where both Asian giants can become competitors to the United States in the struggle for leadership. In this sense, history is repeating itself, with rivals appearing at the periphery. The international community still does not recognize India's status as a global power. Its realpolitik is still poor and the country follows a balancing strategy dating from the bipolar era. However, the Indo-Pacific region is a key direction of Indian foreign policy and it is deepening engagement with East Asia, thus making it easier to analyze the national interests of the country, its limits and opportunities, and the state of cooperation or contradiction with such global actors as the United States and China. The Asia-Pacific is also a vital region for Russia's national interests, but Moscow's political and economic presence is thus far more declarative than real. India is a natural and objective ally of the Russian Federation. However, the joint activities of India and Russia in the Indo-Pacific will be limited, primarily due to their different approaches toward relations with China.

---

**Key words:** balancing, China, India, Indo-Pacific, Russia

新的世界体系赋予了最大的半外围国家，尤其是印度这一特殊角色。不仅是中国，印度似乎也正在转变为国际关系中的一个特定子系统，在这个子系统中，两个亚洲大国都可以成为美国在争夺领导地位斗争中的竞争对手。从这个意义上说，历史正在重演，而竞争对手则在周边地区渐渐崛起。国际社会仍然不承认印度作为一个全球大国的地位。它的现实政治仍然是贫穷的，这个国家遵循的平衡战略可以追溯到两极时代。然而，作为印度外交政策的一个重要方向，印太地区正在加深与东亚的来往，这有助于使分析该国的利益，局限与机遇，其与美国和中国等全球参与者之间的合作或矛盾状态变得更为容易。亚太地区也是俄罗斯国家利益的重要区域，但俄罗斯的政治和经济影响远比现实更具有宣示性。印度作为俄罗斯联邦客观存在的盟友，其和俄罗斯在印太地区的联合活动将会受到限制，主要原因是由于两国针对对华关系采取的做法有所不同。

---

**关键词:** 平衡, 中国, 印度, 印太地区, 俄罗斯

---

<sup>\*</sup>Sergey Lunev is Professor at the Department of Oriental Studies of Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University) and at the Department of International Relations of the National Research University Higher School of Economics.

<sup>†</sup>Ellina Shavlay is a doctoral candidate at National Research University Higher School of Economics.

El nuevo sistema mundial dotó a los países semi-periféricos más grandes, especialmente a India, con un papel especial. Junto con China, India parece estar transformándose en un subsistema específico de relaciones internacionales donde los dos gigantes asiáticos pueden convertirse en competidores de Estados Unidos en la lucha por el liderazgo. En este sentido, la historia se repite con los rivales que aparecen en la periferia. La comunidad internacional aún no reconoce el estatus de la India como una potencia global. Su realpolitik sigue siendo pobre y el país sigue una estrategia de equilibrio que data de la era bipolar. Sin embargo, la región del Indo-Pacífico es una dirección clave de la política exterior de India y está profundizando el compromiso con Asia Oriental, lo que facilita el análisis de los intereses del país, sus beneficios y oportunidades, y el estado de cooperación o contradicción con tales Actores globales como Estados Unidos y China. La región de Asia y el Pacífico también es una región vital para los intereses nacionales de Rusia, pero la presencia política y económica de Moscú es mucho más declarativa que real. India es un aliado natural y objetivo de la Federación Rusa. Sin embargo, las actividades conjuntas de India y Rusia en el Indo-Pacífico serán limitadas, principalmente debido a sus diferentes enfoques hacia las relaciones con China.

---

**Palabras clave:** Balanceo, China, India, Indo-Pacífico, Rusia

### **The role of Greater East Asia for Russia**

The concept of an “Indo-Pacific” appeared about 10 years ago, reflecting drastic changes in Asia, including a sharp rebound of China as well as other actors—primarily India. India welcomed an Indo-Pacific concept that was already in the official discourse of Australia as a reflection of India’s heightened role for both Australia and Asia (Frost, 2016, p. 161). The concept was also used by Indonesia (Koldunova, 2014). In 2017, during his first trip to Asia, Donald Trump used the term “Indo-Pacific” several times instead of the more familiar “Asia” or “Asia-Pacific.”

The concept appears to coincide largely with a theory of the creation of “The Greater East Asia” (North-East Asia, South-East Asia, Central, and South Asia), which has long been supported by experts from MGIMO University of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, primarily from an economic, cultural, and civilizational perspective. In the Greater East Asia region, economic interdependence is generally complementary. The regional states include all three models of economic development—post-industrial, industrial, and resource (Voskresenskiy, 2010, pp. 110–113). Japan developed a “knowledge-based economy,” and was followed by South Korea (which ranked first in the Bloomberg Innovation Index for four years) (Jamrisko & Lu, 2017), Taiwan, and Singapore. The world’s manufacturing industry has already moved from Europe and North America to East and South Asia. The macroregion which includes the Asian part of Russia, Central Asia, and individual countries of Southeast Asia, has over a third of the world’s raw materials.

The region already sees the beginnings of economic integration processes; Greater East Asia is demonstrating a steady growth in regional turnover share. All regional organizations—from the ASEAN, ASEAN Plus arrangements, to the East Asia Summit (EAS)—aim at gradually reducing trade tariffs within the region, as well as lifting import restrictions to the point of creating a free trade

zone. The shift to monetary and financial integration has started, although there is a long way to go to arrive at a single currency.

Economic integration ties are quite profitable for the macroregional countries. Three Asian giants (China, India, and Japan, but especially China) advocate for expanding economic cooperation. China considers East Asia its sphere of influence, and is determined to form and modernize free trade zones with all other regional countries, i.e. Japan, South Korea, India, and ASEAN member states. Economic integration serves China's interests by facilitating the PRC's soft economic overlapping of Southeast Asia, with Beijing expecting to take on the leadership role in the region.

After the collapse of the USSR, East Asia was not a priority for Russia's foreign policy. Yevgeny Primakov who was Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1996, then Prime Minister in 1998, later brought changes to Russian foreign policy toward Asia—primarily in relations with India and China which became important elements of his strategy to balance Russian partners in both the West and East.

During his visit to India in December 1998 as prime minister, he was the first in the post-bipolar world to openly declare the idea of a triple alliance between Russia, China, and India, a concept which had been put forward by Joseph Stalin nearly a century ago (Stalin, 1947, p. 372). Russia's original perception of East Asia emphasized the military and strategic dimension, as overwhelmingly based on Soviet tradition. Russia was not satisfied with the regional security system based primarily on the American bilateral alliances in the region. But the accelerated development of China and India had led to their steady emergence as independent centers of power, thus substantially reconfiguring the whole international system. The triple alliance proposal indicated Russia's "Pivot to Asia," although for explicit progress in this direction, Russia required a change of the power balance. After all, it was the developed countries that had rejected Russia, prompting it to change its foreign policy line and look for new partners primarily among large Asian countries (Lukin, 2016, p. 578). By the year 1996, Russia had become a participant in the ASEAN dialogue; in 1997, it joined the APEC; and in 2010, it entered the EAS.

Russia's increased involvement in economic integration was based on the fact that, by the start of the century, the Far East and East Siberia had already become much more oriented toward Asia rather than toward other parts of Russia. But its economic ties with the region were concentrated on the energy field. Moscow had to take full control of those processes, expand beyond the resource interests, and transform them so as not to lose the aforementioned macroeconomic regions in the future.

Its turn to Asia was a valuable opportunity to raise Russia's international stature and recover the global power status that it had lost in the 1990s. Moscow's active participation in the region created new possibilities for using relations with certain Asian countries with whom it had developed trust during Soviet times. Asia can also become a resource to help overcome disputes dividing Russia and the West. In fact, Russia remains one of the few countries in the world that is not in serious contradiction with East Asia. Russia's presence does not provoke irritation. On the contrary, many countries are seeking its favor—preconditioned by its resource potential, the possibility of using the Russian Federation as a political balance against other major powers, and the absence of a colonialist past.

Yet, the real understanding of the value of East Asia came only by the second decade of the century. The early 2010s marked a drastic transformation of Russia's policy in the Asia-Pacific. Many politicians and experts felt Russia needed more diversified relations with East Asia, among other things, to avoid excessive dependence on China. Indeed, Russian diplomacy has taken several steps to revitalize relations with Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam. A case in point was that in 2013, for the first time in history, Russian-Japanese relations saw a strategic dialogue in a "2 + 2" framework (i.e., simultaneous meetings of foreign ministers and defense ministers of the two parties).

Japan's stagnating economic growth and potential transition into a middle power at the regional level could open additional cooperation opportunities for both sides. Though strategically and politically inclined toward an alliance with the United States, Japan had to find other mechanisms to maintain its leading role in solving regional problems. Increasingly losing space for maneuver due to China's rise, Japan could very well consider a partnership with Russia as one such mechanism, in exchange for supporting Russia in its aspiration to strengthen its position in Asia-Pacific. Japan and South Korea remained the most likely candidates in East Asia to become Russia's partners in modernization. Russian-Korean relations meet the criteria for such a partnership; Russia and South Korea enjoy a high level of bilateral trade, as well as participate in joint projects in space and atomic energy. Russia took part in establishing the South Korean Naro Space Center and launching KSLV-1. Apart from trade diversification, Russia is seeking the expansion of technological and industrial cooperation with South Korea. Meanwhile, South Korea hopes that strengthened economic ties with Russia would help it win a more assertive Russian stance on North Korea.

In 2012, Russia's and Vietnam's bilateral cooperation had developed into a comprehensive partnership. At that time, bilateral ties covered trade, development of oil and gas joint ventures in Russia and Vietnam, negotiations on a free trade zone, and a project to construct the first atomic power plant in Vietnam. Russian investments engage with over a hundred projects in Vietnam. The free trade zone with Vietnam, as a model for a free trade zone with ASEAN as a whole, has been a topic of many discussions.

In 2014, India's and China's importance to Russia experienced significant growth inasmuch as Moscow could rely only on Beijing and New Delhi as a means of easing tensions with the West. The Russian Federation is aware that Russia, China, India, and other large non-Western countries have quite similar approaches to world order and positions on global political and economic problems (which, for instance, determined the emergence of BRICS). For these nations, independent foreign policy had always been a major goal; subordination to anyone runs counter to their plans. Besides, these giants do not relate to the privileged part of the world economic system and are thus not at all enthusiastic about the rules of the game imposed by developed countries.

Some aspects of the Western reaction to the Ukrainian crisis literally forced Russia to develop a strategic partnership with China (Lukin, 2018). Nonetheless, the Russian elite still remain pro-European, manifesting more through an increased skepticism over the United States and less with Western Europe. It spawned ideas for a possible divide between two global centers, and Russia's

emergence as a European partner. The Russian establishment still strongly believes in a Europe-centric “ideal model,”—clearly suffering from an inferiority complex as compared to Europe, and traditionally pessimistic about its own country, which has always engendered real cynicism (in pre-revolutionary times, during the Soviet period, and up until now).

However, the Russian elite are limited by drastic changes in Russian public opinion. From 2014 to 2017, a study by Russia’s Levada Center noted that the public’s negative assessments of the European Union showed a threefold increase, with two-thirds of the respondents impelling the Russian elite to change its approach. According to the Center’s reports on “Non-Profit Organizations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent,” the attitude toward the EU slightly improved in late 2017 (15% hold a *very negative* view of Europe; 39%, *negative*). Nevertheless, 14% called the EU the main enemy of the country. The attitude toward the United States is even worse, with 68% of Russians perceiving it as an overt foe. Only 24% of Russian citizens see the United States in a positive light.<sup>1</sup> This negative attitude toward the superpower has prevailed in the Russian Federation within both society and the elite. Russia-United States economic ties have not acquired exceptional dimensions; and the business elite is not particularly interested in ties with the United States. The Russian establishment does not suffer much from American sanctions. In effect, all the stereotypes of Soviet times, when the United States was the USSR’s chief enemy, have now been resurrected.

Amid worsening Russian relations with the United States and Europe,<sup>2</sup> one trend has emerged: Moscow started to attach greater significance to China. This began when Vladimir Putin first used the phrase “an unprecedentedly high level”<sup>3</sup> in describing bilateral ties. Previously, the prevailing view in Russia had been that China was more a competitor than a partner in terms of integration into the international community. The Russian Federation had to adapt to a new international context: one where China had already projected itself as a global actor with its own well-defined interests that are quite different from Russia’s; and one that it was ready to support economically. Still, Moscow’s approaches to China were quite cautious.

After the overt conflict between Russia and the West erupted in 2014, public opinion toward China saw significant improvement. Data from 2006 showed 48% of Russians calling the P.R.C. a friendly state and 30% holding a different point of view. By 2015, China had won the sympathy of 80% of Russians. Only Belorussia achieved better results (i.e., 81%); however, Belorussia had more negative assessments (11%, as compared with China’s 8%).<sup>4</sup> 46.3% of Russians regarded China as the main ally with which all types of relationships are to be developed (in 2004, only 7.6% favored a coalition with the P.R.C.).

However, both sides lacked in definitive actions to develop strategic cooperation, resulting in diminished Russian sympathy toward China rather rapidly. In 2016, just 34% of respondents defined China as Russia’s main friend (compared with Belorussia, 50% and Kazakhstan, 39%) (The residents of Russia consider the United States, Ukraine, and Turkey to be the main opponents, 2016). Russian experts say that Chinese banks (excluding the state-owned Eximbank and Development Bank) have, in fact, joined the Western sanctions against Russia and started to either refrain from issuing loans to Russian banks and other economic

entities or toughened their terms and conditions for doing so. Many Russians were reportedly forced to close their accounts with Chinese banks. Some Russian experts have also observed that in the last two years, Chinese economic entities exploited Russia's economic problems to try to harden their negotiating positions with Russian partners in general.

There are also complaints with regard to a specific implementation of China's "Silk Road Economic Belt," and its compatibility with the Eurasian Economic Union. Regarding China's energy connections with Central Asia, China has recently found no substantial opposition in Russia. But that is not the case with its pipeline extension to Iran, Turkey, and Europe, which would be considered by Russia as "anti-Russian," and similar to the American concept of a "New Silk Road" (with the Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor project TRACECA having to pass the territory of Russia).

In terms of the transportation component, China pays little attention to the Northern Corridor construction (China-Central Asia-Russia-EU countries) and sees Russia's transit potential only as a railway network for its Central region (Urumqi-Almaty-Orenburg-Kazan-Moscow-Saint Petersburg-Europe).<sup>5</sup> Many experts fail to understand why the already existing transport corridor between the P.R.C. and the E.U.—namely the Harbin Railway—Trans-Siberian Railway Moscow-Vladivostok, which, at 9,298.2 km, is the world's longest railroad to date and is completely electrified—in fact remains off the radar.

Disappointment about cooperation with the West remains Russia's and China's common ground. After the 2008 economic crisis, the P.R.C. expected from the United States and Europe greater understanding of Chinese core interests, given that China took several steps to boost the world economy during the crisis. However, the reality has not met expectations. The West remained critical of the state of human rights in China, especially with regard to the situation in Tibet. In 2010–2011, United States-China contradictions in the Asia-Pacific became particularly acute with the United States supporting the Philippines and Vietnam in territorial disputes with the PRC over islands in the South China Sea. The conflict that seemed to have been latent for some time contributed to the escalation of another territorial dispute—between China and Japan over islands in the East China Sea. The outcome was an active global and regional discussion over China becoming more aggressive in international affairs. In general, Russia supposes China would be the United States' main rival for quite a long time.

At least in the medium term, Russia's and China's interest in working together is bound to prevail over their contradictions. However, the Russia-China strategic partnership is still largely determined by a tactical rather than a truly strategic vision of bilateral relations. Improved Russian relations with the West would likely lead to weakened Russia-China ties, inasmuch as Russia's confrontation with the West was the major factor for the very rapid changes in the country's foreign policy.

### **The Indo-Pacific in India's foreign policy**

India failed to build complementary interdependence with its neighboring countries of South Asia; hence, it values highly the development of economic ties with East Asia. At the beginning of the post-bipolar period, India had proclaimed the "Look East" policy which implied a strengthening of its position

in East Asia; however, the Indian economic model is different from East Asia's export-oriented model and to date, India and East Asia are not particularly interconnected. In contrast, India's strategic partnerships with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, along with its strategic dialogue with Vietnam, are viewed by its government as a key barrier to the spread of Chinese influence (Blank, Moroney, Rabasa, & Lin, 2015, p. 95), adding a strategic dimension to India-East Asia interrelations.

Even during the bipolar Cold War period, India's position had strengthened in the southern and southwestern parts of the Indian Ocean, where the country's increasing military and naval power did not threaten the vital interests of global powers. In these least developed regions, India could fill gaps in low-technological needs and trigger some economic and political integration of those countries. Most countries with direct access to the Indian Ocean have India as one of their major markets. Indian capital, both state-owned and private, has experienced active outflow and a number of joint venture companies have been established. One should also take into consideration India's long-standing cultural ties as well as the large number of Indian expatriates in many countries in the Indian Ocean.

India's lengthy and porous maritime border (6,100 km), vulnerable seaports, far away insular territories (up to 2,000 km from the mainland), the importance of maritime traffic for external trade, and its traditional connections to many island states of the Indian Ocean help explain India's need for rapid deployment of its naval forces. These have, pre-determined India's long-standing position against militarization of the Indian Ocean by the navies of the great powers (primarily, the United States and former USSR), and its desire to strengthen its own position instead (Bratersky & Lunyov, 1990, pp. 936–937).

The post-bipolar world somewhat changed the situation. Delhi's intention to elevate its stature among developing countries significantly weakened as India lost its *de facto* status as a spokesman for their interests. In this regard, India has become less active in international affairs, focusing more on the domestic economy. Indian diplomacy has become more spot-oriented (focused on the development of relations primarily with specific countries and regions), with East Asia being one of the key targets. Following the Cold War, India declared the "Look East Policy"—primarily for Southeast Asia, then starting from the third implementation phase of the initiative, for North East Asia, as well.

In 1993, sectoral dialogue relations between ASEAN and India were established; and in 1995, India was given full-fledged partner status. The first ASEAN + India summit was held in November 2002. India also became one of the 16 participating countries at the first EAS, which took place in Malaysia in December 2005. The launch of the Mekong-Ganges forum brought together India and five ASEAN countries, namely Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. In 1997, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) organization was formed, linking Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand in joint economic projects. However, the aforementioned initiatives have not brought the expected results. In 2007, India even canceled the heads of governments' meeting that was to be held in Delhi after Bangladesh found it impossible to

participate; even though a decision to set the special free trade zone was intended to be made during the meeting.

India's relations with Southeast Asia are very similar to China's ties with South Asia. For the smaller countries, the "neighboring giant" (India for South Asia, China for Southeast Asia) is both a promising economic partner and a security threat. As such, Southeast Asian countries welcome strengthening ties with India while balancing policy by relying on other regional (India and Japan) and extraregional powers (primarily the United States).

India constantly reassures China that its linkages to ASEAN countries do not run counter to the P.R.C. But Indian policy itself, as well as some Southeast Asian states' intention to use Delhi as a counterweight to Beijing, will inevitably mean attempts toward relative weakening of the PRC's position in the region. This, in turn, will lead to complicated relations with India. Nowadays, Delhi's political and economic stature in Indonesia and Vietnam has risen, notably on the basis of anti-Chinese sentiment. Indian government officials and experts believe in the so-called Chinese "String of Pearls" strategy whereby Beijing allegedly intends to build military bases in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan—with the intention of gaining access to the Indian Ocean directly through the Bay of Bengal. However, that concept has no real substance; China did not even build a naval base in Gwadar, Pakistan as was speculated (Khurana, 2008). As of today, China's position in Southeast Asia is substantially more solid than that of India due to the relatively limited Indian influence over Greater East Asia. Given current developments and its limited resources, India will be unable to compete on equal terms with other great powers (Voskresenskiy, 2010, p. 103); thus, one can characterize India's impact in the region as small, though gradually growing (Cohen, 2002, pp. 25–27).

India's participation in regionalization, which covers two completely different phenomena—the revival of regional powers, and formation of regional integration groupings—is of great interest. The simultaneity of these processes is fairly contradictory but, in a post-bipolar world, no longer opposes each other as it did during the bipolar period. Globalization and regionalization are both interconnected and conflicting since all countries are both objects and subjects of the two processes (Buzan & Weaver, 2003; Godehardt & Nabers, 2011; Nel, Nabers, & Hanif, 2012). Regionalization responds better to individual countries' economic interests, as well as political, social, and cultural, interests. Herewith, there are enough facts to consider regionalization as a final goal rather than an intermediate stage toward globalization, which means it can become an obstacle to the further development of globalization. An interim version, and therefore more likely, is the gathering of "old" regions into macroregional complexes (Voskresenskiy, 2010).

Although India is interested, support for pan-regional integration is not the most serious priority for Indian economic policy. First of all, India's economic relations with South and East Asia are underdeveloped. Before the global crisis, India experienced an extremely fast export growth to Southeast Asia (over 30% a year) and a considerable increase in import from Northeast Asia (25–40% annually). However, negative trade phenomena related to economic difficulties and the overall global crisis have been noted in past years. India's external trade with East Asia stood at 27.8% of India's total trade turnover in 2009–2010, but showed

a decrease of 18.4% in 2014–2015<sup>6</sup> although it has risen tremendously in more recent years (Table 1).

In general, India remains a low-priority partner for regional states. India's economic relations with Japan, for instance, are more political in nature, and have no real economic rationale. Secondly, the Indian economy is overwhelmingly domestic-oriented with exports comprising an insignificant share of India's GDP. In the future, however, India could become second only to China as the biggest regional actor in Greater East Asia. India's strategic political goal in the region is largely similar to China's—to become a global power and a regional leader. But compared to the P.R.C., the geographical scope of Indian vital interests is more limited. It involves South Asia, first of all, then Southeast Asia. Besides, India's short-term interests in Southeast Asia will remain modest, although it seeks to expand influence, primarily through some countries' aspirations to deter China, in which case India is to a large extent considered an external player.

India places a premium on enhancing its naval potential in the Indian Ocean. Former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh assumed, "India's growing international stature gives it strategic relevance in the area, ranging from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca (Singh, 2007, p. 4)." India's 2007 naval strategy for the next 15 years and maritime doctrine of 2009 envisage strengthening Indian positions in the Indian Ocean. The 2015 naval strategy called "Maritime security" already gives India's navy the responsibility to ensure navigational safety in the Indo-Pacific region. This concept arose at the end of the first decade of the new century, and was officially recognized in India in the above-mentioned 2015 document. The document highlighted nine locations of special importance to the Republic: the Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, Mozambique Channel, Cape of Good Hope, Malacca Straits, Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait, and Ombai and Wetar straits. The "main interest" zones includes the entire area of the Indian Ocean and Red Sea Basin; while of "secondary interest" is the zone from the West Coast of Africa and the Mediterranean Sea to Australia and Antarctica. The Navy was tasked to contribute to the strengthening of Indian "political, economic, and investment cooperation" in vital regions. As such, maritime diplomacy has been given special attention under the administration of Narendra Modi and has become a dominant element of India's overall foreign policy (Limaye, 2017, p. 52). Prime Minister Modi personally proclaimed these changes in Indian policy when, in March 2015, he suggested a revised and

**Table 1.** India's trade with East Asia (2016–2017 Fiscal Year) (in billion U.S. dollars)

	Import	Export	Total trade	% Share
Southeast Asia	40.6	30.9	71.5	10.6
North East Asia	95.1	34.5	129.6	24.7
East Asia as a whole	135.7	65.4	141.4	35.3

Source: Government of India. Ministry of Commerce & Industry. Department of Commerce. Export Import Data Bank. Retrieved February 10, 2018, from <http://dgft.delhi.nic.in/>

clearer framework for the Indian Ocean, which then became fully reflected in the navy's new official strategy (Roy-Chaudhury, 2015).

India's conduct of joint naval exercises—with Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia, among others—increased considerably, and new warships were bought and constructed. Though the goal is already set, India still cannot expect to dominate in the Indian Ocean.

Traditionally continental, India and China are now rapidly developing as naval powers. "Historically, China has shown more interest in the Pacific Ocean, though the Indian Ocean is drawing more of its attention because it serves as one of China's important sea lines of communication...India, meanwhile, has historically exhibited more interest in the Indian Ocean but now has increasing interests in the Pacific Ocean (Tellis & Mirski, 2013, p. 105)." Yet, even Indian experts posit that India will not be the main actor in the Indian Ocean (Pant, 2009, p. 297).

Currently, nearly 50 warships are under construction, with four to five ships built annually. The Indian naval forces ranked sixth in the world even in the early 21st century, but experts forecast that it will take the third or fourth place in the world by 2030, second only to China in Asia (Mizokami, 2016). Today, India has over 170 warships, including two aircraft carriers. In November 2013, Russia transferred to India its aircraft cruiser (formerly known as "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov"), which was renamed "Vikramaditya" when it became part of the Indian fleet. The modernized aircraft carrier has over 2,000 crewmembers and 30 aircrafts (24 MIGs-29 and 6 KA helicopters).

The aircraft carrier—the "Viraat," built in 1959—was transferred by Britain to India in 1987. Its services, however, were terminated in 2012; and final decommissioning is expected when the "Vikrant" (constructed in 2009, launched in 2013, but which has yet to pass tests) is ready to serve. Originally India expected that the "Vikrant" will be ready in 2014, but now the Indian officials speak about a timeline of 2022–2023.

At present, India has 13 destroyers, all with guided missiles (three are Delhi-class; two Calcutta-class, almost invisible to radar; three Shivalik-class; and six Rajput-Kashin-class).<sup>7</sup> It also has 14 frigates (six of which are from Russia), 24 corvettes, a nuclear submarine (leased by Russia), 13 diesel submarines (nine being Soviet-made), and 109 patrol boats (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016, pp. 251–255).

India's military might also stems from the fact that the country was a nuclear power for over 40 years, having exploded its first nuclear bomb in May 1974 when the government declared it as an experiment for peaceful purposes, but which many in the international community doubted. In 2005, it was estimated that India had between 30 and 100 nuclear warheads (Arbatov & Chufirin, 2005, p. 11). By 2015, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated the number to have risen to 90 to 110<sup>8</sup> and, in 2016, 100 to 120.<sup>9</sup> India uses mainly plutonium for its nuclear weapons. Recently, it started to increase production capacity for highly enriched uranium, with Delhi stressing the need for a nuclear triad for air, land, and sea delivery. The French Mirage 2000H, also called Jaguar IS or Su-30MK, is regarded as India's primary nuclear strike aircraft (Kile & Kristensen, 2015, pp. 345–346).

India is actively developing its missile program, as well. To date, it has deployed approximately 50 intermediate-range ballistic missile launchers able

to carry nuclear weapons. The country also implements a program involving ballistic medium-range missiles called "Agni." "Agni-V" (with a range of over 5,000 km<sup>10</sup> and an operational load of 1 ton) was first tested in April 2012 (Subramanian, 2012). SIPRI reports that the sea-based ballistic missile "Dhanush" (with a 400 km range and 0.5-ton warhead) is already operational. Other similar missiles are also in service, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2016, p. 15). The K-15 (700 km range, 0.5-ton warhead) and K-4 (nearly 3,000 km in range) are under development (Kile & Kristensen, 2015, pp. 345–349). Overall, India has 12 intermediate-range and 42 short-range (500–1,000 km) ballistic missiles (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016, p. 251).

The growth of India might have a certain impact upon the relations between China and the United States. The Sino-United States controversies in the Indo-Pacific are about redistributing spheres of influence and preserving regional security, as the P.R.C. is seen to be subverting the established balance of power in recent years, violating the status quo, and posing a threat to American interests both in the Asia Pacific and globally. Chinese leadership achievements in that direction will enable it to succeed in others, being that it is uncomfortable with the fact that America is a global leader (Fravel, 2014, p. 9). Meanwhile, according to some experts, in the future the United States will lack sufficient financial base to catch up with China, and thus faces a weakening position in the region amidst rapid Chinese economic and military development (Kanaev, 2014, p. 205). Beijing, in turn, fears being "encircled" by the U.S. alliances and partnerships throughout the region, which reflects on its relations with Washington and the ongoing arms race.

The United States, in contrast, is interested in developing relations with both China and India. Both Delhi and Washington are well aware that their relations are built on mutual strategic interest (among other things, to limit China's expansion of influence). At the same time, India does not want to be fully allied with the United States (or Japan) in its confrontation with China—the reasons being the reluctance of the United States to recognize any country as an equal partner; disputes with the United States over many important issues, including world global problems; and India's unwillingness to have its "hands tied" as its leadership seeks to uphold foreign policy independence and maintain broad cooperation with other countries, including Russia (Madan, 2015). India is still following its balancing strategy even at the regional level (Lunev, 2016).

### **Russia-India ties and their cooperation in the Indo-Pacific**

India is Russia's natural and reliable ally for objective reasons. The two countries' national interests coincide with, or at least do not contradict, each other. On a vast majority of world problems, India takes the same or a similar stance as Russia. Particularly noteworthy are the two nations' identical goals in relation to the West—an unwillingness to comply with the imposition of a unipolar world and a United States-led hegemony of developed countries, as well as the need to maintain at least working relations with the West. The Russian Federation and the Republic of India are also interested in mitigating potential conflict in East-West relations. Likewise, they would benefit from acting as a kind of a broker or bridge between the developed and developing countries.

Geopolitical considerations drive the need to enhance linkages between these two. India is Russia's strategic partner on the southern flank, which is particularly essential in case threats from Islamic states arise. Now that both Russia and India are at the forefront of fighting against Muslim terrorism, they face a unity of tasks, including aligning their relations with the Islamic world.

One can say that there are certain commonalities in Russia's and India's civilizational features. For example, collectivism, meaning placing priority on group interests over individual ones (a trait often attributed to Asian culture) confronts individualism or the recognition of private interests as a priority (which is at the core of Western society). Both Russia and India are not in these categories and undergo the so-called "middle" model, which contains "Asian" as well as "European" values. Two periods in Russian history may be observed in this regard. The 1917 October Revolution turned Russia "upside down" to the collectivist way, but this was soon followed by an evolutionary movement toward individualism. In the 1990s, an attempt was made to choose a purely individualist way of development. During these two instances where Russia chose a foreign paradigm, the results differed. The first case led to considerable progress regarding macroeconomic indices, but it was accompanied by great impoverishment of the population and the loss of millions of lives. The second case led to a socioeconomic regression which to date has very few analogies in world history (Clesse & Lounev, 2004, pp. 141–142).

Tolerance of both Eastern and Western civilizations led to a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional structure of both states that now represents a uniting factor for Russia and India. Both countries share ethnic and religious separatist experiences urging them to find a common approach to issues of self-determination, terrorism, and separatism. India has always understood and supported practically all the moves of the Russian government to establish constitutional order in Russia.

The foreign policy processes in South Asia are akin to that of post-Soviet realities, and India's situation is surprisingly similar to Russia's with respect to the following: (i) the presence of a state that obviously surpasses others in economic, political, intellectual, military, and strategic parameters; (ii) historical affinity of the regional countries; (iii) a certain cultural and civilizational resemblance; (iv) small countries harboring ambitions to reinforce their geopolitical positions at the expense of extra-regional powers; and (v) breaches of economic ties within a once unitary economic complex.

Nevertheless, the Russia-India partnership is not without its problems. Despite the many features that bring the two together from the political point of view (e.g. the similar approaches to global problems, the opposition to the monopolistic position of the West and its current policies, and shared geopolitical concerns),<sup>11</sup> there is one key negative factor in bilateral political relations: a psychological perception by the other side's elite. The rather cold approach of the Indian elite to Russia relates to "the third emigration wave" that formed a powerful Indian diaspora in North America and Europe and that now enjoys a rather privileged position in the new homeland. At present, many members of India's elite have close friends or relatives with U.S. citizenship. As a result, India has political leaders who promote an almost exclusive focus on Washington, which threatens to destroy the foreign policy consensus that had prevailed in the

last half-century. An impediment to India's complete turnaround to the United States is Delhi's awareness of Washington's reluctance to treat India as an equal partner; with India finding it impossible to accede to a role of junior partner. Likewise viewed negatively by Delhi is Moscow's continuing approach to India as a secondary power. In turn, the Indian elite is quite skeptical about Russia's current role in the world system (See, for example, Khilnani et al., 2012).

India-Russia bilateral relations are weakest in the aspect of economic relations. An overall strengthening of economic links with the North has become one of the main thrusts for both countries since the beginning of the 1990s. An extremely influential Indian business sector has made no secret of its lukewarm view of socialism. It was the only segment of Indian society that was more or less satisfied with the collapse of the USSR. Today, India's business sector in general is quite disinterested in rapprochement with Russia. The same can be said of Russian business. Under such conditions, it is necessary to restore some form of state economic ties on the one hand, and stimulate the business sector to develop bilateral ties on the other. For example, it is possible to give some state guarantees to Indian businessmen in Russia and similar guarantees to Russian businessmen in India. It is also necessary for the state to lobby for the interests of private businesses in the partner country, as well as for businesses to provide reciprocal support in each other's partner country.

There are no great prospects for trade relations between India and Russia for the time being. A very low turnover<sup>12</sup> is caused by (i) logistics (to date, the transport route between Russia and India is long and expensive); (ii) Russia's problematic export credit to India; and (iii) the absence of harmonization in trade procedures. India and Russia are close to each other only on the political map. In fact, most of the main goods are supplied by sea, so the route turns out to be too long; thus effectively increasing shipment costs. This geographical factor will affect Russia-India trade relations for a long time. To solve this logistics problem, one might create a North-South transport corridor (Europe-Russia-Iran-India-East Asia), but this is impossible in the medium term. This requires huge work—determining the current status of the international transport corridor, elaborating on a common strategy and coherent cargo policies; and creating an international consortium.

There are, however, other economic spheres with huge development potential—energy being the most important of them. The prospect of a strategic and inexpensive energy supply from Russia to India (and to China and Japan, as well) provides a major opportunity for increased regional integration involving energy companies, investors, and governments.

Military technical cooperation is also a cornerstone of Russia-India relations, and is of extraordinary significance to both countries. Military technical cooperation with India has stimulated innovative processes in the Russian military-industrial complex, in the largest extent during the 1990s, when the military orders of China and India saved the Russian military-industrial complex. However, only India constantly demanded the modernization of a wide range of arms. In truth, the military-technical cooperation between Russia and India is very slowly changing from a "trading and intermediary" to a "cooperation" model.

Russia and India vigorously support each other in different regional organizations, especially when it comes to joining multilateral institutions. Moscow had

backed India's membership in APEC while Delhi actively lobbied for Russia's entry into the EAS. Russia applied for membership in the EAS soon after its establishment but became a member only in 2010. Paradoxically, Moscow lost interest in the EAS soon after. Moreover, the Russian Federation always supported India's entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, although—taking into account Beijing's position—it had to agree to simultaneous membership of India and Pakistan, resulting in India's certain disappointment as Delhi did not want Pakistan to join the organization.

Russia initiated the Russia-India-China (RIC) triangle, which provided the basis for BRICS. The RIC countries share the opinion that establishing a unipolar world is unacceptable. The early post-bipolar world had shown China and India's readiness to expand mutual contacts to prevent one country's hegemony in the global system. This was taken up in December 1991 during the visit of Premier Li Peng in India, the first visit of a Chinese Prime Minister to India after 1960.

A fundamental factor of the Russia-India-China triangle is also opposition to growing Islamic extremism and radicalism. The "Muslim curve" goes from North-West of Africa to South-East of Asia. India with its 180 million Muslim population, Russia with Muslims in the Caucasus and Volga-Ural region, and China with Muslims in Xinjiang, are connected to each other by similar problems and common goals of struggling against the Muslim extremists and terrorists that have intensified their activity in all countries.

However, the RIC triangle is almost inactive in the Asia-Pacific. Russia and India have a differing approach toward China. Delhi stresses the need to form a peculiar "diamond necklace" of India-friendly countries and to be more dynamic in ties with such countries as Myanmar, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, South Korea, and Australia. The P.R.C. is uncomfortable with such an idea which could potentially develop into an anti-China alliance, even though Delhi publicly denounces its anti-Chinese character. Russia's attempts to act as an intermediary between India and China have failed so far.

Russia's updated Maritime Doctrine of 2015 states that the Russian Federation seeks to maintain and consolidate positions in the Indian Ocean; to conduct a targeted course of transforming the region into a zone of peace, stability, and goodwill; and to participate in ensuring maritime security. This orientation coincides completely with Chinese interests. Although Russia's aspirations in the Indian Ocean generally coincide with India's interests, India is uncomfortable with how the 2015 Maritime Doctrine identifies China as Russia's main partner in the Pacific (although the document also calls for strengthening positive interaction with other states of the region).<sup>13</sup> Officially, the Kremlin always calls for navy cooperation between Russia, China, and India, but it has stumbled upon Delhi's unwillingness to develop trilateral military ties, as openly voiced by India's defense ministers.

Russia moreover has no contacts with India on the issues where the South Asian giant has contradictions with the P.R.C. Moscow has been relatively neutral with respect to China's conflicts with all its neighbors. Thus, Russia upholds noninterference in the South China Sea and officially states only the need to recuse itself from "internationalization" of territorial disputes. Moscow is unlikely to support Beijing on the issue, though it is obviously ready to become a

mediator between China and Southeast Asia. If Beijing is interested, the Kremlin could conduct confidential negotiations on the matter, as well as help draw the attention of the international community to United States attempts to inflate controversies between the conflicting parties.

The territorial disputes in the South China Sea have also thrust Russia's strategic partners like China and Vietnam into opposite sides; driving Moscow to maintain neutrality whenever possible and, to instead concentrate on promoting initiatives to create a new security architecture. Theoretically, the idea serves the interests of many regional actors, but it needs to be further conceptualized as alliances with the United States still remain the main security guarantee for most countries of the region. Tactics to preserve neutrality have been insufficient, and Russia has yet to elaborate a more comprehensive strategy for regional interaction.

At the same time, Moscow is not happy about the intensified military and political contacts among India, Japan, and the United States, including their holding naval exercises,<sup>14</sup> although it has never publicly voiced this opinion.<sup>15</sup> However, Moscow blatantly corrected its approach toward Pakistan by pursuing military and political cooperation, dealing India a very negative surprise. In November 2014, Russia's defense minister Sergey Shoigu paid an official visit to Pakistan (the last time a defense minister had visited was in 1969). During the visit, a military cooperation agreement was signed and talks on military supplies were initiated. In 2015, Russia signed an agreement to sell four Mi-35M helicopters to Pakistan. The first-ever joint Russian-Pakistani military exercises were held in September 2016, with approximately 200 soldiers participating. Moscow points out that Pakistan joined the SCO together with India, and makes the effort to assure Delhi that this is within the framework of joint combat against international terrorism and aimed at stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan; thus also serving India's interests. However, Delhi has rejected Russia's arguments and refuses to consider Pakistan as a potential partner in the fight against Islamic terrorism.

Russia would clearly benefit from enhanced China-India ties. But, bearing in mind that these Asian giants are extremely cautious about any attempts to meddle in bilateral disputes, the Russian Federation can only try to weaken the negative factors in Indian-Chinese affairs, and propose trilateral cooperation in mutually beneficial fields.

### **Conclusion**

The Indo-Pacific region is extremely important to Russia, and for good reason. As a part of the Eurasian continent, Russia does not detach itself from Asia, which accounts for almost 80% of Russian territory and nearly a fifth of the Russian population. The lion's share of Russia's national wealth is centered in Asia: timber and fresh water; nonferrous and rare metals; oil, gas, coal, and diamonds, which constitute a substantial portion of world natural resources. Notwithstanding this, Moscow has taken only a few real steps to improve its position in the region.

Until recently, the Russian elite was mostly Eurocentric. Nevertheless, dramatic changes in Russian public opinion (2014–2016) showed a threefold increase in the negative attitude toward the European Union; with two-thirds of those interviewed forcing the elite to review its position. Amid a worsening of

Russia-United States and Russia-Europe relations, it has become evident that Moscow can only rely on the biggest non-Western countries. After the Ukrainian crisis began, Western politics literally pushed Russia closer to China.

Yet, Russia has not pursued a more active policy in the Indo-Pacific, even with one of its most important partners and natural allies—India. The national interests of the two states coincide with, or at least do not contradict, each other. Geopolitical considerations underscore the need to enhance cooperation. The foreign policy processes in South Asia are clearly akin to post-Soviet realities, leading to similar approaches by Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States and by India in South Asia; as well as reciprocal support of each other in their regions.

Russia and India currently enjoy full-scale cooperation in solving global problems and many regional issues. In general, political relations between these countries are developing quite fruitfully, and are extremely successful in many areas. Nonetheless, there are some negative points. Both countries underestimate each other. Amid the abrupt worsening of Russia's relations with the West, and its substantiated fears of becoming dependent on China (which has always prioritized its own national interests), it is vital to understand the role of India in helping Moscow accomplish particular global political and economic goals.

India opted for normalizing relations with China. These Asian giants, however, are limited by fundamental contradictions primarily because, in most cases, they are competitors. In the long term, China and India would still consider each other as a strategic rival in Asia and, perhaps, the world. Most of the Indian elite suppose that in the distant future, they will come into direct confrontation.

During the post-bipolar period, Delhi has given special attention to the eastern part of the Indian Ocean. Apart from developing political and economic cooperation with East Asia, the new century has been marked by India's amplification of its naval potential in the area. The number of India's joint naval exercises (with Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia, etc.) increased significantly; new warships were bought and constructed. Nevertheless, India still fails to prevail in the Indian Ocean, though the goal is already set. It is highly likely that India enlarges the term "region," which, apart from South Asia, will involve most part of the Indian Ocean.

In order to be recognized as a global power and enhance its position as a regional leader, India is pursuing an active policy in Greater East Asia. At the turn of the century, Delhi announced the Look East program, bolstering its position in Southeast Asia and, later, in Northeast Asia. India paid great attention to the development of economic relations with East Asian countries, but it has achieved success primarily in trade. The Asian giant currently has little interest in economic integration processes, which means that politics is the priority. That said, the majority of the states in the region sympathizes with India and consider it as a sort of balance to China's influence. Although India cannot be considered as a main actor in East Asia so far, its influence is growing and this process is likely to continue.

On the whole, Russia and India have close ties in terms of regional problems, but Indo-Pacific policy appears to be an exception. Moreover, certain contradictions have become apparent in their perceptions of the main global actors, namely the United States and China. The region can be a major area of cooperation

between the leaders of Russia and India, as their joint actions will assist both countries in expanding their presence in Asia, and will have a positive synergistic effect for the Indo-Pacific. Such effects could include the strengthening of the international-legal foundations of regional security on the basis of the principle of indivisible security, the development of confidence building measures, and the enhancement of the prospects of creating a system of interaction, cooperation, and confidence measures in the region.”

### Acknowledgments

The article is written with the financial support of Russian Foundation for Basic Research Grant No 18-014-00027.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup>The Official Website of Levada-Center (Russia, Moscow). Retrieved February 10, 2018, from [www.levada.ru/2018/01/10/vragi-rossii/https://www.levada.ru/indikatory/otnoshenie-k-stranam/](http://www.levada.ru/2018/01/10/vragi-rossii/https://www.levada.ru/indikatory/otnoshenie-k-stranam/)

<sup>2</sup>The European Union is an economic giant, but a political dwarf who completely supports Washington’s policy, though individual countries may take an independent stance.

<sup>3</sup>The Official Website of the President of Russia. Retrieved February 10, 2018, from <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46705>

<sup>4</sup>The Official Website of Levada-Center. Retrieved February 10, 2018, from [www.levada.ru/](http://www.levada.ru/)

<sup>5</sup>At the same time, Beijing is not implementing the announced project of the construction of the Kazan – Moscow high-speed railway.

<sup>6</sup>Government of India. Ministry of Commerce & Industry. Department of Commerce. Export Import Data Bank. Retrieved February 10, 2018, from <http://dgft.delhi.nic.in/>

<sup>7</sup>The supply of this type of destroyers were begun by the Soviet Union (Victor, 1985, pp. 89–90).

<sup>8</sup>SIPRI Year Book. 2015. *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Summary*. p. 18. Retrieved February 10, 2018, from <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2015/downloadable-files/sipri-yearbook-2015-summary-pdf>

<sup>9</sup>SIPRI Yearbook 2016: *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Summary*. p. 23. Retrieved February 10, 2018, from <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB16-Summary-ENG.pdf>

<sup>10</sup>World media called “Agni-V” strategic missiles wrongfully as intercontinental missiles have a range of over 5.5 thousand km.

<sup>11</sup>Great Kautilya wrote that “an immediate neighbouring state is an enemy and a neighbour’s neighbour, separated from oneself by the intervening enemy, is a friend” (Rangarajan, L. N. *The Arthashastra: Edited, Rearranged, Translated and Introduced*. New Delhi, India: Penguin Books India Ltd., 1992, p. 542).

<sup>12</sup>India Department of Commerce, Export Import Data Bank// Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2015-2018. – <http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecntq.asp>

<sup>13</sup>The Official Website of the President of Russia. Retrieved February 10, 2018, from <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50060>

<sup>14</sup>In 2017, all three countries again took part in Maritime exercise Malabar (Kumar & Barry, 2017).

<sup>15</sup>The U.S. came second after Russia in arms supplies to India, which accounts for 15% of world arms imports, and in 2016 both sides signed an agreement on military logistics, which allows naval ships and military aircraft to use each other’s bases.

### References

- Arbatov, Aleksey, & Chufirin, Gennadiy (Eds.). (2005). *Yadernoe protivostoyanie v Yuzhnoy Azii* [The nuclear standoff in South Asia]. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center.
- Blank, Jonah, Moroney, Jennifer D.P., Rabasa, Angel, & Lin, Bonny. (2015). *Look East, cross black waters*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Bratersky, Maksim, & Lunyov, Sergey. (1990). India at the end of the century: Transformation into an Asian regional power. *Asian Survey*, 30(10), 936–937.
- Buzan, Barry, & Weaver, Ole. (2003). *Regions and powers: The structure of international security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Clesse, Armand, & Lounev, Sergei. (2004). *The vitality of Russia*. Amsterdam: Dutch University Press.
- Cohen, Stephen P. (2002). *India: Emerging power*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

- Fravel, M. Taylor. (2014, March). *U.S. policy towards the disputes in the South China Sea since 1995 [Policy Report]*. Singapore: S. Rajarathnam School of International Studies.
- Frost, Frank. (2016). *Engaging the neighbours*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Godehardt, Nadine, & Nabers, Dirk. (Eds.). (2011). *Regional powers and regional orders*. Abington: Routledge.
- Government of India (2000–2018). Ministry of Commerce & Industry. Department of Commerce. Export Import Data Bank. Retrieved from <http://dgft.delhi.nic.in/>
- Jamrisko, Michelle, & Lu, Wei. (2017). *These are the world's most innovative economies*. Bloomberg. Retrieved from <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-17/sweden-gains-south-korea-reigns-as-world-s-m>
- Kanaev, Evgeniy. (2014). "China's and the US" approaches to the South China Sea issue: Changing patterns and strategic implications. In *Security and cooperation in the South China Sea* (pp. 198–211). Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of Russian Academy of Sciences.
- Khilnani, Sunil, Kumar, Rajiv, Mehta, Pratap Bhanu, Menon, Prakash, Nilekani, Nandan, Raghavan, Srinath, Saran, Shyam, & Varadarajan, Siddharth Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century (2012). Retrieved from [http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/NonAlignment%202.0\\_1.pdf](http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/NonAlignment%202.0_1.pdf)
- Khurana, Gurpreet. (2008). China's "String of Pearls" in the Indian Ocean and its security implications. *Strategic Analysis*, 32(1), 1–22.
- Kile, Shannon N., & Kristensen, Hans M. (2015). Yadernye silyi Indii [India's nuclear forces]. In *Ezhgodnik SIPRI 2014. Vooruzheniya, razoruzhenie i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost* [The SIPRI Yearbook. 2014. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security] (pp. 344–352). Moscow: IMEMO.
- Koldunova, Ekaterina V. (2014). Indo-Pacific region: Perspectives from Russia. In Rajiv K. Bhatia & Vijay Sakhuja (Eds.), *Indo-Pacific region: Political and strategic prospects* (pp. 97–106). New Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt Ltd.
- Kumar, Hari, & Barry, Ellen. (2017, July 10). *India, U.S. and Japan begin war games, and China hears a message*. New York, NY: New-York Times.
- Limaye, Satu. (2017, April). Weighted West, focused on the Indian Ocean and cooperating across the Indo-Pacific: The Indian navy's new maritime strategy, capabilities, and diplomacy. CNA. Retrieved from [https://www.cna.org/cna\\_files/pdf/DRM-2016-U-013939-Final2.pdf](https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DRM-2016-U-013939-Final2.pdf)
- Lukin, Alexander. (2016). Russia's pivot to Asia: Myth or reality. *Strategic Analysis*, 40(6), 573–589.
- Lukin, Alexander. (2018, January). A Russian perspective on the Sino-Russian rapprochement. *Asia Policy*, 13(1), 19–25.
- Lunev, Sergey I. (2016). Indiya i Arabskiy Mir [India and The Arab World]. *Vestnik Rossiyskogo universiteta druzhbyi narodov. Seriya: Mezhdunarodnyie otnosheniya* [Vestnik RUDN. International Relations], 16(4), 603–615.
- Madan, Tanvi. (2015, January 20). The U.S.-India relations and China. *Brookings*. Retrieved from <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-india-relationship-and-china-madan>
- Mizokami, Kyle. (2016, June 25). The 5 most powerful navies of 2030. *The National Interest*. Retrieved from <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-5-most-powerful-navies-2030-16723>
- Nel, Philip, Nabers, Dirk, & Hanif, Melanie. (2012). Introduction: Regional powers and global redistribution. *Global Society*, 26(3), 279–287.
- Pant, Harsh V. (2009). India in the Indian Ocean: Growing mismatch between ambitions and capabilities. *Pacific Affairs*, 82(2), 279–297.
- Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul. (2015). Five reasons the world needs to pay heed to India's new maritime security strategy. *The Wire*. Retrieved from <https://thewire.in/diplomacy/five-reasons-the-world-needs-to-pay-heed-to-indias-new-maritime-security-strategy>
- Singh, Manmohan. (2007). *Freedom to use the seas: India's maritime military strategy*. New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence.
- Stalin, Josef V. (1947). *Sochineniya* [The Works]. Vol. 13. Moscow: OGIZ.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2015). *SIPRI year book 2015: Armaments, disarmament and international security*. Retrieved from <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2015/downloadable-files/sipri-yearbook-2015-summary-pdf>
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2016). *SIPRI yearbook 2016: Armaments, disarmament and international security*. Retrieved from <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB16-Summary-ENG.pdf>
- Subramanian, T. S. (2012, May). New firepower. *Frontline*, 29(9). Retrieved from <https://frontline.thehindu.com/static/html/fl2909/stories/20120518290912400.htm>
- Tellis, Ashley J., & Mirski, Sean. (2013). *Crux of Asia. China, India and the emerging world order*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2016). *The military balance 2016*. London: Routledge.

- The Official Website of Levada-Center (Russia, Moscow). Retrieved from [www.levada.ru/indikatory/otnoshenie-k-stranam/](http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/otnoshenie-k-stranam/)
- The Official Website of the President of Russia. Retrieved from <http://kremlin.ru/>
- The residents of Russia consider the United States, Ukraine and Turkey to be the main opponents. (2016, June 2). *Vedomosti*.
- Victor, Cecil. (1985). Indo-Soviet military cooperation: Factor for self-reliance. In Vishnu Dutt Chopra (Ed.), *Studies in Indo-Soviet relations* (p. 288). New Delhi: Patriot Publishers.
- Voskresenskiy, Alexei D. (2010). *"Bolshaya Vostochnaya Aziya": mirovaya politika i regionalnyie transformatsii* ["Larger East Asia": World politics and regional transformations]. Moscow: MGIMO-University.