

Chapter 1

Introduction. Why Arab Spring Became Arab Winter



1.1 Islamism, Its Currents, and Terrorism

If we open a newspaper, turn on an international news channel, or search for international news via platforms such as “*Google News*,”¹ we will quickly be confronted with the often value-laden and bitter debate which goes on today about “*Islamism*,” the “*Arab Spring*” and also the *future of democracy* under the threat of global terrorism. Almost all politicians turn out, in one way or another, to be connected with these topics. For example on May 10, 2017, “*Google News*” displayed as hit number 1 in the list of articles dealing with the subject of “*Islamism*” an analysis or polemic, depending on your point of view, by the Gatestone Institute (a US think tank), attempting to convince us that France’s newly elected, Emmanuel Macron, is a “*Useful Infidel*.” They argue that he is even worse than a supporter of terrorism or Islamism because he does not even realize the existence of such a threat at all.²

Further down the news result list, we find a completely different item that deals with the encounter between the German Chancellor Ms. Angela Merkel and the Turkish President Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on February 1, 2017, in Ankara:

The term ‘Islamist terrorism’ should not be used in any context, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Thursday. Speaking at a joint press conference in Ankara, Erdoğan expressed concern over the use of term ‘Islamist terrorism,’ saying that it is not ethical to mention the two terms side by side, as Islam is a religion that promotes peace. ‘The literal meaning of the word Islam is peace’ Erdoğan said, and added

¹ <https://news.google.com/>.

² <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/10310/emmanuel-macron-islamism>.

The corresponding authors for this chapter are Leonid Grinin (leonid.grinin@gmail.com), Andrey Korotayev (akorotayev@gmail.com), and Arno Tausch (arno.tausch@yahoo.de).

This research has been supported by the Russian Science Foundation (Project No. 18-18-00254).

that the interchangeable use of terrorism with Islam, as a result of Daesh terrorists worries billions of Muslims worldwide.³

According to President Erdogan, there is no “*Islamism*” at all and consequently, we should change the title of this book? Or, did he mean that one should not confuse terrorism and radical groups using Islam as their banner with those respectable and moderate Islamists who despise terrorism no less than do Westerners? We would think the latter is more likely than the former. Yet, it turns out that it is difficult to define Islamism and decide whether or not terrorism is associated with it. The analysis of Islamism will be a major subject of our book (see Chaps. 2, 3, 8, and 11). It is important to realize that Islamism is far from being homogenous; it is multidimensional and undergoes considerable transformations in the course of time. Islamism is no less diverse than Socialism. You will remember that both the followers of oppressive totalitarianism (down to the cannibalistic Khmer Rouge) and quite respectable social democrats (who play important roles in the maintenance and improvement of the democratic mechanisms of Western countries) would call themselves “socialists.”

Islamism is an ideology and movement associated with the politicization of Islam and the transformation of the ideas and values of Islam (often into political slogans but sometimes even into political programs). Yet, the ideological range of political Islamists is broad and diverse. At the same time, Islamism relies on shaping or directing the powerful domestic mood of lay Muslims and on constructing themselves as a kind of grass roots (i.e., what Americans would call a “populist”) archetype. That is why it can hardly be eliminated and one can only direct it toward becoming moderate, civilized, open, and cultural. Our position is based on the idea that only through moderate Islamism interacting with secular political forces will the Islamic world be able to undergo a considerable transformation of its society. This is complex and contradictory, but perhaps the only real path to social development for many Islamic countries (this aspect is discussed in detail in Chap. 3). Then, perhaps, moderate Islamism will serve as a springboard to transition Islamic societies into accepting or accommodating global values.

Radical Islamism, terrorist Islamism, especially the recent excesses of the terrorist Islamic State/Daesh and its supporters in different countries, have made this direction a scarecrow for the whole world. It is, therefore, not surprising that President Erdogan would like to disown this term as it applies to his fellow citizens. It is also not surprising that quite a few politicians and researchers suggest abandoning the term “Islamism” in relation to moderate Islamism, retaining it only to refer to radicals. However, this would be neither right nor wise.

Islamism has many faces, and the views of its supporters vary. There is nothing strange in the fact that the positions of researchers who write about Islamism differ. There is no complete unity among the authors of this book. But maybe it is good. Perhaps this is the case when the truth is born in a dispute. Be that as it may, our position, which we propose and develop in this book (especially in its Part I), is based on the fact that it is through moderate Islamism, in its interaction with secular

³<https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2017/02/02/islamist-terrorism-shouldnt-be-used-in-any-context-erdogan-says>.

political forces, that the Arab World will be able to move toward a significant positive change in Islamic society.

Talking about the differences in approaches to the definition of Islamism and its danger, it is impossible not to mention that important sections of the leading and, therefore most influential scholars who have a global platform have attempted to counterbalance this rising global concern about Islamist terrorism by maintaining that not Islamist terrorism, but “*Islamophobia*” is the real problem we are facing.

In the prestigious “*Columbia Law Review*,” published at New York’s Columbia University, Beydoun (2016) writes:

Islamophobia as the presumption that Islam is inherently violent, alien, and inassimilable. Combined with this is the belief that expressions of Muslim identity are correlative with a propensity for terrorism. It argues that Islamophobia is rooted in understandings of Islam as civilization’s antithesis and perpetuated by government structures and private citizens. Finally, this Piece asserts that Islamophobia is also a process—namely, the dialectic by which state policies targeting Muslims endorse prevailing stereotypes and, in turn, embolden private animus toward Muslim subjects. Islamophobia therefore has three dimensions: structural policy, private animus, and the dialectical process by which the former legitimizes and mobilizes the latent and patent bigotry of individuals and private actors. The result is far more expansive and complex than mere “fear and dislike” of Islam and Muslims. (Beydoun 2016: 2)

Indeed, Islamophobia can be transferred into a trope from which to Muslim’s anger at the West may transform from an ember into a forest fire. Yet it cannot be said to cause Islamism or to be a central feature of it. Those who claim this are also implicitly suggesting that Islamism is no more than a reaction to Western Islamophobia and thus Muslims are incapable of creating their own independent ideology.

However, of course, the matter is far from being only Islamophobia. Danger, although sometimes pre-enlarged, is quite real. Not everything goes smoothly. The radical Islamism has also a large number of adherents in the Muslim and Arab World as well as in Muslim communities in Europe and other parts of world. And actually, this Islamism is accompanied with mass character terrorism, that is the terrorist movement involves a large number of people. More often terrorist organizations are not mass-based organizations. They are small and secretive (Gause III 2005: 68). However in the last two decades, we could observe the emergence and growth of international terrorist organizations (as al-Qaeda and ISIS) that are rather numerous. In our book, we will examine the social roots of terrorism and its connection with Islamism, and the very real threat of Global Terrorism (we discuss this problem in Chaps. 3, 8, and 9). Nevertheless, we believe that although radicalism is an integral part of the broad current, unpleasant and dangerous, it is, but a natural offshoot in the development of Islamism. Islamism is not identical with terrorism. Any teaching, belief system or ideology, always has a radical wing, if it has enough followers. Therefore, the task is, not to exterminate extremists, but to create as few conditions as possible for the growth of radicalism.

Given the sheer magnitude and the never-ending character of the global Islamist terrorist challenge the world is now facing, we share with the Israeli analyst Heller (2015) the idea that it is time to seriously analyze what those sectors of Muslim society that support extremism, think and do, and why they think in such a way—while, at

the same time, other important segments of Muslim society oppose radicalism and terrorism and even combat it. It is possible to achieve this by the multivariate analysis of global representative opinion surveys (see Chaps. 8–11).

Terrorism and radical Islamism are particularly fueled when two factors coincide: the low level of a population's general culture platform (e.g., low literacy levels) and the low level of political culture in the societies with weak statehood traditions [not by chance terrorists are especially active among the Palestinians who have never had a state, in Afghanistan where the tribalistic ideas still predominate, in some territories of Iraq and Syria where states were never established (see Chap. 2 for more detail)]. So when the state power weakens, terrorism is strengthened in polities constituted of a conglomerate of various ethnic groups and cultures.

That is why the destruction of strong (albeit authoritarian) regimes under the flag of establishing democracy is one of the most important conditions for the growth of radicalism and terrorism. We will take a closer look at this in Chaps. 4 and 5. Thus, it is necessary to select allies in the fight against radicalism. Such allies, albeit temporary, can include socially just authoritarian regimes. Attempts to establish democracy in countries with fragile statehood (for example in Libya) through armed revolution, intervention, and the overthrow of the government will unequivocally lead to rampant terrorism. Attempts to establish socialist republics in countries such as Afghanistan (what the Soviet Union was trying to do) will lead to the same outcomes—a rise in individuals motivated to join terrorist groups. The invasion of Iraq gave birth to Daesh. Another factor contributing to the growth of terrorism is the attempt to use such organizations for geopolitical purposes. We note that al-Qaeda became a product of reliance on terrorist groups in the fight against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan (see, e.g., Kepel 2002).

Osman (2016) considers the secularist-Islamist conflict to be the main issue to be resolved at the center of Islamic societies. In general, this is true. However, in our view, the transition to secularism and its victory is much more likely through moderate Islamism, that is, through cooperation with it. And if we consider that radical Islamism is the result of the violation of social order, then this order should be kept at any cost. To this, the problem is not a choice between authoritarianism and democracy, but between a secular authoritarian regime and radical Islamism. Therefore, it is extremely important to understand that radical Islamism can be weakened if not effectively defeated under current conditions only on the field of Islam proper, supporting moderate and law-abiding Islamism and cooperating with it where possible.

For how long will the Islamic terrorism remain a political label for the Muslim world? This is a difficult question. Huntington (1996) suggested that by the third decade of the twenty-first century the ageing of population and the economic development of the Muslim countries would probably lead to a considerable weakening of the Muslims' propensity to violence. However, the 2020s are close, but Islamist terrorism is still very strong. Yet, we suppose that sooner or later it will decline since the cultural level increases (the process of ageing will influence this too). Moreover, moderate Islam could play a critical role for this weakening of terrorism. Moderate Islam is a legitimate movement, which under certain conditions moves toward order and respectability. That is why it fears radical terrorist Islamism and sometimes even fights it.

Meanwhile, one should keep in mind that wars, interventions, and especially the overthrows of strong political secular regimes contribute to the growth of terrorism. That was the case in Iraq in 2003 after the actual US departure from this country which created a power vacuum which coincided with the start of the civil war in Syria in 2012–2013.

In any case, at present, there is every indication of a global threat of radical terroristic Islamism: the seemingly endless sequence of Islamist terrorist attacks in Manhattan, London, Madrid, Boston, Paris, and Berlin et cetera. In confronting the Islamist terrorist threat, it is wrong to define radical Islamism only in terms of the identification with the outright support for the immediate “*bomb-throwing terror*,” while neglecting the underlying ideological radicalism and also the ongoing radicalization of such organizations as the *Muslim Brotherhood* (Lebl 2014a, b) or the Turkish *Milli Görüş* (Vielhaber 2012), which both start from the intense hatred of Western civilization as such (Lebl 2013; Tibi 2013a, b). It is also worthwhile to emphasize that Islamist movements, both radical and moderate, are internally heterogeneous. Under certain conditions (in particular a strong political order and participation of Islamists in elections), moderate groups begin to prevail, whereas with the banning of Islamist organizations and the pursuit of them radical ones do. Such ambivalence of Islamism is not always taken into account, which sometimes leads to serious political consequences.

1.2 The Arab Spring and Opportunities for Democracy in Muslim Countries

The issue of correlation between Islam and democracy is one of the most complicated and disputed areas of concern with respect to mutual understanding between the West and the Arab World. In Chaps. 3–5, and 8–9, we discuss different aspects of this problem in detail. Is Islam compatible with democracy? Probably, to a certain extent, it is. At least the last decade demonstrates that some Islamic movements are capable of integrating into democratic processes. But one can hardly ignore the fact that this democracy has certain distinctions from the Western standards of democracy. In particular, since the Islamists enjoy broad popularity among the Muslim populations, the democratic procedures are generally profitable for them. That is why it is impossible and dangerous to try to completely separate democratic and Muslim values, but it is necessary to search for a certain balance between them.

The causes and results of the Arab Spring as well as the factors affecting those disappointing outcomes are the major subjects of our investigation (Chaps. 4 and 5 and also many chapters of Part II are devoted to a multiaspect analysis of this event). The Arab Spring revealed the forces and problems which turned the renovation expectations of the spring into the gloomy reality of winter. This phenomenon has showed up in other Islamic states, but in a different way. The price of these revolutionary experiments turned out to be very high everywhere. In this respect, Nikolai Berdyaev

was right when he wrote that “neither revolutionaries nor counter-revolutionaries can make out what a revolution is” (Berdyayev 1990: 41). No doubt, the revolutions in the Arab countries had certain triggers. The analysis of social, economic, and demographic processes and transformations in the Arab World during the last fifty years can convincingly explain the causes of the Arab revolutions and counterrevolutions (the analysis of this phenomenon is presented in Chap. 4, also some aspects are covered in Chap. 2). A rapid population growth, the increasing share of youth cohorts (the so-called youth bulge), as well as fast transformations in education system, living standards, and living habits are combined here with relatively high illiteracy rates, the high influence of religious fundamentalists, unemployment, etc. All these fueled the dissatisfaction with the level of justice, system of distribution of benefits, nepotism, corruption, lack of democracy, with Arab states’ social and political regimes in general, as well as with the autocrats who cling to power for decades. However, all these could transform into revolutions under certain circumstances (including the explosive increase in food prices in 2010–2011) and with active outside interference these have led to revolutionary outbursts. At the same time, most Arab countries (with all the above-described problems) developed quite vigorously and had good chances to overcome some of the problems had that development continued. Yet, in the countries unprepared for democracy where the Western values would be adopted by a smaller part of population and in a quite superficial manner the expectations that revolutions would bring democracy and progress contributed to the fact that the revolutions unleashed powerful destabilization forces but failed to bring any positive effects.

On the other hand, as we said earlier some Islamist movements are capable of integrating into democratic processes. And since the Islamists enjoy broad popularity among the Muslim populations, democratic procedures are generally profitable for them. But this is a path not to liberal but to Muslim democracy, the latter being considerably narrower than the liberal one but still much better than dictatorship. There are many supporters of Muslim democracy. For example, Hoffman and Jamal (2014) concluded that in Tunisia and Egypt the reading of the Quran, not mosque attendance, is robustly associated with a considerable increase in the likelihood of participating in protest. Furthermore, this relationship is not simply a function of support for political Islam. Evidence suggests that personal motivation mechanisms rather than political resources are the reason behind this result. Qur’an readers, the study attempts to show, are more sensitive to inequities and more supportive of democracy than are nonreaders. These findings suggest, the authors maintain, a powerful new set of mechanisms by which religion may, in fact, help to structure political protest more generally.

Why have revolutions in the Arab countries failed to establish a stable democracy? The matter is that revolutions frequently lead to dictatorships even more cruel than the pre-revolutionary one, and moreover, to the societies’ degradation (see, e.g., Huntington 1968, 1993; Gurr 1988; Grinin 2012a, 2013a, b, 2014, 2016, 2017a, b; Grinin and Korotayev 2016b; Grinin et al. 2016b). One can often speak about the so-called Thermidor Law when a revolutionary wave is followed by a reactionary wave which can take the form of dictatorship.

Certainly, revolutions can stir societies, mobilize new forces, raise urgent issues, and give considerable political experience. They can lead to positive developments. But one can hardly expect that revolutions can solve the most important problems. Unfortunately, at present the developmental model follows not the desirable scheme from revolution to democracy but the one from revolution either to counterrevolutions (as in Egypt) which seems more preferable, or to new revolutions or just chaos and civil wars what we observe today in Libya, Yemen, and Syria (see Chap. 5). Moreover, sometimes they lead to the creation of terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS/Daesh). In any case the euphoria of revolution and its initial slogans gave way to deep splits in Arab society, drop in living standards, transformation of peaceful protests into protracted conflicts, civil wars, and military interventions.

It shows that revolution does not necessarily lead to democracy and the transition to democracy requires a certain level of development, mentality, and readiness of a significant part of population. Otherwise, revolutions can even delay the transition to democracy as we see in the case of many Arab countries.

1.3 Islamism and Values

Revolutions also raise the questions of societies' values. The issue of values in the Arab and Muslim countries is covered systematically in the first part of the present book, while the second part uses statistics and formal methods to analyze these same values via their indicators. The analysis of values shows that many Muslim societies demonstrate a large variance in value perceptions as they are modernizing; as a consequence of considerable differences in education level, culture, and income of different population layers (not to speak about the differences caused by confessional heterogeneity of population); they are, to a certain extent, split societies. At the same time, the analysis shows that Islamist values predominate (even in the most advanced societies like Tunisian they remain very popular). To ignore this fact is silly and even dangerous. At the same time, we show that Islamist values are far from inherently contradicting Western liberal values. The matter is related to the emphasis and priorities of this array of values. That is why, in our opinion it will take much time and hard work to promote liberal values, not to replace but to combine with Islamist ones.

Unfortunately, revolutions far from always strengthening democratic, let alone liberal values in a society, the situation can lead to the opposite in this respect. Robbins and Tessler (2012) claimed to have found strong support for the thesis that the impact of the Arab Spring on public opinion includes a decrease in support for democracy but an increase in commitment to democracy, at least in two very dissimilar Arab countries. Democracy is no longer the unambiguous solution to social, economic, and political problems.

It is rather the hoped-for end point of a regime transition that, at least in its early stages, appears to bring political chaos, economic downturn, and [a] rise in crime and violence in [the] transitioning countries. Confronted with these realities, some citizens are apparently less inclined to believe that democracy is the best political system. (Robbins and Tessler 2012).

Although the political transition may be tumultuous, many citizens appear, the authors argue, to blame incumbent regimes for this outcome rather than democracy-seekers or other protestors. The uprisings appear, Robbins and Tessler (2012) argue, to have demonstrated that although regimes made many claims about the disadvantages of democracy, they failed to fulfill their part of the authoritarian bargain by showing decisiveness and providing security and economic well-being in exchange for restricting political rights. This claim, however, appears to be grossly exaggerated (see, e.g., Korotayev and Zinkina 2011b).

Islamism may seem something terrible and unbearable to a Western individual (and there is some truth here). At the same time, moderate Islamism undoubtedly has its positive sides, including the moral aspect (in particular, it encourages the priority of the spiritual over the material and restricts the itch for gain; it requires helping the poor and mutual help as well as preserves family values and justice as well as forbids immorality and drinking, etc.). Islam makes all Muslims generally equal before Allah and, respectively, his law. In this context, Islam and Islamism are especially democratic. Thus, Islamism represents a whole system of moral and spiritual values, rather up-to-date in certain respects which can appear frequently enough to provide a normal life for a huge number of people and entire societies.

What is the problem then with Islamism in terms of modern values? In our opinion, it may be presented in terms of two distinct concerns. First, the Islamists, especially the radical ones, figuratively speaking look not toward the future but to the past, and second, they are not ready to admit a number of modern values especially Western ones. These values are often rejected not because they are bad by themselves but because they do not fit the Islamist dogmas (i.e., they are bad because they contradict Qur'an or Shari'ah law). Also the Islamists try to impose their views on other members of society justifying this with the belief (or espoused claim) that they have the supreme power sanctioned from above.

The status of females in Muslim society is one of the major problems in the relations between Islam and the West, as well as one of the main values heatedly debated. Indeed, numerous real problems are abundant here. Nevertheless, if one sets aside the external attributes (hijab, dresses, etc.), female rights are generally recognized including the right to vote, education, jobs, and many other things [yet, there are many problems here, but that the movement in the right direction is still obvious (see Chaps. 3 and 11 for detail)].

Here one should bear in mind that when brought to their own (extreme) maximum, the rights of individuals are also likely to conflict with social values and other people's rights (as is apparent today in the right to bear arms in the USA). Thus, a gradual expansion of the scope of individual's rights is more socially adaptive because societies would be able to integrate these rights into their national social compact.

There is another painful issue of the balance between Islamism and democracy already described above which also produces non-uniformity among the Islamists. In general, moderate Islamism does not contradict democracy and respect for certain human rights but of course, within the Islamic conception. In the course of the Islamists' integration into the political landscape, they come to perceive democracy more as a value. But certainly, much depends on the political moment. Thus, a spokesman for the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement said in July, 2013: "We have our own belief in the democratic system and we are ready to die for it" (Chumley 2013). But today, Muslim brothers are driven underground and that is why many would obviously change their attitude to democracy. This shows the ambivalent attitude of Islamism toward democracy which was discussed above. Besides, this also suggests that the coalition with moderate Islamism against the radicals may strengthen the trust to democracy and improve its perception as a value. In a number of Muslim countries (as will be also shown in Sect. 3.5 of Chap. 3) democracy is considered to be a great value even in the eyes of Islamist parties who see it as a means to achieve success.

We find it extremely difficult to demand pure democracy according to every western criterion. One should point out that an explosive growth in the popularity of democratic ideas among many Islamists is associated with the fact that Islamist conceptions are very popular among people in many Muslim countries and thus they have real chances to take power by democratic means. In fact, free elections in Muslim-majority countries naturally could end with the Islamists' victory (e.g., Gause III 2005) which cannot but provoke the Islamists' appeal to this form of political organization of a state.

One comes to another important point: under democracy power belongs to those supported by the majority, but they frequently use power in unreasonable ways and this is a problem. It should be clear that if a society is not completely ready for democracy, then one should not be in a hurry with its implementation. However, with development of certain institutions, society can begin to approach the implementation of democratic policies and rights. So in general, the Islamic world, though slowly and with difficulties, moves in the right direction. With the development of the world, technologies, etc., a certain convergence occurs in the perception of values. In particular, the development of information technologies allowS for the distribution and reception of the same information, and values both in the West and in the East. Nevertheless, the differences in the perception of values are still rather considerable (for details, see Part II of the present monograph) and they will hardly be smoothened in the near future (if ever).

1.4 The Middle East, Revolutions, World System, and Geopolitics

The analysis of the situation and trends in the Middle East in the context of the World System's development and in World System terms is one of the main tasks of the present monograph. So almost in every its chapter we try to analyze processes and events that are interrelated with global trends. In the Conclusion to this monograph (Chap. 11), we interpret the events in the Middle East as the start of a reconfiguration process of the World System.

The issues of revolution and the relationship between democracy and revolutions with respect to the Arab Spring will be the main topic of Chap. 4 ("Perturbations in the Arab World during Arab Spring: General Analysis") and Chap. 5 ("Arab Spring, Revolutions, and the Democratic Values"). One of the major and typical problems leading to revolutions (which will be described in Chaps. 4 and 5 but is worth covering in this Introduction as well) is the correlation between a society's rather successful development and increasing discontent within it. Our study of a number of developmental models of different countries in different epochs showed that regardless of consumption level and population growth rate the processes of modernization are quite tightly and intrinsically related to the perils of social and political cataclysms which can rather easily transform into revolutions and violent disorders. That is why one should consider the cases of crisis-free development in the course of modernization and escape from the Malthusian trap rather as an exception in comparison with cases of revolutions and political upheavals.

As a result, revolutions frequently occur in economically successful or even very successful societies. However, that very success leads to unrealistic expectations which become the ideological basis for social upheavals. By the 2010s, the situation in such countries as Egypt and Tunisia developed following this very model.

The events in a more economically backward country of the region—Yemen—developed in a different and dramatic way. Having not yet recovered from a long civil war, Yemen lagged behind its neighbors. The attempts to establish a liberal democracy via revolutions revived old conflicts and triggered new ones. As a result, at present Yemen has been split and gripped with a new civil war, which has been sharply exacerbated by the Gulf States' intervention. All this supports the idea that the attempts to instantly impose liberal democracy on the unformed states, especially on the ones that lack ethnic and confessional unity (e.g., Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, etc.) lead to destabilization of the situation, increasing number of conflicts, and humanitarian crises. This may also result in the collapse of previously stable states which consequently contributes to a rapid spread of the radical Islamist and terrorist ideology.

In case of Syria, we still must deal with "the Syrian Dead-End" because the Syrian conflict has become the center of global geopolitical tensions involving many countries including Iran, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, the USA, European countries, Russia, etc. As a result, the Islamic State stepped forward, which was one of the most unpleasant "surprises" of the Middle East.

In our analysis of the events, we actively employ Berdyaev's law which states that "all revolutions end with reactions" (1990: 29) and the events in the Middle East support that law rather well. We also extend the law to note that any interference also ends with reactions. That is the reason why one can state that ISIS is the response to Western (and, especially, American) interference.

Undoubtedly, the current uninviting prospects are the results of the American and Western foreign policy aimed at the elimination of strong regimes in the Middle East, including support of Islamists.⁴

As a result, today destabilization is observed throughout the region. The most dangerous situation was created in Libya where there is no hope on reunification the country. There are still two main sharply competing governments with different level of the international recognition—more Islamist in Tripoli, and more secularist in Tobruq as well as some other independent groups. In such a situation the Islamist radicals from all countries flow here. There is an increasing threat that the radical Islamists' sphere of influence will spread to the sub-Saharan regions involving Mali, Chad, and Nigeria where radicals from Boko Haram, Al-Mourabitoun, Ansar al-Shari'ah, and others already operate. The West risks creating a permanent source of terrorism and radicalism in Africa which will poison the world atmosphere for many decades. This will pose a definite threat operating in the background of a powerful demographic pressure in this region (see, e.g., Korotayev and Zinkina 2014a, 2015; Zinkina and Korotayev 2014a, b). And this will affect all parts of the world, including the Western countries. The measures to control migration may fail and actually already do not work since the EU authorities seriously discuss the necessity to bomb the illegal migrants' worthless fleet. If one employs Toynbee's term (1974: 153), the external proletariat from Asia and Africa infiltrates into Europe and America and forms the internal proletariat here which is able to undermine stability (see also Emre 2015; Roubini 2015). The USA and the West should abandon the policy of seeking to eliminate statehood in the countries of the Greater Middle East and Africa by means of so-called revolutions and start to think about reinforcing statehood there. Indeed, the globalization processes obviously unites the destinies of many people from different cultural, social, historical, and religious backgrounds.

The USA and Europe often act violently and aggressively against the developing countries because they are sure that none of these affairs concern them. However,

⁴"For the past decade, two successive US administrations have maintained close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Libya, to name just the most prominent cases. The Obama administration conducted an assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2010 and 2011, beginning even before the events known as the "Arab Spring" erupted in Tunisia and in Egypt. The President personally issued Presidential Study Directive 11 (PSD-11) in 2010, ordering an assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood and other "political Islamist" movements, including the ruling AKP in Turkey, ultimately concluding that the United States should shift from its longstanding policy of supporting "stability" in the Middle East and North Africa (that is, support for "stable regimes" even if they were authoritarian), to a policy of backing "moderate" Islamic political movements. To this day, PSD-11 remains classified, in part because it reveals an embarrassingly naïve and uninformed view of trends in the Middle East and North Africa (Mena) region" (<http://gulfnnews.com/news/mena/libya/us-document-reveals-cooperation-between-washington-and-brotherhood-1.1349207>).

the nature of globalization brings the situation to their door if not inside their house when events in one part of the world rapidly affect the landscape in other places.

We make a conclusion that current situation objectively forces actors to take responsibility for the results of their foreign policy and geopolitical actions while the Western countries still act as though they live not in the twenty-first but in the nineteenth century. However, in the epoch of globalization the response to such actions will be quite rapid and can be unexpected as we see by the example of the EU's migrant and refugee crisis.

The subject of the Arab revolutions by all means requires considerable attention and further study. But we hope that the present monograph will also contribute to the understanding of this phenomenon.

Answering the question in the headline of the present chapter, we can say: revolutions have only exacerbated the Arab countries' problems. Unfortunately, over the seven years none of the Arab revolutions has solved any serious problem (and probably, will ever be able to). To be sure, what can be done in terms of modernization either has already been done or could be conducted under authoritarian regimes.

The events of the Arab Spring have in a violent manner proved once again that a democratic constitution and endeavors of some part of revolutionaries are not enough to strengthen democracy. There must be a number of conditions including historical and economic prerequisites, an existing civil society, and relatively high living standards, etc. This poses a question of whether the democratic principles of government can be considered universal.

Despite the mainstream assumption in the West (and especially among Western academics) that democracy is the best pattern for all societies at any stage of their development and cultural level, as well as with any archetypes, in the Western sociology there are serious studies that disprove this statement and show that democracy requires the presence of a number of complex conditions (see, e.g., Aron 1970; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Huntington 1968, 1993). Revolutions for the sake of the establishment of democracy in societies unprepared for it, quite frequently delay its introduction (e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2014c, 2016b). All this, unfortunately, is proved by the events of the Arab Spring. At present, it is important that the region should calm down and pass to economic and cultural growth which will promote the progress of these societies, and their possible but not inevitable transition to more democratic systems than their current ones.

In the present book, we have elaborated on ideas that we have presented elsewhere.⁵ On the basis of the current literature, we have come to the conclusion that a thorough and more comparative-empirical approach, based on the systematic use of opinion survey data would be necessary on the subject (Abdel-Samad 2014; Acevedo and Chaudhary 2015; Achilov 2013; Al Ganideh and Yaseen 2016; Alianak 2014; Amin 2016; Bakker and Rotondi 2016; Brownlee et al. 2015; Brynen 2012;

⁵Tausch and Moaddel (2009), Tausch (2013, 2014, 2015, 2016a, b, c, 2017), Tausch et al. (2014), Grinin (2012a, b, 2013a), Grinin and Korotayev (2012, 2014a, b, c, 2015a, b, 2016a, b), Grinin et al. 2016a, b, Korotayev et al. 2013, 2014a, b, 2016a, b, Korotayev et al. 2015a, b, Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b, Korotayev and Zinkina 2014a, b etc.

Dabashi 2012; Davis 2013; Esposito et al. 2016; Falco and Rotondi 2016; Farha 2016; Fox et al. 2016; Ghanem 2016; Govrin 2014; Guzansky and Berti 2013; Haas and Lesch 2013; Hassan 2011; Hoffman and Jamal 2014; Javorsek and Schwitz 2014; McCauley and Scheckter 2008; Mohamad and Ishac 2016; Noueihed and Warren 2012; Pottenger 2004; Rynhold 2015; Sadiki 2015; Sidamor et al. 2016; Underwood 2013; Yavuz 2011; Zartman 2015 and many others).

1.5 The Structure of This Monograph

Now let us briefly describe the structure of the book. It is organized in two parts. One of the reasons for such an organization of the book is the complexity of its subject. As we have already mentioned and as we will see below (e.g., in Chap. 3), the Islamism is an immensely complex phenomenon, and there is no unanimity among the scholars with respect to the evaluation of it. Hence, there is no surprise that the treatment of Islamism in Part I differs substantially from its treatment in Part II. As it sometimes happens in research, not all of the three authors agree with the political conclusions of this book here in the introduction but also in the overall conclusions. Arno Tausch agrees with the analysis of the genesis of Islamism, and the World System analysis of Islamism by Grinin and Korotayev. But Arno Tausch, following the arguments of Bassam Tibi, does not think that there is any moderate Islamism, and thus, he is absolutely opposed to an “inclusive strategy” vis-a-vis the Islamists, started by former US President Obama (see Part II of the book). Rather than concealing this important difference, all the authors agreed that they can live with it, for the sake of jointly presenting a World System and world values perspective of Islamism, its genesis and trajectory. Thus, the monograph considers the Islamism in different perspectives, which, we hope could allow achieving a truly stereoscopic vision of this important phenomenon. This also allows a more profound analysis of the Islamism.

Part I (by Leonid Grinin and Andrey Korotayev) is titled “Islamism and the Arab Spring: A World System Perspective”.

Chapter 2 is devoted to a systemic consideration of the requisites for establishing modern Islamism in the Middle East through a comparative analysis of some developmental trends in this macroregion and in China and India. Such analysis seems of vital importance since radical Islamism appears a powerful destabilizing force at the global and regional levels. We attend to the need to delineate between radical and moderate Islamisms, since in many Muslim societies the latter appears to be more a stabilizing force and not a destabilizing one.

A multifaceted, multidimensional, changing and inconsistent Islamism is a subject under study in Chap. 3. Islamism possesses many levels and manifestations: from rather respectable political parties and academic disputes to stream of consciousness of individual poor educated or illiterate Muslims, from the state level to the level of fanatic terrorists, from moderate political movements to extremist storm troopers (see Kurzman 1998; Denoeux 2002; Ayoob 2009; Schwedler 2011; March 2015; Volpi and Stein 2015; Achilov 2015, 2016; Achilov and Sen 2017). It is impossible

to comprehend modern Muslim (and all the more Arab) societies without an account of the impact of Islam as simultaneously an ideology, cultural environment, modus agenda, and mode of life.

One of the main conclusions made in this chapter is that actually most parts of Islamism are not radical (yet, even within this non-radical part there exists a kind of swamp disposed to radicalism at certain periods). It would be a mistake to present Islamism as a node on the body of Muslim societies. In fact, Islamism in many respects reflects the essence of modern Muslim societies, of their mode of thought and life. And still most of the population are not the proponents of radical Islamists, otherwise the entire Middle East would have already turned into an analogue of the notorious Islamic State/Daesh. On the contrary, Islamism in many ways helps to maintain social, economic, political and various other arenas of life at different societal levels as well as create a peculiar Islamic pattern of modernization.

That is why Islamism cannot be eliminated at the present stage, it can be only overgrown. And this will take a long time. One should understand clearly that it is impossible to reduce the dangers of radical and terrorist Islamism only by force. It will decrease only after it is separated from moderate Islamism having made the latter a more respectable, open, and involved in normal political life movement.

Chapter 4 (“Perturbations in the Arab World during the Arab Spring: General Analysis”) offers an analysis of the conditions in the MENA countries on the eve of the Arab Spring in the World System perspective, as well as causes (internal and external, general and specific) and certain consequences of the Arab revolutions in certain countries, the MENA region and in the World System. We will discuss Arab revolutions in a wide historical and theoretical context.

In Chapter 5, we will continue to discuss Arab revolutions in a wide historical and theoretical context. However this chapter discusses the Arab revolutions in some other aspects as the previous one, especially as regards issues of democratic transitions and value orientations. Yet, in this chapter we do not preserve a chronological sequence and focus on some other aspects. In particular, we define common and distinctive features in the course of revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and pay considerable attention to the turning points of the Arab revolutions, especially the July 2013 coup in Egypt. This chapter attempts to analyze different versions of the transition to democracy, to show the costs and political, economic, and social perils of the striving to establish democracy quickly and by radical means (from time to time using the example of the recent events in Egypt). Our goal in this chapter is to analyze the issue of democratization of Egypt and some MENA countries within the contexts of globalization and regional history. In the final part of the chapter, we present a sketch of revolutionary and postrevolutionary events in Yemen, Libya, and Syria. We have added to this chapter an appendix titled “Letters from Tahrir. From Revolutionary Euphoria to Disappointment and Frustration.” These letters demonstrate the evolution from the euphoria connected with the overthrow of the Muslim Brothers to a deep disappointment with the situation in the country and the fate of the revolution that developed as a result of the military coup.

Part II (by Arno Tausch) is entitled “Islamism and Its Dimensions in the World Values Perspective” and consists of six chapters (Chaps. 6–11) and there is also an online Statistical Appendix: The Factor Analytical Results.⁶

The second part of the book covers the issues connected with Muslim ideology and its role, much attention is paid to the issues of Islamic radicalism and terrorism, the extent and reasons for the support of terrorism among the Muslims as well as the relations with the West, Islamophobia, and the correlation between Islamism and Anti-Semitism.

The key issues are the analysis of values in the Arab World especially of the democratic ones, including the problems of future democracy in the Arab World.

In this part, we will evaluate already published major empirical studies on Islamism and the “Arab Spring.” Our readers then have a right to know how good and reliable our social scientific GPRS, which we are using on this journey, really is (methodology section). We then go on to present, step by step, our multivariate empirical results on Islamism, the Arab Spring and what we call the solitude of the West in the fight against terror, based on analytical international opinion surveys in the results section.

In the following, we will present the results of a few path-breaking studies which focused on the real issues as we perceive them here and which are an important guiding post in our own empirical attempt to approach Islamism, the Arab Spring and the Future of Democracy. Such recent literature making use of the statistical data, which underlie our analysis provides important insights for our research project, and the available, often contradictory results make further research very urgent. The studies under scrutiny here help us to provide some maps on the scholarly knowledge about Islamism, the “*Arab Spring*,” and the future of democracy. Not only the multivariate analysis about our theme enters almost completely new space, but also the country values of the important indicators used in the multivariate analysis, such as the support rates for the terrorists of the “Islamic State” (ISIS, ISIL, Daesh) or the international rates of people rejecting the fight against them are not known.

In one of the leading studies on the subject nowadays, Brownlee et al. (2015) maintain that democracy remains elusive in the Middle East. Tunisia, the study argues, made progress toward some type of constitutionally entrenched participatory rule, while the other countries that overthrew their rulers Egypt, Yemen, and Libya remain unstable. Elsewhere in the Arab World, the uprisings were suppressed, subsided or

⁶https://www.academia.edu/36302399/Online_Statistical_Appendix_to_ISLAMISM_ARAB_SPRING_AND_DEMOCRACY_Springer_2018_. It also appears appropriate at this point to mention the inputs received by Arno Tausch from the debates about his contributions in the journal “Telos” and in the Blog “Teloscope” in New York (<http://www.telospress.com/author/atausch/>). Note also that Table 8.1, Table 9.3, Table 9.4, Table 9.5, and Table 11.2 are courtesy of Rubin Center, Herzliya, Israel, where Arno Tausch first published those tables in Middle East Review of International Affairs. Table 8.4 is courtesy of Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv, Israel, where Arno Tausch first published this Table in Strategic Assessment. Finally, last but not least, we mention the advice and active help received from Mr. Robert Mundigl, a computer expert, who developed an easy to handle and freely available program to use Microsoft EXCEL data for world choropleth maps. His programs are a vital tool for international political economy and global value research, and are freely available at <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>.

never materialized. Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds find that the success of domestic uprisings depended on the absence of a hereditary executive and a dearth of oil rents. Prior levels of socioeconomic development and state strength shaped whether nascent democracy, resurgent authoritarianism, or unbridled civil war followed.

This part as it is now spreading to the social sciences: starting from background (often also called objectives)—moving on to methods—the results—and then to the conclusion remarks. Part II firmly shares the established methodology of global values and comparative opinion research (Davidov et al. 2008; Inglehart 2006; Norris and Inglehart 2015; Tausch et al. 2014), augmented at the end of this part by the analysis of economic cycles, fully presented in the recent study Grinin et al. (2016). Illuminating earlier opinion studies on the Arab countries, making good use of the systematic study of comparative opinion surveys, were published, among others, in Achilov (2013), Al-Ississ and Diwan (2016), Ciftei and Bernick (2015), Fox et al. (2016), Gorman (2015), Grim (2014), Hoffman and Jamal (2012), Nisbet et al. (2004), Ogan and Varol (2016); Pahwa and Winegar (2012), Paragi (2015), Sjoberg and Whooley (2015), Tessler (2004) and Weber et al. (2013); and consequently, these articles serve as a methodological guiding post for Part II.

Chapter 6 (“Background”) introduces the contents of Part II of the present monograph. It also introduces the concept of *Din wa-dawla* (unity of state and religion) and Anti-Semitism, and analyses important earlier empirical studies on the subject. We highlight the erroneous judgements of past US administrations about ties to the Muslim Brotherhood highlighted in President Obama’s Presidential Study Directive 11 (PSD-11) in 2010. Earlier empirical studies, reviewed in this chapter, inter alia come to the conclusion that 75% of religious Muslims appear to support politically moderate Islam, while 25% show support for politically radical Islam, and that there is no Anti-Zionism without Anti-Semitism. In the present background chapter, we also debate changes in the global economy, and indicators of global terrorism.

In Chap. 7 (“Methods and Data for the Analysis”), we debate the sources of our analysis and the statistical methods used. We also amply discuss the methodological literature on these subjects. Our data sources are the Arab Opinion Index of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha, Qatar; the Arab Barometer, Wave III; the Pew Spring 2015 Survey; the BBC Global Scann; and the World Values Survey. We debate error margins and other statistical concepts and highlight such methods as factor analysis and econometric time series analysis, available via our used Statistical Program, the SPSS.

In Chap. 8 (“Radical Islamism and Islamist Terrorism”), we present in a compact and summarizing form some of our most recent research results on the strength or weakness of global Muslim rejection or support for Islamism and terror in the region, presented in scholarly journals. We ask ourselves the question: how broad is the spectrum of Arab and also global Muslim society, which could be potentially affected by the ISIS/ISIL/Daesh ideology? While the results presented here clearly reject the hypothesis, popular among populist political currents in the West that Islamism and Islam cannot be separated from each other, we reach the conclusion that support for terrorist organizations competing with ISIS/ISIL/Daesh is considerable and that also acts of terrorism receive a sympathy too big for comfort—both for the political forces in the Muslim world, allied with the West or at least with the idea of

democracy and a market economy, and for the political decision makers and political publics in the West.

In Chap. 9 (“Between the Arab Spring and the Support for Terrorism”), we first attempt to answer with the help of our data the question which political and social segments of the Arab population were especially active in the Arab Spring demonstrations. Only 17% of those who participated in the Arab Spring demonstrations were supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, while 49% of those who participated in the Arab Spring demonstrations had no confidence at all in the Muslim Brotherhood. In the following, we underline the still existing weakness of Arab Civil Society (overwhelming support for democracy but weak support for the structures of democracy). Variables of trust, nonviolence, some indicators of gender justice (especially equal access to political office) and tolerance toward homosexuals indicate some of the existing deficits in the development of civil societies in the region. One major other result of this chapter is that armed terrorist operations against the USA are clearly supported respondents oriented toward Iran and Turkey, by the upper strata, by respondents distant from the Arab Spring, and by people supporting the Shari’ah state. The propensity to endorse terrorism against the United States of America is an outflow of an Islamist ideological conviction. Our terror factor has a positive loading with trust the Muslim Brotherhood, and other indicators of common Islamism and sexism. Our results also show the alarming trend of terror support among the manifest electorates of political parties in Turkey.

In Chap. 10 (“The Solitude of the West in the Fight against Terror”) we discuss the following questions: Do global populations and the populations of Western countries in particular stand behind the international consensus to fight Islamist terrorism? As it is generally known, 70 countries of the world are now members of the “Global Coalition against Daesh” (theglobalcoalition.org); but how many global citizens really are behind it? And do they hold the opinion that Islamist terrorism is a real security challenge? Or is the French writer Houellebecq (2015) nearer the truth, when he predicts in his ironic novel the West’s submission to the forces of Islamism? In the present chapter, we would like to enrich international literature on the subject of the future of democracy by providing results from multivariate analysis based on the available evidence from global opinion surveys.

Chapter 11 (“Islamism, Arab Spring and the Future of Democracy”) highlights the strategic conclusions to be drawn from our analysis. We debate the urgent needs of Arab societies for reform: the system of education, and the system of higher education in particular. In compliance with latest results of economic cycle—oriented research on the Arab Spring (see Part I of the present book, above) we analyze some long-term cyclical trends, using spectral analysis. Egypt, the only Arab country with long-term data in our data base, clearly shows only shorter Kuznets cyclical upward and downward movements, while we cannot discern any Kondratieff waves for the Egyptian economy. We also analyze the real convergence of living conditions of the Arab World with the rest of the world, based on life expectancy data from the World Bank. While average living conditions, measured by average life expectancies, improved, there is a considerable slowing down in the velocity of convergence as compared to the European Union since the late 1980s. Not rising poverty or misery,

but a failed relative convergence process seems to create so many frustrations on the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean. This failure in the process of relative convergence is further compounded by the zig-zag economic convergence process measured by Gross National Income per capita in comparison to the EU, and the rate of unemployment. Finally, we wind up our debates about Islamism, Islamicity, the Open Society and the Future of Democracy in the Arab World. To this end, we present international value comparisons, combined with macro-quantitative reflections which will allow us to make cautious predictions about the future trajectories of democracy in the region, based on the relationships between development levels and value developments. Our Open Society Index combines data for the mass support for tolerance, accepting gender equality, secularization and nonviolence. All Muslim countries in our 77 countries and territories with full data which were under investigation here are below the global average; and the best placed Muslim country is post-Soviet Kazakhstan; and the best placed Arab country is Qatar. While some Arab countries might perform, here and there, in a rather surprising and positive fashion, it is especially the combination of the dimensions, where the Arab World really fails. We debate the possible reconciliation of Popper's Open Society and the theology of Islam, namely the writings of the US scholar Hossein Askari. His Index of Islamicity is the instrument how a society fulfills what Askari calls Islam as a rules-based religion. We find that his Indicator is a valid instrument to measure socioeconomic progress. Following Askari's argument, the real precondition to develop a truly Islamic society, guided by truly Quranic principles and directed toward an Open Society, would be to develop precisely the patterns of societal tolerance, captured by our democratic civil society index. The development of tolerance, measured by our democratic civil society index, explains almost 69% of the variance of Askari's Islamicity Index. We also amply debate the famous Hoffman and Jamal (2014) study about Quran reading and the Arab Spring. According to our multivariate results from surveys, individual piety did not play a significant role in influencing Arab Spring protest behavior. In the following, we also used World Values Survey data first to classify the identification of global publics with pivotal aspects of democracy and the market economy, and we then analyzed how the country values for the general publics, the practicing Roman Catholics attending Church services every week, and the Muslims in these countries depend on per capita incomes. Our research gives evidence to the fact that not only macroeconomic phenomena, but also value developments and even patterns of prejudice are U-shaped or inverted U-shaped functions of the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. We call this process the Kuznets trap: rising crises phenomena in the transition phase from the rural to the urban lifestyle, accompanied by an implosion of basic values, necessary for the functioning of a democratic society and a market economy.

Statistical online appendix to Part II gives a complete account of the results achieved. Our specialist readership will find a large amount of information in that appendix

As we will see below, the Islamism is an immensely complex phenomenon, and there is no unanimity among the scholars with respect to the evaluation of it. Hence, there is no surprise that the treatment of Islamism in Part I differs substantially from

its treatment in Part II. Thus, the monograph considers the Islamism in different perspectives, which, we hope could allow achieving a truly stereoscopic vision of this important phenomenon. This also allows a wider analysis of the Islamism.

Chapter 12 (“General Conclusion to the Monograph. Mena Region and Global Transformations. Arab Spring and the Beginning of the World System Reconfiguration”) offers a conclusion to the present book. The matter is that the events of the Arab Spring and subsequent events can be analyzed in two dimensions: first, with respect to internal and global causes [in particular, global crisis and agflation (as we did in Chap. 4)], and second, in terms of their influence on the future scenarios of the World System development. Such a view we use in the conclusion. The authors explain the amazing synchronization of social upheavals in a dozen of Arab countries. The analysis is based on the theory (developed by the authors) of the periodical catch-ups experienced by the political component of the World System that tends to lag behind the World System economic component. Thus, we show that the asynchrony of development of various functional subsystems of the World System is a cause of the synchrony of major political changes. In other words, within the globalization process, political transformations tend to lag far behind economic transformations. And such lags cannot constantly increase, the gaps are eventually bridged, but in not quite a smooth way. That is why the international system is starting to transform more rapidly and more substantially. Thus, we enter a new period of search for solutions within the World System, which implies that this period will be rather complex and turbulent. The formation and consolidation of a new model of political order could be a rather arduous, prolonged, and relatively conflict process. Thus, it eventually becomes evident that the turbulent events in the Arab countries are also a precursor of the forthcoming structural transformations of the world. We called this process the reconfiguration of the World System. This conclusion offers results of our analysis of such reconfiguration of the World System together with a few forecasts that stem from it. We also suggest an explanation why the new catch-up of the World System political component started in the Arab countries.

References

- Abdel-Samad M (2014) Why reform not revolution: a political opportunity analysis of Morocco 2011 protests movement. *J N Af Stud* 19(5):792–809. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2014.974034>
- Acevedo GA, Chaudhary AR (2015) Religion, cultural clash, and Muslim American attitudes about politically motivated violence. *J Sci Stud Relig* 54(2):242–260. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jssr.12185>
- Achilov D (2013) Social capital, Islam, and the Arab Spring in the Middle East. *J Civil Soc* 9(3):268–286. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2013.816541>
- Achilov D (2015) When actions speak louder than words: examining collective political protests in Central Asia. *Democratization* 23(4):699–722
- Achilov D (2016) Revisiting political Islam: explaining the nexus between political Islam and contentious politics in the Arab World. *Soc Sci Q* 97(2):252–270
- Achilov D, Sen S (2017) Got political Islam? Are politically moderate Muslims really different from radicals? *Int Polit Sci Rev* 38(5):608–624

- Al Ganideh SF, Yaseen SG (2016) Arabia versus Persia: is this what the Arab Spring ended with? *J Comp Int Manag* 1:5–25
- Al-Ississ M, Diwan I (2016) Preference for democracy in the Arab world. *Polit Govern* 4(4):16–26. <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v4i4.753>
- Alianak S (2014) The transition towards revolution and reform: the Arab Spring realised?. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh
- Amin S (2016) The reawakening of the Arab world: challenge and change in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. NYU Press, New York
- Aron R (1970) Democracy and totalitarianism. Weidenfeld, London
- Ayoob M (2009) The many faces of political Islam: religion and politics in the Muslim world. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
- Bakker FE, Rotondi V (2016) Vote for your family! Particularism, support for democracy and support for Shari'a in the Arab world. *Rev Middle East Econom Financ* 12(2):115–137. <https://doi.org/10.1515/rmeef-2016-0004>
- Berdyaev NA (1990) *Filosofiya neravenstva*. IMA-PRESS, Moscow
- Beydoun KA (2016) Islamophobia: toward a legal definition and framework. *Columbia Law Rev Online* 116:108–125
- Brownlee J, Masoud TE, Reynolds AS (2015) The Arab Spring: pathways of repression and reform. Oxford University Press, London, New York
- Brynen R (2012) Beyond the Arab Spring: authoritarianism & democratization in the Arab world. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder
- Chumley CK (2013, July 19) Muslim brotherhood: we're 'willing to die' for Morsi. The Washington Times Friday. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/19/muslim-brotherhood-were-willing-die-morsi/>
- Ciftci S, Bernick EM (2015) Utilitarian and modern: clientelism, citizen empowerment, and civic engagement in the Arab world. *Democratization* 22(7):1161–1182. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.928696>
- Dabashi H (2012) The Arab Spring: the end of postcolonialism. Zed Books, London
- Davidov E, Schmidt P, Schwartz SH (2008) Bringing values back in: the adequacy of the European social survey to measure values in 20 countries. *Publ Opin Q* 72(3):420–445
- Davis J (2013) The Arab Spring and Arab thaw: unfinished revolutions and the quest for democracy. Ashgate, Burlington
- Denoeux G (2002) The forgotten swamp: navigating political Islam. *Middle East Policy* 9(2):56–81
- Emre A (2015) Migrant—novye varvary Rima. <http://inosmi.ru/eu-rope/20150417/227576728.html>
- Esposito JL, Sonn T, Voll JO (2016) Islam and democracy after the Arab Spring. Oxford University Press, New York
- Falco C, Rotondi V (2016) The less extreme, the more you leave: radical Islam and willingness to migrate. *World Dev* 88:122–133. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.07.017>
- Farha M (2016) Searching for sectarianism in the Arab Spring: colonial conspiracy or indigenous instinct? *Muslim World* 106(1):8–60. <https://doi.org/10.1111/muwo.12137>
- Fox AM, Alzwawi SA, Refki D (2016) Islamism, secularism and the woman question in the aftermath of the Arab Spring: evidence from the Arab barometer. *Polit Govern* 4(4):40–57. <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v4i4.767>
- Gause FG III (2005) Can democracy stop terrorism? *Foreign Aff* 84(5):62–76
- Ghanem H (2016) The Arab Spring five years later. Brookings Institutions, Washington
- Gorman B (2015) The case for cognitive interviewing techniques in the post-Arab Spring environment. *Middle East Law and Governance* 7(1):50–60. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18763375-00701011>
- Govrin D (2014) The journey to the Arab Spring: the ideological roots of the Middle East upheaval in Arab liberal thought. Vallentine Mitchell, London
- Grim BJ (2014) Growing religion and growing religious restrictions: a global overview. *Int Area Stud Rev* 17(2):134–145. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865914537054>

- Grinin LE (2012a) State and socio-political crises in the process of modernization. *Clodynamics* 3:124–157
- Grinin LE (2012b) Arabskaya vesna i rekonfiguratsiya Mir-Sistemy. In: Khodunov AS, Korotayev AV, Zin'kina YuV (eds) *Sistemnyy monitoring global'nykh i regional'nykh riskov*. LIBROKOM/URSS, Moscow, pp 188–223
- Grinin LE (2013a) State and socio-political crises in the process of modernization. *Soc Evolut Hist* 12(2):35–76
- Grinin LE (2013b) Gosudarstvo i krizisy v protsesse modernizatsii. *Filosofiya i obshchestvo* 3:29–59
- Grinin LE (2014) Modernizatsionnye (postmal'tuzianskie) lovushki. In: Grinin LE, Korotayev AV (eds) *Istoriya i Matematika: aspekty demograficheskikh i sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh protsessov*. Uchitel', Volgograd, pp 98–127
- Grinin LE (2016) Mirovoy poriyadok, Arabskaya vesna i nastupayushchiy period global'noy turbulentnosti. In: Grinin LE, Korotayev AV, Issaev LM, Mescherina KB (eds) *System monitoring of global and regional risks*. Uchitel, Volgograd, pp 191–239
- Grinin LE (2017a) Russkaya revolyutsiya i lovushki modernizatsii. *Polis. Politicheskiye issledovaniya* 4:138–155
- Grinin LE (2017b) Rossiyskaya revolyutsiya v svete teorii modernizatsii. *Istoriya i sovremennost'* 26(2):22–57
- Grinin LE, Issaev LM, Korotayev AV (2016) *Revolyutsii i nestabil'nost' na Blizhnem Vostoke. "Uchitel'", Moscow*
- Grinin LE, Korotayev AV (2012) Does “Arab Spring” mean the beginning of world system reconfiguration? *World Futures* 68(7):471–505
- Grinin LE, Korotayev AV (2014a) Globalization and the shifting of global economic-political balance. In: Kiss E, Kiadó A (eds) *The dialectics of modernity—recognizing globalization. Studies on the theoretical perspectives of globalization* (pp. 184–207). Publisherhouse Aristotelész, Budapest
- Grinin LE, Korotayev AV (2014b) Globalization shuffles cards of the world pack: in which direction is the global economic-political balance shifting? *World Futures* 70(8):515–545
- Grinin LE, Korotayev AV (2014c) Revolution and democracy in the context of the globalization. In: Kiss E, Kiadó A (eds) *The dialectics of modernity—recognizing globalization. Studies on the theoretical perspectives of globalization*. Publisherhouse Aristotelész, Budapest, pp 119–140
- Grinin LE, Korotayev AV (2015a) Great divergence and great convergence. a global perspective. Springer, New York, NY
- Grinin LE, Korotayev AV (2015b) Globalization, revolutions, and democracy. *Global Global Stud* 4:87–109
- Grinin LE, Korotayev AV (2016a) MENA region and the possible beginning of world system reconfiguration. In: Mustafa Erdogan M, Christiansen B (eds) *Comparative political and economic perspectives on the MENA Region*. Information Science Reference, Hershey, pp 28–58
- Grinin LE, Korotayev AV (2016b) Revolution and democracy: sociopolitical systems in the context of modernization. *Cent Euro J Int Secur Stud* 10(3):110–131
- Grinin L, Korotayev A, Tausch A (2016) *Economic cycles, crises, and the global periphery*. Springer International Publishing, Heidelberg, New York
- Gurr TR (1988) War, revolution, and the growth of the coercive state. *Comp Polit Stud* 21:45–65
- Guzansky Y, Berti B (2013) Is the new Middle East stuck in its sectarian past? The unspoken dimension of the “Arab Spring”. *Orbis* 57(1):135–151. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2012.10.009>
- Haas ML, Lesch DW (2013) *The Arab Spring: change and resistance in the Middle East*. Westview Press, Boulder
- Hassan BE (2011) Ideas can also kill: five assumptions that uprisings in the Arab world have disproved. *Muslim World J Human Rights* 8(1). <https://doi.org/10.2202/1554-4419.1244>
- Heller M (2015) Islam and terrorism: A futile debate. *INSS Insight* 659, January 28. <http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=8632>. Accessed 10 May 2017
- Hoffman M, Jamal A (2012) The youth and the Arab Spring: cohort differences and similarities. *Middle East Law Govern* 4(1):168–188. <https://doi.org/10.1163/187633712X632399>

- Hoffman M, Jamal A (2014) Religion in the Arab Spring: between two competing narratives. *J Polit* 76(3):593–606. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381614000152>
- Houellebecq M (2015) *Soumission*. Flammarion, Paris
- Huntington SP (1968) *Political order in changing societies*. Yale University Press, New Haven
- Huntington S (1993) *The third wave: democratization in the late 20th Century*. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman
- Huntington SP (1996) *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. Simon & Schuster, New York
- Inglehart RF (2006) Mapping global values. *Comp Soc* 5(2):115–136
- Inglehart R, Welzel C (2005) *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: the human development sequence*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Javorsek D II, Schwitz JG (2014) Probing uncertainty, complexity, and human agency in intelligence. *Intell Nat Secur* 29(5):639–653. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.834218>
- Kepel G (2002) *Jihad: the trail of political Islam* (transl. Roberts AF). 1st ed. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge
- Korotayev AV, Issaev LM, Malkov SY, Shishkina AR (2013) Developing the methods of estimation and forecasting the Arab Spring. *Cent Euro J Int Secur Stud* 7(4):28–58
- Korotayev AV, Issaev LM, Malkov SY, Shishkina AR (2014a) The Arab Spring: a quantitative analysis. *Arab Stud Q* 36(2):149–169
- Korotayev AV, Issaev LM, Shishkina AR (2014b) The Arab spring: a quantitative analysis. *Arab Stud Q* 36(2):149–169
- Korotayev AV, Issaev LM, Shishkina AR (2016a) Egyptian coup of 2013: an ‘econometric’ analysis. *J N Afr Stud* 21(3):341–356
- Korotayev AV, Issaev LM, Shishkina AR, Rudenko MA, Ivanov EA (2016b) Afrasian instability zone and its historical background. *Soc Evolut Hist* 15(2):120–140
- Korotayev AV, Issaev LM, Vasiliev AM (2015a) *Kolichestvennyi analiz revoljutsionnoy volny 2013–2014 gg. Sociologicheskie issledovaniya* 8(376):119–127
- Korotayev AV, Issaev LM, Zinkina Yu (2015b) Center—periphery dissonance as a possible factor of the revolutionary wave of 2013–2014: a cross-national analysis. *Cross-Cult Res* 49(5):461–488
- Korotayev AV, Zinkina Yu (2011a) Egyptian revolution: a demographic structural analysis. *Entelequia. Revista Interdisciplinar* 13:139–169
- Korotayev AV, Zinkina Yu (2011b) Egyptian revolution of 2011. *Middle East Stud Online J* 2(5):57–95
- Korotayev AV, Zinkina Yu (2014a) How to optimize fertility and prevent humanitarian catastrophes in tropical Africa. *Afr Stud Russ* 6:94–107
- Korotayev AV, Zinkina Yu (2014b) On the structure of the present-day convergence. *Camp Wide Inf Sys* 31(2):41–57
- Korotayev A, Zinkina Yu (2015) East Africa in the Malthusian Trap? *J Dev Soc* 31(3):1–36
- Kurzman C (1998) *Liberal Islam: a source book*. Oxford University Press, New York
- Lebl L (2013) The Sons of pigs and apes: Muslim anti-Semitism and the conspiracy of silence. *Middle East Q* 20(3):95
- Lebl LS (2014a) The EU, the Muslim brotherhood and the organization of Islamic cooperation. *Orbis* 57(1):101–119
- Lebl LS (2014b) The Islamist threat to European security. *Middle East Q* 21(3). <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:bL4E40YEtWQJ:www.meforum.org/3837/the-islamist-threat-to-european-security+&cd=1&hl=de&ct=clnk&gl=at>. Accessed 10 May 2017
- March AF (2015) Political Islam: theory. *Annu Rev Polit Sci* 18:103–123
- McCauley C, Scheckter S (2008) What’s special about U.S. Muslims? The war on terrorism as seen by Muslims in the United States, Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia. *Stud Conf Terror* 31(11):973–980. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100802400201>
- Mohamad A, Ishac D (2016) Preference for democracy in the Arab world. *Polit Govern* 4(4):16–26. <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v4i4.753>

- Nisbet EC, Nisbet MC, Scheufele DA, Shanahan JE (2004) Public diplomacy, television news, and Muslim opinion. *Harvard Int J Press/Polit* 9(2):11–37
- Norris P, Inglehart R (2015) Are high levels of existential security conducive to secularization? A response to our critics. In: Brunn SD (ed) *The changing world religion map: sacred places, identities, practices and politics*. Springer, Netherlands, N. p, pp 3389–3408
- Noueihed L, Warren A (2012) *The battle for the Arab Spring: revolution, counter-revolution and the making of a new era*. Yale University Press, New Haven, CO
- Ogan C, Varol O (2016) What is gained and what is left to be done when content analysis is added to network analysis in the study of a social movement: Twitter use during Gezi Park. *Inf Commun Soc* 20(8):1220–1238. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1229006>
- Osman T (2016) *Islamism: what it means for the Middle East and the world*. Yale University Press, New Haven
- Pahwa S, Winegar J (2012) Culture, state and revolution. *Middle East Report*, 42(263)
- Paragi B (2015) Eastern and western perceptions on EU aid in light of the Arab Spring. *Democracy and security* 11(1):60–82. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2015.1006397>
- Pottenger JR (2004) Civil society, religious freedom, and Islam Karimov: Uzbekistan's struggle for a decent society. *Cent Asian Surv* 23(1):55–77. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634930410001711189>
- Rynhold J (2015) *The Arab-Israeli conflict in American political culture*. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316146729>
- Robbins M, Tessler M (2012) The effect of the Arab Spring on public democracy (APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper). <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2106399>. Accessed 10 May 2017
- Roubini N (2015) Europe's barbarians inside the gate. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/european-union-lack-of-unity-by-nouriel-roubini-2015-11?barrier=accessreg>
- Sadiki L (2015) *Routledge handbook of the Arab Spring: rethinking democratization*. Routledge, London, New York
- Schwedler J (2011) Can Islamists become moderates? Rethinking the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. *World Polit* 63(2):347–376
- Sidamor Z, Lemtaouch L, Bensouici H (2016) The economic consequences of the political instability in Arab Region. In: *Procedia—Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 219. 3rd Global Conference on Business and Social Sciences (GCBSS-2016) on 'Contemporary Issues in Management and Social Sciences Research', Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, pp 694–699. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2016.05.053>
- Sjoberg L, Whooley J (2015) The Arab Spring for women? Representations of women in Middle East politics in 2011. *J Women Polit Policy* 36(3):261–284. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477X.2015.1050902>
- Tausch A (2013) A look at international survey data about Arab opinion. *Middle East Rev Int Aff* 17(3):57–74
- Tausch A (2014) The new global antisemitism: implications from the recent Adl-100 data. *Middle East Rev Int Aff* 18(3):46–72
- Tausch A (2015) The fertile grounds for ISIL terrorism. *Telos. Crit Theor Contemp* 171:54–75
- Tausch A (2016a) Islamism and antisemitism. Preliminary evidence on their relationship from Cross-National Opinion Data. *Soc Evolut Hist* 15(2):50–99
- Tausch A (2016b) Muslim immigration continues to divide Europe: a quantitative analysis of European social survey data. *Middle East Rev Int Aff* 20(2):37–50
- Tausch A (2016c) The civic culture of the Arab world: a comparative analysis based on World values survey data. *Middle East Rev Intern Aff* 20(1):35–59. <http://www.rubincenter.org/>. Accessed 10 May 2017
- Tausch A (2017) Occidentalism, terrorism, and the Shari'a State: new multivariate perspectives on Islamism based on International Survey Data (January 12). <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2731640> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2731640>. Accessed 10 May 2017
- Tausch A, Moaddel M (2009) What 1.3 billion Muslims really think. An answer to a recent Gallup study, based on the 'World Values Survey'. Nova Science Publishers, Hauppauge

- Tausch A, Heshmati A, Karoui H (2014) The political algebra of global value change. General models and implications for the Muslim world. Nova Science Publishers, Hauppauge
- Tibi B (2013a) The Islamist venture of the politicization of Islam to an ideology of Islamism: a critique of the dominating narrative in Western Islamic Studies. *Soundings: An Interdiscip J* 96(4):431–449
- Tibi B (2013b) The Sharia State: Arab Spring and democratization. Routledge, London, New York
- Tessler M (2004) The view from the street: the attitudes and values of ordinary Algerians. *J N Afr Stud* 9(2):184–201. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1362938042000323437>
- Toynbee AJ (1974) Study of history. Vols 1–4. Oxford, Oxford University Press
- Underwood LJ (2013) Cosmopolitanism and the Arab Spring: foundations for the decline of terrorism. *Terrorism studies*. Vol. 2. P. Lang, New York
- Vielhaber D (2012) The Milli Görüs of Germany. *Curr Trends Islamist Ideol* 13. <http://www.hudson.org/search?q=milli+g%C3%B6r%C3%BCs>. Accessed 10 May 2017
- Volpi F, Stein E (2015) Islamism and the state after the Arab uprisings: between people power and state power. *Democratization* 22(2):276–293
- Weber I, Garimella VRK, Batayneh A (2013) Secular versus Islamist polarization in Egypt on Twitter. In: *Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining, ASONAM*, pp 290–297. <https://doi.org/10.1145/2492517.2492557>
- Yavuz MH (2011) Turkey: Islam without shari’a? In: Hefner RW (ed) *Shari’a politics: Islamic law and society in the modern world*. Indiana University Press, Indianapolis, pp 146–178
- Zartman IW (2015) Arab Spring: negotiating in the shadow of the intifadat (Studies in security and international affairs). University of Georgia Press, Athens
- Zinkina J, Korotayev A (2014a) Explosive population growth in tropical Africa: crucial omission in development forecasts (emerging risks and way out). *World Futur* 70(4):271–305
- Zinkina J, Korotayev A (2014b) Projecting Mozambique’s demographic futures. *J Futur Stud* 19(2):21–40