



# The Analytic System of Martin Heidegger's Da-sein and the Anthropology of Max Scheler in the Educational Perspective

N.I. Ishchenko

To cite this article: N.I. Ishchenko (2017) The Analytic System of Martin Heidegger's Da-sein and the Anthropology of Max Scheler in the Educational Perspective, *Russian Education & Society*, 59:10-12, 486-517, DOI: [10.1080/10609393.2017.1433913](https://doi.org/10.1080/10609393.2017.1433913)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10609393.2017.1433913>



Published online: 26 Mar 2018.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 32



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



N.I. ISHCENKO

## The Analytic System of Martin Heidegger's Da-sein and the Anthropology of Max Scheler in the Educational Perspective

*When applied to education, Heidegger's analysis of Da-sein suggests that in his ontology the epistemological problem of clarifying cognition is replaced by the existential problem of the cognition of the understanding individual. Thus, Heidegger treats "education" ontologically as the ability to achieve Da-sein as one's own true and integral being whose Da-sein always takes precedence in understanding. On this basis, we can say that Heidegger treats education as a transcendental ontological structure that he, like Scheler, calls "disclosedness." And although Heidegger almost never uses the term "education" in his analytic system, preferring instead to use expressions such as "authentic being," "projection of the self," etc., all of this content that he invests in this term closely follows Scheler's interpretation, because it also characterizes human existence as*

---

English translation © 2017 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, from the Russian text © 2016 "Filosofia osviti. Philosophy of Education." "Analitika dasein M. Khaideggera v obrazovatel'noi perspektive," *Filosofia osviti. Philosophy of Education*, 2016, no. 2(19), pp. 163–175. Translated by Kenneth Cargill.

Natalia Ilyinichna Ishchenko is a candidate of sciences in history of philosophy and an associate professor in the Faculty of Humanities, School of Philosophy, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. E-mail: [natalie.ishchenko@gmail.com](mailto:natalie.ishchenko@gmail.com).

*“open” and “not foreordained.” For Scheler, the same “open” existence is an expression of existential human freedom, since it serves to manifest the spirit as the ontological principle. Considered in epistemological and value terms, this freedom, according to Scheler, is what he refers to as “education,” a transcending state of being that is manifested for another thing in existence as something that is “known” by loving participation in it with a view to achieving “one’s authentic self.”*

During the first third of the twentieth century, the classical concept of education whereby education was considered as a “process of acquiring knowledge, learning, and enlightenment” as well as “the totality of the knowledge that is obtained through systematic learning” underwent significant changes (Ushakov 1938, p. 695). Thus, the founder of German philosophical anthropology, Max Scheler, defined education as “a unique and distinctive form” where “all free spiritual human activity takes place” (Scheler [Scheler] 1994, pp. 20–21). This form is understood by the philosopher “not as knowledge and experience” but as “the category of being” (ibid, p. 21). Scheler writes,

What is knowledge? After all, cognition itself [...] is the coincidence of some substance that arises through contemplation with a value that is independent of it. [...] Knowledge as such must be defined so that it includes all knowledge and not just particular kinds of it as well as to exclude “conscious” processes more generally (for example, judgment, representation, inference, etc.) from the definition, i.e., knowledge must be defined in pure ontological terms. We say that *knowledge is an ontological relationship*, and it is something that implies the ontological forms of the “whole” and the “part.” It is a relationship of the *participation* of one thing in existence in the being-thus of another thing in existence. “That which is known” becomes “part” of the person who “knows” while not undergoing any other changes. This is an ontological and not a spatial, temporal or causal relationship. For us, “Mens” or “spirit” designates some X or combination of acts in the “knowing thing in existence” that makes such participation possible and through which the thing becomes a “conceivable being” as opposed to a simple *being that is present*. The root of

this X can only be the self-transcending participation [Teil-nahme] that transcends its own being, which we call “love.” No “knowledge” is possible without the tendency of the thing in existence that “knows how” to *step outside* the self to participate in another thing in existence. I do not see any other name for this tendency but “love,” dedication, or the willingness to surrender the self, as though the being is bursting out of the boundaries of our one’s own being and being-thus (ibid., pp. 39–40).

Thus, Scheler does not describe education in terms of the employed methods and objects as such, but as an ontological and transcendental relationship that allows the individual to step outside the bounds of his being as it currently exists and to experience ecstasy, whereas he defines the person’s ability to know as the person’s fundamental openness to the world in the spirit, whose objective purpose, i.e., “the thing for which knowledge exists,” is not “knowledge itself, but [...] a certain *becoming or becoming the other*” (ibid., p. 375).

The point of departure for Scheler’s reflections on cognition and education is his initial understanding of man as an *ens amans*, or a loving being: “Before he became an *ens cogitans* (thinking being) or *ens volens* (willing being), man was an *ens amans*” (Scheler [Scheler] 1994, p. 352). For Scheler, man as an *ens amans* is a specific and ultimate subjectivity that exists in the local world of values. This particular “lifeworld,” which defines the possible structure of the world in general, is primarily a world of love and value preferences (ibid., p. XI). In Scheler’s thought, such an understanding of the person is conditioned by the “argument that the laws of moral life are autonomous, that is, morality is governed by a special ‘logic’ that is not dependent on logic as such,” but on the logic of the heart. Max Scheler elaborates,

The *emotional* contents of the spirit, that is, feelings, preferences, love, hate, and the will, have an original *a priori* content that they have no need to borrow from “thinking” and that ethics must reveal quite apart from logic. There is an *a priori* “ordre du coeur” (order of the heart) or “logique du coeur” (logic of the heart), as Pascal aptly observed. (ibid., pp. X, 282).

The general significance of Scheler's "logic of the heart" is grounded in the study of emotional life, which, in turn, serves as the foundation for the establishment of its phenomenological axiology. In such an axiology, according to Manfred Frings, "emotional intentionality precedes all other intentional acts" (Dorofeyev 2011, p. 14). As A.V. Denezhkin explains,

A valid ethics that is grounded in emotionality can be grounded on the discovery of an intentional, act-based structure that describes certain fundamental human feelings. Such feelings by their very nature emerge from the immanence of subjective and random experiences of consciousness. These feelings are able to transcend themselves. These acts (love and hate) have an objective value content. Thus, values represent the intentional content of emotional acts. This content is totally dependent on the arbitrary and relative norms and goals of human behavior (Sheler [Scheler] 1994, p. XI).

Scheler calls such values, whether emotional or material, *a priori*, and he contrasts his understanding of the *a priori* with Kant's formal *a priori*. As L.A. Chukhina notes,

In contrast to the non-phenomenological experience in which its obvious content is transcended, and where "the meant" (*das Vermeinte*) is represented by that which is not given [...] in the phenomenological experience "the meant" and "the given" are the same: there is nothing that is "meant" that would not also be "given." It is at the point of where they "intersect" that the phenomenon (the content of the phenomenological experience) arises. The phenomenological experience involves *a priori* cognition that equally affects both the content and the form, hence, the "matter" (i.e., the meaningful qualities) is grappled along with the interrelationships that are active here (Sheler [Scheler] 1994, p. 381).

Thus, values as objective qualitative phenomena, which prescribe standards of obligation and assessment for the person and form a special realm of transcendental and superempirical entities, are thought of in Scheler's phenomenological axiology as phenomena that reveal themselves in the act of emotional intuition. Consciousness would disappear if we were to stop focusing on them (*ibid.*). This means that they cannot be deduced by

abstraction from the general properties of subjects and phenomena or expressed in terms of logical thinking: a value is not a general concept, meaning or sense, but rather the direct seeing of a subject or the arrival at the original meaning through emotional contemplation (ibid., pp. 381–387). And insofar as not all givens but only eidetic ones are material a priori according to Scheler, then only entities can be characterized as having genuine apriority. They have been shown to exhibit an imminent, objective, and a priori pattern of emotional life (ibid., pp. 352, 369).<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the material a priori or the emotionality of spirit cannot be deduced logically. Therefore Scheler does not accept the understanding of the person as an animal rationale and rejects the classical (ancient Greco-Roman) understanding of the mind as the only basis of the human spirit:

The personality, Scheler proves, is not the subject of reason, is not the Vernunftperson, but it is also not the subject of reasonable will. The personality is, first and foremost, the “*ens amans*.” If we were to define the personality [...] on the basis of reason, then that would be tantamount to stripping away this personality, because reason is identical for all people, and acts of reasonable activity transcend the individual. If creatures were possible [...] whose activities could be exhausted by reason, then these creatures would be not personalities but logical subjects. But the personality is a specific unity whose essence consists in the variety of acts and is headed by the emotionality of the spirit (ibid., p. 382).

As we can see, the idea of man as an *ens amans* that is advanced by Scheler is rooted much more deeply in the ancient idea of Logos and the Divine reason, or the conception of man as a reasonable creature (*homo sapiens*). This idea is “vast and fraught with consequences,” according to his own words (ibid., p. 75). Scheler writes that this idea is “the invention of the Greeks,” and it “allows us to distinguish between humans and animals in general”: man here is conceived of as the carrier of the Logos, or Nous (ibid., pp. 75, 71, and 76). In other words, the idea of the person as the carrier of the Logos distinguishes the person from the most similar animals not just empirically, but also

morphologically, physiologically, and psychologically. It contrasts the person *as such* with the animal *as such* (ibid., p. 76). Scheler also aims to refute this tradition, opposing the idea of the Logos interpreted as intellect with the conception of the spirit. Thus, in following the ancient tradition, the philosopher also classifies the person's ability to "think in ideas" under the philosophical category of "reason." However, he regards this ability as a kind (of higher) thought process, which is contrasted with reason or "practical intelligence," and which he defines as "spirit." The originality of this interpretation of human rationality consists in the fact that it presents reason as only one form of the spirit: for Scheler, the spirit cannot be confined exclusively to noetic functions that come first. Rather, the spirit is thought of more diffusely as the basic, which also includes, along with reason, special irrational forms of "contemplation of prephenomena and the contents of being" as well as the specific class of higher emotional values and volitional acts. Thus, Scheler's conception of reason as a principle that makes people human does not follow the classical or ancient Greek definition.

Thus, Scheler cannot accept the Cartesian solution to the human-animal problem, according to which the animal is only an "appetitive creature" or a "thing" that is contrasted with the person, who alone is imbued with a spiritual substance. On the contrary, Scheler sharply contests the Cartesian tradition of interpreting nature in terms of "mechanisms," "machines," and "things." On the one hand, he claims that the animal world is not a world devoid of intellect. On the other hand, he also states that the person cannot be completely distinguished from the animal by intellect. Scheler considers "practical intelligence" as the ability to think through one's behavior in accordance with one's environment (Scheler [Scheler] 1994, p. 148). After all, conditioned reflexes exist in addition to unconditioned ones. In other words, the animal is also capable of learning. Thus, the animal is not a "machine," and its behavior is also rational: "A living creature behaves *rationally* [...] if it is able to exhibit meaningful and even "intelligent" [...] behaviors without having to first make trial attempts when placed in situations that are new

and unfamiliar for either the species as a whole or for the individual. The ability to engage in such productive [...] thinking is always characterized by the *anticipatory* mastery of new things” (ibid., p. 149). In other words, there is no fundamental difference between people and animals. It is just that people have a more developed practical intelligence. In that case is there anything left at all that can distinguish a person from an animal? Scheler believes that the person is distinguished from the animal not by intellect, but by spirit. He argues that the person is the carrier of the spirit. Generally speaking, Scheler’s philosophy is consistent with the Christian understanding of the spirit. He interprets it as the ability to engage in “idealistic abstraction” (ibid., p. 161). The spirit is not intellect, which is understood as the ability to solve tasks and problems in the external environment. Spirit, according to Scheler, is the ability to transcend the boundaries of any environment.

Thus, the German word “Welt” (world) can be compared to the word “Umwelt” (environment or surrounding world). According to Scheler, the environment is the only thing that exists for the animal, but the person is a being that can transcend any environment. He is a creature who has his own “world.” However, if the efforts of practical intellect are directed at a particular environment that is specific to a given species, then human practical intellect can be measured using its indicator: IQ. Only the person’s environment in this case is the world of rational creatures and operations, and his IQ is a measure of the speed by which the person thinks and performs operations in this environment, because the person’s survival depends on it. But in this sense, we can say that the animal has a certain IQ. The only difference is that animals can rely on instincts to connect with the environment, whereas the person must first be educated. However, in the world of animals, instinctive behavior is always oriented on the environment. Even the most intelligent animals are bound to a particular environment, and they are not able to exist as a species outside of it (ibid, pp. 148–152).<sup>2</sup> People are able to transcend the boundaries of any environment because people are not associated with an environment, but with a world. People relate to objects

from the world, i.e., they do not distinguish stimuli (environmental signals that correspond to instincts) but rather things (particular objects, i.e., things that belong to reality). For animals, things and substances do not exist. No animal looks at an object “of its own accord.” Scheler believes that this ability to comprehend objective reality represents the main qualitative factor that differentiates people from animals (ibid., p. 154).<sup>3</sup>

In the teachings of the founders of philosophical anthropology this distinction is termed an open or cultural program, which is contrasted with the natural or instinctive program. The essence of the open program is the ability of people to transcend their instincts as prescribed behavioral diagrams. Cultural standards dictate different rules of conduct for the person that are determined completely independently of the psychophysiological state of the organism (Motroshilova and Rutkevich 2012, p. 106). In the philosophy of Max Scheler, such “standards” are an expression of existential human freedom, which is a manifestation of the spirit as an ontological principle. According to Scheler, the spirit conceived as such is an attribute of being, namely, as L.A. Chukhina writes, a “tragically bifurcated ‘being in itself’ (*ens per se*).” *Ens per se*, which is the substance or basis of things in existence, consists of two attributes: an energy-independent and powerful “gust” and a powerless “spirit.” Scheler conceives of the antithesis of the “gust and spirit” as the polar opposite of the ontologically initial potentials, which unfold and interact with each other in the human being (Scheler [Scheler] 1994, pp. 394–395). The “gust” has a universally demonic origin. It is a metaphor not only for the aimless and chaotic powerful forces of the void and the unrestrained flow of “life,” but it is also a capacious symbol for the natural forces in general and the actual course of history, including its economic, political, and demographic dimensions. On the other hand, the “spirit” is “the carrier of the sacred metaphysical meaning of being” and denotes the highest ideal forms of being both in their personal dimensions and in the broader dimensions of the content of culture (ibid.).

Thus, according to Scheler, the spirit as “the new thing that makes a person a person” is no longer a new stage in the

development of mental functions and abilities. Rather, it is understood to constitute an entirely “new principle” that no longer belongs “to the vital sphere of things” and has transcended “the disciplinary boundaries of psychology”: Scheler writes,

The thing that makes a person a person is *the principle that is opposed to the entirety of life in general*. As such, it is not generally reducible “to the natural evolution of life,” and if you can reduce it to something, then it can *only* be to the ultimate basis of things themselves whose particular manifestation is “life.” (ibid., p. 153).

He acknowledges that the Greeks had already defended such a principle, which they gave the name “reason” to. But he uses a word with “a broader meaning” to define this principle: “spirit.” This word, according to Scheler, “embodies the notion of reason, but it encompasses more than just thinking in ideas. It includes a particular kind of contemplation of the initial phenomena or essential meanings and thus a defined class of emotional and volitional acts that are yet to be described, such as, for example, kindness, love, remorse, respect, etc. (ibid.). The spirit is active. The personality is its center. This personality is a special ontological sphere that “towers over the functional life centers, including the mental centers” (Motroshilova and Rutkevich 2012, p. 106). Scheler defines the personality as a “center whose spirit exists inside the finite spheres of being” (Scheler [Scheler] 1994, p. 153). Hence, the idea of spiritual substance in Scheler’s philosophy is not the same as either the ancient Greek or the Christian personalistic understandings. After all, according to this view, on the one hand, reason is conceived of as a partial form of spirit, and, on the other hand, “the personal dimensions of the spirit are limited to the finite, human sphere of existence” (ibid., p. 395). The psycho-vital human sphere as the more powerful and energetic area is not so much defined by the spirit. In this case, what are the fundamental definitions of a spiritual being?

Scheler identifies three “important definitions of the spirit”: objectification, self-consciousness, and pure actuality. But his “basic definition” of the spiritual being is “*existential*

*unconnectedness, freedom, and detachment* (or the detachment of its center of existence) *from coercion, pressure, dependence on the organic*, from life, and from everything that relates to life” (ibid., p. 153). Scheler sees freedom in terms of the indeterminacy of the person in the vital sphere. It is “freedom from the external world,” and he sees it as the main hallmark that shows that the person occupies “the open world” of being: “Such a ‘spiritual’ being is no longer tied to appetites and the surrounding world. Rather, he is ‘free from the rest of the world,’ and, as we call it, he is ‘open to world.’ This being has a ‘world’” (ibid.).

Scheler justifies the “world openness” of the “spiritual” being by analyzing the human capacity to comprehend the very essence of things and consciousness. He writes,

Initially, the being is able to elevate the centers of resistance and reaction to the outside world that are given to him [the “spiritual being”—N.I.] in which the animal part is *ecstatically* dissolved. He is able to raise these centers to the level of “objects.” Such a being can basically comprehend the being-thus of these “objects” *himself* while transcending the restrictions that are imposed on this surrounding world or its givenness by the vital system of appetites. [...] Thus, the spirit is *objectification* (Sachlichkeit), or *the ability to render the world in terms of the being-thus of the things themselves* (Sachen selbst) (ibid., pp. 153–154).

As we can see, you can tell that a person belongs to the category of objectified existence due to his ability to *distance* himself from and substantiate himself independently of the “outside world,” that is, he is able to address the latter as his own comprehended “world” as well as to convert the centers of “resistance” found in reality that are limited by emotions and appetites into “objects.” In other words, such a person is able to objectify their mental life (ibid., p. 155).

In considering the person’s reflexive activity, Scheler cites Leibniz’s argument that “the animal, in contrast to the plant, has ... consciousness, but it does not have [...] self-awareness. *The animal does not know itself*, and *therefore* it is not conscious of itself” (ibid., pp. 155–156). The philosopher concludes:

“Concentration, self-consciousness, and the ability and opportunity to objectify the initial resistance to an appetite constitute [...] one *single inseparable structure*, which as such is unique to people” (ibid., p. 156). In concluding that this structure is “a given fact that characterizes people themselves,” Scheler derives a series of specific human characteristics from it. He says the person has categories for *the thing* and *the substance*, as well as for *space* and *time*. He also emphasizes his capacity for *acts of ideation* or for *essential* contemplation, which is a specific spiritual act in which a person resists the being that is present and derealizes the world in order to distance himself from *existence* for the sake of *essence* (ibid., pp. 157–158, 161–165).

The third important definition of spirit for Scheler is the concept of “pure actuality”: “The spirit is the only being that *cannot* itself be the *object*, and it is a *pure* and absolute *actuality*. Its being consists only in the free exercise of its acts” (ibid., p. 160). In contrast to the spiritual, mental acts, which also characterize animals, do not flow freely. They, as Scheler writes, *do not* manifest themselves. Moreover, since they can be observed by people as experiences that can be *objectified* through inner perception, they become “objects.” In other words, these “mental” acts constitute a number of events in time that are observed from the center of our spirit. But the “center” itself as a condition of their observation does not exist as such: “The center of the spirit, the personality, is neither [...] object or material being, but rather the *orderly structuring of acts* that are constantly and internally *manifesting themselves* (i.e., they define themselves *essentially*)” (ibid.). Therefore, it is impossible to achieve a personality by objectifying the self: “To achieve a *personality*, we can only *gather* ourselves into the being of our personality and consolidate ourselves until that end, but we cannot objectify it. And other personalities as personalities cannot be objects. We can reach the point of participation in them only by performing free acts after them and together with them” (ibid.). Thus, a person as a personality features as a superempirical being in Scheler’s philosophy: his spiritual life is a series of events that correlates with a certain center that specifies the sequence of his actions.

So, independence from the vitalistic sphere and freedom from the surrounding world are the main defining factors of spiritual beings in Scheler's anthropology, because the spirit represents the principled or a priori aspiration to transcend the limits of the being that is present and to "derealize" the real world. The essential feature of this creature that is "open to the world" is the ability to overcome natural determinations and to distance itself from the spatio-temporal parameters of "being-thus," which is the ability to transcend the boundaries of "life" (Sheler [Scheler] 1994, pp. 153–155, 160). Scheler prefers to call the principle that underlies this entire human-specific "openness to the world" spirit as opposed to reason on the grounds that, as A.M. Rutkevich claims, he attributes reason or practical intellect to the animal part of the person, whereas reason represents just a part of the spirit. And insofar as the distinction between good and evil, the experience of love, and the sense of respect that he feels, etc., are no less important than rational cognition, then in addition to the mind that is responsible for conceiving ideas and contemplating entities Scheler also distinguishes such manifestations of spirit as higher emotions and volitional acts (Motroshilova and Rutkevich 2012, p. 106).

As we already mentioned, in transforming the ancient Greek idea of rationality and their conception of the emotional-volitional forms of the spirit Scheler also did not leave the classical conception of education untouched. He defined the latter not as an individually distinctive form of knowledge (or experience), but of being and spirit. In particular, he understood education to constitute the form in which "all spiritual human activity" takes place (Sheler [Scheler] 1994, pp. 20–21). Accordingly, the aim of such education that has been newly redefined as being (or rather as an ontological relationship) no longer appears to be knowledge as such, but a particular *becoming*, and more precisely a *becoming something else*, which characterizes the sheer desire to have knowledge. Because, as Scheler writes, "the reason for which knowledge exists and is sought out cannot be knowledge itself," because "knowledge, like everything we love and seek out, must have *value* and an ultimate *ontic meaning*" (ibid., p. 41). This means that the goals

of this *loving* becoming, in turn, can no longer be exhausted only by traditional forms of knowledge, including the positivistic scientific form, which functions as a means of asserting the pragmatic interest of domination over nature and society, and the metaphysical form, which penetrates into the essence of phenomena and promotes personal development and the formation of one's own ego. But these goals also imply the existence of a cognition that is defined by the aspiration to knowledge of the supreme meaning of existence, which Scheler calls "salvation":

From seeking knowledge for the sake of attaining domination (which serves the goal of affecting practical change in the world and attaining accessible achievements that allow us to change the world) we advance to striving after "educational knowledge," which allows us to expand and develop our being and the being-thus of our spiritual personality down to the microcosm. We thereby try to merge with the totality of the world. [...] We then advance from seeking "educational knowledge" to striving after "knowledge of salvation." The latter is that knowledge that allows the core of our personality to become a part of the most elevated being itself and the very basis of all things (correspondingly, this higher basis itself makes the personal core a part of the very participation). [...] The so-called "knowledge for the sake of knowledge" does not exist anywhere, and it cannot and should not be postulated to exist (ibid. 1994, p. 42).

According to Scheler, the "knowledge of salvation" can only be gained by selecting the path of "love"; and insofar as he does not find any other names than "dedication and a willingness to surrender, as though the boundaries of our own being and being-thus have been exploded" to be suitable for describing this path, then in this regard Scheler is able to clarify:

Education is not [...] a self-loving focus on the self [...] nor attaining knowledge of the self. It is the exact opposite of such deliberate indulgence in the self [...] And only the person who loses himself in a noble cause or in an authentic community and who has no fear of what will happen to him will be able to become himself, meaning that he will find his authentic self, since he acquires it from the deity himself (ibid., p. 32).

Thus, it can be argued that the classical notion of education (*Bildung*) as “the path to knowledge” comes to have a broader meaning in Scheler’s philosophy: Its scope encompasses human development over the course of history through the accumulation of knowledge. But it also includes the development of the self due to the efforts of the person’s own spirit at defining one’s own relationship (“communion,” “transcendence”) to other things in existence, the supreme being, and the basis of all things: Scheler writes, “That which is shared by people and animals is a substance that time and again provides the means for the self-development of the person to become associated with the divine spirit” (*ibid.*, p. 31).

Now we will turn to the issue of education in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger reproduces the same definitions as Scheler through his analysis of “*Da-sein*” (“being-there”). According to Heidegger, who in turn cites Ludwig Yorck von Wartenburg, education strengthens “the individual conscience by encouraging [...] the formation of an individual opinion and outlooks.” Heidegger believes that the conscience does not provide so much an ethical as an *ontological* definition of human existence (Khaydegger [Heidegger] 1997, p. 403). Both Heidegger and Scheler describe cognition as a *transcendental* structure of being, which he, after Scheler, calls “openness” or “disclosedness.” However, for Heidegger the ontological grounding of this structure is fundamentally different. Thus, in following Scheler’s essential definition of the person as a being who is “open” to the world, Heidegger demonstrates that he understands this openness differently: not as spiritual acts, but as the explicitness, disclosedness, and *Da-sein* (“being-there”). Moreover, as P.P. Gaydenko has rightly pointed out: “There are no two kinds of openness here: *Da-sein* and the openness of a being are the same” (Gaydenko 1997, p. 375). What are the specific causes of Heidegger’s approach to the issue of transcendence, and what particular approach does he take to the interpretation of traditional concepts of cognition and education?

In attempting an overview of the existential analytic system of Martin Heidegger, which, first and foremost, can be found in his

first major work *Being and Time* [Sein und Zeit] (1927), we must first make three preliminary observations. First of all, Heidegger understood his existential analytic system as only *one of the possible ways* of stating the issue of being: “We should seek out and *traverse* a particular *path* to clarifying the fundamental ontological issue. We will only be able to determine whether such a path is the only one or the only true one *after we have traversed the entire path*” (Heidegger 2006, pp. 436–437). Secondly, the philosopher did not view his existential analytic system as a method that we can use to answer the question of being. For him, the approach was basically useful for learning how the question should be *framed*. “If we are going to raise the issue of ontology again, it therefore means: we must first satisfactorily *set out* the question” (ibid., p. 4). And, thirdly, Heidegger characterized his analysis as being only *preliminary*:

Our analysis of Da-sein, however, is not only incomplete, but above all it is only preliminary. It speaks only of the being of this thing in existence without interpreting its meaning. It only lays out the preliminary groundwork for proposing an initial interpretation of being. We will barely achieve this goal. Our preliminary analysis of Da-sein will require further refinement at a higher and purely ontological level (Khaydegger [Heidegger] 1997, p. 17).

The preliminary nature of the offered analysis is the result of the so-called “hermeneutical situation” of thinking (Heidegger 2006, pp. 232–235, 397). As Heinrich Schmidinger, the Austrian scholar of Heidegger’s philosophy whose work underpins the arguments of the present article, proposes, this situation results from the fact that thinking is always already aware that it is grounded in its very being (in the form of the copular verb “is”). However, time and again it is faced with the need to remove the veils from this knowledge and to retrieve it from oblivion: thinking must somehow already know being, because otherwise there could be no question of being itself (which, for its part, also *is*) nor would thinking be able to understand itself. After all, it can a priori understand itself only in its being (Heidegger 2006, pp. 5, 35, 222, 311; Schmidinger 1985, pp. 166–177). And if thinking

wants to address its being, to know the self in its being, and through it to break through to being itself, then it must first *hypothetically* insert itself into something that it knows nothing about. This “something” is being itself. But thinking is not able to transcend this preliminary insertion (ibid.; Heidegger 2006, pp. 312–315). This situation, in turn, is conditioned by the dialectic between the need to establish a preconceptual stage for being, on the one hand, and the need, on the other, that this being must somehow be accessible to thinking. Thinking would not be able to approach being if it were not always already associated with it, because being itself is both the foundation of thinking and the ground of the entire “is.” However, because it is associated with being, thinking remains the being of *the thing in existence*. Therefore, if thinking wants to truly understand its experience with being as such, which is always in its possession, then this cannot be done without recourse to circular reasoning, where what should be achieved first and foremost is already somehow expected from the very start: in interpreting being as such, the thinking process must start with the thing in existence, whose being it is; and in interpreting the thing in existence (such as the self, for example), it must consider it based on the assumption that, accordingly, it consists of this thing in existence as a thing in existence, namely, from the being of the thing in existence. Thus, in regard to being thinking already always *anticipates* itself (ibid., p. 314; Schmidinger 1985, p. 167).

The argument that the cognition of the preconceptual represents self-knowledge of thinking means the following: thinking learns not only about itself, but also its *basis* (or it acquires experience of the basis). The possibility for this is provided for in the actual being of thinking, which is not just some “factum brutum,” a simple presence or “bare” existence. Rather, it is the *final horizon* for the understanding of anything in existence, including the very possibility of understanding the basis itself. In considering the thinking process in this respect, it is logical to conclude that the being of thinking, which indicates itself within itself, simultaneously provides the opportunity to learn *being* itself as the *source* of any image of being (albeit the being of

anything in existence, in this case the being of thinking, is known only through the thing in existence).

In following this line of thought, it is not difficult to understand Heidegger's theoretical starting point. He says, the earlier we are able to establish the being of thinking, the more primordial being is itself (Heidegger 2006, pp. 7, 12–14, 17–19; Heidegger 1979, pp. 198f.). However, it would be wrong when pursuing such a line of questioning about being to consider thinking to be exactly like any other thing in existence and to suggest that being itself could be arrived at through any other thing in existence while bypassing thinking. If we conceded this, we absolutely would not be able to understand the particular features characterizing its ontological makeup. After all, thinking differs from any other thing in existence primarily due to the fact that it already always understands this thing in existence (Heidegger 2006, pp. 5–8, 12–13; Heidegger 1979, pp. 197–202). The understanding of being itself or the basis that ensures the ability to understand everything that exists thus constitutes thinking in its *being*. It could be claimed on the basis of these arguments that there is no other source for the question of being than thinking in its being. And because “the framing of this question as the mode of being of a particular thing in existence is essentially defined by what is being requested in it, namely as being,” this question is not like one of the many other questions that thinking poses “given a set of conditions.” Rather, the question of being concerns the fundamental basis that allows the thinking process itself to be conducted (Heidegger 2006, p. 7; Heidegger 1975, pp. 21, 106, and 318f.). A similar question touches on the *very essence* of thinking. When we consider this question, we see that thinking lacks neutrality. “The fact that thinking is so fundamentally affected by the asking of this question means that the question touches upon the essential meaning of ontology” (Heidegger 2006, p. 8).

Thus, given Heidegger's basic conclusions outlined above that, firstly, thinking already always understands its being and that, secondly, this understanding constitutes the being of thinking, we can, following Schmidinger, arrive at the third and decisive step of our

study. It has become apparent that the experience of thinking that arises from the very same process of thinking does not represent in terms of its basis (i.e., the understanding of being) a particular kind of cognition that can always be understood in various ways or not understood at all or that the person possesses in the way that he possesses many other qualities. Rather, this process of thinking is the very *being* of this thing in existence (Schmidinger 1985, pp. 168, 164–177, 188–197). Thus, in existing, thinking understands being and vice versa: in understanding being, it exists. However, the argument that the experience of the basis or the experience of preconceptual thinking is exceptional in its nature as well as the argument that this experience is identical to its ontological definition are not the only conditions under which research into existential analysis as a fundamental ontology can arrive at the most important conclusions. Regardless of what form thinking chooses to relate to its being, whether it does so deliberately, forgets about it, or even intentionally displaces it, at any given moment it is in contact with its being and, consequently, with being itself (ibid., p. 168). If we now say “Da-sein” instead of “thinking” (which will be explained below), then it will be possible to understand the following sentences from *Being and Time* in their entirety: “Da-sein, or being-in-the-world, *is* [i.e., exists] in such a way that, by being, it understands something like being (Khaydegger [Heidegger] 1997, p. 17). “Thus it is constitutive of the being of Da-sein to have, in its very being, a relation of being to this being. [...] It is proper to this being that it be disclosed to itself with and through its being. *Understanding of being is itself a determination of being of Da-sein*” (Heidegger 2006, p. 12).

There is no need to go into further detail to understand that in writing these sentences Heidegger has started an argument with both Scheler and with all those philosophers who believe that the approach to understanding the primordial self-presentation of reality is the privileged approach of one of the ways of cognition. This situation does not change how this privileged way to cognition was understood, either practically or theoretically. In both cases, the understanding was equally shallow, because in any case the understanding of being was considered as a particular ability that the person *possessed*, but not with his own *being*

(Schmidinger 1985, p. 169). A classic example in this regard is Husserl. He practiced only one approach to understanding the primordial self-presentation of reality. That is, through practicing phenomenology, the discipline that he founded under the auspices of the ideal of scientific objective cognition that was made possible by advances in philosophy. However, by espousing this approach alone, we close off all other ways of measuring reality. Heidegger demonstrated the truth of this situation primarily on the basis of the example of the person's being. What will happen to man, Heidegger asks, if we can "pull him out of parentheses" in the same way that we can manipulate the being of any other object? And what would happen to the uniqueness of human consciousness then? What will we be able to discover in the person's being if we understand it in light of those concepts, which were arrived at in completely different areas of reality? What will we be able to discover if we resort to the scientific episteme as the only framework to explore and judge about anthropology? As far as Heidegger's position is concerned, his response to this question is totally unambiguous (*ibid.*). For him, this approach to examining the person represents a clear example of unilateralism, which in no case can claim to fully know the person even from just one particular point of view:

We have "presupposed" *too little* if we "take our departure" from a worldless "I" in order to provide this "I" with an object and an ontologically baseless relation to that object. [...] The object we have taken as our theme is artificially and dogmatically curtailed if "in the first instance" we restrict ourselves to a "theoretical subject" in order that we may then round it out "out of practical concerns" by tacking on an "ethic" (Khaydegger [Heidegger] 1997, p. 316).

But why, then, does Heidegger, like Scheler, not speak about "personal" being? Why does he talk about *Da-sein* or "being-there" or, in other words, about "pure" actuality (being "there")? What is he getting at by his far-reaching equation of thinking and *Da-sein*? Does it not threaten our study if we support this equation? This is the same criticism that we have laid at Husserl's feet. Can we not use this identification to once again distinguish a particular side of

personal being? And does it not once again place thinking on a par with many other dimensions of personal being? Not at all. This, as Schmidinger has noted, is impossible already due to the fact that Da-sein is *totally indifferent* to *any* kind of human approach to reality (Schmidinger 1985, p. 170). This circumstance is reinforced by the fact that Da-sein (which we still need to explain later in the article) significantly affects personal being in *its entirety*. And, finally, personal being *is* Da-sein. Therefore, for Heidegger the ability to reduce the understanding of being to a single ability of consciousness amid all of the other abilities is totally ruled out.

What in fact does “Da-sein” mean? From the point of view of *understanding* being as a way that people exist, it means that the object of such understanding is *being* itself, since the thing in existence reveals itself “by itself and from itself” (Heidegger [Heidegger] 1997, p. 16). Let us unpack what we mean by this in detail. According to Heidegger, the thing in existence can essentially be two things: to exist in a human way of being and in another way that is not like that. But the “*self-presentation*” (the manifestation in one’s *being*) of the thing in existence always occurs, so to say, “according to the person”: the thing in existence shows itself “by itself through the self” to *the person* (Heidegger 1975, pp. 78–94). The person, for his part, already somehow must contain the *conditions* that allow the thing in existence (whether that be the person himself or the thing in existence that exists in some other way) to *somehow* already be able to manifest itself to the person. This is the basis on which the need for a primordial law of *intentionality*, which Heidegger strictly adheres to, arises. It is important to note that, according to Heidegger, the terms governing how the thing in existence presents itself to the person differ from the conditions under which the abilities of consciousness are normally understood. These abilities characterize the process of conceptual knowledge and define the knowable thing in existence in a specific *mode* of being, namely as the “*known*.” The latter cannot represent a condition for the self-presentation of the thing in existence, because they cannot “claim” to be primordial (Schmidinger 1985, p. 171). They, according to Heidegger, are *already* subject to a condition of intentionality, because before the known can be “modified” in its ontological mode “with the

help of” cognition, cognition, consequently, *already* must have some *sort of* relation to the known and have some conception of the knowable thing in existence as such. Heidegger expresses this thought in the following way: the knowing consciousness must always already be “with the known” (Heidegger 1979, p. 346f; Heidegger 2006, pp. 89–101, 200–211). However, for a person to have the ability to make such a connection or for cognition always already to be “with” the known, and, therefore, in order for intentionality to be able to exist in general, then a certain condition is required according to Heidegger. He calls this condition *disclosedness* (*Erschlossenheit*) (ibid., pp. 130–166; Heidegger 1979, pp. 348–376; Heidegger 1976, p. 169f; Heidegger 1975, pp. 94–107, 304–320).

According to Heidegger, this “disclosedness,” once again, indicates exactly what is expressed by the term “Da-sein” (“being there,” “being-in-the-world”), since “the expression ‘there,’” according to Heidegger, “means an intrinsic openness and transcendence. This “there” is a link whereby a holistic unity is possible between a being in existence and the “being-there” of the world itself, which is the “being-in-the-world”” (Khaydegger [Heidegger] 1997, p. 132). Heidegger provides the following interpretation of the meaning of the particle “there” in the phrase “being-there” (Schmidinger 1985, pp. 171–172). Usually, when we think of the word “there” we involuntarily think about spatial relations. We say “there” only because we also have an idea of what “here” and “yonder” mean. But we can only define the meaning of these terms through spatial categories on the basis of intentionality. Intentionality, according to Heidegger, implies disclosedness as a condition of its possibility. Therefore, disclosedness can also be interpreted as “there” on the basis that is supports that particular spatiality, which makes it possible for the first time to reveal the spatial definitions of “yonder” and “here” (Heidegger 1979, pp. 348–350; Heidegger 1991, p. 44f). However, Heidegger believes that starting with spatial categories is the wrong approach to understanding the meaning of the expression “Da-sein.” Because if, as we have just established, disclosedness in the form of “Da” is a prerequisite that allows the thing in existence to be “itself through itself” in order to make it

possible to realize intentionality, then it follows from this that the thing in existence, by virtue of the property of being disclosed, absolutely will not be only internalizable or merely present, but it can also provide the person's ontological relation to the self. This is why Heidegger thinks so little of spatial categories when he uses the concept of "Da." The source of his reasoning in this regard is the notion of "lumen naturale," which he translates as "lightedness" (Gelichtetheit) or "clearing" (Lichtung) (Heidegger 2006, pp. 133, 170, 147, 350, and 408). Clearing is the basis that allows the "intentio" to be able to focus on its "intentim." It precedes both and therefore may not be discerned as the ultimate purpose of study (das Intendiertes), because any way of choosing an object of study (das Intendierens) already assumes the existence of such an object *a priori* and at any time.

Given these considerations, it is not difficult to draw the following conclusion: the concept of "lumen naturale" cannot be understood in terms of the concepts offered by traditional philosophy. Of course, Schmidinger notes, the concept of "lumen naturale" was not a concept in the normal sense of the word in traditional philosophy, but all the same it was understood to be something that the person was able to somehow interpret: for example, one's personal being of God could be discovered in it (Schmidinger 1985, p. 172). "Analogia entis" and various structures of causality that make up reality in both its being and in its understanding could offer a certain opportunity for ascertaining sense here. Light could also be understood as "something" that always already interprets itself and therefore makes itself understandable to a particular degree. For a known relation, it would be totally fair to unveil the meaning of clearing in such a specific way. For Heidegger, however, clearing is a condition for everything that is simply not subject to proof. It reveals itself. And in terms of "analogia entis," this inability to be subordinated to the property of provability is fair above all—because regardless of how these structures are interpreted (whether they are understood as structures of being or as constituting a method of thinking, or as a combination thereof), for Heidegger they primarily characterize intentionality, which he sees as the primordial

structure of the human approach to reality. But insofar as we have only just established that intentionality *always already* entails disclosedness as such, we have to resolve the following contradiction: when it is considered from the traditional positions of transcendental philosophy, disclosedness is never able to “catch up with” intentionality, as this would be tantamount to attempting to overcome the conditions of one’s own ability.

Thus, disclosedness can no longer stand for the ability of human subjectivity and, accordingly, the thing in existence no longer be “open” or “detectable” on the ground that it allegedly is constructed by transcendental subjectivity. On the contrary, the event of constituting rather implies declaredness. So, Schmidinger concludes, disclosedness cannot be “obtained” through the human transcendental act or “read” from some thing in existence, since it already always precedes any way of constituting and any form of reading (*ibid.*, p. 173). So, it can only be presented as a certain *primordial* fact. Here, however, it is important to emphasize the procedure of simply *presenting* in particular, because any process of deduction from something or induction to something always must proceed from the view of a certain primordial disclosedness. The phenomenological method of Martin Heidegger also tries to “sneak up on” this “presentation.”

If disclosedness is the condition of the possibility of intentionality in general, then it cannot be anything other than that which is given *just as primordially* as personal *being* as the bearer of intentionality (*ibid.*, p. 174). If it was something different, then it could not be just as primordial, and, so to speak, it would be “distanced” from personal being, and, because of this difference, it would be identical to anything in existence. But in this case, it would not have anything in common with the disclosedness that has been described as a condition of the possibility of intentionality, for anything in existence already represents “an internal intentional act” (*ibid.*). Heidegger therefore stresses that *lumen naturale* ontically implies nothing less than the ontological structure of *Da-sein itself*, which as clearing, or disclosedness, of being is described now as the being of truth—that is, as the condition of the possibility of intentionality in general: He writes, “*The truth ‘exists’ insofar as and so long as Da-sein exists*”

(Heidegger 2006, p. 226). Any truth as the disclosedness of being is “transferred,” according to Heidegger, to the being of Da-sein, because it is “constituted by disclosedness”—“*Da-sein is its own disclosedness*” (ibid., pp. 226, 133). In his “Letter on Humanism” [Brief über den “Humanismus”], Heidegger clarifies his idea: “But now in what relation does the thinking of being stand to theoretical and practical comportment? It goes beyond any theoretical consideration, because it cares for the light in which only theoretical seeing can gain a foothold and develop” (Heidegger 1993, p. 219). But how can the truth be identified in this case? Heidegger writes, “That which is true may also be understood in the context of the existing object itself, which, considered as something primordial, instructs, justifies, and authorizes its identification. When we say something is true, it means, thus, that it is the same as the thing *that makes cognition true*. And the truth means the same thing here as *being ...*” (Heidegger 1979, p. 71). It is defined by Heidegger as the “obviousness,” “non-concealment,” and “non-distortability” of being (Aletheia or *ἀλήθεια*), and because thinking is only then true when it “discloses” or “shows” being (Heidegger 1976, pp. 134f, 180–182; Heidegger 2006, pp. 28, 33).

Meanwhile, when we consider the line of reasoning about true thinking as “a way of revealing what is kept secret” and “making it apparent,” the problem of the significance of the traditional concepts of “cognition” and “education” also appears in a new light (Heidegger 1993, pp. 225, 224). When he invokes these concepts, Heidegger primarily means the possibility of truly disclosing one’s *own* (eigentliches) being of Da-sein in all of its non-distortability and integrity, and namely the ability of Da-sein to be “itself,” “to satisfy its own substance,” and to implement “its project” (projection or Entwurf) (Heidegger 1993, p. 217; Heidegger 2006, pp. 12, 145). And although Heidegger almost never uses the term “education” in his analytic system, preferring instead to use expressions such as “being authentic,” “hearing the call of conscience,” “decisively choosing the self,” and “projection of the self,” etc., all of the content that he invests in this term closely follows Scheler’s interpretation, because it also

characterizes human existence as “transcendental” and “not fore-ordained” (ibid., pp. 279, 299). Thus, the being of Da-sein is what is described by Heidegger as “already-ahead-of-itself in its being,” “being-possible,” and “the freedom to choose oneself” (ibid., pp. 192, 143, 188). And the relation of Da-sein to one’s own being becomes a fundamental ontological definition in Heidegger’s analytic system: “being-there”, according to Heidegger’s well-known definition, is a particular kind of being in existence, where “it is concerned about its very own being in its being” (ibid., p. 12).

Thus, Heidegger calls the understood relation to one’s own being “care” (Sorge), and this care is the being of Da-sein (ibid., pp. 182f, 192; Heidegger 1979, pp. 404–420; Heidegger 1976, pp. 220–234). According to Heidegger, the concept of care reveals the meaning of the transitive property of Da-sein that is described above. It designates the ecstatic self-realization of a finite thing in existence (Heidegger 2006, pp. 192–193). As such, care shows itself as the foundation upon which the entire structural integrity of Da-sein rests. This integrity first manifests itself in resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), that is, in the true self-understanding of Da-sein from its capabilities, in which, according to Heidegger, Da-sein acquires its “*own being itself*” (ibid., pp. 297–298). In turn, this being characterizes existentials, or the ontological definitions of Da-sein. Among them Heidegger primarily distinguishes “existence” (Existenzialität or the already-ahead-of-itself in its being, or the future), “actuality” (Faktizität or the already being-in-the-world, or the past), and “fallenness” (Verfallen or the “being already alongside the inner world thing in existence,” or the present) (ibid., pp. 192, 56, 175). “Care” is the shared concept that unifies these three structures. Heidegger defines it using the superconcept of “already-ahead-of-itself in its being in the world as being (already alongside the inner world thing in existence)” (ibid., p. 192). It is simple to note that the significance that Heidegger invests in the concept of care has nothing to do with the meaning that we normally attach to this word. The following is also clear: the main condition ensuring the Da-sein structure of integrity is temporality (as the unity of the three ecstasies of Da-sein or “moments” of time [past, present, and future] or as their ecstatic horizon). However, without going into

detail about how Heidegger lays out the problem of temporality, we will ask: what is the reason why Da-sein reveals itself as a whole, i.e., it runs ahead of itself into death while being “lit through” with a feeling of horror? Or, to put it another way, what is responsible again and again for returning Da-sein back to itself from everyday life? The reason for this is conscience (Gewissen), which Heidegger treats as an existentiale, as he is far from writing from any religious or ethical context (ibid., pp. 269–281; Heidegger 1979, p. 440f.). Conscience, according to Heidegger, in its primordial sense performs the “function” of “*discovering*” the truth of Da-sein, which it itself is and which it may be (Heidegger 2006, p. 269). Consequently, Da-sein *is* its conscience. From this, in turn, it follows that the conscience (insofar as authenticity also implies a specific relation to disclosedness) in particular characterizes true disclosedness or clearing, which it itself is—and it is not able to exist in any other form (ibid., p. 270f). Thus, Da-sein is conscience *in and of itself* in the same way that it is *in and of itself* disclosedness. Heidegger’s claim that education “strengthens the conscience” can now be understood. After all, conscience, according to Heidegger, calls us back to our own being: “What does the conscience cry out to him to whom it appeals? Taken strictly, nothing. [...] Nothing gets called to this self, but it is *summoned* to itself, that is, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (Khaydegger [Heidegger] 1997, p. 273).

Thus, it can be argued that Heidegger’s analysis of Da-sein when applied to topics in education suggests that in his ontology the epistemological problem of clarifying cognition is replaced by the existential problem of the cognition of the understanding individual. Thus, the existentiale of “understanding,” which is just as primordial as the existentiales of “disclosedness,” “resoluteness,” “conscience,” and others, is characterized by Heidegger not as the ability of Da-sein *to know* (about itself), but its ability *to be* (itself). After all, Da-sein always acquires the self from its already existing abilities, which it either uses or lets go. On the other hand, Da-sein’s opportunities to use its abilities depend on how they are understood, and namely on the “transparency” or “visibility” of Da-sein, in which it anticipates the thing on the basis of which it becomes itself (Heidegger 2006, pp. 146–281; Heidegger 1975, p. 393). Therefore, being a person

means being oneself using those opportunities that it (being a person) is *itself* by being able to be, or by being transcendent to it. And because, according to Heidegger, among the ways that people use to exercise their ability to be there are the two fundamental methods of authenticity and inauthenticity, it follows that authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) means that Da-sein in its being focuses on this being in such a way that it selects the possibility of its being *itself*, that is, in his own peculiar way in the sense of actuality and its status as being apart from everything else, as the “*always-mine*” (Heidegger 2006, p. 42; Heidegger 1979, p. 325f; Heidegger 1976, p. 228f). In inauthenticity Da-sein offers the right of its own choice to those levels of authority among which it always already finds itself and in whose company it is always and everywhere defined. Such levels of authority are abandonment to the world, dissolution in society, and the self-determination of Da-sein through the category of “Man,” which can be translated as “people,” reflecting the impersonal nature of human existence (Heidegger 2006, pp. 53–62, 113–129, 166–180; Heidegger 1979, pp. 207–215, 326–345, 376–391). Sometimes instead of the notions of authenticity and inauthenticity Heidegger also uses the concepts of truth and untruth (Heidegger 2006, pp. 221–223). But the understanding of the problem of authenticity in the context of the question of how the meaning of being itself is understood, that is, about the way in which disclosedness itself is given is decisive for us, because the more authentically Da-sein understands this meaning, the more it will open itself to being. And the more conclusively we are able to describe how Da-sein is able to be authentic to its being, the more it dwells in the clearing, which it is itself. Heidegger says, “If, however, ‘there is’ being only insofar as truth ‘is,’ and if the understanding of being varies according to the kind of truth, then truth which is primordial and authentic must guarantee the understanding of the being of Da-sein and of being in general” (Heidegger [Heidegger] 1997, p. 316). Thus, there remains only one more question that we have posed that has not yet been addressed: what exactly is the understanding of being itself? We have only outlined the scope in which this particular form of understanding can be detected. And in particular, just like with the meaning of being, this understanding will only become apparent in those places where Da-sein itself shows itself

in truth, and we are able to talk about the being itself of Da-sein in its authenticity.

We should briefly note that Heidegger's concept of Da-sein has often been criticized. Usually, this term has been interpreted to mean that a person lacks a sufficient level of humanity. In the eyes of many critics, the person in Heidegger's system of philosophy seems simply to have been reduced to this notion: he is simply a structure of being. Critics have often aired the view that in advancing this concept philosophy has dehumanized the thinking process (Löwith 1965, pp. 27–34; Müller 1964, pp. 172–183; quoted in Schmidinger 1985, p. 174). There is some truth to this accusation: especially when reading the late Heidegger, where the philosopher speaks more and more about "humanity" and the human, it can be hard to shake this impression. However, this impression is mistaken: it is formed under the influence of a particular feature of Heidegger's thought that you can react negatively to if you fail to probe it deeply enough (the same can be said of Heidegger's "radical" approach to language or his "cavalier" attitude to the history of thought). Perhaps these criticisms of how the philosopher expresses himself do in fact have some real merit. However, as Schmidinger has argued, in the case of the concept of Da-sein, these types of criticisms are completely groundless, since the introduction of such a concept does no violence to such concepts from traditional philosophy as the self, the individual, and the personality (Schmidinger 1985, p. 175). The Austrian philosopher continues that what is meant by this concept is the idea that the person as a transcendental subject is not a source of disclosedness, which is in no way a product of his transcendental ability. And it also is not a "thing" that will only be realized through transcendental history in the distant future. It, on the contrary, always already exists *there*. Without it, there would be no person, because it belongs to his being. After all, if the person's being did not also entail the existence of his disclosedness *there*, there would also be no human freedom (as an existential component of his "essence" as a person capable of choosing being), since the free choice of being already implies a relationship with being itself. Disclosedness, thus, constitutes the meaning of freedom. Of course, this does not mean that disclosedness is a particular definition that, so to say,

“outwardly” describes freedom. What I am saying in this case is that insofar as disclosedness is just as primordial as being free, it is just as correct a concept and just as true. In particular, it represents the primordial, self-understanding of freedom. Thus, disclosedness allows us to formulate a complete definition of freedom for the first time. It also follows that the expression “Da-sein,” which designates the primordial phenomenon of disclosedness as the being of freedom, boils down to the exact opposite of what critics of this expression often understand it to be.

There is, however, another rebuke of Heidegger that we need to consider. It is argued that Heidegger with his analytic system of Da-sein supposedly did not break free from modern transcendental philosophy (Franzen 1975, pp. 24–28; Jonas 1967, pp. 316–340; quoted in Schmidinger 1985, p. 176). This criticism offers the sentence that we cited earlier as evidence of its claim: “Da-sein is its own disclosedness.” According to this line of reasoning, it is believed that “Da-sein” is just another word for “subjectivity” and nothing more. Therefore, Da-sein should consistently be employed as a particular constituted level of authority in a similar way to a concept that was already proposed by Husserl. However, this concept would now be deprived of its super-historical position and therefore constitute “tragic existence” in the abandonment of finitude (Delp 1935). It is not surprising that those who interpret Heidegger in this way often suspect the philosopher of nihilism. But Schmidinger objects that in offering such criticisms these critics only betray their complete misunderstanding of the “critical points” of Heidegger’s philosophy (Schmidinger 1985, p. 176). Of course, you can find passages in *Being and Time* that look similar to the following: “The truth ‘exists’ insofar as and so long as there is existence” and “[O]nly when ontological understanding exists does the thing in existence becomes available as a thing in existence; only when the thing in existence is present in terms of being is ontological understanding as a thing in existence possible” (Khaydegger [Heidegger] 1997, pp. 226, 212). But do these sentences point to the idea of the idealist model of transcendental subjectivity? Not at all. Surely they mean that for us

as people it would be senseless to talk about something if we as people did not exist. But they do not signify that because of this we as people engender ourselves as well as everything else that we are talking about transcendentally. These proposals mean rather the opposite. They relate to personal *being*, and this means that correspondingly they take precedence over the person's "primordial behavior" (his "protobehavior," so to say), against whose background it always already anticipates itself; and so, perhaps, we can say with confidence that the thing in existence shows itself only when a person finds or discovers it. Nevertheless, this fact should not mislead us to believe that the person is only capable of such a discovery on this basis, that it is primordially a certain "discovering being." On the contrary, according to Heidegger, it is both only because this sort of "being" in discovering-being or revealing-being already *by itself* means disclosedness, both as the primordial openness of thinking to its basis and vice versa (Heidegger 2006, p. 297). Given this point of view, it is completely impossible to equate Heidegger's analytic system of Da-sein with modern transcendental philosophy.

## Notes

1. Scheler in particular highlights the two a priori laws of the "order of love" (*ordo amoris*): the law of the primacy of love over hate (hate is a reaction to a false love, and *our heart revolts against this violation of the ordo amoris*) and the primacy of love over knowledge. Scheler's understanding of love is theistic. Human love in its hidden essence is an "imperfect, dormant desire to love God" (Max Scheler, *Schriften aus dem Nachlass*. Bern 1957, p. 356; cited in Scheler [Scheler] 1994, p. 388).

As a step towards being at peace with God, love is also the "valued growth of things": in the act of love a thing in existence becomes a part of another thing in existence without ceasing to be itself at the same time, and in this way it is able to extend his boundaries. As "an experience of contact with the world," love is a primary act that prompts learning and guides the will. Thus, it is the "mother of the spirit and the mind itself." It determines the relationship between consciousness and being, contemplation and thinking, and the activity of the human spirit. It is in this that

the thinker saw the high metaphysical meaning of love and its laws. (Sheler [Scheler] 1994, pp. 388–389).

2. According to Scheler, practical intellect is closely linked to the ability to choose and discriminate between objects as well as the ability to express a preference for certain benefits. However, animals practice these abilities unconsciously. They do not rely on their reflexes, but rather their instincts. In other words, their behavior is always dependent on a particular situation or environment. Thus, the animal expresses no preference when choosing between the benefits themselves as values. For example, the animal will not be able to select something useful in favor of something pleasant independent of considering the specific things as goods.

3. Scheler relativizes the ideas of evolution and those philosophical teachings that view people as “dead ends” or “life deserters.” According to Scheler, people are not so much “dead ends” as they are “life ascetics.” He rejects much of what is called life and what is ascribed to it. He is able to look at life parenthetically, that is, he is able to look at the self from outside himself. The person who has reached a “dead end” has stopped developing and has begun developing technology. Scheler refutes this vision of the person who has stopped evolving and reached a dead end that forces him to develop tool-based reasoning and thereby “lose his soul.”

## Bibliography

- Chukhina, L.A. “Chelovek i ego tsennostnyy mir v fenomenologicheskoy filosofii Maksa Shelera.” In *Maks Sheler. Izbrannye proizvedeniya*. Moscow: Gnozis, 1994, pp. 379–398.
- Delp, A. *Tragische Existenz. Zur Philosophie Martin Heideggers*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder & Co., 1935.
- Denezhkin, A.V. “Ot sostavitelya.” In *Maks Sheler. Izbrannye proizvedeniya*. Moscow: Gnozis, 1994, pp. vii–xii.
- Franzen, W. *Von der Existenzialontologie zur Seinsgeschichte: eine Untersuchung über d. Entwicklung d. Philosophie Martin Heideggers*. Hain, 1975.
- Frings, M. [Manfred Frings]. “Dorefleksivnaya fenomenologiya Shelera.” In D.Yu. Dorofeyev (ed.), *Filosofskaya antropologiya Maksa Shelera*. St. Petersburg: Aleteyya, 2011.
- Gaydenko, P.P. *Proryv k transtsendentnomu*. Moscow: Respublika, 1997.
- Heidegger, M. *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. Fr. a.M., 1975.
- Heidegger, M. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Fr. a.M., 1991.
- Heidegger, M. *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*. Fr.a.M., 1976.
- Heidegger, M. *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*. Fr.a.M., 1979.
- Heidegger, M. *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen, 2006.
- Ishchenko, N.I. “Analitika Dasein M. Khaydeggera v obrazovatel'noy perspective.” In *Filosofiya osviti. Philosophy of Education*, 2016, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 163–175.
- Ishchenko, N.I. “Kategoriya razum v filosofskoy antropologii Maksa Shelera.” *Sledovaniye pravilu: rassuzhdeniye, razum, ratsional'nost'*. St.Petersburg: Aleteyya, 2014, pp. 158–173.
- Jonas, H. “Heidegger und die Theologie.” In G. Noller (ed.), *Heidegger und die Theologie — Beginn und Fortgang der Diskussion*. München: Kaiser, 1967, pp. 316–340.
- Khaydegger, M. [Martin Heidegger]. *Bytiye i Vremya* [Sein und Zeit]. Translated by V.V. Bibikhin. Moscow: Ad Marginem, 1997.

- Khaydegger, M. [Martin Heidegger]. “Pis'mo o gumanizme” [Brief über den “Humanismus”] In *Vremya i Bytiye* [Sein und Zeit]. Moscow: Respublika, 1993, pp. 192–220.
- Khaydegger, M. [Martin Heidegger]. “Vopros o tekhnike” [Die Frage nach der Technik]. In *Vremya i Bytiye* [Sein und Zeit]. Moscow: Respublika, 1993, pp. 221–238.
- Löwith, K. *Heidegger. Denker in dürftiger Zeit*. Göttingen, 1965.
- Müller, M. *Existenzphilosophie im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart*. Heidelberg, 1964.
- Rutkevich, A.M. “Filosofskaya antropologiya.” In N.V. Motroshilova and A.M. Rutkevich (eds.), *Istoriya filosofii: Zapad – Rossiya – Vostok. Kn. 4: Filosofiya XX veka*. Moscow: Akademicheskii proyekt, 2012, pp. 99–134.
- Scheler, M. *Schriften aus dem Nachlass*. Bern, 1957.
- Schmidinger, H. *Nachidealistische Philosophie und christliches Denken*. Freiburg-München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1985.
- Sheler, M. [Max Scheler]. “Chelovek i istoriya” [Mensch und Geschichte]. In *Izbrannye proizvedeniya*. Moscow: Gnozis, 1994, pp. 70–97.
- Sheler, M. [Max Scheler]. *Izbrannye proizvedeniya*. Moscow: Gnozis, 1994.
- Sheler, M. [Max Scheler]. “Formalizm v etike i material'naya etika tsennostey” [Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik]. In *Izbrannye proizvedeniya*. Moscow: Gnozis, 1994, pp. 259–337.
- Sheler, M. [Max Scheler]. “Formy znaniya i obrazovaniya” [Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft]. In *Izbrannye proizvedeniya*. Moscow: Gnozis, 1994, pp. 15–56.
- Sheler, M. [Max Scheler]. “Ordo amoris.” In *Izbrannye proizvedeniya*. Moscow: Gnozis, 1994, pp. 339–377.
- Sheler, M. [Max Scheler]. “Polozheniye cheloveka v Kosmose” [Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos]. In *Izbrannye proizvedeniya*. Moscow: Gnozis, 1994, pp. 129–193.
- Ushakov, D.N. (ed.). *Tolkovyy slovar' russkogo yazyka: v 4 t.* Moscow: GINS, 1938, vol. 2.