

1 Prototype Citizenship

Evolving Concepts of Inclusion and Order

Mikhail Ilyin

The purpose of this chapter is to explore internal connections between various ways of conceptualizing citizenship. The domain of conceptualization is an interface between two alternatives—diverse terminological usage and consistent cognitive design—that ultimately match fundamental Fregean discrimination of *Bedeutung* (reference) and *Sinn* (sense). Overlapping areas expand with shuttle movements from an infinite plethora of citizenship-bounded phenomena (and respective terminological references) to their universal comprehension (cognitive schemata) and back. This chapter seeks to single out major field lines of reference/sense polarity as they are displayed in the conceptual history of citizenship and the models and usages of the concept of citizenship, as well as the conceptual developments linking models with their usage.

Specific vector field lines or strands match institutional and behavioural varieties of political and social association that in some ways correspond to, or concur with, citizenship. The central vector is that of a classical nation state citizenship. Parallel, or rather complementary, strands connect verbal practices, political institutions and cognitive designs typical for contemporary multiple citizenship, polis citizenship or more subtle varieties of association with empires, guilds, orders, tribes and other similar entities.

The chapter refers to selected cases of conceptual analyses and presents their outcomes. Reconstructions of respective cognitive schemata are crucial. Whereas their shared schematic denominator emerges as the ultimate cognitive scheme of inclusion/exclusion, in each case specific nuances are critically significant. Thus, distinctions of varieties of inclusion in terms of kinship, lineage, hospitality, blood oath, filiation and adoption, camaraderie, companionship, patrimonial inheritance—authentic or imaginary, actual participation, formal membership, affiliation, individual selection, belonging etc.—become analytically visible in each case of our conceptual histories.

Reconstruction of cognitive schemata rest on analysis of inner forms of selected usages. Typically, it reveals characteristic metaphors, their patterns and eventually etymons or primary mental representations.

Etymological discussions help to decipher respective cognitive schemata. Such reconstructions are the ultimate results of this chapter's conceptual and cognitive analysis. It begins with a general overview of contemporary or historically recent verbal practices and terminological usages.

Current Usages

Just a glimpse at current usage of the term *citizenship* would allow one to say that the core meanings reflect legal aspects of personal membership in a nation state. This is overwhelmingly the case in current political science literature. It is also typical of everyday English language communication, although British legal discourse provides an array of terminological options. Depending on the context, the idea of nation state legal membership may be rendered in English as *subject* (British subject), or *national* (EU nationals) or *citizen*. There is a variety of legally fixed denominations like *British Citizens*, *British Overseas Territories Citizens*, *British Overseas Citizens*, *British Nationals*, *British subjects without citizenship* and even *British Protected Persons* among a few other legal terms.

This terminological core—reflecting legal aspects of personal membership in a nation state—is surrounded by the fuzzy bunches of meanings of belonging to a variety of groups. It is possible to speak of corporate, social, monastic, republican, imperial, liberal, democratic, fascist and all manner of other ‘citizenships’. Metaphorical shifts of meanings may be concealed or overtly expressed but they are always in force and provide an assortment of conceptual foci expected to grasp very specific phenomena.

The term *citizen* has two major foci. A more evident one is linked with formal membership of the nation state whereas another is linked with social and cultural belonging to a city. The two cores are surrounded by a wide-ranging and lopsided area of expanding metaphorical usages. Its extent may range from *citizen of the Heavenly Jerusalem* to *citizen of the World*, or from *citizen of hope* to *citizen of despair*, or from *citizen of faith* to *citizens of disbelief* or even *citizen of hell*.

In many other languages, the situation looks fairly similar, particularly the Romance languages where the terms sound quite similar because of their Latin base: *civilitas* (qualities of a true Roman that distinguish him from a barbarian), *civitas* (civic community and civic qualities), *civis* (Roman citizen and particularly primary community member of Rome).

The common lexical core of the Romance languages and of the deeply Romanized English language share not only common roots but also the mutual conceptual history of citizenship. Although the word *citizen* was borrowed by English from French in the 14th century to name a city dweller, “it was only around the time of the French revolution that the word takes the meaning of belonging to a sovereign state” (Magnet 2005, 5).

The change is already noticeable in the 'Eastern wing' of Romano-Germanic Europe. Thus, the German terms for citizenship are *Staatsbürgerschaft*, *Bürgerschaft*, *Staatsangehörigkeit* with extra specific terms in Austrian and Swiss legal traditions. Respectively, the terms for a citizen are *Staatsangehöriger* along with *Bürger* and *Mitbürger* and until recently *Untertan*. But city-dwellers are called by an analogous but distinctly different term, that of *Stadtbürger*.

Moving further east and away from the primary domain of Roman Law we discover greater diversity. The Hungarian term for citizen, *polgár*, is a word borrowed from German. Hungarians borrowed the term in the 13th century from a Middle High German dialect where it sounded like *purgær*. A similar loan can be found in Croatian. Citizen is called *pùrgar* (Cyrillic spelling *нургар*). The word *burgher* designated a citizen of Zagreb, whereas a common term for a city-dweller is *građanin*.

In other Slavic languages, respective terms vary and provide an assortment of rather specific derivations. The Russian term *гражданство* (*grazhdanstvo*) and *гражданин* (*grazhdanin*) derive from *grad*, city, whereas in Polish *obywatelstwo* and *obywatel* derive from the root meaning 'to live' and prefix 'close by, around'. Czech *občanství* and *občan* derive from the notion of community. In Ukrainian, the situation is similar. The terms *громадянство* and *громадянин* are derived from *громада*, a standard term for community. In Czech, however, the difference is quite evident. Whereas Czechs refer to something common, Ukrainians conceptualize community, *громада* (*hromada*), as something being great (*громадно*, *hromadno*), i.e. something something greater than person. The Slovene term *državljanstvo* implies a link with a great power or originally with the idea 'holding together'.

The Finnish conceptual history of key political concepts was mapped by the *Käsitteet Liikkeessä* project (Hyvärinen et al. 2003). Finns readily linked the idea of citizen, *kansalainen*, and citizenship, *kansalaisuus*, with that of people, *kansa*. In the early 19th century, some Fennoman writers used the word *kansalainen* to differentiate a subject and 'a member of the people'. Other contemporary options for translation of the Latin *civis* are: *porvari* (bourgeois), *kunnastolainen* (member of municipality), *kansakuntalainen* (member of a nation), *maamies* (a countryman with agrarian connotations). Somewhat later, in the 1870s, *yhteiskuntalainen* (member of the society, *yhteiskunta*) was suggested, but none of those actually survived. A person who lives in a city is *kaupunkilainen*, referring to *kaupunki* (a city or a town).

The Estonian concept has nothing to do with either a city or people. It looks very unusual since it links *kodanik* (citizen) and *kodakondsus* (citizenship) with an archaic form of the word for building, *koda*. But the logic is clear. The property ownership (building) is an implied qualification for being a citizen first of a municipality and then of a country. *Kodakondus* is a status (with rights and duties) of those who possess

property, ‘building owners’. Estonians clearly differentiate citizens from city dwellers who are called *linlased* or *linnakodanikud* from *linn* (city).

Neighbouring Baltic people used the IE root **p̥l̥h₁* related both to Greek *πόλις* and Indian Sanskrit *पुर* (*pura*). The root initially referred to a cliff, then to a stronghold, a fortification and a city. In Lithuanian and Latvian the respective terms are *pilis* (in Modern Lithuanian the borrowed Slavic term *miestas* is used) and *pils* (where the modern Latvian term is *pilsēta*). Corresponding terms for citizen and citizenship are *piliētis*, *pilietybė* (Lith.) and *pilsonis*, *pilsonība* (Latv.).

In sharp contrast, modern Greeks choose to ‘forget’ the classical terms *πολίτης* (citizen), and *πολιτεία* (things pertaining to polis, e.g. order, dignity or identity of polis) and use two terms for citizen, *ιθαγενής* and *υπήκοος*, and for citizenship, *ιθαγένεια* and *υπηκοότητα*. Whereas the words *ιθαγενής* and *υπήκοος* may be occasionally recorded in Modern Greek, the terms for citizenship were devised during the liberation struggle. First the term *υπηκοότητα* was introduced in 1831 as the equivalent of the term *citizenship*. Then the term *ιθαγενεια* was introduced in 1848 as the equivalent of the French term *nationalité*. Currently, the differences in connotations are very slight. In legal terms, they are perfect synonyms. The Ancient word *δημος* is the current term for a city or town. A city dweller is called *δημότης*, and municipal citizenship is called *δημοτικότητα*.

When we move further East to Turkey a new conceptual model is used. It is based on a word, *vatan*, borrowed from Arabic *وطن* meaning ‘birth-place’. *Vatandaş* formerly meant a ‘local person’ until political reforms in the 1860s led to *vatan* being used as an equivalent for the French *patrie* and *vatandaş* for compatriot. It was only later that *vatan*, and its close synonyms *yurt* and *memleket*, received the new referent of ‘the state’ and the terms for citizen finally emerged: *vatandaş*, *yurttaş* or sometimes *yurtdaş* and only rarely *memleketdaş*. *Vatandaşlık* and *yurttaşlık* are the current legal terms for citizenship. City dweller is called *şehirli* or *kentli* from synonyms for a city (*şehir* and *kent*). In the Arab world the same word *وطن* (*vatan*) was used as a conceptual source for citizenship. The core meaning of the term for citizen (*muwatyn*) is a local person, fellow countryman, compatriot. Citizenship is *muwatana*.

The overview ends here on the Eastern fringes of Europe where common traditions of conceptual history citizenship—central for this book—start to fizzle out.

Cognitive Schemata, Prototypes and Invariants

Diversity seems to complicate our understanding of what a citizen is: “Is it possible to be citizens at all within polities which are still ghosts of pre-modern empires: the Commonwealth of Independent States, the United Kingdom, Japan, dare one say it, the People’s Republic of China?” (Dunn 2005, no page).

The doubts look convincing only inasmuch as we tend to stick to a core schemata of conceptualization that the political science lingua franca and *Franglais plus* tradition impose upon us. A broader horizon may not only complicate but also liberate our thinking and vision, but then we should be able to adequately assess as many uses and misuses of these terms as possible along with their correspondence to citizenship-related phenomena.

Paul Magnette, who mostly sticks to *Franglais plus* mainstream, recognizes the universal implications of citizenship (Magnette 2005, 4). Suppose we choose to face the challenge outlined by Paul Magnette. Then, points of view and horizons of vision would multiply progressively. Is there any chance to withstand such snowballing? Yes, if we intellectually equip ourselves to make our units of investigation comparable. Comparative approaches and morphological methods come to our aid. They reduce the boundless plethora of usages and practices, ideas and mental entities, to comparable forms. With all their blurred overlapping and ambiguous variance, they nonetheless reveal their similarities: homology, homeology, homodynamy and other morphological properties. One can morphologically fix their overall configurations, internal setups and external frames. One can analytically shape their dynamics into divergence and convergence.

Morphological inquiry is as old as comparisons. It is our innate proficiency. However, morphology as a distinct branch of science emerged in 1790 when Goethe published his “Essay on Metamorphosis of Plants”. In this celebrated oeuvre, he described *Urpflanze* (protoplants) as a kind procreative model, fundamental morphological universal for all and any plant. Later Goethe and his followers developed a far more abstract construct of *Urphänomen* (protophenomenon), or an ultimate abstract representation of phenomena.

Both *Urpflanze* and the ultimate cognitive scheme are purely theoretical generalizations. In actual research, genera and species, ideal types and concepts, replace abstractions. Moreover, each genus or type embraces further units providing their nested succession up to a single organism or word use.

Some species are more typical than others. Oak is a more typical tree than willow or baobab. A robin is a more typical bird than a penguin or ostrich. In other words, oaks and robins serve as prototypes of a large class of creatures (Roesch 1975). In a similar way, we may associate ancient polis citizenship with its Athenian precedent and modern citizenship with the French one. Conceptual historians focus on prototypes of citizenships when they study word uses.

It would not be an easy task to find a shared quality that underlies all the diversity of phenomena associated with citizenship. One can think of intellectual vehicles like belonging, inclusion or membership. They are universal, or at least widespread and recurrent. Paul Magnette has

proposed the following: “Two contrasts form the continuous basis, and permanent structure, of citizenship. First of all: exclusion. [. . .] The second constant element of the concept of citizenship is legality” (Magnette 2005, 182). This ‘contrast’ implies exclusion and thus also inclusion. Using the notion of legality, the author, in my view, focuses on the acceptability or unacceptability of inclusion or exclusion and related practices and norms. In this sense, the ‘contrast’ could be better represented by the pair order and disorder.

To formalize Magnette’s idea let us fix two ‘contrasts’ of inclusion/exclusion and order/disorder. These two conceptual instruments sound far less charged with nuances and undertones than citizenship, but with all their generalizing potential the proposed notions still have a specific semantic or connotative foci. One can try again to reduce their divergence and variance with a kind of ‘lowest common denominator’. In my view, the best candidate would be the cognitive scheme embedded in orientation metaphor in/out or rather ‘to be in’/‘to be out’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

Specific modes of social authorization emerge and become ingrained at successive stages of social evolution. In his foreword, John Dunn asks a question, “What does citizenship really consists in?” (Magnette 2005). One answer may be: the order. Whereas inclusion may be primarily linked to the form of citizenship, it is the order that provides substance. Furthermore, the very question may be amended. What does citizenship really consist of? The overall fundamental order or cosmology of citizenship rests on three structural domains: (1) inside order and networks that structure it, (2) limits of order or boundaries between the inside networks and (3) outside disorder and agency destructive to internal networks and the entire order of citizenship.

The universal scheme of citizenship order can essentially be described as human conditions that match up dissent living with your own ‘fellow citizens’, whoever they may be—compatriots, kin, neighbours or members of some other community. Proto-Indo-European conceptualization of such human conditions is reconstructed as **priyo*. Its later derivatives are freedom, peace and friendship. It is opposed to active destructive agency of war and the inactive influence of need. This schematic opposition of human/inhuman works as the conceptual base of the order/disorder opposition. Inclusion works to safeguard essential human conditions of peace and freedom while inhuman influence over war and need is excluded. This pattern manifests in all citizenship-like phenomena.

The universal principle of inclusion/exclusion could produce a number of prototypes depending on the scope and media of inclusion, its agency and manner, as well as the character of the results achieved or pertaining order. Thus, scope and media are interrelated. The greater the scope of inclusion the more advanced the medium of communication it provides, ranging from oral speech to global electronic networks of communication.

The agency and manner of inclusion indicate who decides whom to include and what procedures are used, e.g. coercion or consent. The character of the established order may be centripetal or centrifugal, heterogeneous or homogeneous, egalitarian or stratified.

Clear-cut and simple inclusion is rare. Far more common are the intricate spin-off groups that coexist, intersect and even integrate with each other. Their prototypes are those of multiple inclusion. Some variants of inclusion are possible only with individuals and groups that have undergone primary inclusion at an earlier stage. Thus, building the polis or community implies primary inclusion of tribes, common-ancestry lineages (*φ(ρ)ατρίαι*) and extended families (*γένη*). Secondary inclusion in an existing polis is the artificial creation of pseudo-natural groups like deme or trittyes (*τριττύες*). Equally, inclusion in the nation state implies that you integrate people who are already members of estates, social orders, corporations, municipalities.

There is little doubt that today's modern European ideas of citizenship are the most advanced manifestation of a broader effort "to find the meaning of living in a community and to protect themselves from injustice" (Magnette 2005, 4). But we cannot and should not disregard the more general human endeavour to live together in peace, security and pursuit of happiness. A truly universal story of this quest is as long as the very timeline of social evolution, or some 15 hundred to 17 hundred human generations.

We cannot reconstruct and interpret all the phenomena of the entire 50 millennia of social evolution but we can carefully investigate those that are available in the background of overall social evolution. The simplest initial prototype is characterized by closed access and vocal communication restricted by the ability to hear and interact with each other. Primordial inclusion and order emerged some 15 hundred to 17 hundred generations before present (BP) with the so-called Great Leap Forward (Diamond 1999, 39) or the Upper Paleolithic Revolution. It was the focal period when steady long-term accumulation of knowledge and the interaction between skills and frames, resulted in a momentary interface that produced sophisticated enough human language along with cultural universals like burials, art, game playing, cooking, long-distance barter and exchange between groups, and probably humour. In short, the universals are described as behavioural Bs: blades, beads, burials, bone tool-making and beauty (Calvin 2004).

Those self-enclosed enclaves numbered a few dozen people and were maintained by their mode of biological reproduction inherited from pre-human primates. They also developed the first proto-human, and then increasingly human, social reproduction fashioned by immediate vocal interaction and a daily routine of playing procreation roles. Vocal speech and lineage were essential tools of communication and governance. Morphologically, the closed human communities were reproduced by the

‘blueprints’ or memes of ancestral lore transmitted by oral narrative and familial rites. The participation of individual humans in their common customary routine would not even imply any distinction among rights and duties.

Initial patterns of inclusion and order are well entrenched in our current politics, which is little wonder as they have been practised for a thousand and a half generations without an alternative, and followed by another five hundred generations within overlapping orders of multiple inclusion. They are represented by a wide assortment of small-scale forms of inclusion and order, such as cliques, bus parties or even early citizen initiatives.

Demand for Novel Ways of Inclusion, Modes of Communication and Resultant Orders

Extending tribal, chiefdom communities and their alliances could not rely on the patterns of direct rule of kinship genes or even tribes. New and indirect ways of maintaining order were required. There was the need for something that was not immediate but stable, that would transcend everyday contextualized father–son transactions and turn them into structural relations of multitudes of fathers and sons. Such structural relations could be mediated by something that transcends contextual everyday relations and direct communication by a grand and transpersonal medium. Such a medium was common heritage or patrimonium of many generations transpersonalized by acting through the medium of miraculous agency such as Gods, Ancestors, Muse in a poetic and ritualized lore.

Common patrimonium was a thing that would involve generations and imply stability and the essential link between fathers and sons. It represented institutionalized links in the form of customs of maintaining depersonalized generational order and the agents that acted as mediators between the generations as well between the ruler(s) and the ruled.

The gradual development of homogeneous and egalitarian primitive bands into heterogeneous and stratified asymmetrical chiefdoms produced new options. Structural and morphological developments were triggered respectively by the need to maintain order when direct verbal communication—and to this effect, getting input in working out common goals—to give orders and check their implementation became highly problematic or even impossible. The authority was de facto structurally detached from the general populace and often dispersed over sizeable territories.

A morphological solution to the problem was quite self-explanatory and straightforward. It was the creation of a link or medium between the authority and the entire populace. Specifically, a patrimonial solution

for the problem of polity overextension reshaped tripartite division, as essential unity of the prevailing authority (quasi-patriarch, master of the household) and the entire populace (quasi-kinship, kinsfolk, domestics, householders) provided the linkage between them (quasi-household, its instrumental aspects and symbolic representations as common legacy). The last component worked as a crucial integrative device.

The prototype of patrimonial brotherhood did not replace the primordial one but supplemented and integrated it. It was a first instance of multiple inclusion and compound order. The further institutional innovations and arrangements followed this precedent.

Each of the structural units of patrimonial brotherhood—authority, medium and populace—actually utilized the primordial approach to inclusion. Further integration of patrimonial prototypes with more advanced and complex arrangements produced far more assorted and divergent patterns of organization. The patrimonial component in such cases served an important function to compensate the structural and managerial gaps that cropped up with political transformations and growth.

A number of historical types with distinct patrimonial input were described by Max Weber under the rubric of patrimonialism (Weber 2002). They include traditional patrimonialism (*Patrimonialismus*), sultanism (*Sultanismus*), estate domination (*ständische Herrschaft*), as well as the more recent Caesarism (*Cäsarismus*), rule of officials (*Beamtenherrschaft*) and plebiscitary domination (*plebiszitäre Herrschaft*).

There is abundant literature on neo-patrimonialism. Views on the ability of patrimonial orders or rather the patrimonial component of complex orders to serve as a vehicle for modernization and even democratization are quite controversial. The majority of authors stress dysfunctionality of neo-patrimonialism. On the other hand, there are authors who recognize its functionality, particularly in the context of reforms. Christian von Soest, e.g., insists that some patrimonial regimes are fairly accountable to public opinion and promote efficiency reforms (Soest 2007). Furthermore, in his article “Can Neopatrimonialism Dissolve into Democracy?” Mamoudou Gazibo fairly convincingly showed that neopatrimonialism could fuse with democracy within hybrid regimes of ‘new democracies’ in the post-Communist space or ‘third wave democracies’ in Latin America (Gazibo 2012).

Polis Citizenship

Patrimonial brotherhood greatly augmented the growth of archaic societies which soon led to the onset of growth along two distinct tracks. One was further external broadening of patrimonial inclusion beyond old limitations into a greater scope of widespread despotic rule. Another was the internal concentration of overlapping inclusions within densely

populated settlements. The former relied on centrifugal expansion. Another resorted to centripetal contraction. One produced a would-be subject of despotic (domestic) rule. The other led to the appearance of the citizen.

The first poleis surfaced with the Urban Revolution about 300 generations BP. They integrated assemblages of chiefdoms and tribal leagues with the help of the so-called co-habitation or synoikesis (συνοικησις). This new system of synoikismos (συνοικισμός) was a response to the challenge of the gradual growth of populations and corresponding social networks and other structures. Up to this point, their enlargement threatened the limits of the closed primordial and even patrimonial systems. They continued to rest essentially on primary inclusion with minor divergences. The growth was outbound and uneasy external enclosures were highly problematic. With co-habitation, inclusion could turn both ways, outside and inside. Co-habiting chiefdoms and tribal leagues would partially reside within an urban settlement whereas their peripheral edges would cover the surrounding area.

There are historical records on the transformation of old primordial kinship into citizenship dating back to the reforms of Urukagina, Lagash and Solon. When Solon launched his campaign for *seisachtheia* (σεισάχθεια) reforms he expressed concern over the violation of old traditions of kinship and brotherhood. Many free Athenians became *hektemoroi* (ἡκτεμοροί), i.e., serfs who cultivated what used to be their own land and gave one sixth of the produce to their creditors.

All fellow city dwellers are a kind of 'kin' linked not by blood but by political (polis-based) bonds which, nonetheless, led to the development of the concept of citizenship.

The creation of 'artificial' kinship/citizenship and further 'artificial' divisions into demes and tritties actually opened up the possibilities for access to those units. Previous units were closed by lineage, both actual and imaginary. Now new units could be created by political decision that also set up procedures of inclusion.

Another important achievement was the gradual transformation of customs into rights and duties of citizens. Rights and duties were inseparable but contextually people developed the ability to interpret them and to implant them with personal participatory meaning.

Parallel to the polis there was the development of despotic units. It relied not on polis-like contraction but on the further extension of alliances of chiefdoms and tribal federation.

Hegemony of a single chiefdom had been a key structural condition. To that effect its chief transformed into a despot. It was an advanced version of a patrimonial order reinforced by despotic or domestic rule. Each and every one was included in this order as the 'children' of a 'home master'. They were nothing but the domestics (δμῳάς < IE *dems) of a domestic ruler (δέσποτις < IE *dems + pot).

Imperial Civility and Subsidiarity

Growth of the polis and despotic hegemonies allowed for the integration of populations and territories on an unprecedented scale. During and after the Civilization Revolution that took place about 120 generations BP, a new prototype of inclusion and order emerged. It combined explicitly open access and communication networks with all the previous prototypes: primordial and patrimonial, as well as the polis and its despotic variant. Writing provides opportunities to communicate and organize against the restraints of time and place. Political and communication hierarchies could extend infinitely in would-be universal empires unless they faced a lack of resources and malfunctions of their relay junctures and transmission links. Here, it is vital that this open-access order includes closed-access orders in the form of corporate and local bodies. So historical empires and civilizations are, in fact, generally open frameworks with closed units inside them. This amalgamation of openness and closedness may explain internal tensions and the historical instability of empires and civilizations.

New political systems and their civilizations promoted the new and unifying appeal of civility. It was referred to differently in various languages using metaphors ranging from excellence to urbanity and from good manners to peace. In the Roman tradition, civility rested on three central notions: *civilitas* (qualities of a true Roman that distinguish him from a barbarian), *civitas* (civic community and civic qualities) and *civis* (Roman citizen). The etymology has informal and emotional connotations. The word *civis* had been derived from IE **keiyo*—“intimately close, familial” (Benveniste 1969). *Civitas* is primarily the attachment to one’s own, to *cives*, intimate fellow-cohorts. Such well-trusted fellows first built the city of Rome then created a huge empire and finally established *Pax Romana*.

The political form of an empire as an open system includes a dominant centre, typically the Eternal City (Urbs Aeterna) extending its political, military and cultural control over vast surrounding areas. It is an open system because vast resources of civility outnumber barbarian potential. Limes (Lat.) or borderlands served as a transition zone from civility to barbarity and back.

Other important features of imperial order were hierarchy and indirect rule. Imperial inclusion rested on networks of loyalty with authoritative functional subordinations that are centripetally focused on a complex hierarchy. Loyalty to the empire and allegiance to the civilization were primary imperatives for an imperial subject. Although Roman *civis* is traditionally translated as citizen, such a rendition is true only vis-à-vis Republican times. In imperial times interpretation of the term is that of a subject, highly valued and even privileged, but still a subject.

Institutionally and conceptually, the imperial transformation of civic (polis) rights and duties into liberties and responsibilities that were granted was a radical innovation and followed from the extension of politics and the distances between the seat of authority and individual subjects. The ensuing problems could only partially be coped with under the patrimonial model. A more stable and subtle mode was that of establishing hierarchies and subordination.

An important innovation was the development of the imperial virtues of civility and liberality. The imperial mission was to extend the liberality of free people to the uncivil world of barbarians and to liberate all those who were able to civilize.

The theocratic form of imperial rule doubled dimensions of inclusion by converting empires and world religions. The theocratic prototype was soon modified by feudalizing the profane or horizontal dimension whereas the sacral or vertical dimension remained intact. This modification led to the outburst of multiple citizenship in European *Respublica Christiana*, which had existed for a millennium since its formation during the 5th to 15th centuries. Within *Respublica Christiana*, there appeared a great range of corporate structures, including monastic and chivalrous orders, guilds and partnerships, universities and confraternities. The development of such corporate bodies was accompanied by the regulation of inclusion and the emergence of various “citizenships” in monastic and other orders.

It was in the early 16th century that the *Respublica Christiana* collapsed and split into an array of territorial units that multiplied and privatized the former sacral (vertical) dimension. This was the story of a new form: nation state citizenship.

Nation State Membership

Citizenship in its narrow sense of membership in a nation state is quite new, both as a phenomenon and a notion. “It was only in 1792 that it (the word *citizen*—M.I.) was first used to a member of a state” (Magnetite 2005, 5). The term *citizenship* designating nation state membership is still more recent:

A few decades later appeared the *citizenry* derivative (1819), which means the civic body, and *citizenhood* (1871), synonymous with what we call today citizenship. It is only in the second half of the second half of the twentieth century, and even more so since the 70s, that the word is in constant use and that it has taken on a clearly political meaning. The same evolution is found in other European languages.

(Magnetite 2005, 5)

Nation states are also recent phenomena. The term implies the combination of a nation and a state. Such blends have been very uneasy products of the two parallel processes of nation-building and state formation. The interrelation and relative autonomy of those two processes was clearly identified in political science only in the 1960s, but they actually started much earlier, at least as far back as the European Renaissance. The consolidation of sizable linguo-cultural communities within *Respublica Christiana* was re-conceptualized in terms of a common 'origin' or nation. Just as the polis transformation was imagined as the artificial re-creation of kinship on the scale of the city, the modern overhaul was thought of as a similar development on much greater territorial scale.

This new scale of nations did not automatically coincide with new political frameworks of sovereign domination. Early Modern times gives examples of states within nations and nations within states. It was only in the 19th century, in particular, with the unification of Germany and Italy, that the nation state configuration gained prominence.

The word *state* appeared some time in the 16th century (Skinner 1989, 2010). But even then, it referred not so much to a distinct morphological unit of politics but rather to assorted territorial units of very diverse nature that strived to build up partnerships for mutual survival. To that effect, they recognized the legal equality and ultimate authority of each other along with fixed borders. Such an experiment initially took place in Italy after the Peace of Lodi in 1456 and helped to interrupt a long sequence of wars for the next four decades. Many parties to the Peace of Westphalia would not pass even very modern criteria for statehood. It was only after the Vienna Congress that the structural affinities developed by participants of a successive international system made them look like states. So, it is not by chance that *citizenry* entered English political vocabulary just after the Congress of Vienna, *citizenhood* after modifications to the Vienna system in 1871, and *citizenship* was firmly established only in the 20th century.

All through the nascent period of nation states persons belonging to these first territorial units were called, and treated as, subjects. Imperial, patrimonial and other old-fashioned constituents of modern political forms and corresponding concepts dominated long into the next century. They are still apparent and effectual even with much advanced democracies. With autocracies, anocracies and many new democracies that emerged only in recent decades, patrimonial and imperial patterns often continue to prevail. They are still apparent and effectual even within advanced democracies. In actual fact, nation states have always been, and still are, assorted patchworks of overlapping configurations of inclusion, as heterogeneous countries like Switzerland and Belgium clearly prove. But a closer look at 'homogeneous' countries like Denmark or Portugal also confirms a multiplicity of inclusions and specific 'citizenships' (corporate, neighborhood, etc.).

With all the intricacy of multiple citizenships and patterns of inclusion, it is the legal bond with territorially defined domains of power that plays the key role. The territorial borders of states work essentially to establish crucial distinguishing factors. This simplifies and rationalizes inclusion, but at the same time complicates it. In fact, the distinction between internal and external is ambiguous because each individual state has its own perspective and point of departure. States may have shared segments of their borders, but they often operate quite differently from their opposing sides.

Nation state citizen corps can be defined as networks of formal depersonalized contractual partnerships. Such citizenship networks are autonomous to varying degrees but they make up authoritative functional hierarchies with a seat of common sovereign authority at the top acting on behalf of the whole national body. In its turn, the interdependent territorial frameworks for overlapping citizenship networks were conceptualized as sovereign states.

The modern concept of citizenship is based on the principle of autonomy. The emergence of an autonomous possessive individual—epitomized, e.g., by Robinson Crusoe—was only a beginning. It was coupled with new reconceptualization of rights and duties. Citizens could be considered equal subjects of the sovereign state entitled to a set of granted rights by virtue of inclusion, or autonomous participants that can gain civil (political) rights by virtue of qualified participation in the state-size networks of trust. During the Putney debates, the first option was advocated by a ‘democratic’ colonel, Tom Rainsborough, and the second by ‘autocratic’ general, Henry Ireton. Analytically, one can consider whether rights qualify the nature of inclusion or if inclusion provides rights. Equally, long estranged rights and duties could be interpreted as the one conditioning the other, or vice versa.

Those analytic distinctions lay at the bottom of the conflict of republican (civic) and liberal (imperial) orders. As Michael Walzer shrewdly noted, the current and most widespread meaning of being a citizen implies a “particular dualism of republican and imperial or liberal citizenship” (Walzer 1989, 216). In his definition, “a citizen is, most simply, a member of a political community, entitled to whatever prerogatives and encumbered with whatever responsibilities attached to membership” (Walzer 1989, 211).

Does it mean that we can employ two prototypes, republican and imperial, to make a dualistic conceptual device to arrange all specific cases within a bipolar scale? Yes, it is possible, as Walzer himself demonstrates in his chapter on citizenship in a classic political innovation and conceptual change (Walzer 1989, 216). It is a step which is certainly justified from the point of view of the current dilemmas and contradictions of citizenship and ambiguities of civic participation.

Conclusion: Multiple Citizenships, Old and New

European and other multiple citizenships provide a major theoretical challenge for political science. There is nothing special in sharing inclusions and the multiplication of orders. On the basis that citizenship must also include all other historical types and prototypes in its form then the concept of citizenship must be multiple. So multiple citizenship is not something exceptionally recent and outlandish, as is often claimed, but still quite common and widespread many generations ago.

Multiple citizenship is not something that developed by putting together separate national citizenships which then add up to the EU or some other supranational jurisdiction. Rather, those are national citizenships that gradually evolved and split up from an overlapping citizenship of Early Modern polities of Western Europe. The Holy Roman Empire is probably a prototype. But in the case of the unitary Kingdom of France—with its distinct dukedoms and counties having their own parliaments, privileges and political identities recognized by the central authorities in Paris—subnational collective identities were coupled with personal political identities that amalgamated with those of French subjects. The situation in Spain and many other parts of Europe was not much different. Interestingly enough, common Italian identity coupled with personal identities of belonging to the Italian nation developed well into the Renaissance, despite the fact that central political authority was missing. Since the time of Saint Constantine, Europeans combined loyalties to all kinds of authorities with their Christian allegiance. Jurisdiction of the Holy See was central for maintenance of *Res publica Christiana*.

Virtually any kind of citizenship, save for the most elementary forms of inclusion, has always been multiple. So the issue is not multiplication *per se*; the problem is rather the immense scope of inclusion coupled with the contradictory qualities of the ensuing political orders at various levels.

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