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In This Issue:

A. Andreyenkova: “In Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, and a number of other European countries, there is very little trust in both political institutions (especially members of representative bodies designed to ensure that the interests of different groups of the population are represented in government) and institutions whose purpose is to maintain justice, law and order in society. Although the level of trust in government institutions in Russia has been gradually rising in recent years, the absolute level remains very low...”

M. Shabanova: “...new consumer practices expand the space of civil society in Russia and, given favorable conditions, may become a catalyst for its development... The positive dependence on willingness to pay extra for ethical products suggests that this group of consumers is highly heterogeneous.”

Ye. Avraamova: “...the bulk of Russia’s population is exposed to the risk of falling living standards, including about 40% of representatives of the nucleus and the inner periphery of the middle class... the Russian middle class is in a crisis, which is manifested by: the absence of a modernization trend of economic development and shortage of jobs in innovative sectors, which holds back the growth of its numbers; a level of human capital accumulation that exceeds the level of its use; and the overall diffuseness of the middle class.”

G. Satarov: “...a heightened degree of social empathy requires a fairly modern legal consciousness based on modern ideas of law. By contrast, traditional Soviet positivist thinking is associated with a low degree of social empathy.”

V. Rimsky: “The legal consciousness of judges that determines their choice between philosophical concepts of law—natural or positive, the latter often associated in this country with the Soviet law tradition—can be summed up in the following way, based on the meanings of the above factors. Justice and human rights are more important than laws, if only because human rights are given from birth and determined by human nature—and are therefore objective. In contrast, laws are made by the state; therefore they are subjective and can be illegitimate, unjust and unconstitutional.”

Yu. Nisnevich, A. Ryabov: “A deficit of internal development sources and an absence of social and political forces that need modernization are the main problems of all post-Soviet states, either authoritarian or electoral democracies... It seems that not so much the introduction of traditional democratic procedures (or the consolidation of those already functioning)... but a reform of the post-Soviet state may become the preliminary condition of social progress.”

I. Busygina: “Among other great (and not-so-great) powers, Russia and China, located in Eurasia, have the largest number of neighbors. And even a cursory look reveals fundamental differences between them in the way they build the strategy of relations with their neighbor states. The main aim of this article is not so much to explain these differences, but to analyze the benefits and drawbacks of these strategies.”

I. Dobayev, A. Dobayev: “A distinctive feature of the current situation is the high degree of adaptation of terrorist organizations to contemporary realities... the actual structure of financing the terrorist underground in the North Caucasus today is a ramified network that constantly changes its geography and structure, the total amount of money circulating and the share of various sources.”

I. Yakovenko: “Marxism-Leninism... is a peculiarly Russian phenomenon born on the periphery of Europe in a stagnant Orthodox society... The Bolshevik ideology and the political practice that grew out of it took shape as a result of mutual interpenetration of the communal peasant and radical intelligentsia consciousness... The ideological dimension of post-revolutionary society is more difficult to describe.”

B. Mironov: “...Russian workers could not play the role of revolutionary vanguard or hegemon of the revolutionary movement. Owing to a number of social, economic, cultural and psychological factors, they had not formed themselves into a social class and did not have a proletarian socialist world view. However, anti-government political forces... used the workers as a revolutionary ram very effectively. In a situation when the fundamental needs of the workers could not be met, they developed a negative emotional state of frustration... they could easily be drawn into political protest movements...”

Perceptions of Fairness and Economic Inequality in a Comparative Cross-National Context

Anna ANDREYENKOVA

Abstract. Studies of social justice and fairness based on empirical data, especially in a comparative context, are not very numerous. This article analyzes the reasons behind the methodological and theoretical difficulties that stand in the way of a comparative cross-national study of this key concept of social science. Public perceptions in Russia and other European countries regarding the role of the state in allocating public resources and ensuring social justice and fairness, the mechanisms for implementing the social welfare system, and its results are analyzed using data from the European Social Survey (ESS).

Keywords: comparative cross-national surveys, survey research methodology, social justice and fairness, economic inequality, social role of the state, welfare provision, ESS.

The problem of social justice and fairness has rarely been a subject of investigation in comparative cross-national research based on opinion surveys. But then, this is typical of abstract concepts in general. Such things as freedom, equality, democracy and love, although they are basic elements of the value system of any society, of intergroup and interpersonal relations, and key concepts of many sociological theories, are rarely subjected to empirical sociological analysis. But even while justice (fairness) is difficult to define and there is no agreement about the term itself, the pursuit of fairness is characteristic of all people and all societies. The human desire to live in a society based on the principles of fairness, to act fairly and be treated fairly by others can be seen as a fundamental or basic human value. A person's opinion about the fairness or unfairness of the society in which they live is directly related to their overall satisfaction with the existing political and social system and their

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assessment of the operation of its various elements: institutions, laws, specific policies, and individual people. The current importance of this issue in the modern world cannot be overestimated.

For a long time, justice and fairness, their foundations, criteria and assessment remained the subject of philosophical and ethical inquiry, as well as religious strivings. Since ancient times, great thinkers ranging from Socrates and Plato to Kant and Schopenhauer have addressed this problem. In the 20th century the study of these concepts continued within the framework of social psychology. While engaging in theoretical discourse, researchers attempted to test various hypotheses about the nature, criteria and perceptions of justice and fairness by empirical methods, mainly small group experiments. This line of thought includes, for example, what are now classic works by John Rawls on a just (fair) social system as a system with a minimum level of inequality in social and economic results, which he saw as the most rational choice for any disinterested party [13]. Other theories developed in the field of social psychology include theories related to the balance between contributions and rewards in the works of George Homans, J. Stacy Adams, Peter M. Blau, Elaine Walster and her colleagues [1; 6; 10; 18], problems of prejudice and intolerance as a barrier to equality and social justice [2], the study of altruism and prosocial behavior, justice motivation (a desire to achieve justice and fairness for all, for others, and not only for oneself), and rational choice theory.

Cross-cultural and cross-national research on public perceptions of justice (fairness) was pioneered by Morton Deutsch [7]. He believed that the use and recognition of certain principles of justice is associated with the long-term goals that a particular society sets itself and with its development stage. In a society where the main social goal is economic productivity, there is more effective support for the principle of equity, according to which the outcomes received by people should be proportional to merit and contribution. But the use of this principle in social relations leads to increased competition and even to conflict. In a society where the main goals are social harmony, individual development and general welfare, which require a high level of social cooperation and solidarity, the distribution of resources according to "need" or the principle of equality is more effective.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the problem of social justice attracted the attention of many researchers working in the field of economic theory, ranging from theories on personal material interests as the main driver of human economic activity to those on the importance of perceived fairness in company policy as a major component of work motivation and a healthy workforce, as in the works of Truman F. Bewley [5] or Jerald Greenberg [8]. The study of public perceptions of and support for various tax and resource redistribution systems (see, for example, [11; 16; 17]) has played an important role in developing this line of social justice research. All these works have significantly expanded our knowledge and notions of justice and fairness and their perception in different societies and cultures. But it is still too early to talk about a complete picture, since there are not enough empirical data for its completion.

Methodological Specificity of Justice Research Using Public Opinion Surveys

Active research on social justice and its various aspects using quantitative assessments based on surveys began only in the last two decades. The reason why researchers working in the field of empirical sociology and public opinion surveys rarely address this topic is not that they underestimate its importance or relevance, especially in a comparative context. Both academic and public interest in matters relating to the perception of justice in different societies has been and remains highly relevant. But in order to obtain information on how people in different countries evaluate and understand justice, researchers will have to overcome a number of serious methodological difficulties.

Let us consider what I see as the three main methodological problems.

The first, conceptual problem is the *multidimensionality* of the very concept of “justice.” It can be an integral parameter in evaluating the relationships between all elements of a social system (people, institutions, norms and laws), but can also be divided into a number of relatively independent, though interrelated areas: economic, political, social-class, interpersonal, etc.

The second specific feature of the concept of “justice,” which leads to a whole range of methodological difficulties in survey-based empirical research and cross-national comparisons, is its *context-dependence*. Justice is an evaluative characteristic formed in the public consciousness within the framework of institutions, juridical laws and social norms established in a particular society, as well as generally recognized practices and traditions. As a result, any cross-national comparisons of public perceptions of justice formed in different sociopolitical and economic contexts are problematic at the level of both operationalization, measurement and data interpretation.

The third problem is that public perceptions of justice are relatively unstable and *time-dependent*: they change significantly over time, often due to changes in the social context (sociopolitical and economic relations in the community) or changes in the frame of reference that influences people’s perceptions of justice. Although one can assume the existence of certain universal and timeless notions of “higher justice” and basic principles of just relations between people, a significant part of this concept, particularly the criteria of justice, keep changing. These changes occur depending on the level of justice achieved, the specific historical and institutional conditions, the general social atmosphere, the risk of justice violations, and other factors.

Approaches to the solution of some of these methodological problems do exist, but their complete solution is still a long way off. One of the possible ways to address the problem of conceptual multidimensionality is to limit the subject of investigation, to focus on only one or several dimensions of justice instead of studying the concept in all its multidimensionality. Another way is to limit the number of objects being studied in comparative cross-national research or to focus on analyzing similar social systems. This reduces the contextual variability

of the concept being studied and provides opportunities for more robust comparisons. Cross-national surveys often combine these two ways.

In the last 30 years, comparative cross-national surveys have addressed various aspects of justice: economic inequality and justice in resource distribution (for example, ISSP 2009); issues of discrimination and social inequality, including gender and ethnic inequality; and problems of legal justice and the operation of state justice systems. Examples of such research in a cross-national context are provided by the World Justice Project (WJP), the UN Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems and Crime and criminal justice statistics by UNOD, the European Social Survey (ESS Round 5, 2010), and research on political equality and democracy. An integrated systems approach to the study of justice, but limited to only one country, was used in a research project on justice in the perception and practices of citizens and those are in power in Russia, carried out by the INDEM Foundation in 2013-2015 [14; 15].

Perception of Economic Justice and Inequality in Europe

The approach selected for the comparative cross-national project known as the European Social Survey (ESS) is to study certain aspects of justice. The ESS is a comparative cross-national trend study held every two years since 2002 in almost all European countries based on surveys using randomly selected representative samples of the population in each country. These personal interview surveys cover persons aged 15 and over, with respondents interviewed in their homes (door-to-door). In Russia, the ESS has been conducted by the Institute for Comparative Social Research (CESSI) since 2006. The sample for each round is 2,400–2,600 persons (www.ess-ru.ru) [3; 4].

Along with questions that are part of the core module, which are repeated from round to round, ESS Round 4 (2008) includes a new, “rotating” module (“Welfare Attitudes in Europe”) on various aspects of social justice: public attitudes to economic inequality, economic justice, and the role of the state in ensuring economic justice through social support programs (the provision of social welfare) [9; 12]. There are few comparative cross-national data on this topic in Europe. The inclusion of this module in ESS Round 4 provided researchers with a unique opportunity to analyze data for virtually all European countries during a period of economic instability that was important for the region and induced Europeans to take a fresh look at many of their notions of justice and fairness in the operation of social welfare systems.

Social justice as a whole and economic justice (fairness, equity) as one of its main components are among the basic values in modern Europe and Russia both in the public mind and as a goal of social development and government policy. Throughout the 20th century, the question of how to achieve social justice as an absolute value was one of the main issues in European political debates, served as a dividing line between parties, and was a key element of the ideology of the social democratic movement. Public dissatisfaction with severe social inequality and injustice was one of the main causes of social revolutions in the 20th century, particularly in Russia.

The ways to achieve social justice chosen by European countries turned out to be very different. In some countries, as in Russia, there was a radical revolutionary destruction of the old social estate system. In other countries, the problem of achieving greater social justice and reducing inequality became part of the program of the national liberation movement involving the breakup of empires and the emergence of nation-states with a democratic system of government, as in a number of countries of Eastern Europe. Still other countries advanced through a fight for the rights and freedoms of various social groups as part of the labor, trade union and women's movement, as in Britain and Switzerland. Among other things, such different historical paths led to different models for ensuring social justice in modern European countries.

An analysis of ESS data shows that, despite different historical paths, Europeans in different countries generally have quite similar notions of economic justice. In virtually all European countries included in the ESS, survey data indicate broad public support for the idea of equality of people's legal and political rights. There is also a general recognition among Europeans of the leading role of the state in establishing economic justice: in redistributing resources, assisting those in need, and providing equal access to social services.

Public attitudes to the role of government in providing social welfare and reducing economic inequality was measured in the ESS by several questions regarding six different aspects of social welfare:

- ensuring a job for everyone who wants one;
- ensuring adequate health care for the sick;
- ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the old;
- ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed;
- ensuring sufficient child care services for working parents; and
- providing paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care for sick family members.

Respondents were asked how much responsibility, in their opinion, government should have in performing each of these six functions. Responses were rated on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means this "should not be the government's responsibility at all" and 10 means it "should be entirely the government's responsibility."

Based on the data obtained, the ESS provides a summary index of public support for government intervention in addressing social problems. In order to obtain this index, responses to the six items were added and then divided by ten (see Figure 1). A low score indicates weak public support for wide-ranging government responsibility for the performance of various welfare functions, and a high score indicates strong support.

Overall, public support for government involvement in regulating and distributing various social goods and resources in all European countries is very high: the average index value for all countries is 7.8 on a scale of 0 to 10. In each country participating in the ESS, at least 70% of respondents think that the provision of social welfare should be the government's responsibility. Although there are differences between countries in this respect, they are not very large. The average




Fig. 1. Public support for government intervention in addressing social problems (0-10 summary index): by country.

Source: ESS Round 4 (2008), www.ess-ru.ru.

index value for most countries is between 7.5 and 8.5. The strongest support for the idea of government responsibility for welfare provision is found in Southern Europe and in a number of countries of Eastern Europe, including Russia. In these countries, most people believe that welfare provision should be almost entirely the government's responsibility, that is, public demand for social services provided by the state is extremely high. The lowest public support for government involvement in welfare provision is found in countries with a liberal type of economic system: United Kingdom, Ireland and Switzerland. The differences between regions and countries with different types of economy show the importance of the institutional context and historical experience in building social relationships for the formation of public perceptions regarding the role of the state in addressing various social problems and achieving economic justice.

In Russia, the average value of the index of public support for government intervention in addressing social problems is 8.2 on a scale of 0 to 10, with a standard deviation of 1.2. In other words, the spread of opinion on this issue in the country is very narrow.

Whereas general public attitudes towards the role of the state in welfare provision differ little between European countries and between different groups within these countries, the range of opinion regarding the specific functions and objectives of social welfare is much wider. In most ESS countries, there is a very high degree of social consensus on the government's responsibility for social services such as healthcare and pensions. Incidentally, this situation is characteristic precisely of Europe, while in many other parts of the world there is no such consensus. A case in point is the United States, which has been the scene of endless heated debates that divide the society into opposite camps on this issue. As for

government involvement in regulating areas related to employment and industrial relations (such as assistance to the unemployed and to working parents or paid leave from work for people who care for sick family members), the differences of opinion between and within European countries are quite significant.

At the same time, it turns out that although the demand for government social services in ensuring economic (albeit relative) justice is quite high in both Russia and other European countries, the level of trust in institutions designed to ensure such justice and public evaluation of their efficiency, the consequences of welfare policies, and the overall performance of the state welfare system are much lower and differ significantly between countries (see Figure 2). In terms of a summary index of trust in government and public institutions based on the respondents' trust in various institutions such as parliament, the legal system, the police, politicians, and political parties, there is a more than threefold difference between countries, with average scores ranging from 7.1 on a 0-10 scale in Denmark to 2.1 in Ukraine.

In Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, and a number of other European countries, there is very little trust in both political institutions (especially members of representative bodies designed to ensure that the interests of different groups of the population are represented in government) and institutions whose purpose is to maintain justice, law and order in society. Although the level of trust in government institutions in Russia has been gradually rising in recent years, the absolute level remains very low (the average index value for trust is 3.9 on a 0-10 scale). Low trust in democratic political institutions is now characteristic of virtually all European




Fig. 2. Trust in government and public institutions: summary index of trust in all institutions (measuring the level of trust in five institutions—the country's parliament, political parties, politicians, the police, and the legal system—rated on a 0-10 scale, where 0 means “no trust at all” and 10 means “complete trust”)

Source: ESS Round 4 (2008), www.ess-ru.ru.

countries. But the level of trust in legal institutions is quite high in most European countries. Hence, we can say that people in these countries are confident that in such societies it is possible to ensure compliance with established rules and social commitments, that is, to ensure the basic form of justice. Russia, Ukraine, and several other countries are an unfortunate exception in this respect: the level of trust in legal institutions in these countries is almost as low as the level of trust in political institutions.

Public evaluations of the performance of the state welfare system, which is very important for all Europeans, also differ significantly from country to country. In a number of countries, primarily Scandinavian ones, it gets very high scores. In others, people have mixed feelings about government performance, noting both its positive and negative effects. In a third group of countries, including Russia, satisfaction with government performance in social welfare is extremely low.

More than two-thirds of respondents in 10 out of the 29 European countries participating in the ESS agree that the state welfare system performs one of its main social functions: prevents widespread poverty, provides assistance to those most in need, and thus helps to reduce economic inequality. In another 13 countries, the public are divided on how well the state welfare system reduces poverty: about half of the respondents believe the state manages to perform this task, while the other half believe it does not or are uncertain. In a third group of countries (post-socialist countries, including Ukraine, Latvia, Russia, Bulgaria and Hungary), most respondents (about two-thirds) think this task is not performed in their societies. Views on how well the state welfare system addresses inequality in society also differ across Europe. In very many European countries, most respondents believe that the social welfare system in their country does not solve the problem of inequality.

An important component of public attitudes to policies designed to achieve social equality is an evaluation of the need for such assistance in different social groups, of the severity of social risks. In the ESS, respondents were asked to evaluate two kinds of risk: at a personal level and at a national level. The perception of personal risks was measured by questions about the likelihood of various events occurring in the following 12 months rated on a scale of 1 to 4, ranging from “not at all likely” to “very likely.” How likely it is, respondents were asked, that during the next 12 months:

- you will be unemployed and looking for work for at least four consecutive weeks?
- you will have to spend less time in paid work than you would like, because you have to take care of family members or relatives?
- there will be some periods when you don’t have enough money to cover your household necessities?
- you will not receive the health care you really need if you become ill?

Public perceptions of the severity of various problems at the level of the whole society were measured by questions about the living standards of certain groups and the existence of various opportunities for these groups in the country, with

responses rated on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means “extremely bad” and 10 means “extremely good.” Respondents were asked what they thought about:

- the standard of living of pensioners;
- the standard of living of the unemployed;
- the provision of affordable child care services (day care centers, playgroups, etc.) for working parents;
- the opportunities for young people to find their first full-time job in the country.

According to the survey, public perceptions of various social risks differ from country to country. The most positive perception of risks at the personal level, that is, the view that such difficult social situations are unlikely to occur, was found in the Scandinavian countries and Finland, in a number of countries of continental Europe (Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Switzerland), in the United Kingdom, and in two countries of Southern Europe: Spain and Cyprus. The perceived risk of finding oneself in a life situation that might require social assistance is highest in Ukraine, Latvia, Russia, Turkey and Bulgaria.

In public perceptions of the social problems faced by different groups in society (risk at the level of society as a whole), the hierarchy of countries is generally similar. A fairly positive perception of the living standards of different social groups and various social opportunities available to them are found in Northern and Central Europe. People living in many countries of Eastern and Southern Europe have a very negative perception of the situation in these areas. There is a group of countries (Ukraine, Latvia, Russia, Turkey and Bulgaria) with a very high perceived risk at both personal and national levels. In another group of countries (Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Romania, Portugal and Croatia), people estimate the severity of social problems at the national level as very high, while personal risks are perceived to be relatively low.

High demand for government intervention in addressing problems of economic justice and high risk perceptions at both personal and group levels, combined with low trust in institutions designed to perform these tasks and a low evaluation of their efficiency, lead to a high level of public dissatisfaction with the performance of the entire state administration and welfare system, and also to a predominantly critical view of the current situation with economic justice in society and a growing sense of injustice. Such a situation is characteristic of most post-socialist countries (with some exceptions), which means it is systemic. In my opinion, such a perception of the injustice (unfairness) of the system is formed when the perceived current state of affairs in one’s own country is compared with that in other countries, with the country’s past experience, and with existing notions of the norm or ideal. In most countries where public perceptions of social injustice are particularly acute, the level of real social assistance is actually lower in absolute terms than in other countries. But this relationship is not at all linear. For example, estimates in Ukraine are somewhat higher than in Russia while in Hungary they are lower than in Russia, which does not reflect the actual distribution of resources.

For the effective operation of the social welfare system, so as to reduce economic and social inequality in society by providing assistance to social groups in greatest need, there should be a certain degree of social consensus on the goals and objectives

of this system and its specific tasks, with a certain level of confidence in government and public institutions designed to address these tasks and implement various decisions in this area. It is also important to gain public support for certain principles and methods of resource distribution among social groups. At present, we can say that whereas with regard to the goals of welfare provision—preventing poverty and achieving greater economic equality—people in most European countries have fairly similar views, with regard to the methods of achieving these goals there is no such agreement. People’s ideas about the methods of a fair redistribution of resources and the sources of welfare funding are very contradictory in almost all European countries.

ESS respondents were asked to choose between two options: “increasing taxes and spending more on social benefits and services” and “decreasing taxes and spending less on social benefits and services.” In Russia, where overall support for government involvement in social welfare provision and expectations regarding the welfare system, as we saw above, are very high, the idea that the state should raise taxes to pay for increased social spending was supported by only 26% of respondents. In Europe, this option is not very popular either. More than half of the population supports the idea of increasing taxes and social spending in only two countries, Finland and Denmark; support for this option is also fairly high in Israel, Estonia, Norway, Sweden and Cyprus (40% and over), while in most other countries this share does not exceed a third of the population.

Presumably, the idea of increasing taxes and social spending may be more popular in countries with a relatively high level of economic inequality and less popular in countries where a certain level of economic equality has already been achieved. This hypothesis was tested using the quintile ratio (ratio of the average income of the richest 20% of the population to the average income of the poorest 20%), which measures income inequality (UNDP Human Development Report 2015). Figure 3 illustrates the position of countries with different levels of income




Fig. 3. Sources of funding for the state welfare system.

Source: ESS Round 4, www.ess-ru.ru.

inequality on the scale of “support for higher taxes and social spending” (mean scores on a 0–10 scale). The relationship between these two indicators is nonlinear and very weak. In a number of countries with a relatively low level of income inequality, support for the idea of higher taxes and social spending is indeed quite high, as in Denmark and Finland. But in Bulgaria and Germany, countries with similar levels of income inequality, support for this idea is much lower. Russia has one of the highest levels of income inequality, but support for this idea in the country is close to the European average.

The views of Russians (like those of all Europeans) on the principles of redistribution of resources and social goods in society are also quite contradictory. Overall, the idea of equal contributions to the social welfare system finds little support in virtually all European countries. It is supported by less than 10% of respondents across Europe and 5% in Russia. The vast majority of Europeans believe that equity should be the main principle behind contributions to the social welfare system, and the only difference is that some are in favor of a simple proportional, or flat, tax system (the same tax rate regardless of income), while others favor a progressive tax system (the higher the income, the higher the tax rate). In Russia, the percentages of respondents favoring each of these principles are almost the same: 40% support the principle of simple proportionality, and 46% support progressive taxation. Generally, such a pattern is characteristic of most European countries participating in the ESS, except Israel and Ireland, where two-thirds of the population support a progressive tax system.

People’s views on the principles of resource distribution are much more diverse, and there is no consensus on this issue in any country. In a number of countries, most respondents (from one-half to two-thirds) support the progressive principle: higher earners should get more benefits (such as larger old age pensions). Russia belongs to this group of countries, although the percentage of those who are still undecided on this issue (16%) is one of the highest in Europe. In other words, public attitudes to the principles of fair distribution have yet to be formed in Russia or are still very contradictory. In a number of countries, the dominant approach to the distribution of public resources is an egalitarian one, with people supporting the idea of equal social payments for all, e.g., equal pensions for high and low earners regardless of contribution. Such views are held by a significant part of the population in countries with a liberal economic system, as in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Switzerland, and also in the Netherlands, Israel, Denmark and Norway. The number of those who favor total redistribution (“lower earners should get a larger old age pension that higher earners”) is quite large in only a few countries (39% in Turkey, 24% in Denmark, 20% in Israel, and 18% in Finland), but even here supporters of this approach do not constitute a majority. In the matter of unemployment benefits, supporters of egalitarian principles make up more than half of respondents in almost all countries, including Russia. The only exceptions are Germany, Spain, Portugal and Latvia.

Russia’s fundamental distinction from most other European countries is that there is no connection in the public mind between a person’s social contribution (taxes) and social returns (social payments and benefits). The task of the state, as people in Russia see it, is not *redistribution* (taking from some to give to others), but *fair distribution to people* of “state” resources arising from unknown or undetectable sources.

Russians are very uncertain as to what a fair contribution by citizens to the social welfare system actually is. In Russia, as in other European countries, only a small percentage of the population supports equal contributions for all (people should pay the same amount of tax regardless of income), while the rest support the principle of equity in its different forms. Some favor simple proportionality (the same percentage of income for all), and others, progressive proportionality (the higher the income, the higher the percentage).

Factors behind the Differences between European Countries in Public Perceptions of Fairness

Based on the survey results, we can make some assumptions about the impact of various factors on public perceptions of the level of economic justice (fairness) in society and the state's involvement in the wellbeing of its citizens, as well as on public opinion regarding the principles behind the distribution of benefits.

The first factor is the historical experience of the group (country, nation). The group's past achievements provide a reference point for comparison.

The second factor is the specific institutional environment (institutions, laws and norms) that sustains this historical experience, at least in the medium term.

The third factor is the global environment, the level of social justice achieved in other countries. In a global information environment, this factor becomes particularly important.

The fourth factor is whether there is a social consensus behind the benefit distribution principles, which serve as a basis for judgments about justice.

These principles may differ for different issues, ranging from equality to equity, from universality to exclusivity, etc. Consensus on these issues is reached only gradually, through an attempt to gain a better understanding of the problem in public debate on emerging social practices. If there is no such debate, these principles remain uncertain and unknown to the public and are thus frequently perceived as unfair.

For more than a hundred years now, most European societies have steadily expanded the scope and amount of social assistance, starting from simple risk insurance (against sickness, old age, etc.) to the goal of providing opportunities for a comfortable and balanced life for all. But the achievement of this goal requires a certain level of public welfare and a more or less steady increase in public resources. In the postwar decades, most European countries went through precisely such a period of gradual improvement in living standards and a fairly significant increase in social spending. In the last decade, however, the situation has changed. A series of economic crises that developed into one long crisis, increasing migration, demographic changes, and other factors have put excessive strain on the social welfare system, and today there is a wide discussion on the need to reduce it. There is a growing public perception of the unfairness or insufficient fairness of the existing system, with various proposals for its reform.

In the post-socialist countries, including Russia, notions about social equality and a socially acceptable level of inequality, as well as about the role of the state in social welfare provision were formed in Soviet times. The collapse of the system has created an institutional vacuum: the functions that are no longer performed by the state, or are performed poorly or on a smaller scale than before, have not passed to other institutions, while expectations have remained just as high. This has sharpened the sense of social injustice in society.

In my view, positive changes in these conditions are possible only if we meet some of the following three conditions.

The first option is a significant improvement in the quality of state welfare provision without a corresponding withdrawal of resources from the population (through taxes). But at a time of economic crisis and slow economic growth, this condition is extremely unlikely to be met.

The second option is to create a favorable economic, tax, legal and political environment for the development of new institutions that could assume some of the social functions. These institutions could include local communities and religious groups; it is also important to expand the activities of trade unions and professional organizations, charities, and other institutions of civil society.

The third option—and a promising one—is to initiate a broad discussion of the principles for the distribution of social benefits and ways to enhance the legitimacy of decisions in this area through clearly defined decision-making processes and public control.

These three options are not mutually exclusive, but complement each other.

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Socially Responsible Consumption in Russia: Factors and Development Potential of Market-oriented and Non-market Practices

Marina SHABANOVA

Abstract. Socially responsible (ethical) consumption in Russia is only making its first steps and is fairly fragmented. In most cases, consumers engage in practices of one particular sort, whether ethical purchasing, ethical boycotts or waste sorting. This article presents the findings of a representative empirical study aiming to identify specific qualities of citizens participating in *various* socially responsible consumption practices as well as factors facilitating Russians' engagement in the above practices. The article purports that *market-oriented* practices, such as ethical purchasing and boycotts, and *non-market* ones, such as separate collection of waste, are driven by different factors and relate to the sphere of civil society in different ways. The article concludes that differentiated strategies need to be implemented in this area by NGOs and management groups of various levels.

Keywords: socially responsible/ethical consumption, ethical purchasing, ethical boycotts, separate waste collection, civil society, civil activity, social solidarity, social responsibility.

This article continues the conversation started in 2015 [26; 27] about the factors and development potential of socially responsible (ethical, conscious, sustained) consumption in Russia as a new civil society practice. Consumers in developed countries increasingly “vote with their money” against unseemly business practices that harm the environment, people and animals or increase the risks of such harm and, conversely, support socially responsible producers by their consumer choices. In making or refraining from making a purchase people more often than not proceed not only from short-term and selfish goals, but also from moral considerations: justice, compassion, a sense of guilt, solidarity, stability, duty, showing concern for the present

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and future generations. Such consumption is a growing trend that signifies *moralization of the markets* [33; 20] posing challenges business has increasingly to reckon with in order to preserve and consolidate its market positions. These practices are gradually spreading in *developing* countries as well [6; 7; 2; 1; 19], providing everyone with an opportunity to show civil solidarity and responsibility, a chance for “little guys” to contribute to reducing local and universal human problems, in short, an important *economic* instrument of strengthening the civil society (CS).

Russia is not an exception. According to a representative study, a sizeable section of Russians (30%) have at one time or another taken part in socially responsible practices: 17%, in buying a product, looked, along with price and quality, at the producer’s compliance with ethical norms (thrifty attitude to the environment, observing the rights of workers, renunciation of the practice of testing cosmetics on animals); 11% more or less regularly *refuse to buy* certain goods because the producers violate some ethical norms (causing heavy damage to the environment or/and testing cosmetics on animals or/and violating the rights of workers, frequent accidents); an equal proportion (11%) take part in ethical waste disposal (sort and collect it in separate containers). It is notable that the key factors that are likely to put consumers in that group attest that the level of their civil activity in spheres other than consumption plays a notable but not the key role. In other words, new consumer practices expand the space of civil society in Russia and, given favorable conditions, may become a catalyst for its development [26; 27].

As can be seen from the set of key factors, further development of socially responsible consumption depends to a large extent on the efforts of the actors of various levels and types (NGOs, business, government bodies, mass media, the populace): in the majority of cases (71%) they joined one practice, be it purchases, boycotts or waste sorting. Thus, the composition of participants, the factors and conditions of their inclusion in various practices may vary widely. This prompts the need for key institutional actors in this field to develop *differentiated* strategies. Let us, for the sake of brevity, refer to the participants in the first two practices (shopping, boycotts) as *market-oriented* ethical consumers, of the other practices (waste sorting and disposal) *non-market* consumers and the rest *traditional* consumers. Which consumers join market and which ones non-market ethical practices more frequently and which ones join neither? Are there any features in the factors that influence the development of various practices that need to be taken into account by other actors be they NGOs or management groups of various types and levels? Which practices are more likely to get support of the management groups taking into account the key role of the institutional environment in their development? The aim of this article is to identify the specificities of the participants in *various* socially responsible consumption practices and the factors that cause Russians to join (or refuse to join) them.

Theoretical and Methodological Foundations

Several modern concepts and research trends stress the role of moral and cultural factors in consumers’ choices first noted by Adam Smith in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759): *moral economy* [34; 23; 22], *ethical economy* [17], *development* and *ethics*

of efficiency [24; 25; 32], various types of *social economy* and *socio-economy* [18; 11; 12; 16; 13; 4; 29; 30]. *Mechanism-oriented* and *activity-constructivist* methodologies hold out a promise of greater insights into the emergence of socially responsible (ethical) consumption practices [35; 14; 3]. This approach calls for increased knowledge of the conditions and resources of activity in this field of key institutional actors (government, business, NGOs, the media, the populace) as well as interactions among them.

Consumers (including socially responsible, ethical ones) are seen not as a homogeneous subject, but as people with different interests and resources (potential and actualized). With some there is a marked wish to contribute, through organizing their consumption, to diminishing local, regional and universal problems (and they have enough resources at their disposal to do that), with others selfish and moral-cultural motives are in conflict [12, p. 115], yet others are guided by totally utilitarian considerations. At each point in time both institutions and personal aspirations of individuals as well as *unintended consequences* of their economic actions, taken for whatever reason, have a moral dimension [22, pp. 265-266].

Empirical studies focus on revealing the *factors* (sociodemographic, cultural, economic, institutional, etc.) which cause *individuals* to adopt “advanced” consumer practices. In spite of the contradictory results in this sphere (for more detail see [5; 21; 26]), it can be stated that the *range* of tested factors in highly developed and less developed countries is very similar. Describing the accumulated knowledge scholars note the strong “tilt” in favor of two countries that are pioneers of responsible consumption (the UK and the USA) and stress the need to enlarge our ideas of the phenomenon by taking into account cultural/country contexts. They also note the importance of moving from narrow studies of individual practices to a more holistic study of the phenomenon [21, pp. 215-216].

The conduct of a representative study in Russia aimed at finding out the level and factors of inclusion in ethical consumption in general, basically meets both requirements [26; 27]. However, at this stage, in taking a close look at the practices of socially responsible consumption we distance ourselves, as it were, from the second requirement. This is prompted by two circumstances.

First, the different role of *economic* factors and constraints in the development of market and non-market practices. Very often the price of “ethical goods” is higher than the average market price (due to the extra cost to the producers) and are therefore more readily accessible for higher income groups [8; 31].

At the same time *non-market* practices, such as waste sorting, do not involve extra financial outlays and may become a sphere in which low-income groups become more active [15]. Economic differences between participants in different practices may be partly due to *increased time spent* (for example, putting waste not in containers located on the “regular beat” of individuals, but taking it to special stations) [31], something noted by many scholars.

The second circumstance is the great fragmentation of the phenomenon in modern Russia, different parameters of sustainability of various practices,² and different attitudes of the key institutional players, i.e., the authorities, business and NGOs.

Methodology and Information Base

Based on available knowledge about the factors contributing to ethical consumption in various countries, the novelty of the phenomenon in Russia, and the features of the Russian socioeconomic and cultural contexts (the fact that it is not embedded in culture, the absence of formal and informal sanctions, positive or negative, and scant coverage in the public information space, etc.) let us formulate several hypotheses:

H1-H3: all types of socially responsible consumption attitudes are adopted more frequently by women (**H1**), people with a higher level of education (**H2**), and people who attach great significance to *non-individual* values and are socially oriented (**H3**);

H4: participants in *non-market* ethical consumption practices are more often than not individuals with a low material status and in *market* practices, people with a higher material status;

H5: the more active an individual is in the “money” and “material” spheres not connected with ethical consumption, the more likely he is to adopt *market* practices of ethical consumption. And the more they are involved in “non-material” practices of civil participation (rallies, protest actions, collecting signatures, etc.) the more likely they are to adopt *non-market* ethical consumption practices;

H6: the inclusion of Russians in both market and non-market socially responsible consumption practices is hindered by the weak “support potential” of the environment (availability of information, degree of cohesion and mutual help in the social surroundings, etc.).

This study is based on a survey of several groups of actors:³ a large-scale survey of the *population* (2,000 people, 2014), representing Russia’s adult population by sex, age and education level;⁴ a survey of members of the Federal Government, the Legislative Assembly of the RF (deputies of the State Duma and members of the Federation Council), as well as the managers of enterprises in processing industry (a total of 300 people have been interviewed, 100 in each group, 2015),⁵ a large-scale survey of the *heads of non-governmental non-profit organizations* (NGOs) in Russia (850 people, 2015).⁶

Along with descriptive analysis aimed at bringing out the specific qualities of the participants in various consumer practices the impact of various *factors* on the probability of individuals becoming involved in different responsible consumption practices was also measured by the apparatus of binary logit regression. The dependent variable had two possible values: 1—participant in *market* ethical consumption practices (purchases and/or boycotts), 0—all the other consumers (Model 1); 1—participant in waste sorting, 0—all the other consumers (Model 2); 1—ethical consumer (market and/or non-market practices), 0—all the other consumers (Model 3). *Independent* variables characterize a wide spectrum of factors: socio-demographic characteristics and education; value orientations and attitudes; solidarity behavior and civic activity during the last year; economic factors and constraints; assessment of “supportive potential” of the social environment.

Status and Behavioral Features of Participants in Various Practices

Socially responsible practices (both market and non-market) have a higher share of *women* (63–65% versus 51–53% in the entire population and 55% in the whole body). As for the level of *education*, only participants in *market* practices (shopping, boycotts) have a higher education level: most of them (70–72%) have higher (28–29%) or specialized secondary (42–43%) education (versus, respectively, 19–20% and 38% for other respondents). Participants in *non-market* practice—waste sorting—have a lower level of education, practically no different from the education level of traditional consumers.

Consumers involved in various practices differ in terms of their *value and activity* characteristics. Socially responsible consumers (both market and non-market) are more likely to be people whose key values (no more than 5 out of 15) include *supra-individual* values: welfare of all people and of nature, pride for country, its power and prosperity as well as helping the needy. In terms of the share of respondents who have named at least one of these values or two or three values simultaneously they are far ahead of *traditional* consumers (61–63% versus 48%). As for *individual* values (material well-being, well-being of the family, safety of oneself and close ones) participants in *market* practices named them less often than the rest (68% versus 76%), while among *non-market* participants that indicator was no different from the rest of the population.

The value of “authority, respect of the surrounding people” so far does not differentiate the participants in various practices. This is understandable because socially responsible consumption in Russia is only making the first steps and has not yet become a cultural norm. The more “public” participants in ethical boycotts are an exception (30% versus 23% among all the rest). By contrast, “a clean conscience, living in accordance with one’s moral principles” is more often valued by present-day participants in ethical boycotts and ethical waste disposal (50–51% versus 42–43% among the other consumers). This may be part of the reason why advanced consumers of all types are able to wean themselves from the prevailing Russian attitude that “the responsibility for producing goods that cause no harm to nature, humans and animals rests *entirely* with the *State* and business; *ordinary people need not think about it*” (76%). Although this notion definitely prevails among both socially responsible and traditional consumers, the share of those who *do not agree* with it is significantly higher among the latter (24–28% versus 16–18% for the other consumers).

On the whole socially responsible consumers are more pro-social (solidarity-oriented) and less selfish (see Table 1). The positions of the participants in both *market* practices of ethical consumption (purchases and boycotts) are largely similar, and both are noticeably ahead of traditional consumers. The value judgments of those who separate their waste are more moderate. On four positions out of six they are no different from the participants in market practices, and on two, no different from traditional consumers. They are just as frequently dismayed when they are unable to help others who are less well off and they also do not think they should give money for activities from which they cannot benefit themselves.

Table 1

Value Attitudes of Ethical Consumers of Various Types (in %)

Value judgments	Market practices		Ethical waste disposal	Traditional consumers
	purchases	boycotts		
1. "I think it's important to help people in distress" (share of those who agree: <i>certainly/somewhat</i>)	85	85	81	72
2. "I am upset when I can't help another person who is less well-off than me" (<i>share of those who agree—certainly/somewhat</i>)	56	58	46	42
3. "I donate for social needs regardless of whether the state or business deal with these problems" (<i>share of those who agree: certainly/somewhat</i>)	43	44	42	28
4. "People should take care of themselves and we should not worry too much about others" (<i>the share of those who DISAGREE: certainly/somewhat</i>)	53	53	54	46
5. "I do not think I should give money for activities from which I would not benefit in any way" (<i>share of those who DISAGREE: certainly/somewhat</i>)	57	59	53	49
6. "I often think that 'it's every man for himself'" (<i>share of those who DISAGREE: certainly/somewhat</i>)	42	43	45	38
Total: percentage of those who named 4–6 pro-social preferences	47	49	44	34

Solidarity-oriented and *civic activity* of individuals in spheres unconnected with consumption plays an important role in involving people in advanced consumer practices. Thus, during the past year all types of *ethical consumers* more frequently: did *volunteer work* not for the members of their families or close relatives (52-53% versus 33% among traditional consumers); gave *money to the needy* (often repeatedly—17-21% versus 11% for traditional consumers); helped somebody of their own accord, acted for the good of other people (61-67% versus 42% among traditional consumers). On the whole during the past year they more frequently

took part in social activities (one or several), for example, neighborhood clean-up days, events to beautify their house vestibule, courtyard, community, etc.

Those involved in ethical shopping and especially boycotts are well ahead of those who sort their waste and traditional consumers in terms of taking part in actions to help people in distressed circumstances. The highest indicator of total solidarity activities has been registered for participants in boycotts (see Table 2). Participants in *market* ethical practices (purchases and boycotts) are more likely to be members of some social organizations or to be engaged in their activities: 12-13% versus 7% among the rest of the consumers.⁷ Those who sort waste are no different from the other consumers on that count.

Participants in all types of socially responsible consumption are also noted for greater *readiness to unite* with others for joint actions if their ideas and interests coincide (65-67% versus 52-55% among *traditional* consumers). Religious affiliation makes no difference. However, types of activities in which it manifests itself distinguish *market* ethical consumers from *non-market* ethical as well as traditional consumers. Among the former there is a higher share of those who attend religious services (regularly or occasionally) and are involved in the life of the parish (26-28% versus 18-19% among all the rest), and the share of non-believers is lower (11.5-12.5% versus 18-19%). Participants in ethical waste disposal do not differ from the other consumers.

Table 2

Ethical Consumption and Types of Social Activity during the Past Year (in %)

Types of activity	Market practices		Ethical waste disposal	Traditional consumers
	Purchases	Boycotts		
<i>% of those who took part in:</i>				
Clean-up days, clean-up of vestibule, courtyard, city (village, settlement)	32	35	32	21
Actions to help people in distress	10	18	4.5	3
Peaceful demonstrations	4	5	4.5	3
Activities of social and other non-governmental nonprofit organizations	3	3	2	1
Protest actions, rallies, pickets	1	3.5	3	1
<i>% of those who took part in:</i>				
One type of activity	26	24	29	20
Two (and more) types of activity	11	18	8	4
None of the above types	63	58	63	76
Total	100	100	100	100

An important distinctive feature of those who sort waste is their lower *material status*: in terms of the share of those who occupy the two lowest rungs on this scale (“not enough money even for food” or “enough money to buy food, but not clothes and footwear”) they exceed the participants in *market* practices of ethical consumption by almost two times (42% versus 21-23%), and in terms of the share of those who occupy above-average positions (“we can afford to buy consumer durables, but not a car” or “we can afford to buy a car, but not an apartment or a house” or “we can afford to buy an apartment or a house”) they are way behind them (19% versus 29-31% among those who took part in ethical purchases and ethical boycotts).

One of the key brakes on the inclusion of Russians in ethical consumption is the higher *price of ethical goods*. The bulk of *traditional* consumers today are not prepared to buy products at a higher price (49%) or are in the “don’t know” category (16%). Unlike them, the majority of *ethical* consumers (both market and non-market) are ready to pay extra, although usually small sums, no more than 1-5% (36-41%). This attitude is hardly different from those included in ethical purchases and ethical boycotts (see Table 3). Those involved in ethical waste disposal are slightly behind, but considering their substantially lower material status their position on the issue can be regarded as fairly advanced.

On the whole it can be said that in spite of the differences in status and behavioral characteristics the participants in various practices of ethical consumption have more in common than they have differences compared with *traditional* consumers. *Ethical* consumers of all types have a higher share of socially engaged people for whom

Table 3

Readiness of Participants in Various Practices to Buy Products at a Higher Price because Their Producers Follow Ethical Principles (in %)

<i>Willingness to buy products at a higher price if it is the result of following ethical principles</i>	Market practices		Ethical waste disposal	Traditional consumers
	Purchases	Boycotts		
Unwilling	22	21	29	49
<i>Willing to pay if the item is more expensive:</i>				
By about 1%	17	14	17	12
No more than 5%	24	22	19	13
No more than 10%	14	17	15	6
No more than 20%	1	2	2	1
No more than 30%	1	1	1	1
Price doesn't matter, ethical goods are preferred in any case	8	10	4	1
Don't know	13	13	13	16
Total	100	100	100	100

ethical consumption is yet another sphere of manifesting their position. The closest similarities are observed between participants in *market* practices: ethical purchases and ethical boycotts. The body of those who are engaged in ethical waste disposal is probably very heterogeneous. It is no accident that in some ways they are close to *market ethical* consumers and in other cases, on the contrary, are no different from *traditional* consumers.

Assessment of Supportive Environment and Demand for Its Development

There are also substantial differences between representatives of various consumer practices in terms of *being informed* about producers' compliance with ethical norms at the time they make the purchase. Participants in all ethical consumption practices (above all the market ones) are well ahead of traditional consumers in terms of the *importance* they attach to such information while in most cases complaining that there is not enough such information (see Table 4). However, even among

Table 4

**Assessment of Importance and Sufficiency of Information
on Producers' Compliance with Ethical Norms (in %)**

	Market practices		Ethical waste disposal	Traditional consumers
	Purchases	Boycotts		
1. <i>Importance</i> of having information about producers' compliance with ethical standards at the time the purchase is made (share of those who answered "important:" very/somewhat)	73	76	62	47
2. <i>Sufficiency</i> of information for understanding whether ethical norms were broken in the production of the good (share of those who answered "sufficient:" definitely/somewhat)	23	19	22	7
Types depending on importance and sufficiency of information (items 1 and 2)				
Important but not sufficient	62	65	54	44
Important and sufficient	11	11.5	8	3
Unimportant and sufficient	12	7.5	14	4
Unimportant, but also insufficient	15	16	24	49
Total	100	100	100	100
Main sources of information named:				
The Internet	49	55	40	39
Newspapers	25	25	21	16
Television	83	89	89	90

traditional consumers close to one half note that such information is important but is not sufficient at the time they make the purchase. The biggest demands for information comes from individuals who intend to continue (or join) socially responsible consumption in the next year or two. Thus among those who intend to start (or continue) sorting waste in the next year or two the share of those who said information was important but not sufficient, goes up from 54% to 63%, and among those who intend to take part in *market* ethical consumption practices goes up from 62-65% to 69%.

The main source of information everywhere is television. However, ethical consumers (especially *market* ones) more often complement it with newspapers and especially the Internet (see Table 4). The biggest number of those who get their news and information from the Internet is among participants in ethical *boycotts*. Virtual communities of consumers more and more often discuss ethical aspects of consumption, exchange the relevant information and plan actions, including protest actions.

Participants in *market* ethical consumption practices put a higher premium than the participants in non-market ethical and traditional consumer practices on the *degree of agreement and cohesion in their community* and *the degree of people's willingness to help one another* (see Table 5). It may be that the higher level of *cohesion* and mutual assistance *within* their circle is more likely to spread to include people *they do not know*.

Table 5

Individual Components of the Social Capital of Various Types of Consumers (in %)

	Market practices		Ethical waste disposal	Traditional consumers
	Purchases	Boycotts		
1. There is more agreement, cohesion or disagreement and disunity among the surrounding people (the share of those who answered there is more agreement and cohesion: <i>definitely/somewhat</i>)	73	75	69	63
2. Are the surrounding people willing to help one another frequently or rarely (share of those who answered: <i>very frequently/fairly frequently</i>)	51	57	48	44
<i>Level of social capital committed on two counts (items 1 and 2)⁸</i>				
High (4-6 points)	47	55	45	37
Average (3 points)	19	17	20	20
Low (0-2 points)	34	28	35	43
Total	100	100	100	100

Table 6

What Various Groups of Consumers Expect from the Authorities in the Way of Promoting Ethical Consumption and Ethical Business in Russia (in % by column)

	Market practices		Ethical waste disposal	Traditional consumers
	Purchases	Boycotts		
To install waste bins to collect waste in courtyards	64	67	67	58
To increase the number of points for collection of recyclables and domestic waste	48	59	50	48
To support development of garbage recycling business	43	58	35	42
To develop alternative energy sources (sun, wind, etc.)	35	42	33	34
To monitor honest marking of goods	39	50	34	36
To inform the broad public about the consequences of irresponsible attitude to nature	41	56	37	39
To develop social promotion of ethical consumption and ethical business in Russia	35	46	25	30
Tax breaks for ethical business	27	40	22	22
To inform Russians about ethical consumption achievements abroad	23.5	30	21	19
Number of measures named: 0	13	8	14	16
1-3	42	34	50	46
4 plus	45	58	36	38
Total	100	100	100	100
Average/median	3.6/3	4.5/4	3.2/3	3.2/3

Participants in all types of ethical consumption more rarely live in the *biggest* cities (22-23% versus 32%); apparently the more rapid pace, greater social isolation and anonymity are serious factors deterring people from joining these practices. What catches the eye is that a sizeable part of participants in ethical waste disposal live in rural areas (37% versus 27% share of rural dwellers in the entire body). It is possible that some Russians join this practice due to motives that have nothing to do with concern about the common good and reflect the wish to maximize *individual* benefits (waste sorting to feed animals, prepare compost, surrendering metal scrap/waste

paper for money, relieving the “waste” problem because waste removal in small communities is a problem, etc.). At the same time citizens in metropolises with a population of over a million are expected to provide the biggest growth in the number of participants in this practice as well as *market* ethical consumption practices. This presupposes further development of the institutional environment with entrenched ethical consumption habits.

Demands for the development of a supporting environment differ among participants of different practices (see Table 6). The most vocal demands come from those who *boycott* certain goods on ethical grounds. Demands of those who take part in ethical shopping and ethical waste disposal reveal no significant differences on most counts from all the other consumers. It is noteworthy that *traditional* consumers also present demands to the development of the environment in the field of ethical consumption (average number of requests is 3.2, the median is 3.0). However, the consumers who intend to start (or continue) taking part in (market and especially non-market) ethical practices in the next year or two stand out. Thus, would-be participants in ethical waste disposal present the authorities with as many demands as the most advanced representatives of ethical boycotts (average—4.5, median—4.0).

On the whole it can be said that participants in ethical shopping and ethical boycotts are very similar in terms of status and behavioral characteristics and their assessment of the supporting potential of the environment. This permits merging them into one group in regression analysis. The group of those who sort waste occupy an intermediate position: it is less advanced than that of participants in *market* ethical practices and more advanced than that of *traditional* consumers.

Factors of Inclusion in Various Practices: Regression Analysis

The binary logit regression method was used to determine the factors that influence the inclusion of individuals in various types of ethical consumption. *Independent* variables formed a wide spectrum of various factors:

I. Sociodemographic characteristics and education: sex (1—male); age (1—18-60 years); education (base: incomplete secondary education).

II. Value orientations and attitudes: the existence in significant space of *supra-individual* values (binary, 1—at least one value); the presence in significant space of *individualist* values (binary, 1—at least one value); attitude to the proposition “Responsibility for the production of goods that do not harm nature, humans and animals rests entirely with the state and business; ordinary buyers should not think about it” (1—disagree definitely/somewhat, 0—all the rest); *willingness to unite with others* for joint actions if their ideas and interests coincide (1—willing definitely/somewhat, 0—all the rest); *commitment to helping others and responsibility for others* (1—presence of 4-6 positive agreements/disagreements (see Table 1), 0—all the rest); religious activity (1—Orthodox + taking part in church services/parish affairs; Muslim; 0—all the rest).

III. Economic factors and constraints: willingness to buy products at a higher price if the price rise is the result of following ethical principles (base: unwilling

to pay extra or haven't yet made up their minds) (see Table 3); material status of the family: base (average): "can afford buying clothes and footgear, but not consumer durables" (48%); 1—below average: "not enough money even to buy food" (8%) or "enough money to buy food, but not enough to buy clothes and footgear" (21%); 3—"enough money to buy consumer durables, but not enough to buy a car" (19%) or "can afford a car, but not an apartment or house" (3%) or "can afford buying an apartment or a house" (1%).

IV. Solidarity behavior and civic activity: membership in social organizations, involvement in their activities (binary, 1—members of some social organizations); giving *money* to strangers, including beggars, making donations during the past year (binary, 1—often); *voluntary work* not for family members and relatives during the past year (binary, 1—certainly had occasion); regularly give away old clothes, furniture, household appliances (binary); participating, during the past year, in actions to help people in distress (binary); *diversity of other pro-social activities* (not material and not monetary) during the past year⁹ (base—did not take part in any of the above types of activity, 1—took part in one, 2—in 2-5 types of activity).

V. Assessment of the "support potential" of the social environment: *assessment of the importance and sufficiency of information* on producers' compliance with ethical norms at the time the purchase is made (base: "not important and not enough" (see Table 4); level of *social capital* in the environment (binary, 1—high) (see Table 5); *type of community* (1—cities with a population of less than 500,000 and villages, 0—big cities).

Regression analysis. Table 7 contains average partial effects (APE) calculated on the basis of three binary logit regressions. They show by how many percentage points on average the likelihood of a person ending up in this or that group after one measurement of this or that independent variable changes on condition that all the other independent variables remain unchanged.

The probability of being included in *market* practices of ethical consumption is increased in the first place by meeting the demand for information in the field at the moment the purchase is made. Compared with the base group—Russians who simultaneously said that this information is *unimportant* and *insufficient*—the probability of ethical consumption is 28.6 p.p. higher for those who consider this information to be both *important*, and *sufficient*. Important factors are *willingness to pay extra* for ethical products and a high level of solidarity activity aimed at "strange others" involving *redistribution of material benefits, labor and money* (as distinct from "non-money" forms of civic activity, in which participation turned out to be insignificant). Thus, compared to the base group—respondents who do not want to pay extra for ethical products or have not made up their minds about it—the probability of being included in ethical purchases and/or boycotts increases by almost 9 p.p. for those who *are willing to pay* about 1-5% extra and by 13 p.p. for persons prepared to pay more. Participation in assistance to people in distress as well as voluntary work (not for members of the family or relatives) during the past year increases the probability of becoming an ethical consumer by 9.3-9.4. p.p. (compared with those who are not included in these types of pro-social activities).

Table 7

Average Partial Effects of the Choice in Favor of a Type of Ethical Consumption

	Market (purchases and/or boycotts)	Waste sorting	All practices (market and/or non-market)
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
1.1. Sex (1—male)	−0.0397** (0.018)	−0.033** (0.015)	−0.058*** (0.025)
1.3. Education: — incomplete secondary (base)	0.077** (0.034)	—	—
— school, vocational technical school			
— technicum	0.111*** (0.033)	—	0.080** (0.037)
— higher education institution	0.153*** (0.037)	—	0.091** (0.041)
2.1. Presence of supra-individual values	0.032* (0.018)	0.024* (0.014)	0.047** (0.019)
2.2. Presence of individualist values	—	—	−0.046** (0.031)
2.3. Who is to be responsible for the production of ethical goods	0.047** (0.021)	0.035** (0.017)	0.057** (0.023)
2.4. Willing to unite	0.039** (0.018)	0.029* (0.015)	0.050** (0.020)
2.6. Religion and participation in religious services	0.042** (0.0197)	—	0.043** (0.022)
3.1. Willingness to pay extra for ethical goods: unwilling or has not made up his/her mind (base)			
— ≈1% or no more than 5%	0.087*** (0.020)	0.041** (0.016)	0.098*** (0.023)
— no more than 10%, 20%, 30% and more	0.132*** (0.029)	0.087*** (0.026)	0.173*** (0.032)
3.2. Material status of family (average—base) 1—below average	—	0.086*** (0.019)	0.072*** (0.023)
4.3. Volunteer work	0.094*** (0.023)	0.048** (0.019)	0.137*** (0.028)
4.4. Giving old clothes, furniture, household appliances to the needy	0.032* (0.018)	—	—

Table 7 (continuation)

4.5. Taking part in actions to help people in a situation of distress during the past year	0.093*** (0.036)	—	0.070* (0.042)
4.5. Pro-social “non-money” activity (none—base) — one type out of five	—	—	—
— from 2 to 5 types	—	0.077* (0.042)	0.092* (0.051)
5.1. <i>Information:</i> — unimportant and insufficient (base) — unimportant and sufficient	0.212*** (0.037)	0.134*** (0.037)	0.283*** (0.042)
— important but insufficient	0.154*** (0.019)	0.039*** (0.019)	0.171*** (0.021)
— important and sufficient	0.286*** (0.048)	0.061* (0.034)	0.309*** (0.052)
5.3. Type of community (1—cities of less than 500,000 people and villages)	0.082*** (0.021)	—	0.067*** (0.023)
Number of observations	1,998	1,999	1,998

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors are in brackets.

Probability $> \chi$ -square = 0.0000.

“—” variables not significant in *this* model.

The table does not contain variables that turned out to be insignificant in *all* the models: age, commitment to helping others; membership of social organizations, above average material status, social capital in the environment.

The probability of inclusion in *market* practices of ethical consumption increases with *education*: it is higher for persons with secondary specialized and higher education by 11 p.p. and 15 p.p. respectively than for those who have incomplete secondary education. A number of value orientations (sharing responsibility in this field, readiness to unite, etc.) and living in large cities also has a positive impact on the development of *market* practices. Men are less likely to become involved in ethical purchasing or boycotts (by almost 4 p.p.). On the other hand, material status at present makes no difference for inclusion of Russians in these practices at this juncture (the hypothesis on its positive impact has not been confirmed).

The above set of variables, however, does not possess such a satisfactory explanatory power with regard to participation of Russians in *ethical waste disposal*.¹⁰ Further search for significant regressors is needed. At this stage in the analysis let us stress several significant differences between participants of non-market and market practices.

First, lower material status of the former. Compared with the base group (persons with average material status) the likelihood of taking part in waste sorting for persons

with below average status is 8.6 p.p. higher. The positive dependence on willingness to pay extra for ethical products suggests that this group of consumers is highly heterogeneous. Some take part in this practice because of material constraints, because they are concerned only about their household or out of habit, while others think about common good and nature conservation.

Second, there is no connection between the level of education and inclusion in the practice of separate waste collection.

Third, participants in *non-market* practices do not present such a high demand for more information in the sphere of ethical consumption as the participants in *market* practices. This shows, among other things, that if ethical waste disposal is to further develop in Russia a complex of preparatory measures is needed by other institutional actors (notably the NGOs and the authorities) in promoting popular *awareness*.

But that is not all. It is necessary to develop the *infrastructure* that facilitates inclusion in the practice of waste sorting. It is important to install waste bins for separated waste in the courtyards, to increase the number of points receiving recyclables or support the development of waste recycling. All types of consumers signal their dissatisfaction with the current state of such infrastructure (see Table 6), but it is *the intention to join ethical waste disposal in the next year or two* that is particularly important. The demand for one or several of such measures compared with those who do not present such demands increases the likelihood that the former will join the group of *potential* participants in waste separation practices by 23 p.p.

Thus, new consumer practices engage with the civil society in various ways. The multifaceted nature of the phenomenon of socially responsible consumption is reflected in various factors of Russians' inclusion in certain practices. This adds relevance to *differentiated* strategies of NGOs and management groups of various levels and types.

Potential of the Development of Ethical Consumption Practices in Russia

In stressing the importance of *differentiated* strategies in promoting market and non-market practices of socially responsible consumption, it is also necessary to take into account the effect of their mutual support and mutual influence. Under current conditions, market and non-market practices complement each other in different ways. Only 18% of participants in *market* ethical practices (shopping and/or boycotts) also sort their waste. By presenting a high demand to the development of *infrastructure* in this field (see Table 6), they signal the importance of the supportive environment for diminishing the fragmentation of socially responsible consumption in Russia. At the same time far more (nearly 2/5) of today's participants in separate waste collection have also had experience of *market* practices (ethical shopping and/or boycott). Apparently, participation in *non-market* practices makes individuals more choosy in the consumer market prompting them more often to proceed from moral considerations in making their purchases. In this case the area of overlap of the two kinds of practices expands primarily due to the implementation of the complex of measures in the sphere of *awareness* and *provision of information* in Russia, and getting consumers to *trust the labeling* of goods as ethical.

Further development of market and non-market practices of socially responsible consumption depends greatly on the efforts of the actors of various levels and types (NGOs, business, government bodies, media and the populace) and on the interactions between them. Meanwhile there are many disharmonies and bottlenecks in the social mechanism of the emergence of new consumer practices. One reason for this is that the key social groups (above all the authorities, the NGOs and business) have yet to determine their positions concerning the *actorship* of their own and other groups. Thus, while agreeing that there should be *many actors* the main social groups (NGOs, the authorities and business) in most cases (82-87%) *exclude their own group from the group of key actors*, “passing the buck” to other groups. Secondly, there are great discrepancies of ideas about the *real types of activity* both of their own group and other groups acting in this sphere (while often ignoring the advances made through the efforts of other groups) (more in [28]). Finally, there is no consensus within the groups and between them concerning the most promising types of ethical consumption in Russia.

The highest degree of consensus is over the favorable prospects of the development of waste sorting in Russia. 60% of members of parliament, 39% of government members and 41% of industrial enterprise managers think this practice of socially responsible consumption is likely to take root in Russia sooner than any other practices.¹¹ Considering that the biggest popular demand for infrastructure is in this sphere, it is fair to assume that the development of the practice of waste sorting in Russia has a good social base and potential. This non-market practice in turn may be a catalyst for the development of *market* practices of socially responsible consumption.

The heads of industrial enterprises also name among key practices “the purchase of goods from producers who do not damage the environment; boycotting the products of companies which take an irresponsible attitude to nature” (58%), being alert to the modern world trends in developing an ethical consumer market (see, for example, [9; 10]). There are no significant differences between the main social groups regarding the favorable prospects of the development of the practice of “voting with the ruble” for the products of the companies which are active in social projects and charity (30-44%); refusal to buy goods whose production involves saving on industrial safety, frequent industrial accidents, violation of the rights of *Russian* workers (25-34%); refusal to buy the products of companies which exploit the labor from *underdeveloped* countries in violation of labor laws (24-31%). Although institutional actors regard each individual market practice as secondary, on the whole the absolute majority of both branches of federal government (67-68%) and even more heads of industrial enterprises (89%) predict the development of the *market* segment of ethical consumption in Russia. They differ only on details.

Whether or not these forecasts come true depends on improving coordination and eliminating the bottlenecks in the social mechanism of the emergence of new consumer practices (both market and non-market). The NGOs and the authorities must play an important role in establishing interaction among the main stakeholders. They should create venues for dialog and for coordinating the interests of various groups, information and awareness activities, infrastructure

development to facilitate the inclusion of various groups of the population in socially responsible consumption, which meets the goals of sustained development of Russia and the strengthening of the civil society.

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Notes

¹ This article is based on the results of a study carried out by the author at the Center for Studies of Civil Society and the Nonprofit Sector, National Research University "Higher School of Economics" (NRU HSE) as part of the NRU HSE program of fundamental research.

- 2 Different practices have different *stability coefficients* (the ratio of the number of those who intend to continue a practice in the next year or two and the total number of those who are included in this practice at present) and *replacement coefficients* (the ratio of the number of those who intend to join a practice and the number of those who intend to give it up in the next year or two).
- 3 All the interviews have been commissioned by the NRU HSE Center for the Study of the Civil Society and the Nonprofit Sector.
- 4 The survey was conducted by the Public Opinion Fund in the shape of a formalized interview.
- 5 The survey was conducted by the *Glas naroda* independent Public Opinion Center in Moscow by formally interviewing respondents at their place of work.
- 6 The survey was conducted in the shape of a formal interview by MarketAp company in 33 Russian regions. The regions were selected on the basis of the typology of Russian regions according to three characteristics: urbanization index, development of the non-commercial sector and economic development measured as the ratio of per capita GRP to the national average. Respondents were selected in accordance with quotas based on the legal form and year of registration of NGO.
- 7 Membership of house owners' partnerships, gardening and *dacha* partnerships and trade unions was not taken into account because under current conditions such membership is often a mere formality.
- 8 To assess the level of social capital according to the two above-mentioned criteria they were recoded depending on how pronounced the quality was. Thus, positions were awarded the following scores. For consensus and cohesion of the social environment—*unconditional agreement, cohesion*—3 points, *a measure of agreement, cohesion*—2 points, *a measure of disagreement, disunity*—1 point, *total disagreement, disunity*—0 points. On the basis of willingness to help one another: *very frequently*—3 points, *fairly frequently*—2 points, *somewhat rarely*—1 point, *very seldom*—0 points. The “don't knows” on these questions in both cases were awarded 0 points. After adding up the points on two counts those who scored 4-6 points were awarded the *high* level of social capital, those with 3 points the *medium* level and those with 0-2 points the *low* level.
- 9 The following types of civic participation over the past year were taken into account: protest actions, rallies and pickets; peaceful demonstrations; neighborhood clean-up, beautification of house vestibules, courtyards, city (village, settlement); the activities of social and other non-governmental nonprofit organizations, as well as a written collective petition to government bodies or on issues that do not affect the respondent.
- 10 Model 1 correctly predicts 71.4% of outcomes (inclusion-non-inclusion in *market* ethical consumption practices). The *sensitivity* indicator equals 70.7%, and the *specificity* indicator 71.6% (cutoff=0.25). Model 2 correctly predicts only 65.6% of outcomes (inclusion-non-inclusion in separate waste collection). The *sensitivity* indicator equals 62.6%, and the *specificity* indicator is 66.0% (cutoff=0.11).
- 11 The question was couched as follows: “Considering the specific conditions in Russia what types of ethical consumption are likely to be adopted sooner in our country under favorable conditions (awareness and information activities, infrastructure building, etc.)?” The respondent was asked to tick off no more than four out of nine answer variants or propose his/her own answer.

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

The Risks of Reduced Welfare of the Population: Stratification Analysis

Yelena AVRAAMOVA

Abstract. The economic recession in Russia generates risks of reduced welfare of various social strata, including the middle class. The perception of these risks by the population can be seen from the results of a representative nationwide survey (a sample of 3,500 respondents) conducted by INCAP RANEPА in 2016. The survey data make it possible to identify stratification groups relative to the middle class nucleus. The analysis of socioeconomic characteristics that follows is conducted in terms of stratification groups. The risks are assessed of diminishing welfare for each group, including the risks in the areas of employment and consumption. The resources of members of various stratification groups for coping with the risks of declining well-being are examined. Finally, models of adaptation behavior aimed at maintaining the achieved level of well-being are proposed.

Keywords: middle class, social stratification, socioeconomic adaptation, upward mobility, human capital, socioeconomic resources, standard of living.

Identification of Stratification Groups

In accordance with the approach to determining the size of the middle class (MC) on the basis of the concentration of identification characteristics¹ representatives of the corresponding social entity can be identified among those who meet the following criteria:

- social and professional status (MC includes heads of organizations, structural units and holders of higher education degrees);
- the level of material well-being (assessing their material position as “average” or “somewhat good”);

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— social status: assessing their social position as “average” or “above average.”

Those meeting all the three criteria form the “nucleus” of the middle class, which comprises 18.4% of respondents; those meeting two criteria form the “inner periphery of the MC” (29.5%); those meeting one criterion, form the “outer periphery” (26.3% of respondents); those not meeting any of the middle class characteristics account for 25.8% of the population. The outer periphery can hardly be included in the middle class, not even “the lower middle class,” but is merely a stratum that has a chance, given favorable circumstances and sound social policy measures, to build up certain resources to warrant its inclusion in the corresponding identification space. The chances of the lower class in that respect are minimal.

Our previous studies of the MC [1; 3] revealed what we called status discrepancy: a situation when the material well-being and social self-awareness are not functions of a high level of education or skills as is the case in meritocratic socioeconomic systems where these two kinds of status coincide. The new sets of sociological data show that the problem persists. The characteristic of the MC that covers the largest group of respondents (60%) is the subjective assessment of the respondent’s social position. The characteristic “level of material well-being” is revealed by a smaller group (49% of respondents). Finally, the least frequently encountered characteristic turned out to be the social and professional status (32% of economically active respondents). This suggests that the deficit of this characteristic caused by a shortage of jobs that could be filled by workers with a higher education and corresponding qualifications limits the growth of the middle class. The situation in 2000, when study [7] was conducted, was fundamentally different because then income was the characteristic in short supply. Thus, in the last 15 years the structure of the economy did not evolve along the path of modernization which stimulates the creation of innovative work places. However, the slow pace of modernization of the economy did not prevent the growth of material welfare because the country’s development was driven by the production of raw materials.

The situation of status discrepancy and absolute prevalence of the characteristic of social self-identification confirm the thesis about the blurred social structure of Russian society and the fact that neither the difficult 1990s, nor the relatively prosperous early 2000s contributed to the emergence of popular perceptions of the status boundaries based on an awareness of common (group) opportunities actualized by upholding certain socioeconomic interests, or status obligations manifested in performing the functions characteristic of a developed middle class. As a result, an individual’s sense of his/her status does not determine his/her motivations and does not accord with how he/she perceives the character and nature of their socioeconomic interests and ways to uphold them. One has to admit that “the social position and status characteristics of an individual are not associated in people’s minds with their own lives and behavior strategies and, accordingly, are not in any way represented in their political and ideological attitudes” [4, p. 208].

The vague and ill-defined social structure of Russian society confirms the validity of identifying the middle class not on the basis of one, but of several identification characteristics and lends a new relevance to the use of the resource




Fig. 1. Concentration of middle class characteristics
(in % of those who have at least one identification characteristic)

approach [10] whereby each identification characteristic is seen as a resource required to form successful adaptation strategies.

An analysis of the combinations of identification characteristics of the middle class represented in Fig. 1 shows that:

- self-identification of individuals as a member of the middle class is the most profitable characteristic. Not infrequently such identity is not backed up by material or professional status;

- there is a group possessing a fairly high professional status not backed up by an adequate remuneration or status self-assessment (apparently consisting of specialists with higher education who do not hold leading positions), which makes it similar to the lower stratum which is more concerned with the problem of survival than successful adaptation;

- in a number of cases social self-identification of individuals is based not on material and professional, but on some other criteria (holding a university degree, commanding respect among the surrounding people, a sense of a decently lived life, etc.) which is not conducive to thinking about building up development resources;

- the criterion of material well-being is more in accord with the criterion of social identity than with professional status. This indicates that it is possible to derive acceptable income from activities not covered by the professional status, so that this group may follow behavior patterns of an adaptive character.

Previous studies identified the directions of changes in the professional structure of the MC. The 2000s saw professionals engaged in potentially innovative and science-intensive spheres drop out of the MC to be replaced by those engaged in the spheres of administration and security and military structures. It would be interesting to look at today's structure of employment of various stratification groups (see Table 1).

Although representatives of the nucleus and inner periphery of the MC are to be found among all gainfully employed people there are two spheres in which

Table 1

Professional Structure of Various Stratification Groups (in % by line)

Economic sphere	Stratification groups			
	Lower strata	Outer MC periphery	Inner MC periphery	MC nucleus
Industry	21.2	27.2	36.0	15.6
Construction, utilities	28.4	27.4	25.3	18.9
Transport, communications	32.4	27.2	25.7	14.7
Trade, services, public catering	28.8	22.9	31.6	16.7
Finance, insurance	9.1	13.6	40.9	36.4
Education, health care, science, culture, sport	22.5	32.1	24.4	21.0
Public administration, security and military structures	22.0	14.3	34.0	29.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>25.4</i>	<i>26.1</i>	<i>29.7</i>	<i>18.8</i>

these social strata predominate: they are government administration and finances. Representatives of the MC nucleus are less frequently encountered among those employed in industry, trade and the services. Members of the outer periphery of the MC are more numerous in science, education, healthcare and culture. Thus, the nucleus and the inner periphery of the middle class are extremely heterogeneous in terms of professional composition, but their share in potentially innovative areas of activity still tends to shrink.

Risks in the Employment Sphere

From the results of the survey, the material standards have gone down in all the stratification groups (see Table 2).

The nucleus and the inner periphery of the MC stand out because the number of those whose material well-being has not worsened over the past two years is marginally higher than in the other groups where those whose position has worsened clearly predominate.

At first glance, these data are at odds with the results of the MC studies carried out by the RAS Institute of Sociology [10], however methodologically the

Table 2

Dynamics of Material Well-being between 2014 and 2016 (in % by line)

Stratification groups	Material well-being		
	Worsened	Not worsened	Don't know
Lower strata	80.8	17.0	2.2
Outer MC periphery	68.0	31.7	0.3
Inner MC periphery	44.4	54.7	0.9
MC nucleus	42.4	55.7	1.9
Total	59.6	39.1	1.3

authors of that study set lower criteria of belonging to the MC. As a result, more people are referred to the MC, including a large body of skilled workers employed in the processing industries, science, education and healthcare. The incomes of the employees in these spheres were growing in the years of plenty, but at a lower rate than the incomes of those employed in governance, the security and military structures and the banking and financial sector. From that point of view the conclusion of the authors of the RAS Institute of Sociology study to the effect that the incomes of skilled labor in general and MC in particular are falling, which is a disincentive for upgrading the education level and skills of those employed in potentially innovative sectors, does not in the least contradict our data.

The threat to the living standards stems both from external circumstances (negative economic trends) and from internal causes (socioeconomic characteristics). Let us consider the impact of various groups of risks of falling welfare across the stratification groups, starting with assessing the current state of enterprises (firms, organizations) where representatives of various social strata are employed and the outlook for the development of the corresponding economic entities.

The representatives of the nucleus and the inner periphery of the MC work at economically more successful enterprises than those employing comparatively lower social strata. Thus, 38% of respondents from the MC nucleus said they were employed by economically well-off enterprises compared with 23% among the members of the lower group.

At the same time, the representatives of the MC nucleus and its periphery are more frequently employed by enterprises with a steady rate of growth. Thus more than half of those in the lower strata are employed by enterprises whose status has worsened, while only 37.5% of the representatives of the MC nucleus and 30.3% of the inner periphery of the MC work at such enterprises. The explanation apparently lies in the competitive advantages of the MC (more developed human and social capital) accumulated and used in the employment sphere not only in the more successful sectors, but at more successful enterprises. The same holds for the prospects of the development of the enterprises where members of various stratification

Table 3

**Concentration of External Risks to Employment for
Representatives of Stratification Groups (in % by line)**

Stratification groups	Sum of economic risks			
	0	1	2	3
Lower strata	34.0	24.9	22.6	18.5
Outer MC periphery	37.5	29.5	20.1	12.9
Inner MC periphery	63.2	19.7	13.3	3.8
MC nucleus	54.9	21.1	16.6	7.4
<i>Total</i>	<i>47.8</i>	<i>23.8</i>	<i>18.0</i>	<i>10.4</i>

groups are employed: the lower strata are more often connected with the enterprises whose state, according to respondents, will continue to worsen.

Let us try to classify the challenges stemming from factors that are external for the stratification groups, i.e., employment at enterprises:

- 1) those in dire economic straits;
- 2) those whose state has worsened;
- 3) and those whose state is set to worsen.

The conclusion is that the threats arising from the state of the enterprise are concentrated in the lower stratification groups whereas representatives of the nucleus and the inner periphery of the MC are under no such threat (see Table 3).

The second group of risks is the threat of loss of job, which is noticeably higher for the lower strata. Thus 90% of the members of the MC nucleus expect to keep their jobs, compared with less than 70% in the lower stratum.

The data show that in the minds of most respondents, regardless of the stratification group they belong to, it is very difficult today to find a new job. Moreover, in the opinion of the 30% belonging to the lower stratum it is practically impossible to find an equivalent job, an opinion shared by about 20% of MC representatives. This attests to the contraction of the labor market and low labor mobility which could mitigate the threat of falling standard of living due to the worsening of the state of the enterprise or loss of job. That said, those in the nucleus or inner periphery of the MC are in a better position than the other stratification groups.

Aggregating the risks connected with keeping one's job and prospects of re-employment in case of losing it, we can conclude that the representatives of the MC nucleus are in the most secure position employment-wise, and job security diminishes down the status ladder. At the same time it has to be said that differentiation between stratification groups is not as great as one might have expected based on the amount of human capital various stratification groups possess. To recap, only those with higher professional education and skills are included in the MC. The upshot may be the trend

of diminishing differences between the MC and the lower strata and a widening gap between the MC and the upper crust. But the second part of the hypothesis is unverifiable because representatives of the upper stratum hardly ever appear in the samples of mass surveys.

Risks in the Consumption Sphere

Another group of risks is connected with changes in the character of consumer activity. The transformation of the models in this sphere should best be considered in terms of risks, and not only as a phenomenon of falling level of well-being because consumption also characterizes the status affiliation as well as life style and the type of adaptation behavior.

An overall decline in consumer activity has been registered both by official statistics and by sociological surveys which show that the process has affected all the stratification groups. The spending on goods and services has been cut down by the representatives (88.6% of them) of the lower strata, representatives of the outer periphery (76.7%), those of the inner periphery (64.7%) and those in the MC nucleus (60.5%). The above data show that the nucleus and the inner MC periphery manage better than the lower strata to preserve the level of their consumer activity, but they too have been cutting their spending.

The share of disposable income remaining after the spending on food characterizes not only the level of material well-being but also the space of consumer activity. The MC nucleus is well ahead of the other groups, including the inner periphery, because 32% of them spend on food less than a third of their budget (versus 18.7% in the inner periphery, 17.1% in the outer periphery and 13.7% in the lower stratum).

The reduction of consumer activity in all the groups is a sustained trend reinforced by negative expectations concerning the possibility of increased consumption in the future. In other words, the drop in consumption reflects not only the fall of incomes, but also the popular sense that the economic outlook is grim. Contrary to the claim of some researchers that the lower strata have not changed their consumption level because it was very low anyway, our data show that a dramatic fall of consumption occurred in the lower income group where spending on food, drugs, medical and education services dropped substantially. The latter is particularly important because access to education and healthcare gives a chance to increase human capital as a resource for rising out of poverty.

Reduced consumption in the spheres characterizing life style is more relevant for the MC, so that its representatives were confronted not only with reduced incomes, but with reduced opportunities, which is as important for life style and social wellness as the material well-being. At the same time our own and others' studies [6] of the MC display a low sensitivity of the Russian population to falling living standards and lower consumption linking it with the need to strengthen the country.

Some experts suggest that relative insensitivity to diminished consumption possibilities stems from “the poor man’s consciousness,” and the return to limited consumption is perceived by the majority of people as a return to a certain norm [5]. I believe that the current models of consumer behavior stem not from a special type of consciousness, but are the result of rational behavior, with the population investing in what it believes can yield more returns. Thus, our studies in the education sphere [2] show that two-thirds of the parents with school-age children pay for additional tuition hoping that when the children grow up it would give them a competitive advantage. True, further the investment in additional education of adults drops considerably compared to the amounts spent on children. Thus, the Russian population, while taking seriously the task of increasing individual competitiveness and committing effort and money at the early stage in the education trajectories, subsequently loses interest in “lifelong education.” This happens because of the narrow space for actualizing the human potential, low level of competition characteristic of non-meritocratic societies, and the weakness of the institutions supporting individual efforts. Thus, I do not see manifestations of “poor consciousness” in the education sphere.

Investment in health is a complicated case. On the one hand, it has been proven to be useful [8], as witnessed by the interest of the employers and the population in the voluntary medical insurance in the years preceding the reform of the health service. Now presumably that interest is falling. Besides, the reform of the healthcare service, as shown by VTSIOM studies (<http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115370>), substantially upset the *modus operandi* in the interaction between the populace and the healthcare institutions. People give up long-term strategies of investing in health and fall back on informal practices of obtaining medical care. That too, I believe, is not the result of “poor consciousness” but of institutional dysfunction in this important sphere of accumulating human capital.

The above applies even more to the possibilities of investing in housing. Calculations of accessibility of housing in relation to quintile income groups show that prior to 2011 acquiring housing (a standard two-room apartment in the primary or secondary market) was affordable only for representatives of the most well-off, i.e., fifth quintile income group. In 2011 it also became affordable for members of the fourth quintile group. For the other income groups housing in the primary and secondary markets is unaffordable according to the international assessment methodology [9]. For this reason the majority of people do not consider saving towards buying housing to be a rational strategy, especially because they do not trust the institutions responsible for secure savings.

To go back to the risks stemming from the consumption sphere. A serious risk here is the type of credit behavior that has emerged in the period preceding the last crisis. Our data indicate a very active credit behavior of all the stratification groups; there are no differences in the forms in which credit obligations are fulfilled. However, arrears on loan repayment occur twice as frequently in the low-er group than in the MC nucleus.

Table 4

Consumer Risks of Representatives of Stratification Groups (in % by line)

Stratification groups	Consumer risks		
	None (or one) ²	Insignificant (2 risks)	Substantial (more than 2 risks)
Lower stratum	19.2	40.0	40.8
Outer MC periphery	23.7	43.1	33.2
Inner MC periphery	39.0	38.1	22.9
MC nucleus	37.8	44.6	17.6
<i>Total</i>	<i>29.6</i>	<i>41.1</i>	<i>29.3</i>

Let us now assess the consumer risks as a whole (see Table 4). The MC nucleus wins out on other groups because more of its representatives are out of the risk zone than in other groups (12.2% compared with 1% in the lower group).

This typology demonstrates that consumer activity of the nucleus and the periphery are in the risk zone, like the lower strata, but the risks are not so high for the former.

Resources of Stratification Groups

Let us now look at another side of the problem: the resources representatives of various stratification groups have to enable them to withstand the risks of falling level of well-being. As for additional employment (the resource that helped the population to adapt in the early 1990s) the data show that it is fairly evenly distributed among the stratification groups although there are comparatively fewer people with additional employment in the MC nucleus. One manifestation of social and economic stabilization in the early 2000s was the transition from second to multiple employment as a way to adapt to one-job with a relatively high pay, which is more characteristic of the representatives of the MC nucleus.

Another important resource is savings, and there the MC nucleus stands out as the most massive stratum of savings holders: 40.5% versus 12.3% in the lower stratum. The amount of savings can be judged by the answers to the question about the size of the “safety cushion,” i.e., how long the savings would last in the event other sources of income are lost. Only people in the nucleus (11.9%) and the inner periphery (9.1%) have significant savings that enable them to survive for two or more years. Other stratification groups do not have such amounts of savings. The largest group among the representatives of the nucleus and the inner periphery have savings that could last for several months.

Another important resource that can dampen the risks of decline in the level of well-being is ownership of a second housing unit that can be rented out.

Table 5

Amount of Property Owned by Representatives of Stratification Groups (in %)

Stratification groups	Level of material well-being		
	Ownership of consumer durables	Ownership of information goods	Ownership of premium goods
Lower stratum	98.1	80.9	10.5
Outer MC periphery	98.9	90.5	17.4
Inner MC periphery	99.5	91.7	25.5
MC nucleus	98.5	96.6	39.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>98.8</i>	<i>89.5</i>	<i>22.0</i>

Representatives of the MC nucleus possess that resource more often than those in the lower stratum (16% versus 4.7%).

The amount of property owned by representatives of stratification groups can also be seen as a resource. It makes it possible to cut the spending on consumer durables without damage to the quality of life. The body of property can be roughly divided into consumer durables, information goods and premium goods that are signs of a higher quality of life. Table 5 shows that consumer durables (refrigerator, washing machine) are owned equally by representatives of all population groups. Information goods (computer, smartphone, Internet) are also fairly widespread and may be considered to be part of prime necessities. At the same time, we see a tilt in the number of owners of these goods in favor of the upper stratification groups, especially the MC nucleus where they are owned by almost 100%. As for premium goods (dishwashers, air conditioners) the largest number are owned by representatives of the MC nucleus.

Ownership of property can act as a “safety margin” if it includes the full complement of items and it is modern enough. This is what most representatives of the MC have (65% in the nucleus and 58% in the inner periphery). However, the lower stratum is not far behind: 46% of that stratum are well-off in terms of household appliances. So the “prosperous years” marked by a high consumer activity (even though partly on credit) were not wasted. At the same time, a significant group of members of the MC nucleus needs to replenish the set of household items. Less than one-third of its representatives have the wherewithal to do so. Let us determine how well-off the representatives of various stratification groups are in terms of the number of consumer durables (see Table 6).

It follows from the table that the MC nucleus stands out as the most well-off stratum in terms of property. It hardly has any people whose level of ownership of consumer durables is low. However, the inner periphery is already a fair distance behind the nucleus, not to speak of still lower strata. This means that the margin of strength offered by accumulated property is not too great even in the upper stratification groups.

Table 6

Level of Consumer Durables Ownership of Representatives of Various Stratification Groups
(in % by line)

Stratification groups	Level of consumer durables ownership ³		
	Low (up to 3 items)	Medium (4-6 items)	High (more than 6 items)
Lower stratum	26.2	70.2	3.6
Outer MC periphery	12.7	79.6	7.7
Inner MC periphery	11.8	73.0	15.2
MC nucleus	3.8	63.8	32.4
<i>Total</i>	<i>14.3</i>	<i>72.3</i>	<i>13.4</i>

Table 7

Types of Resource Sustainability of Various Stratification Groups (in % by line)

Stratification groups	Types of resource self-sustainability ⁴		
	Low (no resources)	Medium (1 resource)	High (2 resources or more)
Lower stratum	68.4	26.8	4.8
Outer MC periphery	59.7	31.6	8.7
Inner MC periphery	48.1	32.4	19.5
MC nucleus	34.8	37.4	27.8
<i>Total</i>	<i>55.1</i>	<i>31.5</i>	<i>13.4</i>

It is possible that the drop in consumer activity whose character was discussed above is a fairly short-term adaptation strategy. It will inevitably misfire in the longer term.

Table 7 shows the identifiable types of resource self-sustainability of various stratification groups.

High resource self-sustainability is characteristic of the MC nucleus and, with a lag, its inner periphery. At the same time inner heterogeneity of the MC is evident: it is divided equally into three types of resource self-sustainability.

Adaptation Practices

Adaptation to the new reality (sometimes perceived as “new normalcy”) with lower consumption standards and higher threats in the sphere of employment should involve adaptation practices commensurate with the available resources (See Table 8).

Table 8

Adaptation Practices of Various Stratification Groups (in %)

Strategies	Stratification groups				
	Lower strata	Outer MC periphery	Inner MC periphery	MC nucleus	Total
Bought a car (transportation), real estate (housing)	4.0	8.2	11.1	18.9	10.0
Bought hard currency, securities, gold, etc.	1.1	1.6	1.9	7.6	2.6
Stashed away cash	5.4	10.3	15.6	24.2	13.2
Bought consumer durables (computer, household appliances, furniture, etc.)	13.5	17.5	35.2	36.7	25.2
Found a second job, earnings on the side	11.3	12.2	17.5	8.3	12.8
Started growing more fruit and vegetables, bought cattle	13.2	15.1	15.4	11.0	13.9
Acquired an education in a profession currently in demand	4.3	2.6	8.3	4.5	5.1
None of the above	61.5	50.8	34.6	37.1	46.3

The MC (its nucleus and inner periphery) differ from the overall population in that they resort to some adaptation practices (34.6% of the members of the inner periphery and 37% of the members of the nucleus compared to 61.5% of members of the lower stratum and 50.8% of the members of the outer periphery).

About one-fifth of the members of the middle class nucleus invested in transport and real estate. Already in the inner periphery the number of such people is less by almost half. The MC nucleus is also saving more actively. Building up a margin of strength by buying consumer durables can be considered to be a MC strategy. Multiple jobs, extra earnings are more typical of the behavior of the inner MC periphery than the nucleus because they feel more secure in the employment sphere. Importantly, the use of subsidiary private plots of land for a part-time farming has spread about equally among all the stratification groups. Only in the MC nucleus does the use of that strategy tend to diminish.

* * *

Summing up, it can be said that the bulk of Russia's population is exposed to the risk of falling living standards, including about 40% of representatives of the nucleus and the inner periphery of the middle class. The biggest threat

is experienced by the lower strata because of the comparatively lower individual competitiveness in the labor market, lack of monetary and non-monetary resources that support any adaptation practices other than reduced spending on goods and services.

The social strata possessing a larger stock of resources too are not very active in adaptation through labor or investment activities, probably because they adhere to the tactics of wait-and-see in the hope that economic difficulties would soon be overcome. Standing out among adaptation practices is tending the personal subsidiary plot of land, which is an archaic type of adaptation behavior.

It can be said that the Russian middle class is in a crisis, which is manifested by: the absence of a modernization trend of economic development and shortage of jobs in innovative sectors, which holds back the growth of its numbers; a level of human capital accumulation that exceeds the level of its use; and the overall diffuseness of the middle class, which leads to a loss of its qualitative identity.

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Notes

- ¹ This approach was first applied in the study *The Russian Middle Class: Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment* [7]. Today it is used by the majority of those who study the social structure.
- ² Regarding consumer risks (as distinct from other types of risk) households with one actual type can be seen as relatively risk-free. This is because in the context of economic crisis there are hardly any households in the mass groups that do not experience its negative consequences.
- ³ In terms of the number of property items owned (a maximum of 8, including a refrigerator, a washing machine, a dishwasher, a personal computer, Internet access, air conditioner, smartphone, car).
- ⁴ A maximum of 4 (additional employment, savings, housing for rent, high level of personal property owned).

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Social Empathy in the Legal Consciousness of Russian Judges

Georgy SATAROV

Abstract. This article examines the legal consciousness of the Russian judge, the key actor in the institution of judiciary power on whom the functioning of the whole Russian state depends in many ways. I look not only at the attitude of judges to the legal field, but at the judges' ideas of the legal awareness of citizens and compare the legal consciousness of judges and citizens as two social groups interacting in the field of law. A methodology of calculating the social empathy of judges is proposed. The question is also raised of the interconnection of individual social empathy of judges with other variables.

Keywords: legal consciousness, Russian legal consciousness, judges, citizens, empathy, justice.

The ideas of the current state of Russia, its government, its society are increasingly concentrated on the functioning of state institutions. The judiciary branch is often put at the top of the list of such institutions. This is not surprising considering that the whole history of political power attests to the pivotal role of the law court. Because arguing this thesis is not the purpose of the article I will just mention a couple of historical anecdotes, one of which concerns Solomon's judgment and the other St. Louis, King of France, who dispensed justice under a tree. Ever since conflict resolution and retribution for crimes began to be divorced from personal relations between the parties to the conflict or the relations between the criminal and the victim (the victim's relatives) the existence of an intermediary in the shape of socially recognized power became a tradition in various cultures. The judiciary function of an impartial intermediary detached from the parties to the conflict was seen as the key function. As John Rawls put it, "Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought" [4, p. 3]. Obviously, the judiciary is, in that sense, the most important institution.

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Next it would be appropriate to dwell on the concept of “institution.” In this article it is not interpreted in the traditional legalistic sense whereby an institution is a combination of norms regulating a certain sphere of social relations. Modern institutional theories use a broader and more productive interpretation of this concept. Among the range of interpretations offered by these theories I am inclined to go along with the one formulated by Douglass Cecil North, a Nobel Prize winner. He defines an institution as “a combination of formal rules, informal constraints, and their enforcement characteristics” [2, p. 6]. Right off, it has to be noted that North identifies the key condition of an institution’s adequate functioning, i.e., complementarity of all the three components of an institution. This condition was used and investigated in two monographs which presented the results of the study of the transformation of the Russian judiciary system undertaken by INDEM Foundation [1; 8].

In the above-mentioned book North singles out people’s ideas as the key “condition of functioning.” In this sphere, not surprisingly, legal consciousness is the key component. That is why it was examined in detail in the two above-mentioned monographs and in the more recent monograph that compares the legal awareness of citizens, entrepreneurs and judges, in other words, the clients and agents of the judiciary branch of power [7]. Naturally, legal consciousness is not only about the attitude of legal actors to law, but also the relations between them in the legal domain. The two most important social groups interacting in the legal field are the agents and clients in the legal field.

None of the social groups that consider themselves to be agents of this or that power institution ceases to be part of society. This is all the more important because in the case of agents of state institutions the relations between agents and clients (i.e., ordinary citizens) of that same institution are critically important. These relations go a long way to determine the performance of the institution (regardless of how performance is assessed, that is, what interests and whose interests it is called upon to secure). In turn, these relations are in many ways determined by the mutual perception of the agents and clients of power institutions, the court of law in our case. The adequacy of these perceptions is an important condition of the institution’s efficiency. The adequate judgments of the representatives of one social group about the members of another are referred to as social empathy [3; 9] (as a fragment of social perception, to follow the terminology that goes back to Karl Brunner).

Empathy is originally a psychological concept which has fairly recently been borrowed by sociology. Therefore a precise definition of the term has yet to be formed. Besides, its various interpretations in sociology are emotionally charged. In the context of this article there is no need to delve into these details. Naturally, by narrowing the focus of attention to social empathy in the field of law we may continue to think of the latter as a multi-faceted phenomenon. I will confine myself to the aspect to which the research presented to the reader is focused.

So, I propose to speak about social empathy by considering two social groups. I believe that in the consciousness of the first group there is a relatively independent

zone A. There is also the second social group whose consciousness also contains some ideas of the same zone A. We can talk about social empathy (or an element of it) when we consider **the ideas of the second group about the ideas of the first group concerning the same zone A**. We can talk about the degree of social empathy inasmuch as we can indicate the degree of similarity between the perceptions of the first group of zone A and the perceptions of the second group of the first group's perception of zone A. Elsewhere in this article I will consider the degree of social empathy of judges toward citizens as clients in the legal field in a concrete area of ideas, of which more will be said below.

Some Results of Previous Studies

The above-cited monographs published earlier by the INDEM Foundation propose a sociological toolkit for describing the legal consciousness as a special relatively independent zone of group consciousness. Here I will confine myself to one component of legal consciousness, the idea of the aim of justice (more precisely, of court proceedings). In our study this component was identified through a question with multiple answer options which goes like this: "What, to you, is the aim of court proceedings? Please choose 1, 2 or 3 answer options that best correspond to your ideas." Besides, in the second study judges were asked a similar question that had to do with social empathy: "What do you believe to be the aim of court proceedings for the majority of Russian citizens? Please choose 1, 2 or 3 answer options that best correspond to your ideas." Both questions, of course, had the same lists of answer options (see Table 1). The following table presents the frequency of the choice of answers for different social groups and, in the case of judges, for two different questions.

Even a cursory look at the first three columns in Table 1 leaves no doubt that on the whole empathy of Russian judges with regard to their clients and fellow citizens is all but non-existent. A detailed analysis of these data will be found in the above-cited INDEM monographs. It also formulates the following result. In a fairly precise geometric sense the ideas of citizens about the aims of court proceedings are exactly midway between the ideas of judges and the ideas of judges about citizens.

This result is in stark contrast with another result. The same monograph describes the procedure and results of classification of variants of answers and respondents corresponding to each other in the following sense. One class of answers includes those frequently chosen together by the respondents. The respondents find themselves in a certain class corresponding to the class of answers if the respondents choose mostly answers from this class. There may be respondents with a set of answers seen as inconsistent if they cannot be referred to any of the classes in the above sense of the word. The main result is that such sets of classes of answers turn out to be almost identical for citizens, judges and citizens as perceived by judges. Below these classes are described with a few minor exceptions. Each class has its name which is readily understandable when it is compared with the

Table 1

Frequencies of the Choice of Answers to Questions about the Aim of the Court Proceedings

1—sample of judges for the question about their ideas; 2—sample of judges for the question about the ideas of citizens; 3—sample of citizens; 4—sample of entrepreneurs

Aims of court proceedings	1	2	3	4
1. Obtaining a social benefit under law	4.7	52.6	16.7	13.3
2. Punishing the offender	0.9	45.3	23.6	13.8
3. Restoring justice	49.4	36.8	50.8	45.8
4. Restoring legality	40.0	4.7	30.1	33.
5. Protecting the violated rights and legitimate interests of citizens	71.5	40.6	26.5	32.2
6. Defense against illegal or ungrounded accusation, bad-faith or incompetent investigation	9.4	6.8	13.8	16.1
7. Obtaining financial compensation for damages	1.7	41.0	13.4	13.1
8. Obtaining moral compensation for the harm caused by the offence	1.7	20.1	5.7	4.2
9. Establishing all the circumstances of the case, getting at the truth	31.1	2.1	12.7	12.6
10. Restoring the reputation of a falsely accused or libeled physical or legal person	3.0	3.8	8.2	9.0
11. Impartial consideration of the case	50.2	9.0	22.0	30.2
12. Ensuring equal rights of the prosecution and defense	16.6	1.3	6.3	7.3
13. Securing a punishment corresponding to the character of the offense and the personality of the accused	14.5	4.7	9.5	8.6

following set of answers belonging to the class. First come answers that are common for all the three cases (citizens, judges and citizens as perceived by judges) and then the deviations for individual groups, if any. The table that follows shows the distribution of judges by class.

I. Compensation

1. Obtaining a benefit to which one is entitled under the law.
7. Getting financial compensation for damage caused.
8. Getting moral compensation for the harm caused by the offender.

For citizens about themselves and citizens as perceived by judges this class includes one more answer:

2. Punishing the offender.

II. Abstract aims

3. Restoring justice.
4. Restoring legality.

For citizens in the perception of judges this class also includes two more answers:

5. Protecting violated rights and legitimate interests of citizens.

13. Ensuring punishment commensurate with the character of the offense and the personality of the accused.

III. Defense

6. Defense against unlawful or ungrounded accusation, bad-faith or incompetent investigation.

10. Restoring the good name of falsely accused or libeled physical or legal person.

For citizens this class includes one more answer:

5. Protecting the violated rights and legitimate interests of citizens.

For citizens as perceived by judges this class includes two more answers:

2. Punishing the offender.
5. Protecting the violated rights and legitimate interests of citizens.

IV. Procedural justice

9. Finding out all the circumstances of the case, getting at the truth.

11. Impartial consideration of the case.

12. Ensuring equality of prosecution and defense.

The table 2 presents the distribution of respondents by class. Predictably, the share of inconsistent answers (Type 0) is rather high in the sample of citizens. This can be expected in a country without a rooted legal culture where no more than 40% of citizens ever had anything to do with a law court in whatever capacity (see table 2.1.1 in [7, p. 43]). More interestingly (according to the same line in the table), judges speak a good deal more confidently and consistently about the perceptions of citizens than about their own. It will also be seen from the table that the main differences between the perceptions of citizens and the perceptions of judges about the perceptions of citizens belong to Types 1 (Compensation) and 4 (Procedural justice).

An important negative result of the study of the legal consciousness of judges was lack of coherent and statistically meaningful correlations between the diversity of judges' ideas in the legal consciousness sphere and their life trajectories and professional positions. These were identified in our study through the following variables: biological age, length of legal service before becoming a judge, seniority of service as a judge, gender, educational (academic) level, the legal professional sphere immediately prior to occupying the position of judge, specialization as a judge, whether or not he/she is a presiding judge. None of these variables revealed a statistically significant

Table 2

Frequencies of Respondents Belonging to Different Types of Aims of Court Proceedings in Three Cases: Sample of Citizens, Sample of Judges and in the Perception of Citizens by Judges

Types	Citizens about themselves	Judges about citizens	Judges about themselves
Type 0. Random sample	55.6	21.4	38.5
Type 1. Compensation	12.0	53.4	1.3
Type 2. Abstract goals	17.1	17.9	24.4
Type 3. Defense	6.1	5.6	6.8
Type 4. Procedural justice	9.2	1.7	29.1

correlation with the variables characterizing the legal consciousness of the judges, including social empathy. However, distinct and significant correlations were revealed between various characteristics of legal consciousness.

This fact lends itself to at least two explanations.

First: the social-professional group (judges) is highly heterogeneous so that their ideas are influenced not by their position in the legal field, but by other factors that our study did not include.

The second explanation is based on the well-known thesis that establishing a dependence is its justification (with a degree of probability, of course).

If the study does not reveal a certain dependence this does not prove that the dependence does not exist (with any degree of probability, if you like). These two propositions are not mutually exclusive, but mutually complementary. The latter fact prompts the need to pursue this line of research further. There again two options are open.

The first is to conduct a new study including new variables that were not taken into account before.

The second option is to continue statistical analysis of available data in the hope of finding more subtle and sensitive indicators. Below are the results of such a search in the study of social empathy of judges as part of their legal consciousness.

Calculating Individual Degree of Social Empathy of Judges¹

The hypothesis that prompted this study was based on the following consideration. We should try to somehow move toward individual assessment of the degree of social empathy displayed by individual judges. For we have at our disposal a range of the answers each judge gave to two questions: his personal idea of the aim of the court proceedings and his idea of the general perception of the aims of court proceedings by citizens. Previous results warrant the following generalization: on the whole in the minds of judges citizens are their antipodes in the sphere of legal ideas (legal consciousness). Hence, for each judge one can measure the degree to which his personal

ideas of citizens diverge from his own ideas of what is right, in this case the aims of the court proceedings he has chosen.

Clearly, at one of the poles such a measure would not quite be a measure of antipathy. If two sets of answers (about one’s own ideas and the ideas of citizens) coincide this attests to the identity of the ideas, but not to ideal empathy: the two social groups—judges and citizens—do not have identical perceptions. But the required effect is attained at the other end of the scale. Because there are hardly many judges who give Type 1 answers a close approximation to the solution of the task of measurement can be achieved. The problem is how to measure the differences between two choices of answers accurately enough. The procedure of such measurement is described below.

Let us consider a binary matrix (whose elements are only the numbers 1 and 0) of the answers of all the judges to the first of the two questions, their own notions of the aim of the court proceedings. Lines in this matrix correspond to the answers of judges and columns to the variants of answers proposed in the questionnaire. In such a matrix its cell contains 1 if the judge corresponding to the matrix line has chosen an answer that corresponds to the column. In all other cases the cells contain 0. Let us consider a degree of closeness between vectors—the matrix columns (we have used the Lance and Williams measure) which characterizes the degree of compatibility of two answers in the total body of all answers by the judges. Using the procedure of multi-dimensional non-metric scaling let us build on a plane the configuration of dots whose number equals the number of answers. In solving this task each dot should correspond to a certain answer and the distances between the dots should correspond to the maximum degree to some measures of closeness between columns (answers): the closer the answer column vectors the closer the dots and vice versa. The configuration of dots obtained in this way is shown in Figure 1.²




Fig. 1. Diagram representing the method of measuring the degree of individual social empathy on the basis of the configuration of dots corresponding to the answers.

Let us use the diagram to explain the method of building the required measure based on the answers of a hypothetical judge. Let the right-hand ellipse contain two dots corresponding to the answers chosen by the judge as the most important goals of the court proceedings **for him**. In the event these dots correspond to the answers “9. Finding out all the circumstances of the case, getting at the truth.” And “12. Ensuring equality of prosecution and defense.” Dot *S* (end of the section) signifies the center of gravity of the configuration of the two dots. This dot represents in geometrical form the personal position of the expert on the plane of the goals of the court proceedings. The left-hand ellipse contains three dots corresponding to the three answers chosen by the same expert **expressing his idea of the ideas of citizens** concerning the main aims of the court proceedings. These three dots in our case correspond to the following answers: “1. Obtaining the social benefit to which one is entitled under the law,” “2. Punishing the offender” and “7. Getting financial compensation for the damage caused.” Dot *G* (the other end of the section) is the center of gravity of the configuration of three dots within the ellipse. That dot is a geometrical representation on the plane of the aims of the court proceedings according to the ideas of the judge concerning the attitude of citizens (clients of the court institution). The degree (quality) of individual empathy of the judge is represented in the diagram by the section between dots *G* and *S*. The shorter the stretch, the greater the empathy and the longer the stretch, the less the empathy. Thus, the distance between the centers of gravity of the two configurations of dots can be used as a measure of the degree of individual social empathy. This was done in the study described.

Let us try to assess the validity of the numerical scale we have built. To this end let us compare the resulting variable with two classifications of judges according to types of aims of justice through the procedure of dispersion analysis (ANOVA). In both cases a high degree of correspondence with very small confidence probability figures ($2,36E-07$ for classification of judges by type of the aims of justice when answering about their own ideas and $7,15E-15$ in answers about the perceptions of citizens). It is also important to compare the mean values of the degree of individual social empathy of judges from different classes of types of goals of the judicial proceedings. The results of such comparison are represented in Fig. 2.

The mean values presented in Fig. 2 should be compared with the frequencies of belonging to different types from Table 2. From the third column in this table we see that the judges most frequently choose either abstract aims of the court proceedings or aims connected with procedural justice. In Fig. 2 these two types correspond, first, to higher, light columns: the judges adhering to these ideas possess a lower degree of empathy. This chimes with the data of the same table because these aims of the court process are much less characteristic of citizens, from the judges' point of view, which follows from the second column in the table.

Let us now “switch the magnification” and calculate the average value of individual social empathies within the groups of judges who have chosen each of the answers when judges worked on the two questions. The results of the calculations are given in Table 3.




Fig. 2. Mean values of individual social empathy of judges from different classes by type of goals of the court proceedings when answering the question about the judges’ own perceptions and the judges’ perceptions of citizens.

The first thing that strikes one is that the spread of the values in the second column is so much greater than the spread in the first column that no additional statistical checks are needed to maintain that the above characteristic of empathy depends more on the ideas of judges about citizens than on their ideas about themselves. The “other side of the coin” is that judges’ ideas about citizens are more diverse than their ideas about themselves (rather, their general ideas about the aims of the court proceedings). Actually, this is an important conclusion and it merits verification, which will be done below. The second thing the table reveals is that on average the higher are the values in the first column, the lower are the values in the second one. This is borne out by the value of Spearman’s rank correlation between the two vectors (columns) in the table which equals -0.802 (matched by the confidence figure of 0.001).

A more interesting relationship exists between the columns in this table and the frequencies of the choice of answer from Table 1. A comparison reveals inverse dependencies. It would seem that the correspondence between the differences of the frequency of the choice of answers would be even greater in answering two questions. This is confirmed by calculations. The rank correlation between the difference of the first two columns in Table 1 and the two columns in Table 3 is respectively -0.802 and 0.692 with confidence figures 0.001 and 0.009 respectively. A more precise verification could be achieved by building two regressive linear models.³ These models yield a meaningful result if the regression coefficients are meaningful. The quality of the model in which the second column in

Table 3

Average Value of Individual Social Empathies within the Groups of Judges Who Chose Each of the Answers in Working with the Questions about Their Ideas of the Goals of Court Proceedings (Column 1) and the Perceptions of Citizens (Column 2)

Aims of the court proceedings	1	2
1. Obtaining a social benefit under law	0.249	0.630
2. Punishing the offender	0.547	0.685
3. Restoring justice	0.561	0.471
4. Restoring legality	0.592	0.175
5. Protect the violated rights and legitimate interests of citizens	0.519	0.477
6. Defense against illegal or ungrounded accusation, bad-faith or incompetent investigation	0.352	0.631
7. Obtaining financial compensation of damages	0.447	0.710
8. Obtaining moral compensation for the harm caused by the offence	0.390	0.786
9. Establishing all the circumstances of the case, getting at the truth	0.693	0.152
10. Restoring the good reputation of a falsely accused or libeled physical or legal person	0.442	0.643
11. Impartial consideration of the case	0.656	0.243
12. Ensuring equal rights of prosecution and defense	0.691	0.089
13. Securing a punishment corresponding to the character of the offence and the personality of the accused	0.632	0.330

Table 2 is the dependent variable is substantially higher (more than three-quarters of explained dispersion).

The fact that the above results complement validity verification is important. But that is not all. It is also very important that the diversity of empathies is due largely to the diversity of judges' ideas about citizens and not the diversity of their own ideas about the aims of the judicial process.

Interconnections between Individual Social Empathy of Judges and Other Variables

The next step was naturally to study the interconnection between the scale of individual social empathy and the numerous variables (listed above) which describe the social attitudes of judges in the legal field. The key result is that **again no significant links have been found**. This circumstance was partly mitigated by the fact that some

other meaningful dependencies of empathies have been revealed with the variables that characterize other components of legal consciousness, something that did not happen before. Below is a list of propositions with which a degree of agreement (stated in brackets in italics) is connected with judges' empathy:

- the Prosecutor's Office should supervise the consideration of cases in law courts and the court decisions (*"agree totally" corresponds to a low level of empathy*);
- in a state of emergency criminals may be punished extrajudicially (*"agree somewhat" corresponds to a lowered level of empathy*);
- laws must be obeyed even if they are not in my favor. Then I may count on the same or another law protecting me next time around (*"totally disagree" means a low level of empathy*);
- defense lawyers defend criminals, while prosecutors seek punishment for them. That is why judges should nearly always take the side of the prosecutors (*"agree somewhat" means a low level of empathy*).

The higher level of social empathy among citizens may be due to modern legal awareness based on a modern idea of law. On the contrary, traditional Soviet positivist attitude is associated with low social empathy.

* * *

Because the introduction of a new variable—individual social empathy of judges—has revealed previously unnoticed dependencies there is reason to hope that the variable introduced in the study is subtle enough for a deeper statistical analysis. That is why one should take seriously the fact that once again no dependencies were revealed between the empathy and position variable of the judges. It means that to explain the diversity of judges' ideas additional position variables have to be introduced which are likely to characterize judges beyond the legal field. These may be marital status; data on the social status of parents and grown-up children; structure of information consumed; overall cultural level as reflected in the size of the personal library, etc. But that calls for a new survey of judges.

Having said that, expanding the arsenal of statistical methods of analysis should not be discounted. Perhaps the new approaches the author has touched upon in recent articles [5; 6] may come in handy. I am referring to application of the methods of analyzing cognitive networks to sociological data. In effect, this is one way to bridge the gap between the complexity of the social object studied and outdated and primitive methods of analysis of sociological survey results.

The recorded autonomy of the ideas about the aims of court proceedings as part of legal consciousness may have a different origin. It has to be remembered that other components of legal consciousness, as our survey has shown, are interconnected in a meaningful and significant way. But they all have a common conceptual nature. The same cannot be said of the aims of court proceedings. It is no accident that different social groups invariably reveal similar structures (typologies) of aims. It is worth noting the interesting nature of the differences between the identified four types. Two types have to do with the practical results of court proceedings: "Compensation" and "Protection." One type has to do with the abstract qualities of the result and the

qualities of the institutions that delivered the result: “Restoration of justice,” “Restoration of legality.” The final type belongs to the category of instruments through which the abstract aims of justice are achieved: “Procedural justice.” Finally, more than a third of judges gave inconsistent sets of answers. All this mix could disguise the existence of dependencies. If such disguise exists it could be overcome by adopting network methods of analyzing survey data.

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Notes

- ¹ Empathy is considered in a concrete research context: the study of the ideas of the aims of the judicial process as part of the complex of ideas under the common title “legal consciousness.”
- ² The calculations were conducted under PROXSCAL program of the SPSS package. The value of normalized simple stress is 0.065.
- ³ Linearity is confirmed by the shape of the dispersion diagrams.

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

Legal Consciousness and Professional Conduct of Russian Judges¹

Vladimir RIMSKY

Abstract. The legal consciousness of Russian judges goes a long way to determine their professional conduct. Sociological studies reveal disparities between Russian judges' ideas about the proper norms of professional conduct and the actual rules they follow.

Studies carried out by INDEM Foundation in 2007-2010 and 2014 and by the Institute for the Rule of Law in 2011 and 2013-2014, have revealed that Russian judges exhibit a high degree of unity in terms of legal consciousness and professional conduct, and form a stable social group in the post-Soviet period. In the community of Russian judges, the norms and rules of professional conduct tend to evolve toward bureaucratization and greater awareness of the consequences of judicial decisions for the political and government interests, at the expense of their independence and adherence to the principles of justice.

Keywords: judges, legal consciousness, professional conduct, independence, positive law, law abidance.

The judicial community in modern Russia is a fairly closed social group. Judges, even in the top positions in the judicial system, rarely make public statements on the problems of society, economics, the state and politics, the problems of the judiciary branch and the issues of reforming it. When they do make public statements, they usually base their position on the norms of law and not the actual enforcement of these norms, still less the real activities of citizens, businesspeople and judges under the current Russian conditions.

In 2014 INDEM Foundation used a special methodology to conduct a survey of Russian judges to gain an insight into the legal consciousness of Russian judges at the current stage in the development of the Russian judicial system and to compare

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their features with the legal consciousness of Russian citizens revealed by INDEM Foundation studies conducted in 2007-2010 [1; 3]. The main purport of the survey was to assess the actual legal consciousness of judges and not the normative requirements to it. This marked a departure from previous legal studies dealing with legal consciousness issues. This focus of the survey determined the following features of its methodology.

The target of the survey could not be met without conducting a questionnaire survey of a fairly large sample of judges. But because judges are extremely reluctant and rarely agree to be interviewed personally, it was decided to let the judges fill out the questionnaires themselves. Therefore the questionnaire included corresponding explanations and comments to enable the judge to fill out the questionnaire without additional clarifications or interviewer's questions. The instructions on how to fill out the questionnaire also recommended the judges not to confer with one another in filling out the questionnaires and not to write in answers arrived at collectively. The instructions also urged the judges to read the questions and proposed variants of answers very attentively.

Naturally, the Russian judges were concerned about confidentiality of their personal data. Asking them to provide their personal social and demographic data was therefore not an option, so the questionnaire included the bare minimum of data needed to interpret the results of the study. The above-mentioned concern with confidentiality meant that it was practically impossible to ask sensitive questions eliciting an emotional reaction. To enable the survey to be conducted at all, no such questions were included in the questionnaire. Specifically, we had to steer clear of such topics as violations of rights and laws by the judiciary, corruption, informal relationships between judges and attorneys, investigators and prosecutors, informal relationships within the judicial system, etc.

As a result, the main topics of the expert sociological survey of judges were as follows: how independent should the law court be, what concept of law—natural or positivist—was preferred by the respondent, what was his/her attitude to law abidance, how supportive was he/she of the use of trial by jury in the Russian judiciary system, what was his/her position on independence of judiciary rulings, election versus appointment of justices of the peace, and what is the purpose of court proceedings for him/her and for citizens. In addition, the questionnaires also included some questions about the respondents' social and demographic characteristics: gender, age, education, length of service as a judge, their previous work in a different sphere and the duration of that work as well as the respondent's specialization as a judge, if any.

These topics determined the structure and main content of the questionnaire the judges were asked to fill. In accordance with the above-mentioned peculiarities of the judicial corps, the questionnaire was significantly shorter than the questionnaires earlier used by INDEM Foundation for quantitative studies of the legal consciousness in present-day Russia.

The size of the sample for a survey of the judges was to be such as to yield statistically significant assessments of the features of their legal consciousness. It had to include no less than several dozen, and better still, two or three hundred respondents. It

was difficult to form such a sample on a random basis, for example, by going to Russian courts of various levels and asking their judges to fill out the questionnaires. It was therefore decided to organize an expert survey of judges at a university department where they were attending refresher courses.

One of the merits of this method was that it brought together in one place judges from various Russian regions who were temporarily unencumbered by their routine duties and had free time to fill out the questionnaires. In preliminary consultations with the Supreme Court of the RF it was decided to conduct an expert survey of judges at the Department of Upgrading of Judges Qualifications at the Russian Justice Academy. It took several months to secure the approval of that decision by the Russian Supreme Court chairman Vyacheslav Lebedev, his staff, the rector of the Russian State University of Justice Valentin Yershov, and Yelena Mitina, the dean of the Department for Continuing Education of Judges, Civil Servants of General Jurisdiction Courts and the Justice Department.

As a result the judges who had arrived for upgrading courses filled out the paper forms in two stages: in April and June 2014. The judges filled out the questionnaires anonymously, with no control over who did or did not fill them out and how they filled them out. Forms to fill out were distributed by the department staff to anyone who wanted to fill them out and the filled out forms were returned unsigned and without any other identifying data.

Study of Russian Judges as a Professional Group

The characteristics of the legal consciousness of Russian judges are closely linked with their features as a social group. To make the interpretation of the data of our expert survey more objective, we used the study carried out by the Institute for the Rule of Law at St. Petersburg European University (IRL) devoted to “the main characteristics of judges as a professional group” [5]. That study, conducted in February-December 2011, used a questionnaire method to obtain quantitative data from a sample of 759 judges from five regions of five Federal Districts of the Russian Federation. Focus expert interviews with judges before and after the survey were used to interpret the data [5, p. 3].

The survey of the judges conducted by IRL in 2011 proceeded from the hypothesis that “judges are a distinct profession and a professional group” and that “judges undoubtedly form a separate professional group possessing peculiarities that distinguish it from other legal specialties” [5, p. 6]. This hypothesis corresponds to the concept of the INDEM Foundation 2014 sociological survey and determines some of its specificities.

The results of the survey of judges conducted by IRL in 2011, on the one hand, form a substantial addition to the INDEM Foundation survey of 2014 and on the other hand, make it possible to compare the results and findings of these two studies. The additions and comparisons are given below. It has to be borne in mind, however, that the 2011 study covered federal judges and justices of the peace, and the 2014 study only federal judges working at district and city courts.

Conceptualization of the Notion of Legal Consciousness and Professional Conduct in the Sociological Survey

In order to be able to assess the legal consciousness of judges as a social group by applying an empirical method, the notion first had to be conceptualized. We used the conceptualization used in analyzing the legal consciousness of Russian citizens conducted by INDEM Foundation in 2007-2010 as part of the study of the Russian judiciary system. That study defined legal consciousness as “the complex of interconnected dispositions shared by a group of respondents related to the functioning of the legal field” [3, p. 257]. Individuals are not always aware of these complexes, but as a rule use them in the process of communication as dynamic stereotypes internalized in the process of socialization. The hypothesis was that the use of complexes of legal consciousness dispositions by judges within their professional community and with citizens goes a long way to determine the functioning of the judiciary branch. This hypothesis was tested during the sociological survey of the judiciary by INDEM Foundation in 2007-2010 and partly in the expert survey of judges in 2014.

In this expert survey of judges, legal consciousness meant the totality of feelings, perceptions, senses and meanings expressing the attitude of individuals and social groups to existing or desired law, to existing and desired legislation. These feelings, perceptions, senses and meanings determine the complexes of legal consciousness dispositions as a peculiar method of reflecting social reality which nevertheless possesses a measure of independence. This concept of legal consciousness links it with law theories, concepts and their actualization in the norms of laws, but also recognizes a certain independence from them because any individual's system of motivation and social behavior regulation has significant informal components that are not regulated by the legal norms and by laws. Judges are no exception in that they use informal motives and regulators in their professional activities, but do not always recognize or realize these features of their own legal consciousness or the peculiarities of their socialization.

For the purposes of empirical study we had to identify the key complexes of legal consciousness dispositions that determine social behavior and social stereotypes on which it is based, in the first place in situations involving the application of law and legal enactments. In the sociological survey of the judiciary conducted by INDEM Foundation in 2007-2010, the following components were chosen for the analysis of the legal consciousness of citizens and judges: legal notions, knowledge of law, requirements of law (attitude to law as obligatory and existing), the attitude to current law, attitude to compliance with legal prescriptions, attitude to the subjects of law, readiness to engage in legal interactions (going to a law court, an interest in information about the work of law courts, etc.) [3, p. 260]. For a quantitative assessment of these elements of legal consciousness the survey questionnaires included the following empirical indicators derived from the sets of respondents' answers to specially designed questions: support for independence of the judiciary, support for the concept of natural law, law abidance, support for

independence of court decisions and intolerance of breach of law [3, p. 261]. The same conceptualization of law consciousness, with some modifications, formed the basis of the methodology of INDEM Foundation 2014 survey of judges.

In the empirical sociological studies INDEM Foundation did not conceptualize professional conduct because these studies were not expressly aimed at studying it. Even so, the data obtained in 2007-2010 and 2014 enabled me to analyze the professional conduct of judges on the basis of the interpretation of the concept briefly described below.

Behavior is more a sociopsychological than a purely sociological notion. Physical movements of people observed from outside [4, p. 63] as well as the sequence of these movements can be described as behavior. However, for the analysis of the professional conduct of judges something more than the common features of all types of individuals' behavior need to be taken into account. Also important are the specific characteristics of the professional conduct of judges which enable them to be socially evaluated. In particular, it is important to determine how judges act in dealing with the representatives of other social groups, how these actions are linked with the norms and rules of such actions, what the motives of these actions are and what their significance is for society and the state.

The professional conduct of judges is conduct which is directly or indirectly linked with the performance of their duties. Two interconnected aspects can be singled out: official, i.e., actions in the line of duty, and unofficial, which transcend the boundaries of official duties. Both types of judges' behavior are regulated by codified norms of the law and ethical codes as well as by unwritten and largely informal moral-ethical norms accepted in this social corporation. On-the-job conduct of judges is regulated largely by codified norms and their off-duty behavior by non-codified norms.

The *Code of Judicial Ethics* of 2016 "sets the rules of conduct in the performance of professional activities in the administration of justice and in extrajudicial activities that are obligatory for every judge and are based on high moral and ethical requirements, the provisions of legislation of the Russian Federation, the international standards in the sphere of justice and judicial conduct." In particular: (1) A judge should observe the high standards of morals and ethics, be honest, preserve personal dignity in any situation, value her/his honor and avoid anything that may diminish the authority of the judiciary or harm the reputation of the judge; (2) A judge must not use her/his professional position in order to gain personal advantages in civil law relations; (3) A judge must not use her/his status in order to receive any kind of goods, services, commercial or other gains for her/himself or the judge's relatives, friends or acquaintances... (5) A judge must not commit any actions or give other persons reasons to commit such actions that might suggest the possibility of exerting influence over the performance of duties by the judge and might cast doubt upon the judge's independence and impartiality" [8, art. 1, part 1; art. 6, parts 1, 2, 3, 5].

Under the Federal Law on the Status of Judges in the Russian Federation of 26 June 1992 (3 July 2016 edition with amendments of 19 December

2016), “[j]udges shall be independent and shall be subject only to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and to the law. In the activity of administering justice, they shall not be accountable to anyone” [10, art. 1, part 4]. The same law sets direct requirements to the conduct of judges. For example, “judges must observe the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the federal constitutional laws, the federal laws” [10, art. 3, part 1]. “When exercising his powers, and also in his unofficial relations, the judge shall avoid everything which could detract from the authority of the judicial power or denigrate the judge’s dignity, or to give rise to doubts as concerns his objectiveness, fairness and impartiality” [10, art. 3, part 2]. The same law contains the text of a judge’s oath: “I solemnly swear to discharge my duties honestly and conscientiously, to administer justice, obeying only the law, and to be impartial and just, as my duty as judge and my conscience dictate to me” [10, art. 8, part 1].

These norms are key in regulating proper professional conduct of any Russian judge. Compliance with these norms was assessed during the course of INDEM Foundation’s sociological surveys on the basis of the answers of citizens and entrepreneurs about the work of judges via questionnaire and focus groups, as well as the answers of the judges themselves to some of the questions in the expert survey questionnaire, on independence of courts and court rulings, the purpose of court proceedings, compliance with the law and some others.

Court Independence: Norms and How They Are Implemented in Judges’ Professional Conduct

It is always difficult in a sociological survey to reveal the state of consciousness and the actual rules of conduct in a social community because they are not always conscious and sometimes are simply concealed from sociologists who do not belong to these social groups. These difficulties are very much in evidence in the study of the corps of Russian judges. Nevertheless we have managed to establish some features of their legal consciousness and professional conduct.

Let us begin with the attitude of judges to court independence and how that principle is followed in their professional conduct. To analyze the judges’ position on court independence the 2014 INDEM Foundation’s study used a table with nine propositions for each of which the respondent had to choose one of four answers: “agree totally,” “somewhat agree,” “somewhat disagree,” “disagree totally.” The respondent could also tick the “don’t know” box. To analyze answers to the whole set of questions, the first and second options were merged into “fully or somewhat agree” (code 1) and the third and fourth options were merged into “somewhat or totally disagree” (code 0). The “don’t know” responses were ignored because the responding judge did not express his/her position. Percentages of thus transformed answers of judges are represented in Table 1.

Table 1

Responses to Propositions on Court Independence Offered to Respondents
(%, with the “don’t knows” not counted)

No.	Proposition	Answers chosen	
		1	0
1	If the court handed down an acquittal, this looks suspicious: people are not put on trial for nothing	10.5	88.3
2	The judge should heed the opinion of the prosecutor because both protect the interests of the state and society	26.9	72.8
3	Judges should not be given too much independence because the court is part of the unified state machine	8.6	90.7
4	The court is the last link in the chain of government bodies that safeguard the law	73.5	24.4
5	The President should have the right to overrule the court decisions that are harmful for the state	11.4	86.1
6	The Prosecutor’s Office should supervise the handling of cases in the law courts and the court rulings	16.7	82.4
7	European Human Rights Court rulings in favor of Russian citizens humiliate our country	32.1	65.0
8	Power is above law because power adopts laws and builds the legal system in the country	13.2	85.1
9	Independence of judges is folly because the court is part of the state and cannot be independent of the state	16.9	82.3

1—fully or somewhat agree

0—somewhat or totally disagree

The data in Table 1 show that an overwhelming majority of judges (between 65.0% and 90.7%) had very similar positions concerning court independence. This conclusion reinforced the result of the analysis of differences of answers on this topic for groups of judges. There turned out to be no differences, for example, when comparing the positions of groups based on sociodemographic indicators: gender, age, seniority, sphere of previous legal activities and whether or not the respondents were presiding judges.

From Table 1, the elements of the legal consciousness of the judges showing their views on court independence can roughly be described as follows. The court is a state power body independent of the Prosecutor’s Office and the country’s President, which obeys only the law, like the other branches of power, capable of delivering rulings of acquittal in criminal cases and recognizing the rulings of the European Human Rights Court in favor of Russian citizens. One can spot some contradictions in the legal consciousness of the responding judges. On the one hand, the vast majority

of them are sure that the courts should be part of a system, a “chain” of state power bodies which together and in a coordinated fashion “safeguard the law.” But on the other hand, they would like the courts to be independent of the prosecutors and the Prosecutor’s Office in general in handing down acquittals in criminal trials.

Sociological surveys also give reason to doubt that the principle of court independence is adhered to by the Russian courts. The 2011 IRL study, for example, noted the low geographical mobility of judges. Three-quarters of them (76.9%) work in the regions where they grew up, with 48% never having moved outside their region and having obtained their degrees in the regions where they were born. About one-seventh (14.6%) of them have stayed in the region where they acquired a higher education. Only 8.2% do not work in the region where they were born or studied. The mobility of Russian society as whole is much higher: while about 55% of people live and work where they were born and grew up, 45% have moved to another place [5, p. 12].

The lower-than-average mobility of Russian judges shows that they are firmly embedded in their local and regional communities, which diminishes the level of independence of judges from local (regional) elites, a fact not always realized by the judges themselves [5, p. 12]. The 2007-2010 INDEM study of the judiciary revealed that citizens and entrepreneurs who use the services of the judiciary branch maintained that the courts in Russia are apparently controlled by the country’s leadership (59.0% and 67.9% respectively) [2, pp. 391-392].

To What Extent Judges Adhere to the Concept of Positive Law

The INDEM Foundation’s 2014 probe studied the attitude of judges to the concept of law. To this end a table was offered with 10 propositions presented in a way similar to the questions on the court independence described above. Agreement or otherwise with each of these propositions is shown in percentages in Table 2.

The data in Table 2 warrant the conclusion that the respondents had different views on propositions 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8, as neither agreement nor disagreement dominated. On other propositions dominant opinions were revealed. The majority of judges agreed with propositions 4 and 7 and disagreed with propositions 9 and 10.

When the differences of opinion in support of positive or natural law were considerable the Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization was used. This method was to provide data on the structure of the perceptions of responding judges concerning the concept of law. The resulting factor model contained 4 factors with the summary share of explained dispersion of 54.9% (see Table 3).

From the data in the table, the meaning of the factors identified can be described in the following way:

- factor 1 (15.4% of explained dispersion)—justice and law come from the state, but nevertheless unjust laws are possible;
- factor 2 (14.7%)—justice is above the law, but in protecting human rights criminals cannot be punished without trial even in an emergency situation;

Table 2

Opinions on the Concept of Law in the Answers of Respondents
(the “don’t know” answers were not taken into account)

No.	Proposition	Answer chosen	
		1	0
1	Justice is more important than law	48.6	48.3
2	Any law is part of justice so there can be no unjust laws	41.7	55.8
3	A law can be unjust if the interests of the state demand	46.6	50.8
4	Sometimes laws are passed which violate citizens’ constitutional rights	80.6	16.1
5	Everyone has inalienable rights from birth, and they are more important than any laws	64.1	32.9
6	Any law or regulatory act adopted by the state is legitimate	55.3	42.1
7	A law that deprives citizens of their constitutional rights is illegitimate	74.6	24.1
8	The Latin saying <i>Pereat mundus et fiat justitia</i> (“Let justice be done, though the world perish”) is true	51.7	44.1
9	In a state of emergency, criminals can be punished without trial	16.9	81.4
10	There are no human rights in general, there are only the rights of citizens	13.1	77.6

1—fully or somewhat agree

0—somewhat or totally disagree

— factor 3 (13.8%)—human rights are more important than laws, which may be unjust, and justice must be done regardless of external circumstances (“collapse of the world”);

— factor 4 (11%)—a law cannot be unjust even if the interests of the state demand it, but it happens that laws are adopted that violate the constitutional rights of citizens.

What the combined components of these factors have in common is that the respondents follow the concept of natural law whereby “human rights are above laws and the state must guarantee and protect them.” Thus verbally the corps of judges in modern Russia has ceased to support the concept of positive law, in accordance with which “the laws dictated by the state constitute the essence of law, and human rights are subordinate to the interests of the state” [1, p. 401].

The legal consciousness of judges that determines their choice between philosophical concepts of law—natural or positive, the latter often associated in this country with the Soviet law tradition—can be summed up in the following way, based on the meanings of the above factors. Justice and human rights are more

Table 3

**Factor Loads for Factors Identified by Rotation for Each of the Original Propositions
Concerning the Concept of Law**

No.	Proposition	Factors			
		1	2	3	4
1	Justice is more important than law	-0.016	0.374	0.170	-0.349
2	Any law is part of justice, so there can be no unjust laws	0.515	0.014	0.012	-0.102
3	A law can be unjust if the interests of the state require	0.235	0.050	-0.093	0.594
4	Sometimes laws are passed which violate citizens' constitutional rights	-0.222	-0.048	0.148	0.643
5	Everyone has inalienable rights from birth, and they are more important than any laws	0.033	-0.128	0.563	0.064
6	Any law or regulator act adopted by the state is legitimate	0.473	-0.028	0.063	0.062
7	A law that deprives citizens of their constitutional rights is illegitimate	-0.159	0.143	0.403	-0.015
8	The Latin saying <i>Pereat mundus et fiat justitia</i> ("Let justice be done, though the world perish") is true	0.178	-0.110	0.386	-0.016
9	In a state of emergency, criminals can be punished without trial	-0.014	0.491	-0.005	0.037
10	There are no human rights in general, there are only the rights of citizens	0.028	0.529	-0.240	0.077

The dominant factor loads are in boldface script.

important than laws, if only because human rights are given from birth and determined by human nature—and are therefore objective. In contrast, laws are made by the state; therefore they are subjective and can be illegitimate, unjust and unconstitutional. There is an inherent contradiction in these components of the judges' legal consciousness because the majority of them (55.3%) support the legal character of any law or normative act coming from the state, which means that they support one of the bedrock principles of positive law.

The results of sociological studies also give some cause to doubt that the majority of Russian judges have given up the positivism in their interpretation of law characteristic of the Soviet period. The doubts are reinforced by the growing priority of bureaucratic norms in the conduct of judges which assume that state interests prevail over the interests of citizens [6, p. 133].

This argument is bolstered by the data of the IRL survey to the effect that “the main source of changes in the corps of judges today are comparatively young female members of the courts’ staff who bring into the profession bureaucratic norms that stress promptitude in following orders, discipline and adherence to the letter of the law rather than independence and justice” [5, p. 4]. Personnel of the court system is also provided by prosecutors and representatives of other law-enforcement bodies [5, pp. 17-18; 6, p. 116; 11, pp. 24-25].

Attitude of Judges to the Issue of Law Abidance

The INDEM 2014 study probed the position of judges based on their attitude to the law: strict compliance with the law or “legal nihilism.” To this end questions were arranged in a table with nine propositions similarly to the above-described questions on court independence (see Table 4).

Table 4

Answers to Propositions Concerning the Attitude to Law
(%; “don’t know” answers were ignored)

No.	Proposition	Answer chosen	
		1	0
1	Any law must be strictly complied with always	84.0	15.6
2	Laws must be obeyed to avoid being punished	64.0	31.8
3	Laws must be obeyed even if their provisions are not in my favor; then I can expect that next time around this or some other law will protect me	83.9	13.1
4	If the law hinders citizens in solving their problems it can sometimes be broken	7.6	91.6
5	Citizens do not have to obey the law because laws are made in the interests of the bosses and not the citizens	4.2	95.4
6	It makes no sense to obey the laws if the authorities do not obey them	13.1	85.3
7	There is nothing wrong about violating unjust or stupid bans or prescriptions	18.7	78.3
8	Worthy and unworthy people should not be equal before the law	5.9	93.2
9	It’s useful to know the laws in order to use them in one’s interests	87.8	10.9

1—fully or somewhat agree
0—somewhat or totally disagree

The above data suggest that the respondents had dominant opinions on each of the propositions offered. The majority agreed fully or somewhat with propositions 1, 2, 3 and 9, but somewhat or totally disagreed with propositions 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. For all the propositions the level of consolidation of opinions was very high, from 64.0% to 95.4%. The high level of consolidation of opinions warrants the following description of the components of the judges' attitude to law abidance. The law must be known and strictly obeyed even when it contradicts the interests of citizens or when it is broken by the authorities. The law must be obeyed not only to avoid possible punishment, but in order to be eligible for protection under the law. All citizens should be equal before the law.

Thus, on the level of verbal declarations the judges in modern Russia strictly adhere to the principle of the rule-of-law and abidance by the law under any circumstances. However, the practice of court proceedings makes one doubt that they accord with the verbal declarations on strict adherence to the law. For example, the 2007-2010 INDEM study of the judiciary found that legal redress (89.1%) was one of the main motives for citizens to take part in court proceedings. However, the expectations of legal redress were met much less frequently (51.7%). True, the assessment depended on whether a civil case was won or lost: expectations were more often justified for the winners. Additionally, strict abidance by the law is challenged by the findings of the INDEM study in 2007-2010 to the effect that "the respondents' most important expectations of the outcomes of legal proceedings were far more often justified for the more well-off than for the less well-off citizens" [3, pp. 62-68].

Attitudes of Judges to Independence of Court Rulings

The INDEM Foundation's 2014 study probed the opinions of judges concerning independence of court decisions. To this end a table was devised with nine propositions arranged similarly to the above-described questions on court independence (see Table 5).

The data of Table 5 suggest that the respondents had dominant opinions on each of the propositions offered. The overwhelming majority agreed fully or somewhat with propositions 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7, but somewhat or totally disagreed with propositions 1, 5, 8 and 9.

A comparison of the meaning of the dominant and largely consensual opinions of respondents reveals three main opinions concerning the independence of court decisions.

The first opinion is that judges do not have adequate immunity guarantees to be able to deliver independent and just court rulings. This suggests that so far judges do not always make independent and just court decisions.

Second, the interests of the state are not always given priority in the judges' rulings and are not always above the interests of citizens.

Table 5

Answers to Propositions on the Attitude to Independence of Court Decisions
 (%; “don’t know” answers were not taken into account)

No.	Proposition	Answer chosen	
		1	0
1	Attorneys defend criminals and prosecutors seek punishment for them, therefore judges should nearly always side with the prosecutors	3.4	96.1
2	Guarantees of judges’ immunity should be broadened to enable them to administer justice independently	89.3	8.5
3	Only a high degree of judges’ independence can guarantee that they deliver just verdicts and sentences	86.8	11.5
4	In some cases the judge in making a decision must take into account the political consequences of his decision and its political desirability	57.7	39.4
5	The judge in his decisions must always protect the interests of the state	20.4	77.8
6	The state grants and guarantees rights along with obligations	83.2	13.7
7	Every person is endowed from birth with inalienable natural rights which he/she expects the state to safeguard	85.9	10.6
8	A citizen can exercise his/her rights only in common interests, in the interests of the state	21.3	74.9
9	The interests of the state are more important than the interests of its citizens	16.2	79.6

1—fully or somewhat agree

0—somewhat or totally disagree

And third, judges are not obliged to always take the side of the prosecutors, but they must in some cases take into account the political consequences of their decisions.

The history of post-Soviet reforms of the judiciary shows that guarantees of judges’ immunity are gradually strengthened at the level of law making and law enforcement. However, in reality the level of independence and justice of court rulings is not rising. Thus, reforms of the judiciary in our country are aimed at changing the conditions that meet the interests of the judiciary community, but do not contribute to the key characteristics of court rulings, i.e., their independence and justice. Under current Russian conditions these characteristics are not directly connected with the increase of judges’ independence.

Sociological surveys of the professional activities of Russian judges bear witness to the fact that independence of court rulings in this country still falls short of required world standards. One universal formulation of these requirements is Clause 2 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and subsequently approved by the UN General Assembly: “The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason” [7]. The majority of judges recognize, at least verbally, the independence of judges in their professional activities. Thus, the 2011 IRL survey found that in drawing the normative portrait of a judge the majority of them noted the need to be independent (50.5%) and named independence as the most important principle of their work (70.4%). However, there is a noticeable downgrading of the importance of independence and justice for judges who took office in the period of reforms in 2002-2014 (47%) compared with those who became judges before 1991 (54%) and in the period of reforms in 1992-2001 (57%) [5, pp. 30-31, 33]. Consequently, the judges themselves have tended to attach less rather than more significance to independence in their professional activities over the past decades.

In the focus group studies of the judiciary conducted by INDEM in 2007-2010, participants cited numerous examples of judges acting contrary to the principle of independent court rulings. For example, they said that “judges, as a rule, are instructed on what rulings to pass on their cases.” Participants also noted that “judges cannot always pass decisions only on the basis of the provisions of the law” and that “judges often decide in favor of the parties with which they personally sympathize.” Respondents said that Russian courts “practically do not observe the principle of equality of all before the law. Court cases are often won by those who have more money. In general, judges treat wealthy people with more consideration than poor ones.” During court proceedings judges give more credence to the pleadings of the representatives of government bodies and prominent citizens than to the pleadings of other citizens. Judges as a rule give more lenient sentences to criminals who have influential relatives than to ordinary citizens [2, pp. 23, 25, 26].

Lay people of course may be mistaken in their assessments of the independence of court rulings and adherence to the principles of impartiality and equality of all before the law and the law court. However, as focus groups have demonstrated, citizens make such assessments of the behavior of judges not speculatively, but on the basis of their own experience of taking part in court proceedings or the experience of their relatives and friends known to them. There were far fewer accounts of independent judicial rulings at these focus groups. Respondents noted that Russian courts may deliver just rulings “only on simple cases where clear-cut simple solutions are easily predicted both by the citizens and by the judges. This happens, for example, when citizen’s rights are obviously violated and there are no alternative interpretations of such situations. But such cases are rare” [2, p. 24].

In semi-formalized interviews of the same INDEM study “experts admitted that impartiality, like independence of judges, is a key characteristic of judges at any period under any political regime.” Experts pointed out, however, that there are many factors that prevent the courts from being impartial in modern Russia, including the dependence of judges on the presiding judge, corruption in law courts which allows bribe-givers to induce judges to pass desired rulings, the tendency of the judges to agree with the charges brought by the prosecutors in criminal cases and with the testimony of representatives of government bodies in dealing with civil lawsuits [9, pp. 7, 5, 17-18, 19-20, 14-15].

Furthermore, modern Russian judges think of themselves more as representatives of government power than independent arbiters, so one can hardly expect them to pass independent court rulings [9, pp. 17, 19, 20]. On the whole such expert opinions bear out the opinions of ordinary citizens and confirm the existence of a wide gap between the declared values of independent judges and court decisions and the actual judiciary practice. Court rulings in modern Russia often demonstrate lack of independence.

* * *

In conclusion, it has to be said that one of the significant findings of the 2014 INDEM Foundation survey, which correspond to the findings of the 2007-2010 survey and the Institute for the Rule of Law studies conducted in 2011 and 2013-2014, is that Russian judges in answering the questions in the questionnaire paid lip service to their adherence to universally recognized values and norms. Thus, the vast majority of them pledged their allegiance to the principles of independent courts and judges, legality and compliance with the law under any circumstances, and declared that they were gradually giving up the concept of positive law characteristic of the Soviet judiciary system. But these verbal declarations, as found during the study of the judiciary conducted by INDEM Foundation in 2007-2010 and partly in the Institute for the Rule of Law in 2011, diverge from actual Russian practice, from the practice of court proceedings and passing of court rulings. Violations of the universally recognized principles and norms of activities of judges in favor of the interests of the state, influential and wealthy citizens at the expense of the interests, rights and freedoms of all others are frequent and universal.

INDEM 2014 and IRL 2011 studies found that “on the whole judges as a professional group exhibit a high degree of cohesion and, in spite of the existence of subcultures with characteristic gender, age and career features, this group has been steadily reproducing itself over the past two decades” [5, p. 4]. Consequently, in the modern corps of judges as a social group the norms and rules of professional conduct tend to evolve toward bureaucratization, concern about the possible consequences of court rulings for political and state interests at the expense of independence and justice.

Reform of the judiciary in post-Soviet Russia has been aimed primarily at changing the external conditions of the work of judges: raising their immunity,

making them more independent, irremovable, raising their salaries, social benefits, etc. But none of the above contributed to the expectations that society and the state pinned on the judiciary. Sociological surveys identify one of the main causes of this situation: *the external conditions were reformed, but the activities of the judiciary depend much more on internal factors of its functioning*: the established values, norms, rules and stereotypes of professional conduct, informal relations within the corps of judges and with the law enforcement bodies. The expectations of citizens and the state of the performance of the judiciary can only be met if its reform shifts focus from external factors to changing the internal social norms and informal relations that have taken root and are sustained by the social practices of the judiciary community and the law enforcement bodies.

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Note

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Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

Post-Soviet Authoritarianism

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Abstract. The authoritarian regimes in post-Soviet states emerged and consolidated in an absence of strong traditions of civil society and the fact that the anticommunist revolution of 1991 in the Soviet Union was not predated by a “revolution of values.” The democratic transit in the newly independent states failed and democratic changes were suspended, among other things, because the new ruling layers that had monopolized power and property in post-Soviet states never wanted continued market and democratic reforms. In short, the authoritarian regimes, on the one hand, owe their stability to the power/property institution, the *nomenklatura* as the ruling stratum and the patronage state. On the other, authoritarianism in the post-Soviet space was kept within certain limits by power equilibrium between regional elites and de-*nomenklaturization* of the political elite while an absence of political and social actors that need democratic transformations was and remains the highest barrier on the way toward such transformations.

Keywords: post-Soviet space, authoritarianism, neo-authoritarianism, *nomenklatura*, the power/property institution, the neo-patrimonial state.

Variety of Political Forms in the Post-Soviet Space

Starting with the 2000s, the subject of authoritarianism in post-Soviet countries¹ has been figuring prominently in scholarly publications. It was at that time, and contrary to the expectations very popular in the early 1990s of the coming triumph of democracy in the former Soviet republics, this type of political regime moved to the fore to dominate in this part of the world. Having acquired

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independence, some of the republics never tried to abandon the authoritarian forms of governance. This is true of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Others, having initiated democratization and having failed to cope with the serious difficulties on the road to market reforms and democratic national states, moved back to authoritarianism. Some of them covered the road back pretty fast (Azerbaijan, Belarus and Tajikistan) while others (Armenia, Russia) needed many years. Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine wavered some time between authoritarianism and democracy: the so-called color revolutions of 2003-2005 had defused the attempts to restore authoritarianism in these republics. Another round of attempts to restore authoritarian rule took place in Georgia where Mikhail Saakashvili tried to establish authoritarian regime during his second presidential term; in Kyrgyzstan, by President Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2005-2010; in Ukraine, by President Viktor Yanukovich in 2010-2014. The Republic of Moldova due to several factors was a single one to acquire sustainable electoral democracy in the 1990s.

The academic community related this fairly big group of post-Soviet countries that either smoothly slid into authoritarianism or for a long time vacillated between authoritarian rule and democracy to a so-called “grey zone” [4]. It was practically at the same time that the concept of “hybrid” regimes as a combination of elements of democracy and authoritarianism came into circulation to define these transitory forms [14]. Further events demonstrated that the transitory group in the post-Soviet space was highly unstable. Some of the countries continued moving toward authoritarianism through the “regime of dominant power” [4, p. 54]; others tried to cope with huge problems to start moving toward democratic governance. In the final count, authoritarian regimes became dominant across the former Soviet territory.

According to the assessments of the international Freedom House (FH) organization in 2016 “the consolidated authoritarian regimes” existed in seven countries—Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Russia (the countries are arranged according to the “index of authoritarianism” from the largest to the smallest.) The FH analysts referred two countries (Kyrgyzstan and Armenia) to “semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes” while three state (Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia) were placed in the group of countries with “transitory governments or hybrid regimes” [21]. This classification is contestable, to say the least: Moldova hardly belongs to the states with “transitory governments or hybrid regimes” while Kyrgyzstan having become a parliamentary republic is moving toward electoral democracy rather than remaining in the category of “semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes.” Some of the FH assessments are challengeable yet the general conclusion can be accepted: authoritarianism is deeply rooted in the post-Soviet space. Here we have tried to analyze the causes of this phenomenon and, hence, the variants of political evolution of post-Soviet states.

The highly varied definitions of the post-Soviet political regimes in academic writings stem from methodological pluralism (for more detail see [15]), typical of the studies of authoritarianism at the present stage. The variety of approaches

to this phenomenon, the typologies and definitions of authoritarian regimes are determined, to a great extent, by the variety of forms of contemporary authoritarianism and their great difference from the traditional models of the twentieth century. We have selected the actor approach to the subject of our studies based on the mono-subjective nature of power and decision-making as the main criterion even though in real life the ruling “mono-subject” is not necessarily represented by one person; it may have a much more complicated structure.

Transformations in Post-Soviet States: National Specifics

The initial positions of national state construction in the former Soviet republics were very different that explains, in the final analysis, the variety of social and economic systems and political regimes. Some of the post-Soviet states tried to appeal to the traditions of their short-lived statehoods established on the ruins of the Russian Empire and that, therefore, were seventy-year old. Others had to build their statehoods from scratch. Some states wanted to leave the Soviet Union and were readying for this move; others (the Central Asian states and Belarus) were not ready for independence and, at first, feared this prospect.

Some countries acquired fairly influential national-democratic movements led by the politically active minority including members of national intelligentsia and, to a lesser extent, of the emerging business community (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Ukraine) determined to push aside the former ruling class—the Soviet *nomenklatura* (party and economic bureaucrats)—for the sake of market and democratic reforms patterned on the economic and political systems of the developed Western countries. This made possible the changes in the ruling class and progress of the newly independent states along the road of market and democratic reforms in the first years of independence. Azerbaijan that had lived through a war with Armenia and two state coups and Tajikistan plunged in a bloody civil war folded up their democratic reforms; in both countries the *nomenklatura* regained power under the guise of the “party of order.”

In other countries where the national-democratic movements were either weak (Belarus and Kazakhstan) or absent (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) the *nomenklatura* remained in power in the whirlpool of regime change. In July 1994, in Belarus the new and so far the only president Aleksandr Lukashenko was elected at the crest of the wave of anti-*nomenklatura* and anti-corruption sentiments widespread in the republic at that time. At first, the new president had pretended to side with the masses that stood opposed to the interests of the *nomenklatura*. Later, he learned to rely on it to preserve his authoritarian regime.

In the three countries where national-democratic movements were weak or absent (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) the *nomenklatura* promptly replaced the communist ideology with the nationalist one and proclaimed the national statehood as its aim. In Kazakhstan, due to its geopolitical specifics and poly-ethnic structure (in which the titular nation was slightly bigger than

the other ethnicities) the ideology of Eurasianism gained popularity. Belarus was the only state that in the 1990s was moving toward integration with Russia; from time to time it tested different ideologies—the neo-Soviet (Union) and neo-socialist. Three countries of this group (Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) had not privatized the basic assets of their national economics and, therefore, did not need market reforms. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, carried out large-scale privatization of national economics that set the market mechanisms in motion.

Why the Democratic Transition Failed

By the late 1990s, however, due to two interconnected reasons all countries folded up market and democratic reforms, including those that had already started them, because, in the first place, of the deep social crisis that spread far and wide across the post-Soviet states. As distinct from the leading countries of Central and Eastern Europe in which the “revolution of values” in the minds had predated the downfall of the communist order in 1989 and made their progress along the road of democratic changes possible, in the post-Soviet republics, with the exception of the Baltic states, there was no “revolution of values.” It was a very narrow stratum of the elite intellectuals that, being fully aware that the socialist system had no future in human history, rejected it at the axiological level. The masses were displeased with the Soviet social order for different reasons: they realized with an increasing clarity that it could not satisfy their consumer demands.

By the late 1980s, when the crisis of the Soviet system became clear, the Soviet Union had already acquired a consumer society (the process had been launched by the reforms of Nikita Khrushchev.) Gorbachev’s *perestroika* and the policy of *glasnost* widened the horizons; people became aware that Soviet socialism (or real socialism in the parlance of the times) was losing the social and economic competition with contemporary capitalism. This explains the dissatisfaction with the Soviet state widespread at the time: the Soviet leaders proved unable to fulfill their own promises and to radically improve the nation’s material well-being. The anti-communist revolution of 1991 was, in a broad sense of the word, a “revolution of consumers” wishing to enjoy the same boons as the people in the developed Western countries. Democracy was nothing more than an instrument of achieving this end [13, p. 186]. The majority that preferred to wait and see hailed the new “democratic” power as soon as the victory of the revolution had been confirmed in a hope to finally realize their consumer expectations.

Civil society could not appear and could not survive in the Soviet Union: the totalitarian system controlled all and everything thus making concerted civil actions impossible. Paternalist feelings predominated: the socially and politically passive absolute majority looked at the state as a source and “distributor” of material wealth and was prepared, therefore, to accept anything power was doing and adjust to it. No wonder, at the turn of the 1990s when high consumer expectations, crushed by the inevitable economic decline of the transformation period, could no longer be satisfied, society in all post-Soviet countries lost interest

in democratic changes. The rising wave of dissatisfaction with the results demonstrated by the governments of the newly independent states washed away an interest in the problems of state organization and the way state power functioned. People opted for the behavior models rooted in the Soviet past: individual strategies of survival and adaptation to the dramatic changes in their lives rather than collective struggle for their rights.

Later, when the active democratic minority had been squeezed out from power and big politics in post-Soviet countries, the national-democratic movements declined or even left the stage of history leaving behind a wide gap between the new ruling circles and society. Having escaped control and having achieved monopoly on the basic assets of national economies through privatization, people in power abandoned reforms as unnecessary [3, pp. 204-205]. The new ruling circles won and took all. The progressist lineal development strategy was suspended by the easily explained desire of the narrow elite groups to consolidate the social order (based on their de facto power and property ownership) in which the masses were excluded from political decision-making. Authoritarianism was restored, albeit on a different basis and due to the conservative nature of the new social order, in those post-Soviet states that had at first opted for democratization. The vector of their further evolution depended on the degree of cohesion of the ruling elite, regional specifics and the level of regions' impact on the federal government and the extent to which civil society was prepared and able to influence power.

Having grasped the meaning of the new realities in the post-Soviet countries, the academic circles abandoned their old ideas that had taken shape within the transitological approaches to produce a huge number of new assessments and interpretations of the social order in the post-Soviet space ranging from deviations of sorts from democracy caused by the negative Soviet heritage to sustainable "hybrid" social and political models.

To sum up: the winners' reluctance to go on with changes as well as their isolation from society were the key factors behind the revival of authoritarianism in the newly independent states. An analysis of authoritarian restoration demands that the role the *nomenklatura* in the transformation processes should be discussed in greater detail.

The *Nomenklatura* as the Main Factor of the Revival of Authoritarianism

There is an opinion of long standing in the academic circles that, having realized that the market and decentralization (two factors of Gorbachev's *perestroika*) might prove to be highly profitable, the Soviet party and economic *nomenklatura* (up to and including its factions in the Union republics) joined the process as one of the driving forces of the anticommunist revolution of 1991. When the Soviet Union had fallen apart, the first secretaries of the Communist parties of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine became first presidents of the newly independent states. The *nomenklatura* played the key role in

liquidating the Soviet and consolidating a new social and political order even though the starting conditions differed from country to country. This was one of the common features of post-communist transformations in the newly independent states. On the whole, this confirmed what Leon Trotsky had predicted in his time: "One may argue that the big bureaucrat cares little what are the prevailing forms of property, provided only they guarantee him the necessary income. This argument ignores not only the instability of the bureaucrat's own rights, but also the question of his descendants. The new cult of the family has not fallen out of the clouds. Privileges have only half their worth, if they cannot be transmitted to one's children. But the right of testament is inseparable from the right of property" [16, p. 254]. Trotsky's followers from among the members of the international Trotskyite movement (the Fourth International) insisted from the very first days of *perestroika* that the *nomenklatura* of the Communist parties would push the socialist countries back to capitalism.

At different stages of post-communist transformations and in different newly independent states with different political specifics the place and role of the *nomenklatura* in post-communist transformations were different. In Russia the *nomenklatura* demonstrated a lot of energy while regaining power after the August 1991 revolution when the cabinet of young reformers who steered the country toward the market had been formed. It was Russia's "democratic" power that initiated the process; it was argued that Soviet bureaucrats knew the former economic system well enough to apply their managerial skills to market reforms [7, p. 226]. From the late 1992, when the cabinet of Viktor Chernomyrdin had been knocked together, the flow of the former *nomenklatura* to its former posts became a flood.

In Ukraine, throughout the 1990s the *nomenklatura* preserved its key positions in politics and the economy despite the fairly high wave of national-democratic movements in the first years of the decade. We have already written that in Azerbaijan and Moldova the *nomenklatura* promptly regained its leading positions in the transformation processes. While in the former, after the obvious failures of the first elected democratic leaders led by Abulfaz Elchibey the national-democratic forces were pushed out from governing the country and completely marginalized, in Moldova they preserved, for a long time, their positions in parliament and were involved, albeit with limited powers, in the distribution of power. This explains why the democratic reforms in Azerbaijan were folded up to give space to an authoritarian regime while in Moldova the democratic institutions and procedures, competitive elections in the first place, survived.

In Armenia, "re-*nomenklaturization*" of the structures of power began when President Levon Ter-Petrosyan (who had come to power in the early 1990s as a democratic leader) lost the 1998 elections. Somewhat earlier the same happened in Kyrgyzstan where the *nomenklatura* clans organized on the principles of kinship or origin promptly regained power despite the democratic reforms launched by President Askar Akayev (deposed in 2005 he had to flee the country.) In Tajikistan the Kulob regional *nomenklatura* clan came to power as soon as the civil war had ended.

It should be said that in the post-Soviet states not only the “reformist” factions of the Communist *nomenklatura* (those that had abandoned the idea of preserving the Soviet system) but also non-*nomenklatura* groups (national intelligentsia, bureaucrats of lower levels and the emerging business community) joined ranks as new elites of the post-Soviet states. The level of their representation directly depended on the impact of the people’s democratic and other grassroots organizations of civil society on the process. It was the *nomenklatura* that affected, to the greatest or even critical extent, the makeup of the new ruling class, its political ideas, its values and behavior patterns.

The *nomenklatura* won the battle for leadership it was waging against the leaders of the national-democratic movements for two reasons.

First, when the Soviet republics proclaimed independence, it controlled the basic assets of national economies as well as financial and administrative resources.

Second, unlike the intellectuals who found themselves in power structures, the *nomenklatura* had skills and contacts indispensable at the times of economic crises and state paralysis.

Confronted by these problems at different levels of power, the national-democrats proved unable to promptly and efficiently respond to the emerging challenges. No wonder, at first the fact that the former *nomenklatura* was regaining power bred hopes that stability and manageability would be restored.

In the course of time the composition of the ruling circles in the post-Soviet countries was changing: members of different social groups were gradually rising to the top layers. In the latter half of the 1990s, the countries that had privatized the basic assets of their national economies acquired an influential group of big business known as *oligarchs*. This happened in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Moldova. The relationships between the oligarchs and top bureaucracy ranged from partnership (Ukraine and Russia under Boris Yeltsin) to complete subjugation by the state (Kazakhstan and Russia from the latter half of the 2000s onwards.) The share of the former Soviet party and economic *nomenklatura* that had done a lot to make the victory of the anti-communist revolution of 1991 possible remained high. In 2001, in Russia it comprised 77% of the political elite and 41% of the business elite [5].

Throughout the quarter of a century that has elapsed since the Soviet Union’s disintegration the social makeup of the ruling elite in post-Soviet countries changed to a certain extent or considerably. This did not mean, however, that the role of *nomenklatura* and its political heritage in the policies of the newly independent states was gradually contracting. It helped root its culture of governance and the philosophy of politics and practice of geopolitical domination in the new ruling classes, in power relations. This heritage that has become stable in the new political environment included the idea of rigid power verticals, the desire to weaken and marginalize (or, if possible, to get rid of) any political and civil forces independent of the state and arrange the power relationships on the patron/client principles. The power/property institution and the “patronage” (patrimonial) state are the main elements of the post-Soviet heritage reproduced in post-Soviet realities.

The Key Role of the Power/Property Institution

Despite the fact that the power/property institution is fairly deeply rooted in Russia's history (for more detail see [10]) the Soviet heritage played the main or even decisive role in the social, economic and political order of the newly independent states. From the very beginning the Soviet project proceeded from the idea that the means of production should belong to the state and that the ownership on the means of production as the economic cornerstone of the Soviet order should be under full control of the Communist Party that identified itself with the new state. These ideas were born by two processes typical of the world capitalist economics in the late 19th and early 20th centuries: monopolization and the emergence of state-monopoly capitalism that rested on the might of the state fused with the economic might of private capitalist industrial and financial monopolies. This became especially obvious during World War I. Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, believed that it was but the first step toward socialism. In 1917, he wrote: "...socialism is merely the next step forward from state-capitalist monopoly. Or, in other words, socialism is merely state-capitalist monopoly *which is made to serve the interests of the whole people* and has to that extent *ceased* to be capitalist monopoly" [6, p. 362]. The Bolshevik leaders liked the prospect of concentrating power and property in the hands of their government that, they believed, should divide justly the social product among all members of society and govern the country's development in the interests of the "toiling classes." In the 1930s, the system took its final and comprehensive shape and was spread across the entire territory, up to and including the former colonies of the Russian Empire, the Union republics of the Soviet Union.

This system relied on the unlimited power of the Communist Party that created a new ruling class—the *nomenklatura* that united in its ranks the privileged groups of bureaucracy endowed with the powers to govern the country and manage its economy at its different levels. Mikhail Voslensky hit the point: "What matters to the *Nomenklatura* is not property but power" [18, p. 72]. Unlimited and uncontrolled power in the country where nearly all property belonged de facto to the state allowed the *nomenklatura* to dispose of it as the only class of property owners. Milovan Djilas offered his precise definition of this phenomenon: "Contemporary Communism is not only a party of a certain type, or a bureaucracy which has sprung from monopolistic ownership and excessive state interference in the economy. More than anything else, the essential aspect of contemporary Communism is the new class of owners and exploiters" [1, p. 58].

In the power/property institution power was primary while property came second as a derivative of power hence the hierarchy of functions of political leadership and management of material production that predetermined the structural specifics of the *nomenklatura*. The central structures (*apparat*) of the Communist Party was the real owner endowed with supreme historical responsibility for its use; it realized controlling functions, while directors of industrial enterprises

and other managers (the so-called “economic *nomenklatura*”) were in charge of the property and its practical use [12, p. 77].

In the post-Soviet countries that privatized property on a grand scale the power/property institution was restored as soon as, at the turn of the 2000s, privatization had been completed. In different states this institution assumed different economic and legal forms and, what is especially important for the subject of this article, gave rise to different configurations of the relationships of power. In Ukraine, the so-called oligarchs and top bureaucracy acted as partners; in Armenia state power was limited by big business. In the 2010s, a unique situation took shape in Moldova with its democratic institutions: local oligarchs became power here. In Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan state bureaucracy moved to the command positions in their relations with business. Property was controlled by the forces in power. In the countries where the basic assets remained state property the power/property institution was adjusted to the new market conditions while state bureaucracy continued to control it very much as before.

The gradual slide to authoritarianism of the countries with no history of authoritarian rule made these distinctions relatively unimportant. The fact that the power/property institution was present in these countries became a crucial social and economic factor that predetermined this slide, the regime of “dominant power” being the first phase of authoritarianism.

The Patronage State

The patronage state is another cornerstone of the post-Soviet political order that, in its turn, rests on the patron/client relationships in power based on kinship and origin from the same regions, belonging to the same profession and having legitimacy in the eyes of the majority. These relations stem from political domination of the *nomenklatura*. The groups and clans of the *nomenklatura* that contest an access to all sorts of resources look at these relationships “superimposed” on the laws and other legal forms of “interaction” within the political system as guarantees of their power and consequence. They are patterned on the principle: the status, access to the rent and other material boons in exchange of loyalty to a bureaucrat (or a group) on a higher step of the ladder and the readiness to fulfill his (their) instructions, even if illegal.

While in the socialist system the patron/client relationships envisaged, within certain limits, the responsibility of *nomenklatura* for the well-being of the common people for purely ideological considerations, in the post-Soviet times the ruling circles have relieved themselves from this responsibility. Not infrequently, they appealed to the quasi-market ideology according to which each and every one should, allegedly, look after himself and his family. Mancur Olson’s comparison between “stationary bandits and roving bandits” [11, pp. 6-7] is an apt description of the above.

People, on the whole, remain, in many respects a political and anthropological type of “Homo Sovieticus” [20] even if they sometimes are very critical of the

patrimonial state. They, however, do not oppose it because, they are convinced, the state is responsible for their well-being. This explains why wide social strata have rejected the state model based on a negative consensus offered to the people in many of the post-Soviet states in the 1990s. It boiled down to a complete mutual rejection of all obligations—of the state to society and of society to the state. This forced the *nomenklatura* (that at the early stage of independence shook off its social obligations to society) to encourage the illusion that it was working hard to raise the standard of living and to fan expectations that the situation would soon improve thanks to its efforts. This means that the patron/client relationships in power structure as a means of continued domination and the paternalist-minded population strata are mutually complementary; they consolidate the neo-patrimonial state and prevent the rise of forces that could have moved society to a contract state based on mutual obligations of the state and society in which power would be responsible to society and society would control power.

Post-Soviet Authoritarianism and the Forms of Governance

The history of the post-Soviet states shows that the choice between authoritarianism and democracy is strongly affected by the forms of government registered in their constitutions. The countries with the parliamentary (Moldova) or mixed presidential-parliamentary or parliamentary-presidential forms of governance (Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan) stand a better chance to move toward democracy. Significantly, no country with the presidential form of governance in the post-Soviet space has started moving from authoritarianism to democracy (Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.) Armenia that announced a transfer to the mixed parliamentary-presidential republic so far has not launched the process for want of practical experience.² The choice of either parliamentary or mixed form of government is determined by an absence of vertical integration of the elite or the desire of some of its factions to remain in power contrary to the constitutional norms (Georgia and, recently, Armenia.)

The interconnection between the forms of government and political regimes in the post-Soviet states is not that simple. Indeed, sustainable authoritarian regimes might exist in presidential-parliamentary republics which demonstrate no signs of democratic evolution (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Uzbekistan.) The failed attempt of President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich to establish an authoritarian regime in the country that had been living with the presidential-parliamentary form of government since 2010 pushed the country toward electoral democracy. The experience of the parliamentary republic of Moldova showed that in a situation in which all branches of power are controlled by one and the same party (in 2004-2009 this was the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova) attempts to restore authoritarian order cannot be excluded [17, pp. 603, 614].

The forms of the post-Soviet authoritarian regimes vary from country to country. They are mostly personalized (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) or typologically close clan regimes (Azerbaijan and Tajikistan). The

corporate regime in Armenia with part of the elite united into the Republican Party that remains at the helm can be described as another “pole.” In Russia the regime is a mix of personalized and corporate forms in which the role of corporations belongs to groups of bureaucrats and businesses.

The variety of forms apart, the post-Soviet authoritarianisms have one thing in common: frequently changed institutions. One may be tempted to wrongly describe this as a sign of instability. There are no stable or permanent institutions because the elite does not need them: it is much easier and much more efficient to redistribute property through the patron/client relationships [2] and, what is even more important, through access to the president as the center of decision-making. Not infrequently, institutions are changed together with changed priorities of the elite and the alteration of elite groups and factions at the helm. The institutions are adjusted to the new interests and new tasks as understood by the ruling circles. They can change the election system, the means and methods of forming the parliament or electing the president, set up the upper chamber of the highest representative structure and indulge themselves in other institutional changes. This does not threaten the regime: that much has been abundantly confirmed by the behavior of the authoritarian regimes at the critical moments of their evolution (power transfer in the first place.) At the critical moments stability is preserved not by the formal institutions but by the informal, behind the scene so to speak, understandings between the elites, confirmed by the experience of Turkmenistan in 2006 and Uzbekistan in 2016.

Post-Soviet “Neo-Authoritarianisms”

As we have written above, contemporary authoritarianisms differ greatly from the traditional models of the twentieth century. In the post-Soviet space authoritarian regimes demonstrate mostly modern “modifications” that can be described as neo-authoritarian and that survive thanks to the “dynamic interaction between coercion and corruption, the dominant role of either the former or the latter depends on the domestic political context and the current political, economic and social tasks the regime has to cope with” [8, pp. 96-97]. The regimes of this type are more flexible than the traditional models; they are less ideologized and, not infrequently, change their ideological landmarks [9, p. 171].

These regimes are lavish with official declarations of their devotion to democracy but inevitably stress the national specifics of their countries. They insist on their respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and separation of powers; elections to the organs of representative power are regular and formally competitive with predetermined results in the majority of cases. There is no official state monopoly on the media yet the information space is controlled and regulated by corresponding government structures. The neo-authoritarian regimes are determined to limit, as much as possible, the use of force especially on a mass scale with the exception of cases when the country’s stability is threatened or their power is endangered. They have replaced the use of force and repressions

by mass propaganda and psychological brainwashing realized through state-controlled TV channels.

The political regime of Turkmenistan that took shape under the country's first president Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbashi) (1990-2006) stands apart as an extreme form of autarchy or a sultanist regime in Juan J. Linz's terms. Under the next president Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov the country began its slow drift toward neo-authoritarianism; it acquired, in particular, a multiparty system. This evolution is going on, even if the state remains, partly, in control of petty details of public and private life of its citizens and foreigners related to their way of life and behavior.

Authoritarian Rule and the Development Limits

The authoritarian regimes are fairly firmly rooted in the post-Soviet space yet there are certain limits to their development and the territories they cover. The first group of such limitations consists of factors that limit, in one way or another, the influence the *nomenklatura* as one of the main vehicles of authoritarian trends. We have already mentioned one of them: the development level of civil society and NGOs as its structures, initiatives, public organizations set up to deal with certain problems and address certain tasks. In the countries where this factor was and remains highly visible authoritarianism either runs against stiff opposition (Armenia) or has to retreat to vacate space for alternative development variants (Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Ukraine).

Discrediting the very idea of the *nomenklatura* governance belongs to the same group of factors: at the dawn of transformations this idea was discredited in many of the former Soviet republics—Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Russia. In Georgia only it became a powerful and consistent factor of bringing new political elite to power. The events that followed the Rose Revolution of 2003 triggered generation change in national politics: members of the former party and economic *nomenklatura* were replaced with people and groups unfamiliar with the Soviet experience of government. They belonged to new political parties, movements and NGOs or were top managers of private companies. Despite these impressive shifts inside the political elite, many of the members of *nomenklatura* preserved their posts in state structures. It was in 2011 that the parliament of Georgia practically unanimously adopted the Freedom Charter that contained the norms of political lustration to be applied to the former officials of the CPSU and the Soviet special services [19].

The same happened, albeit in a somewhat tuned-down form, in Moldova that pushed the political process closer to democratization.

The second group of the limiting factors is associated with the structural specifics of the new ruling class. The geographic and regional patchwork of some countries and conflicts of interests between regional elites do not allow any of the *nomenklatura* clans to subjugate the others and to build up a power vertical, Ukraine being an adequate example. For a long time it remained the arena

of struggle between two strongest regional clans—the Dnepropetrovsk and the Donetsk-Lugansk—with Kiev being the battlefield. The same applies to Kyrgyzstan where sub-ethnic groups of the Northern and Southern Kyrgyzes are locked in power struggle. This configuration of the ruling class presupposes equilibrium between the leading political clans: they have no choice but settle their disagreements publicly which adds weight to the national parliament as a political institution and increases its role in harmonizing their interests. This makes the role of competitive elections more important and adds vehemence to the struggle between different ideological and political platforms: the more or less equal weights of the leading groups on both sides mean that they need additional factors, of which electoral support is one.

Tajikistan can be compared with Ukraine because of its great regional variety. Yet, it is a country with authoritarian rule: as a result of the civil war of 1992-1993 the Kulob clan suppressed all other clans—the Kurban Tyube and the Gharm clans as its enemies in the war—and the Khujand and Leninabad clans, its wartime allies. The emergences of “oligopolies” headed by the biggest businessmen who control large segments of national economies and can strongly affect national politics through their clients in the parliament, the government and the state structures and the controlled media. In this way they remain independent, to a certain extent, of state power. This system is typical of Ukraine; in 1995-2000 it existed in Russia.

An absence of common national identity in some countries where there are several competing identities with different ideas about the past and the future and, what is most important, about their place in the world can be described as the third group of limiting factors. This is typical of Moldova and, to a lesser extent, of Ukraine. The rivaling identities create a space for an open political rivalry and require concerted efforts to achieve national consensus. Democratic institutions, rather than authoritarian rule, are much better suited for this.

What Next?

A Deficit of internal development sources and an absence of social and political forces that need modernization are the main problem of all post-Soviet states, either authoritarian or electoral democracies. This explains why their political systems tend to status quo. It seems that not so much the introduction of traditional democratic procedures (or the consolidation of those already functioning)—competitive elections, plurality in the media, wider public activity spaces—but a reform of the post-Soviet state may become the preliminary condition of social progress. This means that the power/property institution as the main pillar of such states should be removed while the patronage (neo-patrimonial) state should be replaced with a state based on a contract that presupposes mutual responsibility of the state, power and society.

In fact, continued democratic changes in the states where they have begun and brought tangible results and their successful cooperation with the developed

democratic countries may create institutional conditions for a gradual ripening of the subjects of modernization and creating mass demand for it. For the countries of “barren pluralism” and electoral democracy the prospects of successful construction of democracy are closely connected with several tasks of great importance. First, they should defeat corruption of the *nomenklatura* and oligopolies (oligarchs). Second, they should achieve national consensus on the development aims. Third, they should develop new, post-Soviet national identities.

Other countries of the same region may follow a different road. If Russia decreases its economic support they would be forced to turn to the West for economic support that will be inevitably stipulated by the demands to move toward democratization and reforms.

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Notes

- ¹ The Baltic countries—Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—were left outside the scope of our article. Post-Soviet by their origin they, as distinct from the other newly independent states that appeared in the post-Soviet space, from the very first day of independence, steered toward integration in the Euroatlantic institutions which required deep democratic and market reforms. Today, the functioning of the political institutions of the Baltic states that in 2005 joined the European Union, regulated, to a great extent, by the democratic norms and rules of this organization that moved them away from the other post-Soviet states.
- ² At the referendum of December 2015, Armenia approved the transfer to the parliamentary form of government. We will soon see how this will affect the evolution of its political regime. Here we are writing about its political system as it exists today, before this transfer has been completed.

Translated by Valentina Levina

Great Powers and Their Neighbors: Strategies of Relations (A Comparative Analysis of Russia and China)

Irina BUSYGINA

Abstract. For any great power, neighboring countries are spaces that attract attention mainly when they try to extend their influence beyond their own territories. At the same time, great powers use neighboring countries as security buffers. However, there are fundamental differences between the neighborhood strategies of the two powers. For Russia building a territorial coalition around it is the main foreign policy priority and proof of the country's great power status. The implementation of this strategy involves massive investment of resources, both material and symbolic. By contrast, for the Chinese elite forming a coalition with its neighbors is not a priority. China's overall approach to neighbors can be described as a combination of active, even aggressive, penetration into the neighboring economies and the creation of geopolitical buffers. Coalitions are built not by China, but by neighboring states against China. The aim of this article is to make a comparative analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of the strategies of Russia and China vis-à-vis their neighbors.

Keywords: great powers, Russia, China, neighborhood policy, coalitions.

Great powers are global by definition, they have interests in various regions and are active throughout the world. However, each of them has its own neighbors with which it has relations which may or may not be friendly. Big powers regard neighbors as key in terms of their interests and in defining their "natural" sphere of influence. Great powers turn their attention to neighboring countries primarily when they attempt to spread their influence beyond their own territories. At the same time great powers use neighboring countries as security buffers.

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According to John Mearsheimer, the main aim of any great power is regional hegemony while preventing other powers from achieving the same goal with regard to its neighbors [24]. In other words, great powers may have no or minimal presence in some regions of the world, but they are always present in the relations with their neighbors. Moreover, for neighboring countries having a common border with a big power is the most important factor of their foreign and often domestic policies.

The neighbors are inevitably the first to experience the “greatness” of great powers. The latter may develop and pursue various strategies with regard to their “less great” neighbors. The most logical thing would seem to be to bring them into their coalition by starting to shape surrounding spaces by including neighboring territories. This is what we see in the relations between the USA and NAFTA or Brazil and MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market). Russia is the most active in building coalitions with its neighboring states. Forming a coalition with neighbors is inevitably complicated by the fact that the neighbors feel the most mistrust and fear with regard to their great neighbor. However, the mistrust can in principle be overcome or at least mitigated if the hegemon has a democratic and liberal regime or if the coalition includes another big power.

However, coalition-building is by no means the only possible strategy of relations with neighbors. For example, neither India nor China follow a coalition strategy; the latter is described as a mercantilist power which builds up its influence in the surrounding countries and throughout the world thanks to its powerful state-controlled economy and active and ambitious foreign economic initiatives [31].

Among other great (and not-so-great) powers, Russia and China, located in Eurasia, have the largest number of neighbors. And even a cursory look reveals fundamental differences between them in the way they build the strategy of relations with their neighbor states. The main aim of this article is not so much to explain these differences, but to analyze the benefits and drawbacks of these strategies.

Forming coalitions with neighbors is not a task China's elite sets itself. For all the diversity of instruments it uses, its general approach to its neighbors can be described as a combination of active and often aggressive penetration into the neighboring economies and the creation of geopolitical buffers. Coalitions are built not by China, but by neighboring states *against* China to minimize the perceived Chinese threat. It is hard to say to what extent such policy meets China's long-term interests, but at least it is consistent and, most importantly, does not demand heavy investment of resources.

Russia stands in a different case. For more than 25 years now building a territorial coalition around it has been its priority and the main proof of its great-power status. This strategy involves massive investment of resources, both material and symbolic, while its results so far have been fairly modest. Within the EAEU, the most “advanced” integration bloc, Russia unites around it five states, half of the number of CIS members whose commitments are significantly less. Obviously, for the neighbor countries (certainly for most of them) entering into a coalition with Russia is not the only foreign policy option for all the importance of having

Russia as its neighbor. Owing to the geopolitical location and the current situation the strategic choice facing many neighboring countries is that between Russia and the European Union. Consequently, if a coalition with neighbors is important for Russia (and it obviously is important) it has to face this situation and compete for neighboring countries by offering them an attractive agenda. In reality, however, Russia is behaving otherwise promoting the idea that world politics “belongs” only to the great powers and thus implicitly sidelining the countries that are not “great.”

Claiming that each country must make “the final choice” and bolstering this thesis with coercive measures (punishment for disobedience) merely increases mistrust of Russia and ultimately makes the coalition strategy less effective, and not only at present but also in the longer term. In other words, this approach is costly, inconsistent and doomed to be ineffective.

Great Powers: Building Coalitions with Neighbors and an Alternative Choice

“Neighborhood management”—stimulating cooperation, punishment for disobedience, etc.—is one of the most important foreign policy tasks of regional and, even more so, of great powers. These powers are assumed to have a wide range of instruments of reward and punishment in pursuing that task. The literature on the relations between great (and regional) powers and their neighbors is usually based on the concept of hierarchy in international relations, stressing unequal might of the players, which enables powerful states to influence the policies of weaker neighbors by various means. To put it another way, weaker states have, albeit to varying degrees, to bow to the will of the stronger neighbor (see [10; 14; 15]). However, in my opinion, the hierarchic character of relations between great powers and their neighbors and tools for the leverage the former have on the latter are just the prerequisite, whereas the strategic choice with regard to the neighbors consists in deciding whether or not to form a durable coalition with them.

A great deal has been written about coalitions. All the main theories of international relations, for all their differences, stress the key role of creating and maintaining coalitions around (or against) countries that claim the status of a great power. Indeed, compared with the earlier bipolar system the role of coalitions in the present-day world system, far from diminishing, has in fact grown, although it has fundamentally changed. Hanns Maull maintains that “an important early step towards effective international cooperation under the conditions of globalizing international relations will generally be coalition building. Once coalitions have been formed successfully, this nucleus can be widened and deepened, and cooperation between its members may also be institutionalized through setting up international organizations or regimes to address specific problems. The ability to initiate, enlarge and empower coalitions able to assemble the power resources and develop the strategies to deal with international challenges against the background of globalization may in fact be the most important form of skill or ‘soft power’ in future international politics” [23, p. 132].

Let me note that the countries in geographical proximity to one another (i.e., neighbors) have more incentives to form a coalition even if there is no great power among them as the driving force. For example, within the European Union closer coalitions are taking shape which have a significant level of institutionalization, structured cooperation, intensive interaction and a developed system of internal coordination. Such coalitions are formed on the basis of geographical proximity, for example, Benelux, the Visegrad Group, or the Visegrad Four, and Nordic-Baltic coalition [27].

States form coalitions in order to pool resources to tackle common problems. A coalition offers its members obligatory and inalienable benefits for which they do not have to compete because the benefits accrue to all the members [25]. However, building a successful coalition is no simple task even if the necessary resources are available, and it is still more difficult to maintain it. An effective coalition needs a sound agenda, clearly defined common objectives and a clear division of roles and labor among its members, good faith of all its members and finally, legitimacy of coalition institutions on the coalition's territory [23, p. 132]. Besides, member countries play different functional roles within the coalition. Above all, there need to be leaders (initiators and "builders") and their followers. It is important that the led recognize as legitimate the role of the leader and initiator [3; 11].

Inside coalitions, especially with weaker neighbors, great powers will inevitably assume the role of leaders and builders. However, for them the point of having a coalition is not to accumulate resources (the contribution of smaller coalition partners to the common "chest" is usually not very hefty) but to influence the surrounding space and pursue its agenda and ultimately assert their great-power status. Great powers are potentially capable of uniting the surrounding space within the coalition (and beyond) and yet it is they that face the greatest challenges in the process. Thus Olav Knudsen has noted the inherent instability of the relations between great powers and their smaller neighbors due to asymmetry of the significance of these relations for the great and smaller players [13].

A still bigger challenge is that the cost of sustaining the benefits the coalition offers its members (above all security) is unevenly distributed: bigger members of a coalition always incur larger spending, for example on defense, compared with smaller members. So the biggest member of the coalition assumes the bulk of the cost of maintaining it, which means that the responsibility and functional roles in coalitions with great powers are distributed asymmetrically. The asymmetry makes the coalition stable: it has been proven that the more asymmetrical the distribution of responsibility and roles within coalitions, the more stable they are, given other equal conditions. But the flip side of asymmetry is the danger of unlimited sway of the biggest member of the alliance [28].

Thus, a coalition can be functional if it includes an asymmetrically big participant capable of assuming the main financial burden, but at the same time if there are the safeguards that limit its dominance within the coalition. The inherent contradiction of this condition makes it so difficult to form and maintain asymmetric alliances involving great powers. Asymmetric coalitions can be effective and durable if they are built by states with liberal democratic regimes on the basis of clear norms

and expectations concerning the process of decision-making within them [6; 18; 19; 20; 21; 22; 26; 29].

Furthermore, the presence of a great power in the coalition inevitably creates the problem of trust in the obligations it has assumed. So, in order to successfully build and maintain a coalition the great power has to convince potential allies of its commitment to its obligations even when it is objectively against its interests.

It is notable that the problems arising in forming coalitions around great powers increased after the collapse of the bipolar system. Thus, in a bipolar world the position of a state in the system of international relations was largely determined by which of the “big” allies (the USSR or the USA) it chose and what “big” allies chose it. This made coalitions rigid and transition from one alliance to the other extremely difficult. The modern multipolar system is fundamentally different: great powers have more room for maneuver and for choosing “like-minded” potential allies. At the same time coalitions are no longer rigid, that is, the composition of allies may change depending on the specific task. This means that the great power has to prove its attractiveness as a coalition partner constantly reaffirming its status in the system of international relations. Small countries today can choose, and great powers have to compete for their loyalty, with geographical proximity not always conferring an advantage: for a small country a big power next door may be (or be perceived) as much more dangerous than a power that is geographically more remote.

At the same time, the strategy of building a stable coalition with neighboring states is not the only option for a great power. It may either be totally uninterested in this, or it may form a coalition selectively with some neighbors and/or over some issues. Countries may be deterred from forming a coalition for a variety of reasons which may have to do both with internal and external circumstances of this or that great power. Thus, the ruling elite of a great power, on the one hand, may not consider the role of coalition leader to be attractive and may not need to prove its great power status. On the other hand, building a stable coalition with neighbors may be practically impossible, for example, if the neighbor states have already built a coalition or another great power is actively impeding such plans. Given such conditions, the task of a great power in the neighborhood may include preventing the formation of coalitions against it and/or weakening the existing coalitions. Great powers may also build up their influence in neighboring states using every manner of instruments, from trade and economic preferences to coercion into cooperation. The emphasis is on the development of bilateral relations which—if the great power has many neighbors—can be very diverse and to which the great power will seek to assign different functional roles, from a buffer against another great power to that of the most loyal ally.

Russia: Coalition Building as Policy Priority with Regard to Neighbors

For Russia building a coalition with neighboring states is not only a foreign policy priority, but its main claim to being a great power. This approach seems to make sense considering the vast size of its territory, its natural resources, its military might, economic potential and the fact that it is recognized as the successor

to the Soviet Union, a great power in the bipolar world. It is natural for Russia to choose neighbor countries as partners in a coalition centered around Russia. Considering their economic (and political) dependence on Russia it has a large set of instruments to punish or reward its neighbor countries. Russia sees these countries as spaces where it has “special” or “privileged” interests [2, p. 63]. “Special interests” imply “special rights” to these territories that are not formally determined but have been confirmed and recognized by other great powers. These should be the underlying principles of Russia’s relations with the states around it.

However, the Russian elite would not settle for “any” coalition, but only for a coalition with certain characteristics. It seeks a “rigid” coalition reminiscent more of the coalitions at the time of the bipolar world than the flexible coalitions that are more common today. A “rigid” coalition means loyalty of the small states to the hegemon (Russia) on all (or nearly all) significant issues, both economic and political. In Russian discourse this topic is referred to as “the ultimate choice” between Russia and other power centers which the neighboring countries, former Soviet republics, have to make. In Russian discourse, 25 years after the collapse of the USSR, its former territory is still referred to as “post-Soviet” and the term “near abroad” indicates the position of these spaces with respect to Russia. It is true that geographical proximity of Russia is a key factor for its neighbors which determines not only the main vector of their foreign policy, but often the character of their internal policy.

There is nothing surprising about the fact that economic integration processes are going on around Russia; indeed, it would be surprising if this was not the case. For the neighboring countries Russia is the largest and most accessible market for goods and the import of energy. Russian investments are critical for many of the weaker neighboring economies. However, I would like to stress again that Russian plans are not confined to economic integration, they also envisage political integration.

The Russian *Foreign Policy Concept* of 1993 declared the CIS region as its top priority and since 1996 Russia’s then Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov sought to shift the focus of foreign policy relations from the West to neighboring post-Soviet states. Primakov’s plan was to create a group of states—integration leaders—prepared to set up common institutions and delegate part of their sovereignty to the supra-national level; other post-Soviet states could join the group if and when they saw fit. President Boris Yeltsin also repeatedly said that Russia should assert itself as a great power through its relations with the CIS countries stressing that it did not seek to create a new Russian Empire or recreate the Soviet Union [40]. However, in the 1990s these wishes were largely rhetorical: mired in a deep structural crisis Russia did not have enough resources. Such resources began to be available in the 2000s and accordingly rhetoric became strategy. The new *Foreign Policy Concept* adopted on 30 November 2016 confirms the relations with neighboring post-Soviet countries and further integration as Russia’s top priority [37].

Thus, from the early 1990s, that is, almost immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia initiates re-integration projects in which it naturally

plays the role of hegemon. The first such project was the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) founded in December 1991. More recent projects include the 2010 Eurasian Economic Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and the signing in January 2012 of the agreement on the common economic space transformed into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), with Armenia and Kyrgyzstan becoming respectively the fourth and fifth members. In all these projects Russia played the role of unifying leader. As Jan Adams put it, “without Russia there would be no commonwealth” [1, p. 51]. The same is true of all the integration projects around Russia (although the EAEU officially has two “founding fathers,” President Vladimir Putin of Russia and President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan). The most loyal Russian partner in the coalition is thought to be Belarus, the presidents of the two countries having signed the Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Russia on 2 April 1997 and a Standing Committee of the Union State having been formed in 2000.

It has to be noted, however, that between the first (CIS) and last (EAEU) projects Russia lost several potential coalition partners. Thus, the CIS followed the principle of admitting all comers, and 12 out of 15 former Soviet Republics joined the Commonwealth (the three Baltic republics opted to join the European Union from the moment they became independent). By now the number of EAEU members is less than half of that of the CIS, and these numbers as well as the composition of the post-Soviet space show that the pool of potential partners of Russia has been exhausted, at least for now. From this it follows that every member of the pro-Russian coalition counts and Russia cannot afford to lose a single one of them.

Nevertheless losses have occurred. After the “five-day war” of 2008, Georgia ceased to be a member of the coalition, but a far greater (and irreparable) loss was Ukraine, strategically the most important country for Russia. While the relations with Georgia can somehow be repaired, which Russia has been at pains to do recently, the loss of Ukraine is irreversible.

The hegemon creates and maintains the coalition using the “carrot and stick” principle—that is, using the instruments of reward and punishment with respect to the partner countries. However, the balance of these instruments varies for each particular case. Russia used the instruments of rewarding its neighbor countries since the first half of the 1990s when it was itself going through a painful period of economic transformation. Nevertheless financial assistance to the former Soviet Republics continued. Granting technical credits and writing off of old debts were common Russian practices at the time, which was a goodwill gesture on Russia’s part [34]. At the same time Russia during that period made extensive use of the instruments of coercion. Daniel Drezner has calculated that in the 1990s Russia imposed economic sanctions against the former Soviet republics 39 times and in 38% of the cases this yielded the desired result. The instruments of coercion included, among other things, increase of export tariffs (with respect to Azerbaijan), cuts in energy supplies and increase of prices for them (this applied above all to Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) [7].

In the 2000s the Russian Government continued using economic instruments of coercion against neighboring countries to earn economic dividends and, more importantly, to increase its political influence. The fact that several neighboring countries depended on Russia for energy supplies naturally determined the main vector of the use of coercive instruments which included total or partial suspension of gas and oil supplies (and the threat to do it, which is also a coercive instrument), changes of price policy (preferential prices and cancelling or threat to cancel them) as well as hostile takeovers of companies or energy infrastructure facilities [16].

Sanctions, however, were used not only in the energy field. Thus at various times the Russian Government imposed an embargo on Moldavian wines, Georgian mineral water, Ukrainian candies and dairy products from Belarus. As a rule, Russia's tactic was a surprise introduction of sanctions as punishment and equally sudden lifting of sanctions, which was perceived as a reward. This approach, incidentally, is fundamentally different from that of the European Union which, as a rule, is not in a hurry to impose sanctions, but having introduced a sanctions policy is unable to quickly change it.

Coalition-building includes the use not only of economic, but also of ideological instruments ("soft power") because similarities of value orientations and ideological principles is an important factor of maintaining the union, as for example in time of crisis. Russia offers its coalition partners (and not only them) the concept of the Russian World, designed to "define the identity" of people, social groups, regions, though (and herein lies its strength) not in a head-on, but in a flexible manner. The concept can be interpreted through a multitude of contexts. The existence of the Russian World, first, justifies Russia's right to "look after" what is happening in the neighboring states and sometimes interfere in what is going on. Second, the concept links modern Russia to its pre-Soviet and Soviet history, with the link ensured by developing intensive interaction with Russian Diasporas abroad. Thirdly, and finally, the Russian World is a critically important instrument enabling Russia to position itself in the world and acquire its own unique "voice" in world politics [17, p. 1].

Beginning from the mid-2000s the Russian authorities set about to actively form groups and organizations to bring the message of the Russian World into the public domain. *Russkiy Mir* (the Russian World) foundation was set up in 2007, the Rossotrudnichestvo federal agency was set up in 2008, the Fund for the support and protection of the rights of compatriots living abroad in 2009 and the Gorchakov Fund in 2011. One of the most important target audiences of *Russkiy mir* is the youth of neighboring countries, with Russian forums such as the Seliger International Youth Forum, the Caucasus and Baltic Dialogs enabled pro-Russian young people to meet with Russian politicians and other public figures. Russia is not only inviting and educating young people from neighboring countries, but is financing pro-Russian associations in these countries [17].

One of the key advantages of the Russian World is its "flexible geography," the inclusion of ethnic Russians and other Russian citizens, compatriots living in

the near and far abroad, émigrés and a huge number of foreign citizens who speak Russian, are interested in Russia and care about its future. Thus, geographically speaking the Russian World is undoubtedly a global project which assumes that affiliation with it defines a person's identity, provides him/her with a system of coordinates irrespective of the place where he/she lives [17, p. 13].

China: Mercantilism and Its External Limitations

Unlike Russia, China is not inclined to build a stable coalition with the neighboring countries. Indeed, speaking about international organizations, it is less prone to behave in a coalition manner than other great powers. A comparative analysis of the behavior of China, India and Brazil at the WTO carried out by Kristen Hopewell found that the latter readily builds coalitions on issues (*ad hoc* coalitions) within that organization, whereas China hardly exerts any efforts in that direction [8]. Chinese analysts argue that China is trying to assert itself in the relations with its neighbors as a strong but peaceful power, as manifested, for example, in its *Good Neighbor Policy*. This is a concept of a peaceful and independent policy toward its neighbors based not on hegemony or expansion, but on creating a friendly, secure and prosperous neighborhood [5]. However, there is also the opposite view which claims that China is pursuing an aggressive mercantilist policy in neighboring countries and is not averse to staging provocations against them, including military provocations. China's reach extends not only to its neighbors. It is even more aggressive in Africa where it separates politics and economics. In the eyes of the Chinese elite the political and strategic "usefulness" of that continent is very low, but the economic dependence of African countries on China is steadily growing [40].

While being exceedingly active with regard to its neighbors, China does not seek to create a permanent coalition with them. Perhaps it does not have potential partners in these territories? Not so. It has partners, but their circle is limited. With 14 neighbors, China has a wide choice of potential partners. True, Russia and India, those two giants, should be stricken off the list at once because it is impossible in principle to build a coalition with them around one hegemon (China). The relations with India are seriously complicated by the conflict over Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh regions, where China and India have a disputed border. Besides, China sides with Pakistan in its conflict with India over Kashmir.

China's closest ally is North Korea, but it does not appear to be a promising coalition partner, on the contrary, it may alienate other potential members. Indeed, the DPRK is the only and utterly loyal ally of China in a coalition, but it is a coalition of a peculiar kind: China is the key source of energy, food and arms for the DPRK [30]. China accounts for more than 70% of North Korea's foreign trade, so it can safely be said that the DPRK's economy would simply be dysfunctional without Chinese aid [9, p. 35].

So, the DPRK is a special case; prospects for building a "normal" coalition are more promising with Mongolia, Pakistan and, for that matter, with Central

Asian states with which it already has (a fairly loose) coalition within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which includes another great power, Russia. In other words, while there are prerequisites for building a territorial coalition around China, China does not intend to build a corresponding strategy. China's strategy with regard to the majority of neighboring states is best described as aggressive penetration through the economy and use as buffers in geopolitics.

China's coalition-averse behavior does not signify lack of an economic interest. On the contrary, for many neighboring states it is an important economic partner and a source of investments; the Chinese presence shows a marked tendency to grow. This is true of such countries as Laos, Vietnam, Central Asian states and finally Afghanistan with whose government China's National Petroleum Corporation signed a major agreement in December 2011 allowing it to extract natural gas and oil in the country's north-east [38]. It is worth noting that its numerous territorial disputes with its neighbors do not prevent China from building up its economic presence there.

In addition to economic tasks, China uses its neighbor countries to promote its geopolitical interests. Thus, oil export from Kazakhstan makes China less dependent on supplies from Middle East countries by sea, besides, Kazakhstan serves as a buffer zone between China and Russia [38]. The same is true of Nepal: for Nepal China is the main source of investments, technologies and economic aid, while for China Nepal is a strategic buffer in its relations with India (think of Tibet). Bhutan, a traditional ally of India, is a buffer between China and India.

I have to note that China's relations with its neighbors are not only extremely diversified, but also vary greatly in intensity, as analysts note. Thus, interaction with ASEAN, South Korea and Taiwan is multi-faceted and often economically and geopolitically aggressive (China has repeatedly launched military operations against some of these countries over territorial disputes). At the same time China is far more passive in its relations with the Central Asian countries.

Perhaps there is no other country with which China's relations are as complicated and even paradoxical than South Korea. The paradox is that South Koreans consider China to be the second most attractive country after the USA, but at the same time see China as the second biggest threat to their country after North Korea [9, p. 33]. Moreover, as China's presence in South Korea's economy and trade (trade increased more than 35 times since China and South Korea established diplomatic relations) grows and cultural ties increase the level of trust in China as a good-faith partner continues to decline [9, p. 34]. The South Korean elite hoped that its growing relations with China would contribute to the reunification of the two Koreas, but that hope has not come true. There are no grounds for expecting China to back South Korea on the issue and thus "betray" its closest ally.

No wonder China's policy toward its neighbors meets with serious obstacles and resistance. It is not only that the USA is vigorously opposed to expanded Chinese influence in the region. Chinese policy meets with resistance on the part of neighboring states, especially economically powerful ones. Thus, if China is not building coalitions, coalitions are being built against it: the recent years have seen

India and Japan forming a coalition to oppose China's territorial claims. At practically the same time, China "reactivated" the long-standing territorial conflicts with India (over Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh), Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines over part of the South China Sea, and with Japan over the Senkaku Islands. China's claims have forced the neighbor countries to be more active (including in the military field) and to strengthen their strategic, diplomatic and military cooperation among themselves (for example, India sent its personnel to monitor Vietnam's naval exercises) [35]. It is important to note that the new process of coalition building is prompted by the desire to prevent the growth of Chinese influence in the vast spaces from India to Japan.

As for ASEAN as a coalition of states, China is interested in weakening that organization, and it has leverage to do so because over the last decade it has emerged as the first or at least the second largest trading partner of nearly all the ASEAN states. ASEAN is increasingly afraid of China's intention to parlay its economic influence into political and geopolitical influence. And indeed, China has more than once tried to split the bloc by making bilateral deals with its individual members [9, p. 42].

The Upsides and Downsides of Russian and Chinese Strategies

The strategies of Russia and China in their relations with their neighbor countries of course have their upsides and downsides, but their character differs. Russia has managed to solve its main foreign policy task and build a coalition with its neighbors on condition of Russian hegemony, albeit with a limited number of participants and little weight in the world economy (the combined GDP of the EAEU countries is less than one-fifth of that of the European Union and less than one-third of that of China [35]). Many countries, and by no means all of them neighbors, consider Russia to be a potentially attractive cooperation partner, and what is more, a good-faith partner that honors its trade and economic commitments. However, some objective problems prevent the formation of a broad and, most importantly, a durable coalition around Russia. "At present the main problem with the EAEU is that out of the two motives for developing integration—the creation of additional resources by lifting mutual restrictions and redistributing resources in favor of some participants—the second motive predominates. The EAEU agreement does not fully tap the potential for moving toward creating additional resources through higher efficiency." If the redistributive motive remains the driving force of integration "the Russian budget will suffer losses from the functioning of the EAEU and the involvement of new members" [12, pp. 102, 103].

However, this is by no means the only problem. An even more important and daunting problem is the danger of unlimited dominance of Russia and the issue of trust in its obligations toward the neighboring countries which are partners in the coalition. The perception of Russia as a threat is characteristic not only of the political elites in the neighboring countries, but also of their populations: opinion surveys conducted in Russia's neighbor countries show that beginning from

2014 Russia's policy vis-à-vis Ukraine confirmed for many people in the neighbor countries what they had known all along, and that is Russia's imperial ambitions and its policy of regaining control over the territory of the former USSR [39].

Besides, Russia's attempts to build a rigid coalition by presenting neighboring countries with "offers they can't refuse" create problems with maintaining the loyalty of "the lands brought back together." In December of 2016 the President of Kyrgyzstan Almazbek Atambayev at the end of the EAEU summit in St. Petersburg refused to sign the Union's Customs Code and the statement on trade development [33]. Another example: in early January of 2017 Belarus introduced a visa-free regime with 80 countries, including the USA and European Union countries. Under the new rules tourists from these countries can stay in Belarus without a visa for no more than five days and nights. In response Russia, on 1 February, introduces a border zone with Belarus (the territories of Smolensk, Pskov and Bryansk regions) citing the need to combat illegal migration and drug smuggling. The Foreign Ministry of Belarus declares that the decision to create a border zone contradicts all the agreements existing between Russia and Belarus and President Lukashenko describes Russian measures as "mindless steps" which worsen bilateral relations [32].

All these problems, in my opinion, highlight the inherent contradictions of the Russian strategy in Russia's relations with its neighbors and in its foreign policy. On the one hand, Russia cannot deny the existence of competition between great powers for partners in the modern world, as was amply demonstrated by the cases of Georgia and Ukraine. Under these circumstances *every member of the coalition matters*—whether big or small. Consequently, the foreign policy of the hegemon should be attractive for potential coalition partners, especially bearing in mind that a measure of mistrust and fear on the part of small countries is there from the start because of the difference in the might of the hegemon and the neighbor countries.

On the other hand, the character of the Russian discourse and its foreign policy actions tend to drive home the message that the neighbor countries have no choice and have to accept rapprochement with Russia on its terms. This contradiction, first, threatens to cause this or that country to leave the coalition—for real and forever—and then maintaining the coalition will become even costlier for the hegemon than theory predicts. Second, this contradiction puts into question the chances of the coalition expanding, and new members joining. In my opinion, this contradiction partly stems from "inflated ambitions," a factor which objectively runs counter to Russia's strategic interests.

Unlike the Russian strategy, China's strategy with regard to its neighbors appears at first glance to be less costly and more consistent and effective. Many of the Russian problems with its neighbors are unknown to the Chinese leadership. However, there is also a down side to China's excessive practicality and mercantilism: neglect of the interests of neighboring countries, and aggravation of territorial disputes have undermined the trust of the political elites of the neighboring countries in China's declared "peaceful rise." They seek to unite against the

“Chinese threat” (something unimaginable for Russia’s neighbors) enlisting as an ally the USA, another great power which is also very worried about the growing Chinese influence in the region and the world. China’s approach is not strategic enough as it puts too much focus on economic considerations. Without appropriate political and geopolitical efforts, the current benefits China derives from economic expansion may turn out to be not durable enough in the future.

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The status of a great power implies that other big players in their calculations think of it as a power that possesses a corresponding economic, military and political potential [4]. Thus the status of a great power hinges on it being recognized as such. The grounds for such recognition differ for different powers. In the case of Russia, apart from its territory, natural resources and nuclear potential—it is the ability to build and maintain a coalition with neighboring countries. Unlike Russia, China asserts its status by aggressively expanding its presence in the neighboring economies. Both approaches have their benefits, drawbacks and risks. However, for all the obvious differences, there is one common question, and that is the character of the foreign policy of a great power: it should be non-contradictory and consistent with the strategic approach thus confirming and not casting doubt on its great power status. This is all the more important because a great power, by each statement—and even more so, by each action—generates certain expectations of the neighbor countries projecting its relations with them in the future. In other words, if China’s neighbors do not believe in great China’s “peaceful rise” today (and plan their foreign policy accordingly) it is impossible to change this attitude in a short space of time. If Russia, recognizing the value of neighbors as coalition partners, nevertheless declares that only strong players matter in global politics, and tries to build a coalition with its neighbors by using coercive instruments, this generates a durable sense of mistrust, which will tend to grow, seriously undermining the country’s status.

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Financing of Terrorist Networks in the North Caucasus

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Abstract. This article examines the main areas and sources of financing of terrorist groups in the world and in the North Caucasus. These have to do with the processes of economic globalization and the adoption of network principles by terrorist groups. The broad picture is presented of the transformation of the financing of network terrorist groups in the North Caucasus, the main feature being reduction of assistance from foreign sources and increase of internal financing of terrorism, diversification of internal sources, development of a widespread system of extortion under the guise of the “jihad tax.”

Keywords: Jihad, Zakyat, Imarat Caucasus, Islamism, Radical Islam, North Caucasus, terrorism, financing of terrorist, Hawala, extremism.

The main features of modern terrorism, which is often disguised as Islam, are as follows: it is not confined to any particular region structurally; its organizational structure may vary, with individual terrorist groups based on the networking principle while their activities are highly decentralized; however, they are committed to common ideological doctrines and goals. Terrorist groups are in principle capable of staging actions with the use of weapons of mass destruction and modern technologies, which may lead to catastrophic consequences not only for individual states, but for the entire world community.

A distinctive feature of the current situation is the high degree of adaptation of terrorist organizations to contemporary realities. Their structure may be strictly hierarchic, or it may have a loose management mechanism. There are “cobweb” structures as well as totally independent ones. A distinctive feature of terrorism at the current

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historical stage is also the unprecedented inclusion of the Islamic component, especially its ideological constructs.

There is another feature of modern Islam to be borne in mind: traditional Islam did not threaten society as such and did not affect the underlying foundations of its life activity. Modern high-tech terrorism is capable of triggering a systemic crisis in any state with a highly developed information infrastructure, as witnessed by the activities in Iraq and Syria of the “Islamic State,” an organization that is banned in the Russian Federation.

No wonder “the new terrorism” has in recent years come in for close study in all its aspects. Experts are interested above all in the dynamics of the changes due to the formation of ideological doctrines of radical Islamists, their organizational structures and the forms and methods of their specific political practices. There is, however, a fourth important aspect that has to do with the funding of terrorism because obviously the modern terrorist movement could not have existed so long without an adequate economic base, without funding. Our main objective is to reveal the main sources and specific features of financial support of terrorism in Russia’s North Caucasus region.

Main Trends in the Financing of Modern Terrorism

The past two decades have seen substantial changes in the way terrorist groups are financed [2]. These changes have been caused primarily by two factors:

- globalization of the economy which offers unprecedented scope to terrorist groups in financial matters;
- the adoption of the network structure by the terrorist groups.

The factor of globalization of the economy and its role in the transformation of the economic nature of terrorism has long been the subject of economic and political discussions at various levels. Thus, the background paper to Item 4 of the Agenda of the Naples World Conference on Organized Transnational Crime and Terrorism notes the following factors of world economy and politics that gave rise to transnational crime and modern terrorism:

- increased interdependence of states;
- the formation of the world market characterized by close economic ties and mutual investments;
- the emergence of international financial networks, international settlement systems which make it possible to quickly carry out complex financial transactions involving the banking institutions of several states;
- the development of world communications systems;
- the development of international trade, boosted especially by the introduction of the system of free trade in the post-war period;
- the spread of container carriage technologies;
- increased scale of migration and the formation of multinational megalopolises.

As regards the network (cell) principle of terrorist group organization, it turned out to be highly effective in asymmetrically countering various kinds of opponents. Both the above mentioned factors (globalization of the economy and the network principle of organization) substantially changed the nature of terrorism. As a result,

as rightly pointed out by Yekaterina Stepanova, a Russian specialist on terrorism financing, the traditional, essentially “technical,” division of terrorism into internal and international is hardly relevant today [14].

We believe the financing of terrorism is a very important issue because it is impossible to carry out terrorist acts without having money. The financial system that has been put in place is the key element which goes a long way to determine the capacity to pursue terrorist activities. At present there are many channels of financing modern international terrorism and its regional clusters, including the one in the North Caucasus. Its scale, structure of its sources and their relative importance are constantly changing. However, at any point in time the structure of financing the underground may differ widely between territories and network structures. Besides, as semi-centralized structures that prevailed in the early 21st century gave way to polycentric (network) organization of the underground, the sources of its financing—and the number of possible recipients—were bound to become more differentiated and fragmented. That is another circumstance that makes it much more difficult to reveal and cut the channels of funding the underground [15].

World experience attests that terrorist groups need financial injections primarily for infrastructure (preparation of the terrorist act) and immediate purposes (carrying out the terrorist attack). It has to be noted that according to leading world students of terrorism, the ratio between infrastructure goals and immediate targets is nine to one. Analysts also note the dependence between the scale of the terrorist act, the cost of carrying it out and its consequences. Terrorism is seen at once as highly effective and highly ineffective [10; 11].

As of today the sources of financing terrorist units can be divided into two main groups: external and internal (see Figure). External sources include support by governments; religious institutions, commercial and non-commercial organizations; individuals, the population and diasporas; as well as terrorist cells. Internal sources include incomes from legal and illegal business as well as other proceeds (for example, dues paid by members of an active terrorist organization, assistance from rich terrorists as well as extortion).

It has to be said, however, that over the past decade the processes of economic globalization and the transition to network organization structure have transformed the role of financial sources of terrorist groups diminishing the share of external sources and increasing and diversifying internal sources. Thus, terrorist organizations are becoming more self-sufficient financially.

It has to be stressed though that the sources of financing terrorist groups have by now taken their shape and remain relatively stable while the channels of financing tend to become more sophisticated technically. This is due above all to financial globalization and the development of the Internet which made it possible to introduce electronic money [7] and modern forms such as electronic payment systems, cryptocurrencies, digital gold currencies, digital currency exchange services and other elements of the virtual economy [3]. Experts predict that such financial products and services, being highly effective, are sure to be taken up by criminals, including terrorists, spreading, as world practice shows, from developing to developed countries (see Rosfinmonitoring official site: <http://www.fedsfm.ru/news/957>).




Fig. Sources of international terrorism financing.

Terrorologists believe that the origin of a terrorist organization determines the pattern of its financing. Yury Latov proposed the following classification.

1. Terrorist organizations based on faith and ideology (for which criminal activities are not the central goal).

2. Terrorist groups that sprang up on a criminal basis and later started using religion as a cover. Such terrorist organizations have many features of the mafia: they are illegal, have fighting resources and are based on personal trust. Therefore they successfully infiltrate terrorist trades that are typical of organized crime. For example, terrorists in Latin America are closely linked to cocaine trafficking, those in Asia, to heroin, rebel groups in West Africa, to diamond smuggling. By infiltrating mafia criminal trades terrorism is commercialized, acquiring the features of an “ordinary” mafia. Gradually, fighting “for an idea” is replaced partially or completely by fighting “for big money.” This kind of mafia terrorism is more difficult to fight than the mafia or ordinary terrorism: it is more militant

and bloodthirsty than the traditional mafia and richer than terrorism of the traditional type. While compromises can be sought and reached with “ideological terrorists” they are impossible in principle with mafia terrorists. All varieties of terrorism today have mafia features to varying degrees [9].

However, the feature shared by both varieties of terrorism is that the criminal business for them is not an end in itself. The main similarity to crime of various levels consists in the methods used to raise financial resources and legalize them and the main difference lies in the character of their use. An increasingly visible recent trend is of crossborder terrorism taking over the types of criminal business that also involve international activities. The origin of a terrorist group, coupled with the sources of its financing, makes it possible to build a model of financing terrorist organizations. Practice shows that there are several such models (see Table 1).

Table 1

Terrorism Financing Models

Characteristics	<i>Model 1:</i> Administratively institutionalized gray zone	<i>Model 2:</i> guerilla gray zone	<i>Model 3:</i> underground group with strong external links	<i>Model 4:</i> underground organization with weak external links
Examples	Chechen Republic 1992-1999; autonomous zone in Columbia 1998-2002, Afghanistan 1996-2001	FARC and ELN in Columbia since 1980s; Kurdish Workers' Party in Turkey since the 1980s	Al-Qaeda since 1990s, Chechen terrorists after 1999	IRA in Northern Ireland 1990-2000
Main sources of income	Stealing resources (Chechnya), drug trafficking (Columbia, Afghanistan)	Smuggling of drugs and other goods, “taxes” on the population	Sponsorship by diaspora and religious organizations	Local shadow economy (contraband, trade piracy, extortion, robbery)
Approximate size of annual income (\$m)	Up to several billions	600 mln (Columbia), at least 300 mln (Kurdish Workers' Party)	From \$20-50 mln (Al-Qaeda), \$90-270 mln (Chechnya)	Up to \$10 mln
Number of terrorists	About 40,000 (armed units in Chechnya in 1994)	10,000-15,000 (Kurdish Workers' Party), 20,000-25,000 (drug guerillas in Columbia)	1,000-1,500 (Chechnya in 2000s)	Up to 500

Source: [9].

An analysis of a vast body of material on the sources, forms and methods of financing modern terrorist organizations reveals the following significant trends:

- active use of the networking principle in the financial area as well of the advantages of financial globalization of economies;
- most terrorist organizations have a powerful, lucrative, stable and far-flung financial base;
- reduced share of external financing of terrorist groups;
- increased share and diversification of internal sources of financing;
- “fouling” of “clean” money due to multiple merger of incomes derived from legal and illegal business and external financing [2].

Specificities of Financing of Terrorist Groups in the Northern Caucasus

As for the North Caucasus terrorists, their economic base, like in other regions of the world, has two components: assistance from abroad and the use of internal sources. The ratio between these components has been constantly changing. Thus, during the first Chechen war of 1994–1996 the bulk of financing came from abroad, usually through corresponding NGOs (foundations, non-governmental religious and political organizations, etc.) Today that channel has become secondary, additional.

Available materials attest that nearly all the extremist groups in the North Caucasus territory tend to coordinate their actions in instigating further disintegration processes in the region. Part of the reason why these groups are manageable is that in the 1990s and 2010s they were to a large extent funded by the special services and organizations of foreign states either directly or through international non-governmental structures. The upshot of this pattern of financing was often loss of political independence. Experts stress that to this day one source of funding of the North Caucasus underground is international terrorist centers, radical Islamist organizations located in the Muslim world and in the Western countries [5]. True, as has been noticed, the level of financial dependence of the North Caucasus extremists on external sponsors was steadily falling in the first decade of the 21st century. This is due to the above-mentioned reasons (especially the adoption by international terrorist groups of the network, decentralized structure) and the considerable diversion in the past decades of the resources of international terrorists toward financing Islamic militants in many Middle East and North African countries.

As regards the channels of external financing of the North Caucasus terrorists, couriers are the most frequent channel used. However, in their financial operations radical Islamic terrorists in many hot spots of the world make active use of the far-flung system of international capital transfer such as Hawala, which makes it possible to transfer money without actual movement of cash. This trust-based system is widely practiced in South-East Asia and in the Middle East. It holds great attraction for terrorists because it is reliable as it leaves no documentary or electronic trail

(absence of standard financial and credit transfers). Yet this system is perfectly legal in the countries where it is most used. In a nutshell, it operates as follows: the sender of the money gives a certain sum to the dealer who has a small office in some country; the latter contacts his partner in another country who issues the sum indicated to the recipient. So big is the flow of money through such channels that it enables the dealers not to worry about debts, while trust between them is based on family, clan and ethnic ties, which again makes it possible to defer payments toward debts. Therefore Hawala is fairly resistant to those who fight the financing of terrorism. The efforts of the USA and the European Union countries to control it have so far failed to bring the desired result.

There are no reports yet of the use of Hawala to finance terrorists on Russian territory, but that does not mean that it does not exist. Specialists believe that the system may well be used in the Russian regions because, for example, in the North Caucasus republics there are numerous exchange and selling points as well as commercial entities owned or controlled by citizens of Middle East countries. They may well be connected with foreign non-governmental religious and political organizations and their accomplices from amongst the local population.

Internal sources of funding radicals in the 1990s included illegal oil and gas production, criminal incomes (extortion, kidnapping, arms and drug smuggling, financial fraud like fake credit note, false money, etc.). This was particularly widespread in Chechnya.

The same period saw the formation around Islamic organizations of a “buffer layer” of legal economic, social and political entities which provided the separatists with access to financial, economic, information and infrastructure resources. Thus, during 1999 the Federal Tax Police Service jointly with the tax inspectorate of the Karachay-Circassian Republic looked into the legality of acquisition of property and into the economic activities of the commercial entities belonging to extremist social groups or rendering them financial support. Eleven enterprises were identified whose managers preached radical Islam and supported extremists. The owner of two such enterprises was Achimez Gochiyayev who was wanted on account of the terrorist acts in Moscow and Volgodonsk. The inspection of the financial and business practices of these enterprises led to their shutdown [4]. The same niche is being used by the underground today. Sergey Sushchiy stresses that “incomes flow from business structures organized by underground terrorists (the bulk of them are located in the ‘home republics,’ but clearly production facilities can be set up in other republics of Russia and foreign countries). The same category includes proceeds from various forms of criminal business (from selling oil products to prostitution and gambling business)” (quoted from [6]). Thus, the formation of network terrorist structures in the North Caucasus in the first half of the 2000s changes the system of their functioning as it becomes more autonomous and less reliant on external sources.

Khanzhan Kurbanov, a scholar from Dagestan, stresses that although cutting the channels of funding bandit groups is important, it does not always solve the problem of spreading religious and political extremism, let alone terrorist groups which thrive on certain ideological and political and socioethical trends, have an autonomous

organization and mobile units which do not need stable and generous financing. In an atmosphere riddled with corruption gaining control over several firms and commercial enterprises, even through blackmail and threats, is not a problem for the terrorists. Shamil Basayev said this was how they secured hefty financial support from the heads of Chechnya administrations [8].

Andrey Przhezdovsky, adviser to the Chairman of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee of the Russian Federal Security Service stressed in an interview the leading role of the internal factor in financing terrorists: “We often feel like attributing the activities of terrorist groups to ‘foreign mischief-making.’ Activities of foreign centers of influence of course cannot be denied—financing, methodological and organizational assistance, briefings, etc. But it has to be admitted that these are not the decisive factors that ensure the high level of underground activities. Thus, the financing of anti-state activities to a large extent takes place locally. The main source of the flow of money used to organize ever new terrorist acts is pervasive extortion practice. Just about all private business in some southern regions has to pay the ‘terrorism tax.’ Business people and officials fear for their lives, official safety instruments do not work (sometimes corrupt officials are in cahoots with the extremists)” [13].

The internal character of current financing of terrorism in the North Caucasus is confirmed by Sergey Sushchiy who notes that money flows from legal and shadow business entities are controlled by the underground to varying degrees. Considering the scale of the shadow economy in the North Caucasus republics, which is an easier target for extortion than legal production, the share of proceeds of the underground from that source can be considerable [15]. Thus, an important feature of terrorism in the North Caucasus is that it is a stable and fairly self-sustaining system financially with a multi-level budget consisting of the budgets of jamaats, sectors, valayats and finally, Imarat Caucasus (Caucasus Emirate) [16].

The budget of Imarat Caucasus is formed from the budgets of valayats, the budgets of valayats from the budgets of sectors, and the latter in turn draw on the budgets of jamaats. All these budgets are formed by the “Jihad tax” which is presented by the militants as “a pillar of Islam”—Zakyat. Zakyat is levied by Islamists on officials in the North Caucasus republics and fellow tribesmen elsewhere. This system of taxation is based on extortion for which the Imarat leaders gave a theological reason. Money is collected from the bottom up starting from jamaats of villages and ending with the republics and the entire zone controlled by the Imarat.

The cash of the valayats, sectors and jamaats is administered by the amirs of these structures. Experts note that these features are ideal for the effectiveness of the whole system because in the context of clandestine activities and terrorism financial independence of terrorist units makes it possible to plan and carry out terrorist attacks and acts of sabotage quickly at all levels. Money is collected by the militants and their relatives as well as terrorist sympathizers. Refusal to pay the “tax” often leads to the execution of the “tax-dodger” [16].

The “jihad tax,” of course, was not invented by the North Caucasus radicals. It has been practiced under similar conditions everywhere in the Middle East and North Africa. For example, during the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan a similar

tax was paid to bandits by government and party functionaries, including ministers, members of the Revolutionary Council and Politburo of the ruling People's Democratic Party [12].

This practice of extortion came to the North Caucasus under a theological cover during the first Chechen campaign. However, at that time those were individual acts of extortion in the interests of specific bands. It is hard to tell exactly when the practice morphed into a system of collecting and distributing money in the interests of the whole network. However, the practice as a system was not mentioned until 2010 when the website of the militants in Kabardino-Balkaria posted the first threats to businessmen who refused to pay Zakyat. The practice was then spread to all the territories where the modern underground is active and was given a theological justification [16]. Efficient interaction of all the levels of "taxation" in the North Caucasus provided the underground with a significant amount of money which strengthened it and increased its ranks making it less dependent on the waning external transfers.

At the same time the "administration" of the virtual Caucasus Emirate, like the lower network structures of the North Caucasus terrorists, is afflicted by the same social "blight" as the state structures, including corruption. Embezzlement scandals were made public and even the relevant rulings of the Sharia court were published [1]. Experts also note that separatism and radical Islamism in the North Caucasus is often just a disguise for criminals who have in recent years resorted to extortion.

Thus, the actual structure of financing the terrorist underground in the North Caucasus today is a ramified network that constantly changes its geography and structure, the total amount of money circulating and the share of various sources. Of the common trends of recent years one should also note the diminishing transfers from external sources and increased internal financing of terrorism, diversification of internal sources and gradual financial "streamlining" of underground activities which, coming under strong pressure from the state adopted a regime of austerity and learned to make effective use of the diminished financial transfers. In spite of the weakening role and influence of the Caucasus Emirate as a result of the liquidation of its leader Doku Umarov in late 2013 and reorientation of some North Caucasus terrorist groups to the so-called Islamic State, the situation with the financing of local Takfiki jihadists has changed but little. This is not surprising considering that such entities demand that the foreign network structures and their cells which have pledged allegiance to them pay their way by fair means and foul, including plainly criminal methods.

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Thought Revolution

Igor YAKOVENKO

Abstract. This article raises the question of the place and role of revolution in general and the Russian October revolution in particular. The author describes the processes that triggered the formation of the Bolshevik ideology. The stage Russia was at and the specificities of its civilization shifted the period of eschatological upheaval of the traditionalist masses in the context of the chiliastic project to the era of industrial upsurge, which made it possible in principle for Russia to join the mainstream scenario of historical development. The alliance of the radical intelligentsia and the broad masses equally attracted by the socialist perspective demolished the dead-end “old order” and turned a new page of world history. The Bolshevik Revolution solved the tasks of the classical bourgeois-democratic revolution, a fact that secured the Bolshevik victory in the Civil War. However, because the chiliastic project is impossible in principle since it contradicts human nature and the nature of social relations, the socialist experiment ended as it should have ended.

Keywords: socialism, civilization, revolution, radical intelligentsia, chiliastic project, Bolshevism, archaic communal peasant consciousness, Orthodoxy, culture, historical choice.

Today, with the approach of the centenary of the 1917 events—the February Revolution followed by the Bolshevik coup, as well as the Civil War which sealed the result of the coup—there is no getting away from the theme of the title of this article. A hundred years is a long enough time to shed myths, overcome the powerful ideological schemes and at least to try to step back and look at the event in an impartial way unencumbered by party allegiances and ideological preferences. Understanding of this world historic phenomenon raises the questions of the nature of Russia, its place in the world as a whole, gives insights into the present era and provides pointers to the more probable directions of our future development.

One has to bear in mind the historical-cultural and ideological context of the discussion of the revolutionary topic. To this day, ever since 1917, it has not been

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possible to speak in Russia about the October coup in a calm and detached way as one might discuss, for example, the Reformation or the wars of the Diadochi.

First of all we have to define the concept of “revolution” and the corresponding political and ideological contexts. In the Soviet Union the word “Revolution” carried a sacral connotation. The bourgeois-democratic revolutions were perceived as milestones of European history over the past two centuries which propelled world history and prepared the Great October Socialist Revolution. The latter was seen as the key event that ushered in a new era in human history. The Soviet Union and the communist project grew out of that event and thus conferred legitimacy on the ruling regime, which is why the Bolshevik Revolution was seen as an indisputable good. This view was shared by the majority of Soviet society (at least in the post-war period). People of the older generations have vivid memories of the spiritual atmosphere of the 1960s and 1980s. Bulat Okudzhava’s confessional poem, which was miles away from the official ideology prevalent at the time, has the words: “I am destined to die / in that only war, the Civil War, / and commissars in their dusty helmets / will silently bow their heads over me.” This is the way one writes about existentially important personal values.

The 1990s did not add any new shades of meaning to the universal concept of revolution. The interpretation of the Bolshevik Revolution was the subject of fierce debate. The concept of “revolution” lost some of its appeal because the leaders of the new Russia did not dare to describe the events of August 1991 as a revolution. Changes occurred in the 2000s when a classical conservative ideology began to assert itself slowly but steadily. This paradigm presents revolution as something alien to the spirit of the people, an imported weapon of political struggle resorted to by (self-seeking) “interest groups” guided by external forces.

Oddly enough, nobody mentions the moral aspect of this interpretation of historical events. In the framework of these myths the hundreds of thousands and millions of people who come out to the central squares of their capitals are not citizens acting on the basis of moral and civic choice, but unenlightened and unreasonable people led by experienced manipulators. This theory comes in handy in assessing foreign policy changes. Everything that is seen as hostile and is not part of “our” plans (i.e., the plans of the political elite and the ideologues who serve it) whether it has to do with the post-Soviet space, the former “people’s democracies” of Eastern Europe or the Arab world which has lived through its own “spring,” is branded as the intrigues of the strategic enemy. This automatically shoves under the rug questions of the internal reasons of events, the historical evolution and the historical choice made at turning points in history by all peoples (only the forms of choice differ).

Discussing whether or not the revolution was needed anywhere, including Russia in 1917, makes no sense. There are no accidental revolutions. Processes involving statistically significant numbers of people, millions in our case, are inevitable and logical. This is an objective historical process. For all the tragic characteristics of revolutions, they are inescapable in principle. Revolutions resolve the conflict between the stable structural element of any society and the universal

imperative of change. Much of the responsibility for revolutions is borne by the elites, who have the intellectual and organization resources to understand reality, fathom the logic of history and the shaping of sound policy, but are unable to step over ideological barriers and sacrifice something in order to save a great deal more. To a lesser extent the responsibility lies with the broad masses which at some point refuse to tolerate the old order and sweep it away.

Nobody knows the long-term consequences of any revolution. However, at all times the vast majority of the people involved in it experience it apocalyptically as an end to an intolerable state of affairs and the advent of a new era, an era of universal justice and happiness. For that category of people the revolution is a feast, a space of ideal being. I have known people who have lived through this tragic and wonderful era and I can attest that those who took the side of the revolution treasured that experience until last in spite of all the horrors and disappointments. This experience can be traced to religious consciousness and even deeper, to the archetypes of collective ritual actions.

Now let us look at the accepted definition of the phenomenon we are studying. The Great October Revolution was not a revolution in the proper sense of the word. Incidentally, during the first ten years after the events of 25 October 1917 the Bolsheviks referred to it as the “Bolshevik coup” (*perevorot*). A revolution is commonly seen as a change of political regime that occurs as a result of spontaneous actions of the popular masses. People come out into the streets, the army refuses to shoot at civilians, takes the side of the rebellious people and the old regime falls. If power is taken over by an organized force which seizes state control centers, it is a military or political coup.

Next, every coup goes through the procedure of verification. Society either accepts or rejects its results, and in the latter case a civil war ensues and a counter-coup takes place. In our case a Civil War broke out after the Constitutional Assembly was dissolved. The fact that what happened in Petrograd on 25 October 1917 was a coup does not detract from its significance. Nor does it represent an attempt to present it as something external and accidental because the Bolshevik coup was endorsed by a nationwide referendum whose name was the Civil War. It is a matter of the correct approach and correct use of terms.

Why Did Bolshevism Arise and Win in Russia?

Marxism, of course, appeared in Europe. On its way from being an ideological doctrine to becoming a political movement, the radical revolutionary teaching underwent substantial changes. The Social Democrats were a legitimate feature of the European political landscape pushing their countries toward becoming social states and posed no threat to normal historical evolution. Europe had its radicals—anarchists, Blanquists—but they were on the periphery of social life. Not so the Bolshevik ideology, or to use the terminology accepted in this country, Marxism-Leninism. It is a peculiarly Russian phenomenon born on the periphery of Europe in a stagnant Orthodox society. These are important circumstances.

The Bolshevik ideology and the political practice that grew out of it took shape as a result of mutual interpenetration of the communal peasant and radical intelligentsia consciousness.

History attests that at the turn of the Middle Ages and the Modern Times when the settled way of life hallowed by tradition collapses, the traditionalist masses, mainly peasants, become radicalized and fall victim to an eschatological hysteria. The conviction that the world steeped in sin is approaching its inevitable end and that the “righteous” will be admitted to the Kingdom of God which will replace this world, becomes all but universal. Chiliastic movements bring under their banners tens of thousands of people. Savonarola in Venice, Müntzer in Germany, the Taborites in Bohemia, Luddites in England differ in their scale and ideological tinge, but share an underlying motive: categorical rejection of the Modern Times and a striving back to the starting historical point of humanity which was perceived as idyllic, before money, before social inequality, before exploitation, before death, disease and suffering.

Let me note in passing that all the peasant wars end in defeat owing to a fundamental circumstance: grassroots chiliastic movements do not have a viable plan for an alternative social order. Müntzer’s people burned grain stores and refused to plough land and raise crops, being convinced that Christ whose advent is nigh will know how to feed his warriors. Russia lived through a similar movement in the early 17th century. In Soviet historical studies it came to be known as Ivan Bolotnikov’s Peasant War (1606-1607). The Cossacks and “thieves” (which in those days was a blanket term for all criminals) brought nothing but devastation. For the ordinary people it meant looting and murder. The First and Second Militias fought both the Polish invaders and the Cossacks. The whole enterprise ended in a predictable way: Bolotnikov was blinded and drowned, Ataman Zarutsky was impaled.

Faith in the chiliastic project calls for an intense religious consciousness, a prophetic conviction of an inevitable triumph of What Should Be. Secular Europe which entered the Modern Times lived down that type of world sense. By the 19th century the Medieval idea of What Should Be was dead. Accordingly, the section of society capable of mounting a radical political challenge shrank and was sidelined. The experience of the Paris Commune was short-lived and came to a dismal end.

Russia was a different case. In the opinion of experts, the 1830s and 1840s marked a watershed. The capitalist sector of the economy starts developing in the bosom of the feudal society based on social estates and serfdom. A nationwide market gradually emerges. The system of education brings tangible fruit, a sizeable educated social stratum begins to be formed in Russia and the Modern Times begin. Incidentally, it was then that the phenomenon known as the “Russian intelligentsia” emerged.

At the same time the serfdom system suffers crisis as the traditional patriarchal way of life is destroyed. That inevitably creates conditions for “passionarization,” eschatological yearning, dark prophecies of itinerant monks who sing

and recite spiritual verse and folk epics (*bylinas*) and other “God’s people.” The unshakable conviction that the end of time is nigh created an ideal soil for the search for a qualitatively new alternative.

The late 19th century saw a key development that ensured the victory of the Bolsheviks and that development was the “meeting” of the radical Russian intelligentsia with the powerful popular masses. The two shared a categorical rejection of the direction of historical development which became ever more clearly discernible as the Modern Times arrived.

The first attempt at a marriage of the radical intelligentsia and the popular masses—known as “going to the people”—was made in the 1870s and was not particularly successful. The Bolsheviks were working in the same direction, but not with the peasant masses, but with yesterday’s peasants who had moved to the cities to work at factories. Unqualified “gut” rejection of “the bourgeois kingdom” (Nikolay Berdyayev) was shared by all the members of the Russian intelligentsia from Aleksandr Herzen to the Silver Age intellectuals. The popular masses, that is, actual or yesterday’s peasants, for their part hated the “kulaks” (rich peasants) and dreaded the city which they saw as a threat to their familiar patriarchal world. It was in this space that cross-pollination occurred, with the Bolshevik mythology acquiring Manichean and eschatological motives, and ideas of normal and ethical methods of implementing these ideals were formed. Unlike the chiliastic movements of the past, the adepts of Marxism-Leninism managed to formulate and implement a *real alternative* to the society they rejected, a monstrous, economically inefficient but viable (at least in the space of two or three generations).

Each time I hear or read harrowing stories of the tragic stage in Soviet history and the atrocities committed by the Bolsheviks I cannot help asking myself, have these people come from Mars? Have they been sent in by a hostile external force? The monsters of the punitive system had grown up in Russia and had absorbed its spirit. They are an organic product of our national psyche. Mikhail Davydov put it in the following way: “The Bolsheviks were an organic part of this society which had very serious problems with morality and ethics although the words ‘ethics’ and ‘justice’ were extremely popular, a society in which there was room for Nechayev and terrorists were regarded as ‘holy people,’ in which Jewish pogroms were condemned while pogroms of land owners were called ‘illuminations’” [1, p. 881].

In Russian reality since the days of yore human life cost almost nothing and the Manichean conviction prevailed that an enemy is not a human being, but a tool in the hands of the Devil, that is, of absolute Evil. A culture in which repressions permeated every level of existence and sometimes assumed monstrous form (branding, cutting off nostrils, whipping, beating with sticks) was part and parcel of Russian reality. There were no Bolsheviks in Russia in the 17th century and the decision to execute Ivan the Little Thief, the three-year-old son of False Dmitry II and Marina Mnishek, was made by the supreme rulers. Hangmen had to carry the gravely sick child to the gallows. Is that episode of Russian history much different from the Bolshevik practices?

We have no right to forget about these deep-rooted traditions. We have to admit that Russian society was pregnant with the idea of socialism and the Bolsheviks were the force that was able to meet the aspirations of the peasants (*chorny peredel*, or re-dividing land) and of the educated part of society (socialism). The fact that the practical result of this turned out to be scary and historically removed these two driving forces of the revolution constitutes one of the key problems in understanding Russian history in the 20th century.

The Russian Intelligentsia and Socialism

The topic of socialism and the educated class of Russian society merits special attention. Let me begin by saying that left-wing ideology, the ideas of socialism and communism are a universal intellectual temptation that haunted the Christian world since the second half of the 19th century until the end of the 20th century. Today, after the collapse of world communism, the lure of left-wing ideas has faded somewhat, the proponents of these ideas joined the anti-globalists and moved closer to the marginal sector. And yet only 40 or 50 years ago left-wing intellectuals held university professorships and “left” discourse was considered to be *bon ton* in decent society. (Having said that, “the historical pendulum” may well swing the other way.)

The cultural and historical sources of left-wing ideology form the subject of important and serious discussion. It is about the myths of Progress and Enlightenment, the beckoning triumph of What Should Be or chiliastic utopia and a powerful rejection of personality. Finally, it is about the Enlightenment-inspired philosophical anthropology.

A brief comment is in order on the grand 18th and 19th-centuries mythologies. One has to distinguish the Enlightenment project and the ideology of Progress and their mythological interpretation. The masses inevitably mythologize any philosophical or scientific tradition that comes within their field of vision. Such is the nature of things. Mythologically interpreted Enlightenment and Progress provided the basic technologies for building the Kingdom of God on earth. Drawing on the achievements of science and technology and guided by the luminous idea an enlightened people will create an affluent society, do away with the vestiges of the old world and pave the way to the land of White Water, a legendary land of freedom of Russian legend. Real Enlightenment and Progress can build a modern society with all its contradictions, problems and bottlenecks. But they are unable to build the Bright Future because nobody will ever be able to build a Bright Future under any circumstances since it contradicts human nature. Man, like any other biological species, can manifest his nature in various ways. There are, of course, saints and villains, but the common people work of necessity (forced by the overseer or fear of starving to death) and tend to “grab anything that comes along” at the slightest opportunity.

Mythologized glorification of the people is an occupational disease of the Russian intelligentsia. Forgetting the behest “thou shalt not make yourself an idol” the Russian intelligentsia has been afflicted from birth with love of the common people with regard to whom it has an abiding feeling of guilt. The sources and psychological mechanisms of this phenomenon merit a special study. Let me just note that the Russian intellectual in the 18th century had no such feelings and had no compunction about distancing himself from the archaic mass which belonged to a different historical stage.

The People is the custodian of the ideal of communal life who has been spared the experience of fragmentation of the syncretic whole. In that sense our people is an antipode of the bourgeoisie which has cast aside righteousness and flouts the eternal laws of goodness and justice. A member of the Russian intelligentsia typically has a knee-jerk, “gut” aversion for the bourgeois individualist and his world. He believes that the right kind of human being should think about great things and serve sacral causes. In effect a classical member of the Russian intelligentsia saw himself as “a lay monk.” The religious sources of such perception of the world are obvious to a historian of culture.

Unlike the unlettered peasant, the Russian intellectual has read the New Testament and the Church Fathers. The underlying idea of the intelligentsia’s consciousness is that of the early Christianity “My kingdom is not of this world” (John 18.36), of detachment from earthly things in the name of the ideal world of divine truth. Enlightenment and secularization have replaced divine authorities. The Kingdom of God and eternal life has been transformed into the bright future for the whole mankind, a world of universal happiness and harmony. This is the only goal worth living for. Looked at from that perspective the pragmatic European of the secular era who is part of *this* world, stands firm on his feet and seeks to make his own life and that of his close ones comfortable is disgusting because he has betrayed Man’s divine mission.

The member of the Russian intelligentsia is a contradictory creature. European education orients him toward a rational perception of the world, autonomy of the individual and liberal values. But his background, the innate archaic instincts revolt against the sinful autonomous subject, the pettiness of his world, and he is confident that bourgeois society is doomed, that it will collapse and give way to a truly just and wonderful future.

Worship of the People sprang from the values underlying the world perception of the intelligentsia. The traditional peasant belongs to a syncretic world. The pristine purity of his mind is not muddied by the deadening wisdom of rational knowledge. He is immeasurably closer to the unarticulated magic truth. Socialism is wonderful *a priori*, just like Paradise is wonderful *a priori*. This is a convention that is not subject to discussion. A peasant living in a commune already participates in the blessing of socialism. (Special thanks for this to Baron von Haxthausen who in 1843 discovered the Russian peasant commune which he saw as a barrier in the way of a European revolution in Russia.)

I have mentioned the anti-personality thrust of the Russian intelligentsia's consciousness, and its historical stage-related and qualitative (Orthodox) sources. I would like to say a few words about philosophical anthropology or the interpretation of human nature. The revolutionary intelligentsia rejected anthropological pessimism which considered man to be an imperfect creature prone to vice and guided more by emotions than reason. To simplify, the advocates of the socialist perspective assumed that *man is inherently good*, although not always and not under any circumstances. Human nature is open to the seductions of idleness, lust for gain and power acquired over the centuries of living in a class society. However, if these temptations are removed and a society is created that is oriented toward man's better nature, people will return to their initial goodness. In other words, parasitic and predatory strategy is rooted *not in human nature*, but in the dramatic experience of history.

Summing up, the answer to the question why did Bolshevism arise and triumph in Russia? can be formulated as follows: The stage Russia was at and the specificities of its civilization shifted the period of eschatological upheaval of the traditional masses in the context of the chiliastic project to the era of industrial upsurge which made it possible in principle for Russia to join the mainstream scenario of historical development. The alliance of the radical intelligentsia and the broad masses equally attracted by the socialist perspective demolished the dead-end "old order" and turned a new page of world history. The Bolshevik revolution solved the tasks of the classical bourgeois-democratic revolution, which secured the Bolshevik victory in the Civil War.

In the epoch described here chiliastic ideas were alien to the pragmatic West European who had his feet firmly on the ground. Not so the Orthodox world. 20th-century history shows that all Orthodox societies fall back on the communist project when they reach the critical phase of modernization transition. The only exception is Greece which was saved by Britain and USA during the 1946-1949 civil war. In Yugoslavia the communists came to power as a result of the national liberation civil war. In Bulgaria communists came to power through a government coup in September 1944. In Romania a similar scenario was played out. It has to be noted that the history of Catholic as well as Protestant societies in the "people's democracies" (East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) is riddled with popular movements and uprisings against the local communist regimes. As for Orthodox societies, they did not see any large-scale protests or attempts to drop out of the game (like the Prague Spring in 1968).

Dmitry Olshansky, a political scientist, considers Soviet-style socialism to be "a reaction to precipitous individualization, a kind of hark back to the past," to the reality where there was no alienation and the psyche was integral and not fragmented. The main mechanism for consolidating society under socialism is massive ideological brainwashing. Accordingly, the slowdown of the pace of development, gerontocracy, and renunciation of innovations are inevitable and inherent consequences of the restoration of a *quasi-traditional society* which Olshansky interprets as a historical compromise between the traditional mentality of the

broad masses and the imperative of modernization. From the sociopsychological point of view socialism is a revenge of mass psychology in response to an attempted hasty and largely forced individualization of the psyche [2].

What would Russia be like if the October Revolution had not occurred? I don't think a revolution could have been avoided. One might also muse about what would have happened if the Bolsheviks were defeated in the Civil War? Most probably a tough authoritarian regime would have been established. The ideological dimension of post-revolutionary society is more difficult to describe. Judging from the internal alignments one might have expected a pro-Fascist ideology. However, Fascism prevailed in societies that were more or less homogeneous ethnically. Russia is a continental empire where ethnically and religiously different peoples live side by side (this distinguishes continental empires from colonial ones). In this case one could expect the triumph of a universalist doctrine that rejects ethnic and confessional differences and unites all people, which is what actually happened. In the light of the above one could imagine that a mild form of Great Russian ideology would prevail. The range of variations goes from Marshal Józef Piłsudski and Generalissimo Francisco Franco to Conducator Ion Antonescu.

Modern humanities uses the notion of "development dictatorship." I believe that Russia in the 1920s and 1930s was doomed to a development dictatorship. Because in a dictatorship there are no endogenous sources of development, development dictatorships inevitably morph into dictatorships of stagnation. In any case the characteristics of society dictated conservative modernization and the establishment of a quasi-traditional society. That of course rules out any talk about a population of 500 million, prosperity and the status of a leading world power. Economic achievements would have been more modest, but there would have been much less bloodshed and suffering.

Russia gave the world two great totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century. It implemented the project of building a communist society, an event on a world historic scale. The chiliastic project accepted by the bulk of the population, constant exposure to ideological brainwashing and massive coercion on the part of the state mobilized a huge amount of social energy which made Russia a superpower.

From the time of Philotheus of Pskov the political elite aspired to the status of a mystical and ideological center of the Universe, and from the beginning of the 19th century it consistently sought world domination. Needless to say, that goal was invariably described as the struggle for establishing the true faith and absolute good. Russia was never closer to achieving that goal than in the heyday of the USSR in the 1950s and 1960s.

World dominance was not achieved and modernization processes ground to a halt in the late 1960s. What was achieved? The historical material that dragged the country into the communist project was reworked. By the 1970s the reproduction of the traditional Russian peasantry stopped. Peasant Russia ceased to exist, bemoaned solemnly by the "rustic writers." The 1990s and 2000s saw the departure of the last generation of the Russian intelligentsia who inherited the

characteristics of traditional members of the Russian intelligentsia. The generations that followed did not reproduce that type of consciousness.

During the 70 years of the communist experiment history was solving the objective tasks of the country's development. They were very different from those intended by the leaders during the Revolution and the Civil War. When the potential of the Soviet form of a sociocultural whole were exhausted, it fell apart, and we are witnessing the next stage of Russian history unfolding.

Russia devoted the entire 20th century to a new religious truth which Russian society had conceived and nurtured through much suffering. The truth, by definition, was universal. The Russian people and the other peoples of the USSR were persuaded of their historic mission of bringing the truth they had arrived at to the whole mankind. All the available strength and huge resources were expended on that. Cyclopean projects were implemented for this purpose. But *humanity rejected* the prospect of the "bright future." Communism failed to become a world religion. In its quest of world dominance the Soviet Union entered into a military-technological race with the bloc of world leaders, overstrained itself and collapsed. The collapse of the communist project and the "society of real socialism" was the crowning event of the 20th century that ushered in an era of transition of the world to a new order. The Soviet Union was a political shell of the communist project. The collapse of communism marked the end of the empire.

How and Why Did Everything Come to an End?

The Soviet period of Russian history is diverse. I would single out one significant aspect. In the second half of the 20th century Russia entered the secular era (in the USSR the concept of "secularization" was used in the legal sense of separation of church from state). In reality the Bolsheviks pursued a policy aimed at destroying Orthodoxy. In the European sense secularization means the process of transformation of social relations, culture and the individual through the formation of a secular society and a secular culture. It has to be said without mincing words that the indoctrinated Soviet man had a religion. But his religion denied the existence of God and considered the church to be an institution that was spreading a harmful and dangerous opiate.

However, from the beginning of the 20th century Russia experienced an urban revolution. The Soviet project embraced the ideology of Enlightenment. Soviet power realized that education was a key factor in the competition between the two socioeconomic and political systems. Vast resources were committed to these goals. Higher, secondary and specialized secondary education increased many times over. Industrial production emerged as the core of the economy. The mass person moved into a qualitatively different social and information context and his consciousness was changing. De-Stalinization and the failure of the Soviet project marked the fading of the chiliastic utopianism and the faith in the Great earthly god. However, secularization makes a person autonomous, dilutes the ascetic ideal, erodes the norm of equality of all in poverty and of course devalues

eschatological optimism. The emphasis is shifted from life for the sake of the future to life in the present.

The ideological climate of the later Soviet society implied dedicated work for the good of the future generations. But life is life. People were getting fed up with the world of shoddy consumer goods and a growing shortage of everything. During the Second World War millions of men in military uniforms saw Europe with their own eyes, the notions of “lend-lease” (bomber jackets and boots) and “trophy” goods became current. Later, in the 1960s people got access to magical “imported” or “trademark” goods (foreign-made cars and status symbols). These realities buried chiliastic consciousness. Equality in universal poverty or in just being able to get ends meet held no appeal. In mature Soviet society there emerged a privileged social estate (bosses, factory managers, cultural celebrities) although their privileges were fairly modest by modern standards. There was no equality and could not have been, because it runs counter to human nature. When that fact sank in, utopian consciousness was finished. The dreary and unbearably shabby life of the Soviet man was too much to bear compared to the holes opening up in the rusty Iron Curtain. Eventually Soviet society itself lost faith in the communist perspective and abandoned the Soviet project. The more flexible members of the ruling elite and the intelligentsia were the first to come to this conclusion. Then *perestroika* (restructuring) broke out and the Soviet consumer, worn down by constant deficit, scored a strategic victory. The mouth-watering sight of store shelves laden with thirty kinds of sausages overshadowed images of the City of the Sun.

What Are the Problems of Present-day Post-Soviet Society?

In the most general way, the main problem is that the Soviet project has spent itself while the post-Soviet man does not seem to be ready or able to live and work in a different way, not in the way he used to work in the last 150-200 years. The private interest, suppressed over 70 years, came back with a vengeance and took hideous forms. It turned out that the overwhelming majority of our fellow citizens do not want to “live by the law,” that is, in accordance with the normative model of social relations (which is the only mode of existence in an effective and dynamic market economy). They prefer living according to unwritten rules of the mob. But that is a dead end that pushes Russia into the Third World.

The concept of “legalistic” consciousness, formerly thought to be rather an exotic notion from another world, suddenly turns out to be relevant because the law only exists when its provisions are shared by the whole society. Otherwise it becomes window-dressing. It turned out that “our people,” confronted with reality in which they have to obey the law and should not steal at the slightest opportunity, experience something like a metaphysical protest and, after a painful attempt at changing their ways are going back to where they feel more at home with a sense of relief. One can imagine a situation when stealing, grabbing what belongs to others or giving bribes would become dangerous. But in my opinion, it is even more important to create an atmosphere in society when people would

be ashamed of all this, as they are ashamed of crossing the street against the red light, leaving litter in the woods, etc. So far nobody has found an answer to how to do this.

Russia has no future unless private property becomes sacred as a universal moral convention. It is still unclear whether the right of property is compatible with the Russian sociocultural whole. By the way, Russia never had private property as common law. The Soviet stage revealed and sharpened that tradition. Nor will Russia be able to build a modern society without forming genuine democratic institutions and without real involvement of the majority of people in managing homeowners' community affairs, municipal government bodies, regional legislatures and finally, national democratic institutions. So far what we see is widespread passivity, alienation of the majority of the population from state institutions and a paternalistic mentality of "the little man" counting on help from those on high. These and other problems of our time make relevant the study of the events of 1917-1922. The Bolshevik Revolution and the destinies of Russia in the 20th century will continue to attract scholarly attention.

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Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

The Russian Proletariat in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries: Revolutionary Vanguard, Hegemon, or Marginal Actor?

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Abstract. The Russian workers could not play the role of revolutionary vanguard and hegemon in the revolutionary movement because owing to a number of social, economic, cultural and psychological factors they did not form a social class and did not possess a proletarian socialist world view. In a situation when their fundamental, basic needs could not be met the workers developed a resentful, emotionally negative state of frustration, discontent, disenchantment, anxiety, irritation and even despair, which often manifested itself in aggressive behavior. Frustrated, poorly educated people were suggestible and easy to manipulate, prone to be drawn into protest political movements becoming easy prey for various political and religious prophets who promised a quick change for the better.

Keywords: Russian proletariat, workers' movement, social protest, political protest, Russian Revolution of 1917, manipulation of public opinion, Bolsheviks, historiography.

The study of pre-revolutionary Russian proletariat was accorded pride of place in Soviet historiography. Thousands of books, dissertations and articles were written about it. One would have thought that given such intensive study, the topic would have been, if not exhausted, at least comprehensively researched. However, this did not happen because the topic was heavily ideologized. Soviet social scientists followed the tenets of the Marxist-Leninist theory whereby the Great October Socialist Revolution was a logical and necessary event and all the methods the Bolsheviks used to gain victory, including mass terror, were justified. Specifically, they had to prove that:

- 1) the country had sufficiently developed capitalism which had prepared it socially and economically for a "socialist revolution" and subsequent socialist transformation;
- 2) the revolution was proletarian and socialist in its essence;

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3) the proletariat played the role of vanguard and hegemon of the working people;

4) the working class had all the qualities needed to play such a role;

5) the victory of the revolution vindicated the Marxist-Leninist thesis that the working class is the main driving force of the revolutionary transformation of the world.

Quotations from the works of Vladimir Lenin and other Marxist classics often clinched the argument in favor of this concept [29, pp. 140-143, 160-164; 30, pp. 80-91, 119-121, 183-189, 194-201; 31, pp. 17-81, 317-323, 678-681; 64, pp. 5-17, 374-383].

Exposed to ideological and administrative pressure, scholars went out of their way to overstate the degree of capitalist development in Russia and exaggerate the strength, numbers, consciousness and revolutionary sentiments of the “advanced,” “heroic” class, the hegemon of all working people. A radical way of inflating the number of workers by lumping all hired workers together into a single class of proletarians was a fallacy. Many employees, especially in the services sphere (house servants, salesclerks, janitors, cabmen, tailors, shoemakers, shop assistants, prostitutes, actors and so on) represented social groups that differed from industrial workers in terms of income, lifestyle, education and mindset; some of them were to varying degrees engaged in intellectual trades and did not identify themselves with the proletariat.

The lower-level managerial personnel in industry, construction and transport, in spite of its working-class background, can hardly be identified with the proletarians. A popular way of exaggerating the class consciousness and revolutionary spirit of the proletarians was to treat them all as a single class and to attribute to them the qualities of a small group of “mental, or intelligent workers.” In 1999 Stanislav Tyutyukin, a noted specialist on the history of the proletariat and the revolution, addressing the Academic Council of the RAS Institute of Russian History, rightly described Soviet historiography as biased and geared to promoting a predetermined view: “It is obvious that our approach in the past erred on the side of idealization. Instead of flesh-and-blood people the working class was seen as a bronze statue only remotely reminiscent of the historical realities of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The approach has to be changed. Above all, the approach should be simply more objective because what we have been doing up until now was far removed from the historical truth” (quoted from [59, p. 103]).

In my opinion, the idealization of the proletariat and the workers’ movement and exaggeration of its role was the key reason for the swing of opinion against the proletariat in historiography which, unfortunately, still continues. In spite of the huge Soviet research heritage, there are many more things that are unclear than things that have been explained, and the results of research are not unimpeachable and not objective in more ways than one.

So what was the Russian proletariat in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a revolutionary vanguard, hegemon or marginal actor? What role did it play in the 1917 Revolution, the subject of the political process or an object of manipulation by politicians? This article tries to throw some light on these issues.

Numbers of Workers and Their Breakdown by Gender, Age, Marital Status and Profession

The question as to whether workers can be seen as a social estate is still moot [18, p. 301]. In my view, workers can be considered to be a social or professional group, but not a social estate because they were not a social estate under law: the “title” of worker was not earned or inherited, and there were representatives of many social estates among workers (see Table 1).

Industrial workers as a *professional group* appeared in Russia in the 17th century with the first industrial enterprises (manufactories). By 1861 the number of workers employed at large factories and mining industries (less transport workers) reached 810,000. Between 1861 and 1916 the number of workers in the Empire (less Finland) increased to 3 million (see [61, pp. 62, 189-190; 50, pp. 132-133; 65, pp. 34-43, 245-255; 64, pp. 73-76, 152-177, 260-274].¹ However, their share in the able-bodied population nationwide had grown only from 1.9 to 3.8% and was

Table 1

Breakdown by Estate of the Workers in the Moscow Guberniya (not incl. Moscow City) in 1879-1884 and Smolensk Guberniya in 1894-1895

Estates	Male		Female		Both sexes	
	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%
Peasants	64,608	84.55	30,204	92.25	94,812	86.86
Soldiers and their wives	6,530	8.55	733	2.24	7,263	6.65
Urban commoners	5,151	6.74	1,787	5.46	6,938	6.36
Nobility	42	0.05	8	0.02	50	0.05
Clergy	27	0.04	1	0.00	28	0.03
Orphanage graduates	14	0.02	6	0.02	20	0.02
Guileded craftspeople	13	0.02	0	0.00	13	0.01
Distinguished citizens	10	0.01	1	0.00	11	0.01
Cantonists	7	0.01	0	0.00	7	0.01
Foreigners	4	0.01	1	0.00	5	0.00
Workers	4	0.01	0	0.00	4	0.00
Merchants	2	0.00	0	0.00	2	0.00
Other	2	0.00	0	0.00	2	0.00
<i>Total</i>	76,414	100.00	32,741	100.00	109,155	100.00

Calculated from [77; 4].

insignificant, way behind the leading Western countries where it increased as follows in the second half of the 19th century: Great Britain (less Ireland) from 42% to 74%, France, from 18% to 25%, Germany from 7% to 39%, the USA from 18% to 25% [44, pp. 530, 568, 619, 620, 668; 28, pp. 8, 126, 134; 49, pp. 20-24, 35-37, 41-42, 52-53, 155, 157, 163].

The period after the emancipation of the serfs saw *professionalization* of Russian workers as manifested in the growing share of permanent and hereditary personnel, and increased length of service and skills and the weakening of links with farming and rural life. However, Soviet historians exaggerated the intensity of these processes. In 1914 the share of hereditary workers in industry was less than 50%. Even in 1929, the year for which the most complete data are available, permanent workers in industry accounted for 52% of the total number of workers [65, pp. 73-76; 64, pp. 285-303; 41, pp. 28-29].

Data on the links of industrial workers with agriculture are disparate because they depended on the method of collecting them, on the questionnaire the workers filled, the region and the industrial sector and finally, the economic situation at the time of the survey. Soviet studies provide contradictory data on the degree and pace at which workers were distancing themselves from agriculture, so the successes of proletarianization should not be overestimated. The August 31, 1918 professional census which covered 983,800 workers (84% of all workers at the time of the census) in 31 Great Russian guberniyas revealed that before the 1917 revolution 31% of the workers owned land or the land of their family, and 21% worked their plots of land (calculated from [17; 67, pp. 64-65]). These figures are understated for two reasons. First, at the time of the census about 18% of workers moved to the countryside [50, pp. 132-133; 68, p. 38; 69, pp. 64-65] to flee hunger and the revolution and to take part in the confiscation of land from the *kulaks* (rich peasants) and landowners. Most probably those who migrated had relatives, family and farms there, in short, they had not severed their close links with the countryside during the years that they worked in industry. If one counts in the 18% who migrated as people who had links with agriculture on the eve of the revolutionary events of 1917 42% of workers owned land, and out of that number 28% were working their land. Second, the professional census did not cover workers from Ukraine, Urals and Siberia whose links with rural life were much stronger than those of the workers in the Great Russian guberniyas. In 1886-1893 about 55% of all the workers in Ukrainian guberniyas took time off to do agricultural work and in the southern steppe regions the percentage was 76%, whereas for those covered by the census the figure was 11-24%.

The average figures, of course, did not reflect the great regional and sectoral diversity. In 1910 10% of workers from St. Petersburg went home for the summer agricultural season, in 1914 16.5% had land in the countryside [61, p. 570; 39, p. 145], in 1912, from Moscow, 25% [23, pp. 100-101], from the mining industries in Southern Russia in 1914 between 25 and 50% and almost all the mining workers in the Urals area retained their links with land in the early 20th century. In 1897 the percentage of printing workers who owned land in the countryside was 70%,

in the metal-working industry, 55%, in wood-working, 54% [39, pp. 141, 149, 154]. However, everywhere a large part of the workers had not forgotten agriculture and those who had severed links with the land did not quite lose their peasant mentality—that takes about three generations. A childhood spent in a rural environment leaves an imprint which an illiterate or semi-literate person can never quite erase.

Two circumstances tended to perpetuate close links with the countryside.

First, most factory workers lived in the rural areas where the majority of industries were located, many within a short distance from their homes [56, p. 254].

Second, most of the new workers were recruited from amongst peasants.

Getting rid of the peasant past was a contradictory, slow and painful process while migrants from rural areas accounted for nearly 90% of the urban population growth (workers and hired labor) because the natural population growth among the urban folk was negative and among hereditary workers very low. Between 1869 and 1910 the population of Petersburg grew by 969,000, of which peasants accounted for 90% (872,000). The number of peasants in the capital increased by 5.3 times and the total population by 2.5 times [69, p. 342; 61, p. 439]. In Moscow in 1853-1854 the share of migrants among the 45,400 industrial workers was about 90%, in 1912 they accounted for 91% of the 165,200 workers [33, pp. 22-23, 67; 23, pp. 100-101]. The situation was similar in all the other big cities and industrial centers. Under these circumstances, the share of hereditary hired workers and professional workers who had severed links with agriculture and rural life could not increase rapidly.

The gender, age and family composition of the body of workers went a long way to determine their mentality, continuity of generations and the reproduction of the population and culture. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries women accounted for 15% of the industrial workforce [61, p. 218]. More women began to be involved in industry during the First World War and by the beginning of 1917 they accounted for 40% of all workers [60, p. 236; 65, pp. 245-254; 64, pp. 275-277]. The age profile of workers shows that adult workers aged 17-39 (70%) prevailed among both male and female workers; the share of people aged 40-59 was 12-17%, and of those above 59, about 1-2% (it increased by 1.5% during the war). The core was formed by workers in the 20-39 age bracket who accounted for more than half of the total 55-59% [17, pp. 11-125; 12, pp. XLII-L; 16, pp. 70-73; 65, pp. 34-42; 64, pp. 275-277].

The marital status of workers was markedly different from that in the other social estates, so in 1897 many persons over 15 were unmarried: nearly half (about 45%) of men and two-thirds (63%) of women; the share of married persons was respectively 53% and 29% and of widowed persons 2% and 8%. Among marriageable-age peasants 1.2 times more males and 1.8 times more females were married than among workers. Surprisingly, 63% (259,000) of women workers were unmarried, although there were 1,199,000 single men [54, pp. I-XX], that is, there were almost five single men for every unmarried woman! The situation changed but little in the years that followed [65, pp. 66-68]. Considering the peasant tradition of having large families, this attests to a sad fact: workers did not have conditions for family life that were normal by peasants'

standards. Poor housing, lack of pre-school care centers and schools, and an underdeveloped state social security system all contributed to that situation. There was no social security in rural areas either. But there the functions of material provision and care of the elderly, or in case of the loss of breadwinner and disease were performed by the community and the relatives [48, vol. 2, pp. 216-217].

In the native village the house was inherited, and building a new one did not cost very much. The factory at best provided a place at a barracks, and renting a flat or building one's own house was a tall order. So, until the mid-19th century the majority of workers lived for free at the enterprise, sometimes in the workshop where they were employed. After the 1861 reform the percentage of industrial workers, nationwide, who had housing provided by the employer went down to about 35% in 1897 and 25% in 1918 [34, pp. 230-232]. The living conditions were anything but comfortable. In the barracks the space per person was between 4 and 10 m³ or between 2 and 5 m², which was close to the norm of the time (in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 9,7 m³ per person was the standard volume of air per person in "common" houses and 7.4 m³ in hostels. As the ceilings had to be not higher than 2.5 m the standard floor space per person was 3.8 m³ [34, pp. 243-244]). As a rule there was no running water or sewerage [5, pp. 211-253; 34, pp. 213-258]. True, workers' living conditions improved by 1914, especially after 1905, but they were still unsatisfactory for the overwhelming majority. Characteristically, the percentage of workers with families increased at the enterprises where the housing conditions improved [34, pp. 220-221, 253-254, 257, 270-271; 65, pp. 98-106; 64, pp. 345-351].

Another obstacle that deterred people from raising families was the almost total absence of pre-school childcare institutions and the small number of free schools. Given the lack of contraceptives, family life inevitably meant the birth of one child after another. In the village, the young family lived with his parents and relatives who could look after young children. A working woman who gave birth to a child had to quit her job and become a dependent of her husband, which created daunting financial problems for most of them. Therefore working women often resorted to abortion, which was outlawed. Because family life was impossible or difficult there were many children born out of wedlock, prostitution and venereal diseases were spreading in industrial centers where young unmarried men were concentrated.

Let us now compare the gender and age breakdown and composition of families of workers and peasants in 1897 (see Table 2). It has to be borne in mind that unfavorable gender and age breakdown and family composition of workers had far-reaching social and political consequences. Gender balance makes it possible to find a spouse or sex partner. "If there are two women per man or two men per woman this will result in debauchery and neglect of children; no moral precepts will help to ward off this disaster," wrote Vasily Bervi (Flerovsky), a well-known specialist on workers, in the 1860s and 1870s [19, p. 418]. A balanced age breakdown in which all age groups are represented in natural proportion, enables the older generation to protect and help the youth, to transmit life experience and at the same time keep it under control. An important role in society belongs to the family which of course meets the sexual needs, brings up, disciplines and provides social control, performs the communicative

function (exchange of information and interaction), offers emotional, moral and material support, wards off loneliness, provides a cozy domestic atmosphere and services, helps to rest and organize leisure activities, care for the sick, children and elderly, and maintains health. People who live in the family are sick less often, live longer, are less prone to alcoholism, suicide and crime and are better off materially compared with single persons. In short, the family provides more comfortable living conditions [32, pp. 229-237]. How did Russian workers fare from that point of view?

Table 2

Gender, Age, Family Composition and Literacy Level of Peasants and Factory and Mining Workers in Russia in 1897

Indicators	Workers			Peasants		
	Male	Female	Both sexes	Male	Female	Both sexes
Average age, years	30.7	28.6	30.3	24.4	24.3	24.3
Average age of people aged 12-70, %	30.7	28.6	30.3	32.9	32.5	32.7
Children, 0-11 years, %	1.5	2.7	1.7	33.4	32.4	32.9
Children, 12-14 years, %	5.9	10.7	7.1	7.0	6.7	6.9
Adolescents, 15-16 years, %	5.8	13.6	7.6	4.1	4.2	4.2
Youth—A, 17-29 years, %	57.9	45.9	55.1	20.1	21.7	20.9
Youth—B, 15-24 years, %	36.0*	46.0*	40.0*	17.0	18.4	17.7
Adults, 30-39 years, %	9.5	13.4	10.1	12.3	12.3	12.3
Adults, 40-59 years, %	17.9	13.2	17.1	16.1	15.7	15.9
Elderly, 60-69 years, %	1.4	0.5	1.2	4.4	4.3	4.3
Old, over 69 years, %	0.1	0.0	0.1	2.6	2.6	2.6
By gender, %	86.5	13.5	—	49.2	50.8	—
Married, aged above 15 years, %	54.6	37.0	52.2	66.4	65.9	66.2
Single, %	43.4	54.9	45.0	27.8	21.2	24.4
Widowed, %	2.0*	8.1*	2.8*	5.7	12.8	9.3
Divorced, %	—	—	—	0.1	0.1	0.1
Number of children per family**	—	—	1.5—2.0	1.5—2.0	1.5—2.0	3—4
Literacy, %	57.8	28.4	53.6	38.6	13.3	25.4

Calculated from: **Workers:** [54, pp. I-XX]. **Peasants:** [21, pp. 16-22, 64-67].

* Based on data from Vladimir, Moscow and Smolensk guberniyas.

** Factory workers in Moscow and Smolensk guberniyas in 1879-1895.

In 1897 (like in other years) the gender ratio *among workers* was not normal, with 5.7 times less women than men [61, p. 218]. This was because there was greater demand for males than females in industry, where physical strength and special skills were prized. At the same time parents tried to have their daughters close to them until they got married and after marriage husbands did not allow their wives to leave home. Rural authorities did not issue passports without permission from their parents and husbands, something women frequently complained about [48, vol. 1, p. 700]. Compounding the situation was the fact that in the urban population men outnumbered women by 5%, and in large cities by 10-14 %. For example, in Petersburg in 1897 there were 55% men and 45% women, and in Moscow respectively 57 and 43 percent [21, pp. 50, 55]. Age-wise there was a tilt towards younger people (there were 2.6 times more workers aged 17-29 and 2.3 times more workers aged 15-24 than peasants). This suggests the existence of a “youth overhang” among workers, which some sociologists see as an important prerequisite of revolutionary actions. At the same time there were 2.7 times fewer children and adolescents and 5.3 times fewer elderly and old people (the latter retired to the village to live out their days and die [15, pp. 246-249]) than among peasants. The share of adults (30-59 years) was roughly the same, 27.2% versus 28.2%. There were 1.2 times fewer married male workers and 1.8 times fewer married female workers than among peasants, but there were twice as many single men and women. Thus, given birth-rates and death rates similar to those among peasants, they had on average half as many children per family.

Thus, compared to peasants, there were many young single men and women among workers, few children and elderly people, in other words, there was a huge gender imbalance. Their literacy rate was more than twice that of peasants. Workers had broader intellectual horizons, greater needs, but their living conditions were worse than those of peasants.

By 1913 the age and gender imbalance increased further compared with the late 19th century. Nationwide there were about 1 million single men and about half a million single young women among industrial workers. Because of the gender imbalance there was sexual deprivation, irritation and a sense of unhappiness if only because in a country where family and children were so highly valued many had neither. The situation of not being able to meet their basic needs gives rise to a confrontational, emotionally negative mindset: discontent, disenchantment, anxiety, irritation and even despair, what psychologists call frustration which often gives rise to aggression directed against a real or imagined source.

Frustrated people are easily drawn into protest political movements becoming easy prey for various political and religious prophets who sympathize with them and promise a quick change for the better if they follow their principles and advice. It is no accident that the main social base of anarchism was made up of factory workers, déclassé individuals, the lumpenproletariat, tramps, jobless people and immature youth, and its followers during the First Russian Revolution were predominantly young people—the anarchist's average age was 18-24, and the education level was primary school or less [55, pp. 134-164].

The high crime rate, active participation in strikes and low level of discipline at factories are eloquent proof of the general sense of frustration among workers. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries latent crime among various trades (the ratio of the share of representatives of a trade among the total number of convicts and the share of representatives of that trade to the whole population) workers were in first place (11,2%), and peasants who tilled land were at the bottom (0,6%). The 5.2 million workers who made up 4% of the population accounted for about 30% of all convicts [3, p. V; 48, vol. 3, pp. 133-134]. Workers, most of whom belonged to the social estate of peasants, were 19 times more likely to commit crimes than peasants who lived in the rural communities, largely due to their frustrations and their marginal position in society. Joan Neuberger notes that it is very hard to tell hooligans from workers during the strikes and demonstrations in 1905-1906 and in 1912-1914 [51].

The high crime rate and low discipline of workers was due to their marginal social status—not yet proletarians, but no longer peasants working the land: plucked out of the habitual rural conditions and behavior standards, they found it hard to adapt to factory and urban life, which explains their asocial behavior and negative mental states.

Yet in spite of the sordid living conditions and mental hardship, more and more peasants migrated to the cities after the 1861 reform. The main reason for this was agrarian overpopulation in Central Russia and higher earnings of workers [48, vol. 3, pp. 424-429].

No longer controlled by the community yet not having enough self-control young people readily gave vent to hostilities and other negative emotions [47, pp. 198-202; 57, pp. 145-177]. The chief of police Pyotr Svyatopolk-Mirsky wrote in 1901: “The past 3-4 years saw a good-natured Russian lad turn into a kind of semi-literate member of the intelligentsia who deems it his duty to reject religion and family, flout the law, disobey and jeer the authorities. Such young people, luckily, are still few in industry, but this tiny handful leads the rest of the inert mass of workers” [72, p. 62].

Thus, the Russian workers were an unhealthy community in sociobiological and psychological terms, they were an explosive mass ready to erupt at the slightest provocation. Besides, most of them were concentrated in a few industrial centers, especially in the two capitals, which made them still more dangerous socially.

The Workers' Movement in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries as a Reflection of the Marginal Position of Proletarians

In its scale and intensity the Russian workers' movement matched the West European and American movements even in peaceful times and noticeably exceeded them in the years of revolution and war. International comparisons of strike movement usually record only the number of strikes and the number of people taking part. These indicators are not sufficient for three reasons:

a) because of the different numbers of workers in different countries,

- b) because they ignore the duration of strikes; and
- c) due to the special character of Russian statistics of the strike movement.

Data on strikes in Russia cover only private enterprises in processing industry, with enterprises employing less than 20 workers recorded selectively [75, pp. 36-37]. West European and American statistics covered all the enterprises (regardless of size) and all the sectors, including agriculture, the services with published reports not differentiating strikes by sector. That is why it is impossible to fully compare Russian and foreign strike statistics.

According to the popular comprehensive source *The Workers' Movement in Russia. 1895—February 1917. Chronicle* [76] in 1895-1904 there were four times more strikes and three times more strike participants than reported by the factory inspectorate on which historians of the working class usually drew. The number of strikes grew more than the number of striking workers because for 21% of the strikes the number of participants was not reported: in 1895-1904 there were 6,986 strikes, but data on the number of striking workers are available only for 5,792 strikes [40, p. 69]. The dramatic difference of the data of the *Chronicle* and the Factory Inspectorate is due to the fact that the *Chronicle* includes more guberniyas, industries and enterprises: while previously 58 guberniyas were covered, the *Chronicle* sometimes covered as many as 81; in addition to big private enterprises (employing more than 20 workers), government factories, large and small, private and government mining, small arts and crafts businesses, transport, communication, construction as well as lower-level employees of the above enterprises, general workers and day laborers were taken into account [40, p. 59]. In 1913 the sectors included in the *Chronicle* employed about 10.4 million people, or 4.5 times more than in big private processing industry (10.4 versus 2.3 million) [60, pp. 62-65]. For the same reason the *Chronicle* [76] provides a more complete record of the strike movement during the war than the Factory Inspectorate: between 19 July 1914 and 28 February 1917 it recorded 1.9 times more strikes in all production spheres and 1.6 times more participants [35, pp. 19-20, 202-203].

Unfortunately, the authors apparently had no data on the overall number of workers (not striking workers, but workers in general). If it were possible to use new data to calculate the share of strikers in the total number of workers and the loss of working days per 1,000 workers, the *intensity* of the strike movement would be little different from that indicated by my calculations. However, if my calculations underestimate the pitch of the strike movement, there is even more truth in the general conclusion that the strike movement in Russia had more participants and was more intensive than in the Western countries.

The years 1885-1913 were marked by a growth of the workers' movement, which historians attribute to the dire and worsening position of workers. In reality these years saw improved social security of workers, increased wages and a shortening of hours as labor legislation improved under the pressure of the strike movement [65, pp. 107-121]. The workers expressed their discontent with their position in two main ways: petitions and strikes, both of which were growing in number (see Table 3). Between 1901-1904 and 1912-1914 the average annual number of petitioners increased from 4.1 to 6.8%, reaching 10.3% during the 1905-1907 revolution. Because complaints were exclusively

economic the petition movement is a measure of dissatisfaction with the economic conditions, and that dissatisfaction was growing. An analysis of *economic* strikes yields a similar picture (see Table 4).

Table 3

Number of Workers Who Filed Individual and Collective Petitions and Complaints against Employers with the Factory Inspectorate, and the Number of Strikes in 1895-1914

Year	Number of workers [*]		Number of enterprises where strikes were held		Number of participants		Number of petitions			Number of petitioners	
	thou.	abs.	%**	thou.	%**	thou.	%***	legal, %	thou.	%****	
1895	1,552.2	68	0.4	31.2	2	—	—	—	—	—	
1896	1,520.6	118	0.6	29.5	1.9	—	—	—	—	—	
1897	1,501.3	145	0.8	59.9	4	—	—	—	—	—	
1898	1,505.2	215	1.1	43.2	2.9	—	—	—	—	—	
1899	651.2	189	0.9	57.5	8.8	—	—	—	—	—	
1900	1,699.4	125	0.73	29.4	1.7	—	—	—	—	—	
1901	1,710.7	164	0.96	32.2	1.9	19.1	1.1	58.5	70.6	4.1	
1902	1,711.8	123	0.72	36.7	2.1	19.9	1.2	51.8	82.2	4.8	
1903	1,766.9	550	3.21	86.8	4.9	18.3	1.0	48.9	71.6	4.1	
1904	1,746.0	68	0.4	24.9	1.4	19.5	1.1	69.7	62.9	3.5	
1905	1,772.7	13,995	93.2	2,863.2	161.5	22.7	1.3	65.0	190.1	10.7	
1906	1,801.7	6,114	42.2	1,108.4	61.5	19.7	1.1	61.1	191.6	10.6	
1907	1,889.7	3,573	23.8	740.1	39.2	25.3	1.3	31.9	180.8	9.5	
1908	1,882.9	892	5.9	176.1	9.4	25.2	1.3	45.7	128.7	6.8	
1909	1,886.3	340	2.3	64.2	3.4	24.1	1.3	47.9	91.3	4.8	
1910	2,005.3	222	1.4	46.6	2.3	25.1	1.2	36.8	88.5	4.4	
1911	2,051.2	466	2.8	105.1	5.1	26.0	1.3	43.8****	108	5.3	
1912	2,151.2	2,032	11.7	725.5	33.7	28.5	1.3	42.1****	154	7.2	
1913	2,319.6	2,404	13.4	887.1	38.2	27.3	1.2	41.8****	145.6	6.3	
1914	1,960.9	3,534	25.2	1,337.5	68.2	20.2	1.0	43.0****	115.7	6.8	

Sources: [12, p. LV; 13, pp. LXI, XLVII].

* Number of workers in 1895-1900 interpolated according to the percentage of participants.

** To the number of enterprises.

*** To the number of workers.

**** Interpolated according to percentage of causes for complaints and petitions recognized as being grounded and fully or partially granted.

Table 4

Economic and Political Strikes of Russian Workers in 1895-1914
(average per year)

Indicator	Measure	1895-1904	1905-1907	1908-1911	1912-1914	1915-1916
Number of workers	thou.	1,636.5	1,821.4	1,956.4	2,143.9	2,008.3
Economic strikes*	abs.	177	4,050	343	1,079	886
	%**	100	51.3	71.6	40.6	80.0
Participants in economic strikes*	thou.	43.1	864.2	69.7	304.1	483.3
	%***	2.6	47.4	3.6	14.2	24.1
Political strikes	abs.	0	3,844	137	1578	222
	%**	0	48.7	28.4	59.4	20.0
Participants in political strikes	thou.	0	706.4	28.3	679.3	265.0
	%***	0	38.8	1.4	31.7	13.2
Participants in political strikes	%****	0	45.0	28.9	69.1	35.4
Total number of strikes	abs.	177	7,894	480	2,657	1108
Total number of participants	Thou.	43.1	1,570.6	98.0	983.4	748.3
	%***	2.6	86.2	5.0	45.9	37.3

Calculated from [75, pp. 46-48; 7; 8; 10, pp. XCIII-XCIV; 12, pp. LXXIX-LXXX; 13, pp. LXVII, LXXI; 67, pp. 37-38, 131, 139, 141, 149, 155, 159, 163].

* Determined as the difference between the total number of strikes (strikers) and political strikes (strikers).

** To the total number of strikes.

*** To the number of workers.

**** To the total number of strikers.

Between 1895-1904 and 1912-1914 the percentage of participants in economic strikes rose by 11.6 points (from 2.6 to 14.2%), but during the 1905-1907 revolution almost half of all the workers took part in them. The spikes in the total number of strikers in 1905-1908 and 1912-1914 are due mainly to the growth of political strikes which provoked the proletarians to press economic demands. But the big surprise was that the growth of both economic and political strikes took place against the background of industrial upsurge and rising wages. As a rule, workers made exaggerated pay claims that outstripped the economy's ability to meet them. "Without doubt the growing strike movement is connected with the generally favorable situation in the manufacturing industry and the highly favorable market situation," reads the *Compendium of Reports of Factory Inspectors for 1911* [10, p. LXXXVII). This is also noted

in [11, p. LXXIV]. The fact that the underlying cause of the growing strike movement was that the workers' demands outstripped economic improvements was noted back in 1979 by Yury Kiryanov [34, pp. 271-273]. All the opposition parties, including the Liberals, egged on the proletarians to put forward unwarrantedly high economic demands in order to use the workers' movement to bring pressure on the government.

What strikes one about the workers' protest movement in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is the aggressive style of behavior. They presented ever higher demands to the employers, as witnessed by the diminishing share of legitimate complaints which complied with the rules and laws of the time. In 1901-1904 factory inspectors recognized 57% of complaints as legitimate, in 1905-1907, 53%, and in 1912-1914 42%, that is, 15 percentage points less than in 1901-1904.

As workers' anger and aggressiveness grew labor discipline dropped. As the data on fines in 1901-1914 show, it fluctuated depending on the economic and political situation in the country, just like strikes and petitions. In the periods of economic upturn when labor demand rose and work was easy to find, discipline fell and, on the contrary, during economic downturns fear of losing a job forced workers to stick to the instructions and the number of complaints and grievances tended to diminish [8, p. 21]. When the liberation movement was on the rise, when all the opponents of the monarchy stepped up their activities, bringing in the proletarians to shore up their political demands, labor discipline plummeted, hitting rock bottom during the 1905-1907 revolution, and discipline improved during the years of political stabilization. From that point of view the Russian proletarian was no match to his West European colleagues. This prompted the employers to make significant financial outlays to maintain control bodies thus pushing up production costs (the situation was different for the "workers' intelligentsia") [43, p. 54; 37, pp. 22-45].

Another feature of the Russian workers' movement was its highly politicized character. In the West workers took part in strikes mainly to uphold their group economic interests; politics was mainly the business of trade union bosses and political parties while citizens did politics only in their after hours. For example, in the USA in 1895-1905 there were no political strikes as the workers were concerned with their wages, working hours, the work of the labor unions and other mundane matters (see [28, p. 179]).

In Russia the struggle for economic interests was combined with the political movement both before and after the issue of the October 17, 1905 Manifesto, the creation of parliament and legalization of political parties in 1905. In 1905-1907 the share of political strikes was 48.7%, and in 1912-1914 it was 59.4%. In other words, *Russian proletarians engaged in politics during their work time* regardless of the losses it caused to the striking workers and to their employers. According to Vasily Varzar, during a period of 14 years (1895-1908) these losses amounted to 190.2 million rubles (about 1.5% of Russia's GDP in 1900) due to production shortfalls and for the proletarians to 25,4 million due to missed wages [75, pp. 36-37].

While economic strikes were often prompted by the way specific enterprises were operating, political strikes, as a rule, were the result of external propaganda and agitation. It is a well-known fact that all the pro-socialist parties used the working class

movement to bring pressure to bear on the government; the Liberals too were nothing loath to use this method. That is why the strike movement peaked precisely in the years when the confrontation between government and opposition was at its highest, in 1905-1907 and in 1912-1914. Consider, for example, how factory inspectors described the pretexts for totally political strikes that came to be known as “demonstrative-political.” “The pretexts for demonstrative-political strikes in 1912 were the events at the Lena goldfields, the events at the Nerchinsk labor camp, the sentence on Sebastopol sailors, elections to the State Duma and the insurance laws of 23 June 1912 (the workers did not want to pay dues to hospital funds) and so on. Predictably, mainly the proletarians of St. Petersburg and partly of Moscow took part in these strikes. The provinces were much less inclined to take part in this kind of strikes” [11, p. LXXVIII]. All this leaves no doubt as to who led these strikes.

Thus, relative deprivation is a satisfactory explanation of the rise of protest movements in Russia after the 1861 reform and especially in the period of the First World War when deprivation became twofold or progressing relative to the claims and relative to the pre-war situation [47, pp. 92-198]. Rising expectations ran into a sudden worsening of living conditions and setbacks at the front and huge losses killed the optimism and faith in a final victory, which turned out to be particularly painful. This is an example that ideally illustrates Davies’ J-curve [14].

There are a lot of people unhappy with their material position at all times and in all countries. Russia, of course, is no exception. As a rule, the workers did not complain because they were starving. Proletarians, like other social groups, became concerned not only with living standard but with the quality of life as their spiritual needs grew faster than their well-being because even the “common man” was developing a sense of dignity and self-respect. They started complaining not only about low wages and long hours, like before the Great Reforms of 1861, but about the rude foremen and other managerial staff, the use of physical force and swear words, sexual harassment of women workers, addressing the workers by the rude “thou,” treating them as “children,” “slaves,” “serfs” or “objects.” [52; 70]. Table 5 presents data on workers’ complaints of “maltreatment and beating” according to the Factory Inspectorate reports for 1901-1913.

Within just 13 years the *number* of complaints of maltreatment increased by 3.5 times in absolute terms, and considering the change in the number of workers (per 1,000) by 2.8 times; the *share* of complaints of maltreatment in the total number of complaints almost doubled (from 3.4% in 1901-1904 to 6.4% in 1911-1913). And this was despite the humanization of relations between management and workers. “Beatings are comparatively rare,” a factory inspector reported in 1911, “physical abuse is receding into the past” [24, p. 119]. That is why, in the opinion of factory inspectors, the share of justified complaints dropped from 81.6% in 1901-1904 to 50% in 1908-1910. It has to be noted that workers filed the same complaints not only with factory inspectors, but also with justices of the peace. In both cases it was a clear manifestation of demand of respect for oneself as a person [48, vol. 1, pp. 437-439; 52, pp. 254-268; 70, pp. 96-113; 25, pp. 28-54].

In 1903 the worker P. Timofeyev wrote in the magazine *Russkoye bogatstvo*: “The feeling of inviolability of the individual, the feeling of self-respect were not at the time [15 years ago.—*B.M.*] as developed in the Russian worker as today. At the time only one

Table 5

Workers' Complaints of Maltreatment in 1901-1913

Indicators	1901-1904	1905-1907	1908-1910	1911-1913
Number of complaints, thousands	62.6	238.4	128.3	218.4
Complaints of maltreatment, thousands	2,134	7,622	5,283	14,011
Substantiated complaints, thousands	1,741	4,087	2,642	—
Complaints of maltreatment, %	3.4	3.2	4.1	6.4
Substantiated complaints (% of above)	81.6	53.6	50.0	—
Number of workers at year's end, thousands	1,733.9	1,821.4	1,924.8	2,174.0
Share of petitioners among workers, %	3.6	13.1	6,700	10.0
Nominal annual wage, rubles	201	218	232	248
Nominal daily pay, kopecks	139	146	145	178

Source: [6-12].

thing mattered, and that was earnings... Today, along with good pay the modern worker demands good treatment; it is enough for a foreman to threaten to hit a worker or to push him for the entire workshop to be electrified, and the flame often ignites the whole factory. The chronicles of Russian industry of recent times report many strikes and riots triggered by the foreman abusing a worker physically" [73, p. 775]. "Grievances against the managerial staff" caused 77 strikes a year during the period of 1895-1904, 131 strikes in 1905-1907 and 85 strikes in 1912-1914. Taking part in them were respectively 41,000, 43,800 and 32,300 workers [74, p. 52; 75, p. 47; 12, p. LXXIX; 13, p. LXXI]. About a third of these strikes were sparked by "maltreatment" (29 out of 77 in 1895-1904) [74, p. 52; 38, p. 102].

Not surprisingly, there was no connection between changes of living standards and the protest movement. In 1895-1913 there was no close connection between the strike movement on the one hand, and the economic situation and material well-being of the workers, on the other. In addition to the growing sense of personal dignity the workers' behavior was greatly influenced by the features of mass consciousness which made them less amenable to the impact of the economic factor and of political parties [2, p. 76; 1, p. 62; 26, pp. 79-113; 27, pp. 112-137].

Workers' Involvement in Politics

Contrary to expectations, the early 20th century saw a falling off of labor discipline: the number of disciplinary offenses per worker increased from 2.22 a year in 1901-1904 to 2.50 in 1910-1913 [46, p. 278]. How does one account for it, considering that objectively the conditions of workers were gradually improving? The public stirred up and pushed workers toward active economic and political

struggle for better conditions while at the same time using the workers' movement to bring pressure on the government in pursuit of its political ends. The story of the so-called Bloody Sunday provides a graphic example. Members of the Emancipation Union, the Liberal Democratic party, the Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries established contacts with Georgy Gapon and other leaders of the St. Petersburg Factory Workers' Assembly, persuaded them to introduce political demands into the petition to the Tsar: calling a Constitutional Assembly, an end to the war, separation of church from state and so on. These demands lent the petition a revolutionary character and made it impossible for the Tsar to grant it [58, pp. 530-541]. During the procession on January 9 the Bolsheviks carried the slogan "Down with autocracy" and unfurled a red banner. The Social Revolutionaries caused disturbances during the march, tore telegraph wires and cut down lamp posts, built barricades, looted munitions stores and armed the people. Definitely seeking to provoke a clash and cause a riot they pushed the crowd moving toward the Winter Palace toward the soldiers who guarded it to within a distance when, according to army regulations, they had to shoot to kill after firing some warning shots into the air [20, p. 93; 22, pp. 144-174; 63, pp. 330-338; 53, pp. 13-74].

The tragedy of January 9 ignited the whole country. The Zemstvos, the city dumas, citizens' organizations condemned the government and backed radical political movements morally and financially. Student riots broke out; the workers' movement spread culminating in the All-Russia Political Strike in October of 1905. Under its impact Russian citizens gained political rights and freedoms, the legislature (State Duma) and near-universal suffrage for men. The Main State Laws of the Russian Empire issued by Nicholas II on 23 April, 1906 were similar to Western constitutions in terms of their legal force and content. Therefore the majority of pre-revolutionary and contemporary Russian historians of law and Western Russia scholars consider them to be a constitution and the State Duma with a new State Council a bicameral parliament [48, vol. 3, pp. 412-418].

The opposition successfully used the workers' movement it had organized to overthrow the monarchy. The month-by-month dynamics of strikes illustrates how the mood and the sociopolitical activity of workers in 1912-1917 changed under the impact of the opposition's PR activities, including propaganda and agitation (see Table 6).²

The pitch of the strike movement was rising from 1912 until July of 1914, with political actions having mostly a demonstrative-political character. After the declaration of war in August 1914 the protest temperature dropped almost to zero, which attested not so much to "chauvinist fever" that swept the masses as to trust in the monarch and the legitimacy of his regime in general. If the people really hated the regime, neither the war, nor state propaganda could have generated a veritable upsurge of patriotism the country experienced for a fairly long period. Incidentally, in the early 20th century the percentage of draft dodgers in Russia was among the lowest in Europe, at 3% compared with 4.4% in France, 7% in Austro-Hungary and 10% in Germany [62, p. 235].

Table 6

Economic and Political Strikes of Russian Workers by Month in 1912-1917

Month	Economic strikes					Political strikes					Total
	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917
January	20	44	52	14	128	1	100	312	6	38	389
February	21	24	59	21	104	0	0	26	7	4	—
March	28	32	66	20	61	0	3	349	6	46	2
April	68	73	91	103	150	591	176	300	1	7	1
May	132	146	343	149	153	492	281	672	13	1	3
June	109	231	185	162	118	0	61	130	2	5	11
July	76	370	139	90	81	2	43	605	0	1	100
August	115	96	7	26	97	0	2	2	50	7	140
September	26	61	6	69	88	30	175	0	115	0	107
October	70	73	9	71	79	72	34	0	8	119	150
November	46	169	8	48	51	99	154	5	6	15	—
December	21	51	4	46	57	13	5	0	1	0	—
<i>Total</i>	732	1,370	969	819	1,167	1,300	1,034	2,401	215	243	—

Sources: [13, pp. LXV, LXVIII; 67, pp. 151-155, 160-161, 164; 71, p. 486; 45, p. 710].

The number of political strikes in 1915-1916 remained low with some exceptions. For example, there was a spike of political activism in August and September 1915 in connection with election of workers to the Military-Industrial Committees and the dissolution of the State Duma and in January of 1915, 1916 and 1917 on the occasion of the Bloody Sunday jubilee, and again in October 1915 and 1916 in memory of the All-Russia Political Strike in 1905. By contrast, economic strikes resumed in 1915 and started to grow, yet even in 1916 there were one-third less of them than in 1913. It was not until January 1917 that the strike movement picked up dramatically (389 strikes, including 228 political strikes, that is, almost as many as in the whole of 1916) [71, pp. 482-483, 486]. Strikes continued to mount in February 1917 before they began to wane in March.

How does one account for the upsurge of the workers' movement in January and February 1917? Until the end of 1916 all the parties, with the exception of the Bolsheviks and SR internationalists, were against organizing any mass actions because they were detrimental to the war effort. However, starting from the late 1916 they called off the moratorium and launched actions aimed at replacing the monarch and creating a popular trust government in order to prosecute the war more successfully. The protests were spearheaded by the "working groups" of the Central and Petrograd

Military-Industrial Committees [36, pp. 91-96, 101-102]. Nevertheless workers' political protests even in January-February 1917 were much less powerful than in 1905: there were almost seven times fewer political demonstrations in 1914-1917 than in 1901-1904 [36, p. 103]. They began to pose a threat to the regime only because all the political demonstrations shifted to Petrograd and Moscow where political opposition to the monarchy was concentrated.

Discontent was not mounting universally, being limited to the capitals and several industrial centers where the opposition was concentrated and mass PR campaign were conducted. In 1915 the number of strikes did not exceed 10 in 22 of the 44 guberniyas where records were kept, and in 10 guberniyas it did not exceed 5. Three guberniyas—Petrograd, Moscow and Vladimir—accounted for 81% of all strikers, with the first two accounting for 53%. In 1916 the number of strikes did not top 5 in 24 out of 45 guberniyas, and the Petrograd, Moscow, Vladimir and Kostroma guberniyas accounted for 74.4% of all strikers, with the first two accounting for 52.3% [67, pp. 151, 161]. In January of 1917 strikes were registered only in 20 out of 50 guberniyas in the European part of Russia, with 57% of all strikes and 75% of political strikes taking place in the Petrograd and Moscow guberniyas, i.e., in the capitals [71, pp. 482-483]. Between January 1 and February 23 97% of political demonstrations (32 out of 33) also took place in Petrograd and Moscow [36, pp. 104-105; 42, p. 25]. On the eve of the war the population of the two capitals stood at 3.8 million and that of the 45 guberniyas, at about 120 million (see Table 7). Consequently, *the intensity of the strike movement in Petrograd and Moscow was about 18 times higher than the average for Russia*, a fact long noted by historians [42, pp. 24-52; 66, p. 331].

Table 7

Number of Striking Workers by Guberniyas in 1915—January 1917

Guberniya	1915		1916		January 1917	
	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%
Petrograd	130,126	24.1	361,867	38.2	103,276	42.3
Moscow	155,846	28.9	133,629	14.1	53,857	22.1
Vladimir	151,796	28.1	120,028	12.7	16,918	6.9
Kostroma	26,622	4.9	89,394	9.4	8,464	3.5
Kharkov	5,970	1.1	42,593	4.5	14,887	6.1
Oryol	2,287	0.4	29,264	3.1	95	0.0
Tver	6,993	1.3	30,206	3.2	2,335	1.0
Estland	10,030	1.9	26,365	2.8	8,735	3.6
8 Guberniyas	489,670	90.8	833,346	87.9	208,567	85.4
45 Guberniyas	539,280	100.0	947,891	100	244,144	100.0

Sources: [67, pp. 151, 161; 71, pp. 482-483].

The key factor that caused a surge of the workers' movement in January-February 1917 was increased political activity of the opposition which took the decision to overthrow the monarchy [48, vol. 2, pp. 775-812]. The contributing factors were socioeconomic (wartime hardship, war-weariness, setbacks at the front, etc.) as well as the psychological predisposition of proletarians for radicalism, aggressiveness, and manipulation of illiterate and ill-educated people by the opposition leaders.

All the above suggests that the Russian workers could not play the role of revolutionary vanguard and hegemon of the revolutionary movement. Owing to a number of social, economic, cultural and psychological factors they had not formed themselves into a social class and did not have a proletarian socialist world view. However, the anti-government political forces (both liberal and socialist) used the workers as a revolutionary ram very effectively. In a situation when the fundamental needs of the workers could not be met, they developed a negative emotional state of frustration, discontent, disenchantment, anxiety, irritation and even despair which often manifested itself in aggressive behavior. The radicalism and aggressiveness of the proletarians were due not only to socioeconomic, but also to demographic and psychological factors, such as unfavorable gender and age breakdown and family structures, relative deprivation and frustration. Like all frustrated people they could easily be drawn into protest political movements and become easy prey for various political and religious prophets.

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Notes

- ¹ Adolf Rashin's data which I trust more are based on official data. Soviet scholars amended them in a way that in my opinion overstates the number of workers employed at large capitalist enterprises.
- ² Published sources and the literature cite somewhat different and even conflicting figures for 1915—January 1917. I prefer the official data of the Ministry of Trade and Industry [71].

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

VESTNIK ROSSIYSKOY AKADEMII NAUK
(Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences)

No. 9, 2016: General Meeting of the RAS. Ahead of a Crucial Stage; Speech by the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation A. Dvorkovich; On the Reform of the RAS and the Main Scientific Results of the Year; On the Work of the RAS Presidium and Implementation of Resolutions of the RAS General Meetings in 2015; Speech by D. Medvedev, the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation; Speeches by the Participants of the RAS General Meeting; Closing Remarks by the RAS President Academician V. Fortov; On the RAS Reform, the Main Scientific Results of the Year and Activity of the RAS Presidium in 2015; **I. Zibareva, N. Soloshenko.** Russian Journals in Global Informational and Analytical Resources; **N. Chubarova et al.** Current Issues in the Study of Ultraviolet Radiation and the Ozone Layer.

No.10, 2016: O. Favorsky et al. What Is to Be Done to Implement Russia's Energy Strategy; **A. Blinov, V. Konnov.** Funds to Support Science in National Research Complexes: Advantages and Limitations; **A. Akayev, V. Sadovnichy.** Closed-loop Dynamic Model for the Description and Calculation of Long Wave Kondratieff Economic Development; **A. Arbatov.** Crisis of the Limit Control and Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; **A. Arefyev.** Trends of Export of Russian Education in 2005-2015; **O. Bukharin.** Infectious Simbiology—New Understanding to Old Problems; **V. Ilyin, M. Morev.** The Psychological State of Russian Society; **A. Karpov.** The Influence of Christianity on the Formation of the Mathesis of the New Time.

VOPROSY ISTORII
(Problems of History)

No. 10, 2016: A. Stykalin. The 20th Congress of the CPSU and the Dismissal of Cominform; **Yu. Solovyov.** Ivan Mikhaylovich Labintsov; **S. Kholyaev.** Turn of "The Union of 17th October" to the Revolution; **R. Poroshin.** P. Shuvalov and P. Albedinsky: Careers and Political Views of Fellow Dignitaries; **S. Malkin.** Army and Scotland Politics of Great Britain in the Middle of the 18th Century; **T. Vorobyova, V. Yungblyud.** Afghanistan in the Policy of the Soviet Union and the United States in 1979; **V. Bukhert.** Nina Teymurazovna Beriia; **D. Perevoshchikov.** The Hospitals for Foreign Prisoners of War in the Territory of Udmurtiya (1943-1949); **A. Gulyaev.** Ye. Shchadenko and Repressions in the Red Army in 1937-1938; **I. Kuchumov et al.** Pierre-Charles Levesque—the French Explorer of History and Ethnography of Russia; **Sh. Aliyev.** From the History of Political Unification of Sheki Realm and Kakheti Principality.

No. 11, 2016: S. Papkov. Elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1937. The Introduction of the Soviet Electoral Manipulation; **B. Petelin.** Kurt Biedenhof; **A. Tetuyev.** Problem of the Russian Nation in the Context of the Globalization; **K. Shekov.** Transport and Industrial Colonialization Plant of Murmansk Railway in 1923-1934; **Ya. Trofimov.** Functioning of the Magistrates Courts in the Don Cossack Region in the Second Half of the 19th Century; **I. Ignatchenko.** Foreign Policy of the July Monarchy on the Eve of the 1848 Revolution in France.

No. 12, 2016: **K. Yudin.** From the Stalin's Dictatorship to Khrushchev's "Modernization"; **P. Iskenderov.** Abdul Frashery; **M. Feldman.** Perception of the NEP in the Minds of Regional Elites in Late 1923; **M. Oskin.** The Food Supply of the Russian Army on the Eve of and after the February Revolution; **S. Krasnov.** Trustee of the Customary Law at the Don Cossacks in the Second Half of the 19th Century; **T. Vasina.** Reforms of the 1860s at the Izhevsk Arms and Ironworks; **V. Voropanov.** Systems of Justice in the Areas of Northern Ural in the 16th–17th Centuries; **F. Khodeyev.** Peace Treaty of 1940 with Finland as a Strategic Mistake; **M. Gasimli.** Territorial-border Issues at the Russian-Turkish Conference and in the Treaty of Moscow in 1921.

No. 1, 2017: **A. Mayorov.** Discovery of the Ipatyev Chronicle by N. Karamzin; **Ye. Mironova.** Yevgeny Vasilyevich Sablin; **K. Maksimov.** German Occupation Policy in Kalmykiya in August-December of 1942 and Its Consequences; **D. Maslyuzhenko, G. Samigulov.** Turkic Yasak Volost in the First Half of the 17th Century; **N. Fyodorov.** Armed Forces of the Kuomintang in Indochina after the End of the Civil War in China; **A. Filitov.** The Triangle Moscow—Berlin—Bonn, and the European Policy of Detente in 1969-1970; **A. Dugin.** The Cipher Telegram of I. Stalin Dated 10 January 1939 (Source Analysis).

NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA (Modern and Contemporary History)

No. 1, 2017: **A. Tyrsenko.** France's Foreign Policy Plans during the Great French Revolution; **I. Ignatchenko.** Charles X and the July Revolution of 1830; **L. Brovko.** Nazism and Religion; **Ye. Glazunova.** "Enmity, But Not Open": the US Interference in the Internal Affairs of Chile (1970-1973); **J. Puchsek Farras.** Historiographical Myth "The Kremlin in Barcelona": the Role of the Soviet Consulate during the Spanish Civil War; **S. Kretinin.** Resettlement of Ethnic Germans from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to Germany in 1940-1941: On Materials of the Russian Archives; **Ye. Guskova.** Armed Conflict and Political Settlement: Crisis of Dialogue Model on the Balkans in the 1990s (Part II); **A. Yemelyanov.** Armed Conflict and Political Settlement: Crisis of Dialogue Model on the Balkans in the 1990s (Part II); **S. Paulson.** The American Diplomats about Life in St. Petersburg in the 19th Century; **Ye. Agafonova.** Minister of Foreign Affairs E. van Kleffens and His Role in the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the USSR and the Netherlands; **M. Gurina.** Canadian Fund of the Help to Russia and Supply to the USSR during the Great Patriotic War; **K. Gorbachyova.** Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Beijing in 1920-1930.

ETNOGRAFICHESKOYE OBOZRENIYE (Ethnographic Review)

No. 1, 2016; Special Section of the Issue: Urbanization and Indigenous Cultures in the Arctic North and Siberia: (Guest Editors—O. Povoroznyuk, D. Funk). O. Povoroznyuk, D. Funk. Urbanization and the Indigenous Peoples of the North: Introduction to the Special Issue; **P. Schweitzer.** Indigenous Peoples and Urbanization in Alaska and the Canadian North; **O. Povoroznyuk.** The Urban Aborigines of the BAM Region: Industrial Boom, Technosocial Networks and Struggle for Resources. **E. Ruttkai-Miklian.** Modernization of a Taboo: Issues of "Purity" in the Urban Environment (the Case of Szingai Hantik); **Ye. Lyarskaya.** "Somebody Has to Live in the City Too...": Specificities of the Transformation of Social Structure of the Yamal Nenets; **M. Gavrilova.** The Main Figurative Motifs of Traditional Russian Games; **A. Lazareva.** The Falling Tooth, Tumbling Ceiling, and Other Oneiric Plots in the Light

of Traditional Patterns of Dream Interpretation; **S. Tkachev, N. Tkacheva.** The Origins of Competition between Russian and Chinese Settlers during the Early Period of Colonization of the South Ussuri Area (the Mid-19th—Early 20th Centuries); **F. Galiyeva.** The Russians of Bashkortostan in Ethnic Interactions (the Late 19th—Early 21st Centuries); **V. Tishin, N. Seryogin.** Age Differentiation among the Ancient Turks of the 6th—10th Centuries: An Attempt at a Complex Analysis; **K. Dontchev.** The Rural Community of the North-West Bulgaria (1878-1940).

No. 2, 2016: Special Theme of the Issue: The Economy of Mobile Livestock Keepers in Post-Communist Countries (Guest Editor—A. Khazanov). **N. Kradin.** The Transformations of Pastoral Economy in Tuva and Zabaykalye Region at the Turn of the 20th—21st Centuries; **L. Baskin.** Modern Reindeer Husbandry in Russia: Status, Mobility, Property Rights, State Paternalism; **P. Gray.** The Current State of Reindeer Breeding in Chukotka; **A. Zhaparov.** The Present-Day Cattle Husbandry in Kyrgyzstan; **J. Janzen.** Economic Changes in Mongolian Livestock Keeping during the Transformation Period; **I. Golovnev.** “Forest People”—The Phenomenon of the Soviet Ethnographic Cinema; **M. Butovskaya, G. Rusakova.** Bullying and Bullies in Today’s Russian School; **S. Manyshv.** Wartime Medicine among the North Caucasus Peoples in the First Half of the 19th Century; **S. Amosova.** Notions of Week Days among Eastern Slavs; **N. Dushakova.** Housing Practices of Lipovans and Nekrasovites: Religious and Regional Aspects of the Tradition; **T. Bulgakova.** The Audience of the Nanai Shamanic Kamlanye Ritual.

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Lessons Learned from Antiquity for Contemporary Cities; **K. Grigoriev**. “They Are but They Aren’t There”: “Chinese” Greenhouses in the Suburban Space.

VOPROSY FILOSOFII

(Problems of Philosophy)

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No. 6, 2016: **V. Stepin**. Historical-Scientific Reconstruction: Pluralism and Cumulative Continuity in the Development of Scientific Knowledge; **F. Lazarev**, **S. Lebedev**. The Philosophical Reflex: Essence, Form, Types; **T. Rockmore**. Piketty, Marxian Political Economy and the Law of the Falling Rate of Profit; **P. Joung Ho**, **A. Sokolov**, **Je. Sung Hoon**. Park Chung Hee’s Governance Philosophy; **P. Bojanic**. What Is or Who Is the “We”? Heidegger and Reconstruction of Concept “Volk”; **O. Timofeyeva**. “We” and “They”: Community after Humanism; **A. Rubtsov**. Architectonics of Postmodernity: Continuum Aleksandr V. Rubtsov; **A. Volsky**. Friedrich Hoelderlin and the Creation of the European Myth; **I. Dokuchayev**. Phenomena of the “Object-Body” and “Live Flesh” in Structure of Existential Experience of the Body; **A. Kharitonova**. Medical Anthropology in the 18th Century and Development; **P. Grechko**. Differences and Information: Trying Ontological Conjunction; **V. Balanovsky**. N. Grot and C. Jung: About Russian Philosophy’s Contribution to the Development of Analytical Psychology; **T. Obolovich**. “Forwards to the Fathers” together with the Hellenes? Reflection on the Margins of the Book “Georgy Vasilyevich Florovsky.”

No. 7, 2016: **A. Chumakov**, **A. Korolyov**. Philosophy, Tolerance, Globalization. On the results of the 7th Russian Philosophical Congress; **V. Mironov**, **D. Mironova**. Philosopher and Power: The Case of Heidegger; **N. Motroshilova**. And Again about “Black Notebooks” of Martin Heidegger (Deliberations on the Debate of Summer—Fall 2015); **H. Klemme**. Adolescence as a Program. A Deliberation on Heidegger and His Critique of Modern Times; **Ye. Rashkovsky**. Historical Thought between Life and Death; **K. Khvostova**. Methodology of History and Its Connection with Concrete Historical Researches; **V. Porus**. What Does It Mean to “Understand” a Literary Text?; **Ye. Skvortsova**. Far Eastern Tradition as a Foundation of Cultural Complexity; **O. Lebedeva**. Towards the Problem of Historical Painting in Japan of the 1890s: The Polemics of Toyama Shoichi and Mori Ogai; **A. Nazaretyan**. Psychology in Social Forecasting: Peering into the System Causalities; **V. Khmylyov**, **V. Kondrasyuk**. Features of the Influence of Sensory Language Channels on Perception; **B. Mezhujev**. How Vladimir Solovyov Has Not Become Edmund Husserl (Apropos the Book by Thomas Nemeth).

No. 8, 2016: **A. Kokoshin**. Several Dimensions of War; The Self-Integrity of Knowledge as a Problem of Modern Epistemology. Materials of a Roundtable; **A. Karpov**. The Knowledge Worker in the Genesis of the Socioeconomic Concept of the Knowledge Society; **A. Zhuravlyov**,

A. Yurevich. Psychological Aspects of the Search for Russian National Idea; **R. Apresyan.** The Phenomenon of Universality in Ethics: Forms of Conceptualization; **S. Horuzhy.** Ancient Greek Care of the Self and Hesychast Practice: Comparative Analysis (Marginalia to “Hermeneutics of the Subject” by Foucault); **S. Smirnov.** Eventfulness of Thought (on the Question of Ontology of Eventfulness); **V. Yemelin, A. Tkhostov.** The Temptations and Traps of Temporal Identity; **V. Bazhanov.** Sociocultural Revolution in Neuroscience: New Facets of Kantian Research Program; **G. Levin.** Realism on the Relation of Consciousness to Existence.

CHELOVEK (*Human Being*)

No. 5 2016: Transdisciplinarity in Philosophy and in Science: A Roundtable; **M. Manuilsky.** Cultural and Anthropological Determinants of Terrorism; **Ye. Grebenshchikova.** Projects of Human Enhancement and the Thesis of Technological Inevitability; **A. Voloshinov.** Transformation of the Concept of Genius in Enlightenment’s Artistic Consciousness in the First Half of the 18th Century; **M. Frolova.** The Problems of the Ethics of Technoscience in the Works by E. Agazzi; **Yu. Zaretsky.** P. Rudolph Decker, a Historian; **R. Dekker.** Long-Term Developments in Autobiographical Writing in the Netherlands since 1500; **P. Gurevich.** Identity and Its Shadow (Sociocultural Configurations of Self-identity); **E. Werikson.** The Life in the Face of Death (Excerpt from the Lecture *Human Strength and the Cycle of Generations*); **N. Shakhovskaya.** A Human Being in the Universe by A. German and A. German Jr.; **A. Burykina.** Noh Theatre in Edo Period: Elite Art and Mass Audience; **A. Popova.** Symbolic and Communicative Functions of the Monuments to Law Enforcement Bodies Members; **V. Chaykovskaya.** Orest Kiprensky’s “Personal Myth.”

No. 6, 2016: **A. Pelipenko.** Evolution: Vector and Trajectories; **Ye. Tetushkin.** Genes of Forgotten Ancestors; Transdisciplinarity in the Philosophy and in the Science: A Roundtable; **Ye. Bogomyagkova.** “Genetization” of Society: Technologies and Interests; **L. Vishnyatsky.** War before History; **N. Popov.** Authoritarian Personality in the United States and Russia: Shifts over a Quarter Century; **V. Petrov.** Existence of Idleness; **Yu. Zaretsky.** 18th Century Russian Autobiographical Stories as Social Practices: An Attempt in Classification; **I. Matveyeva.** Tolstoy. Repin. From the Portrait to the Myth; **V. Kravchenko.** A Stroke of a Pen: A Case Study or Psychological Narrative; **A. Kulkin.** Neizvestny, Dante and Dostoevsky.

PSIKHOLOGICHESKY ZHURNAL (*Psychological Journal*)

No. 2, 2016: **N. Maksimova, I. Aleksandrov.** The Prospective Trajectory for Psychology Evolution. Part II. Organization of the Subject Field of Psychology; **A. Zhuravlyov, T. Nestik.** Psychological Peculiarities of Group Creativity in Network Communities; **A. Sidorenkov et al.** Trust and Identity as Factors of Work Groups’ Effectiveness; **N. Pavlova, Ye. Sergiyenko.** Subject and Personal Regulation of Behavior as a Manifestation of Man’s Individuality; **T. Gordeyeva et al.** Motivation of Self-respect and Respect by Others as Factors of Academic Achievements and Persistence in Educational Activity; **A. A. Karpov, A. V. Karpov.** Correlation between Psychometric Intelligence and Organization of Metacognitive Processes and Person’s Qualities; **K. Arutyunova, V. Aleksandrov.** Factors of Gender and Age in Moral Judgment of Actions; **N. Lebedeva et al.** Social and Psychological Basis of Multiculturalism: Testing of Intercultural Interaction Hypotheses in the Russian Context; **L. Chaynova et al.** Psychological Elaboration of Musical Means for Person’s Functional State Optimization; **Liu Zeya.**

Psychological Health of Chinese University Students; **A. Karayani, Yu. Karayani**. Military Psychology during the First World War.

No. 3, 2016: **V. Petrenko, A. Suprun**. Methodological Manifesto of Psychosemantics; **A. Ivashchenko** et al. The Problem of Activity as Formation of Subjectivity in Postnonclassical Psychology; **V. Konstantinov, Yu. Buzykina**. Experiencing Extremist and Terrorist Threat and Person's Sociopsychological Characteristics; **Ye. Rasskazova**. Psychological Factors of Choice and Change of the Action Strategy; **M. Volovikova, A. Zhuravlyov**. Implicit Notions of Moral Elite's Features; **M. Kozlova, A. Kozlov**. The Origins of Individual-oriented and Group-oriented Morality: Sociopsychological and Scientific Aspects; **A. Vartanov, V. Shvyryov**. Subjective Perception and Formal Computer Analysis of Russian Language's Sounds; **A. Zhuravlyov, A. Yurevich**. Patriotism as an Object of Psychological Research; **V. Dorosheva** et al. Validation of Two Russian-language Versions of Self-conception Questionnaires; **T. Kornilova**. Psychology of Choice and Decision Making as Cognitive and Personality Moderated Overcoming of Uncertainty.

OBSHCHESTVENIYE NAUKI I SOVREMENNOST (ONS) *(Social Sciences and Contemporary World)*

No. 1, 2017: **T. Khabriyeva, N. Chernogor**. Current Problems of the Strengthening of Rule of Law and Combating Corruption in the Framework of Eurasian Integration; **Ye. Gurvich**. Institutional Framework and Economic Development; **D. Melnik**. Between Leviathan and Mammon: In Search for Moral Economics; **A. Medushevsky**. Law and Justice: The Russian Social Development in Modern and Contemporary Times; **A. Baranov**. Justice and Equality—Linguistic and Extralinguistic Aspects; **Ye. Avraamova**. Young People in Socioeconomic and Ethical Coordinate System; **N. Latova**. The Role of Professional Education in the Reproduction of Russian Working Class; **A. Prigozhin**. Business Macroculture: Methods of Development; **S. Levin, K. Sablin**. “Politicized” Bureaucrats as Subjects of Economic Development of “Resource Regions”; **I. Pantin**. Revolution and Violence: In Defense of a Historical Approach to the Understanding of the Russian Revolution; **V. Tambovtsev**. Ontogenesis of Individual Values; **V. Martyanov**. Late Modernity and the Boundaries of Habitual Capitalism: in Search for Non-economic Factors of Development.

No. 2, 2017: **S. Glinkina**. Post-socialist Transformations in Light of Discussions on the Diversity of Models of Capitalism; **N. Tikhonova**. Income Stratification in Russia: Model Specifics and Vector of Dynamics; **Yu. Latov**. Phantom of “Revolutionary Situation”: Protest Actions and Protest Moods of Modern Russians; **N. Zarubina**. Historical Memory as a Source of Knowledge about the Specifics of Civilization; **M. Feldman**. On the Eve of the Centenary of the October Revolution (Some Results of Historical Research); **V. Zhdanov**. The Building of Post-Authoritarian Stateness: Spain, 1976-1982; **E. Pain, D. Sharafutdinova**. Multiple Modernities: The Features of Bureaucratic Hierarchy and Corruption in Clan Society; **V. Martyanov**. The Political Limits of “homo economicus”; **N. Rozov**. The Mechanisms of Cycles in Politics and Economics: the General Model. **A. Shastitko**. Behavioral Economics: Application of the Methods of Cognitive Psychology in Economics.

POLITICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (POLIS)

(Political Studies)

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GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO

(The State and Law)

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SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (SOTSIS) (Sociological Studies)

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VOSTOK (Oriens)

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VOPROSY LITERATURY (Problems of Literature)

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VOPROSY YAZYKOZNANIYA
(*Problems of Linguistics*)

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