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ALCOHOL POLICIES AND CRIME RATES IN RUSSIAN REGIONS⁴

In economic theory, alcohol consumption is considered as an addictive and sometimes irrational behaviour. Such behaviour often leads to undesirable external effects: increasing crime rates, traffic and occupational accidents, fires, and domestic violence. That is why most countries facing high levels of alcohol intake apply special measures to reduce consumption and, as a result, the external effects. Recently, the same measures have also been put in place in Russia, including price rises and time restrictions on retail alcohol sales. This paper investigates the influence of these measures on crime indicators. The empirical study is based on an econometric analysis of panel data from Russian regions, 2003-2015. The results confirm the effectiveness of time restrictions on alcohol sales with regard to juvenile and adult crime. However, the increase of vodka prices due to increasing excise tax reduces juvenile crime but does not influence crime rates among adults.

JEL Classification: H23, I18.

Keywords: alcohol; alcohol policies; crime; Russia.

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Introduction

In economic theory, alcohol is considered as a consumption good with special characteristics. Becker and Murphy (1988) in their seminal paper count alcohol among other ‘addictive goods’ and show that its consumption increases because of growing tolerance. The authors divide alcohol consumers into two types: rational and myopic. Rational drinkers comprehend the consequences of their addiction but make a rational choice comparing the present value of consumption and the present value of total costs. Myopic consumers do not anticipate the distant consequences of their behaviour. Aside from this possible consumer irrationality, alcohol consumption is also characterized by an evident negative aftermath not only for consumers themselves but also for society as a whole. Excessive drinking leads to increasing morbidity and mortality, including poisonings and suicides (Denisova, 2010; Nemtzov, 2016); it worsens a worker’s position in the labour market (Kenkel, Ribar, 1994; Macdonald, Shields, 2001). For an employer, the consequences of drinking include absenteeism, increasing rates of occupational injuries, and decreasing labour productivity (Anderson, Baumberg, 2006). In families where parents drink excessively children are often ill, neglect schoolwork, start to drink themselves and quit school (Chatterji, DeSimone, 2006); alcohol intake is the main cause of child abandonment. At the macroeconomic level, the consequences of excessive alcohol consumption include the reduction of life expectancy at birth and decreased quality of life, a decline of gross domestic product, and additional expenses for public health systems. In 2012 more than 3 million people in the world died of the causes connected to alcohol; this was 6% of all deaths (WHO, 2014, c. 14). Half a million Russians die annually because of direct and indirect causes related to excessive drinking (Obshchestvennaya Palata Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2009, P. 27).

It is not difficult to see that the numerous consequences of alcohol consumption present externalities. In economic theory this term is applied to a situation where some of the benefits or costs from an activity of a certain economic agent fall on other economic agents. In the case of alcohol these are costs, that is, negative external effects, or negative externalities. The list of alcohol external effects traditionally includes increasing crime rates, fires, occupational accidents and road accidents. As a result, people not consuming alcohol suffer. For instance, in 2004 among all the cases of deaths connected to alcohol in the EU 6% were innocent victims (Rehm et al., 2012). Total public costs of excessive alcohol consumption were estimated by WHO from 1.5 to 3% of GDP (WHO, 2014, P. 18). For Russia similar estimate gives 1,700 billion RUB or more than 4% of GDP (in 2008) (Obshchestvennaya Palata Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2009, P. 28).

According to economic theory, the very existence of externalities is a market failure and so argues for governmental intervention. That is why most countries facing high levels of alcohol
intake apply special measures to reduce consumption and, as a result, the external effects.

In Russia, the last decade has also been characterized by significant governmental activity in applying alcohol policies. In this paper we investigate the influence of policy measures (such as price increases and time restrictions on retail alcohol sales) on the negative external effects of alcohol consumption, in particular on crime rates. The empirical study is based on official data of the Russian Federal Statistical Service (Rosstat) and the authorities of Russian regions. We use econometric modelling to test the hypotheses. The paper concludes with recommendations for public alcohol policy.

**Alcohol consumption and alcohol policies in Russia**

Excessive alcohol intake has been an issue for Russia for as long as anyone can remember. At various times the authorities have made different attempts to limit alcohol consumption. There was total prohibition prescribed by the ‘dry law’ of Tsar Nicolas II during World War I, and a famous anti-alcohol campaign by Mikhail Gorbachev in the waning days of the USSR. However, the volumes of alcohol intake in Tsarist Russia and in the Soviet Union are incomparable with the extent of drinking in post-Soviet Russia. In the beginning of 1990s the state monopoly on alcohol production and trade was abolished, the state has lost control over the alcohol market and a number of large multinational companies (first of all, beer producers) entered it. Alcohol sales (per head of adult population) are represented in Figure 1. Compared to 1990, sales of vodka doubled in the five years to 1995 (from 12 to 25 litres of vodka per adult per year). Beer sales peaked in 2007 and more than tripled from 28 to 97 litres per head.
Figure 1. Dynamics of total alcohol sales, vodka sales, and beer sales (in litres per person 15+, % to 1990).

Figure 2. Shares of alcoholic beverages in total alcohol sales (in pure spirits), %%, 1990-2016.


To a large extent the rapid growth of alcohol sales and consumption observed in the 1990s can be explained by the dramatic decline in relative prices. High inflation and the lack of price control by the state made alcohol cheap. While at the beginning of 1980s one could buy 60 bottles of vodka for the average monthly wage, in 2010 this figure was 235 bottles. However, since 2005 vodka sales were more or less stable at the level of 18 litres per person for almost 10 years and then started to decline. Since 2010 beer sales have also declined. An important result of this dynamic is the changing alcohol-mix. For many years Russia belonged to the group of countries with the so-called ‘Nordic type’ of alcohol consumption with a dominant share of strong spirits. As Figure 2 shows, in the middle of 1990s the share of vodka in total volume of alcohol sales amounted to 80%, but in 2012-2014 the shares of vodka and beer were equal (about 40% each), and the share of other beverages (mostly wines) was 20%. This fact obviously contradicts the stereotype of Russians as vodka-drinkers. This new ‘alcohol mix’ places Russia close to many European countries which substitute the consumption of strong spirits with beer or

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wine.

On the whole, during the last decade in Russia total alcohol sales per head declined from 11.6 litres of pure spirits in 2007 to 8.1 litres in 2016, although official statistical data on alcohol sales do not reflect the total consumption. There is a shadow alcohol market which includes home production of wine and strong spirits (samogon), and illegal enterprise production and trade. The amounts of shadow production cannot be measured precisely. However some indirect estimates based on the data of pure spirit production (Khaltourina, Korotayev, 2015), and survey results (Kolosnitsyna et al., 2014; Radaev, 2015) do not support the idea that shadow alcohol substitutes for the official sales decline. Therefore, the overall dynamics of alcohol sales and consumption shows clear downward trend, and the ‘Nordic type’ of alcohol consumption is not as obvious in Russia today as it was 15 years ago. Both those facts let us expect that the external effects of alcohol have become less pronounced.

What are the reasons for the changes observed? We can suppose that there is no single cause, rather a number of factors have led to the reduction in alcohol consumption. Drinking habits vary a lot between socio-demographic groups, and depend on gender, age, educational and employment status, income, type of settlement and many other individual characteristics (Kolosnitsyna et al., 2015; Kossova et al., 2017; Radaev, 2016; Roschina, 2013). Young people drink less than middle-aged people and prefer low-alcohol beverages (Kueng, Yakovlev, 2014). Surveys results show that youth behaviour is changing in particular: in the six years from 2011 to 2017 the share of alcohol consumers among young people 16-24 years old decreased by 40% (Zasimova et al., 2017, P. 38). Since adult consumer behaviour is more stable because of addiction, the shifts in young people’s preferences obviously contribute significantly to the overall dynamics of alcohol consumption.

The alcohol policies that the Russian government have implemented over the last decade have also had an effect. Their main outlines were defined in 2009 in the ‘Concept for State Policy to Reduce the Scale of Alcohol Abuse and Prevent Alcoholism among the Population of the Russian Federation’. In 2006 Russian regional authorities gained the right to establish time restrictions on night sales of alcoholic beverages though not all of them used this possibility; the restrictions varied significantly across the country. Since 2011 off-premise liquor sales have been forbidden from 11 PM until 8 AM throughout Russia\(^6\). These minimum time restrictions are now obligatory, the regional authorities can only prolong the intervals when the sales are forbidden. From 2011, the rates of excise taxes on alcohol beverages have been increasing gradually. In 8 years the tax has more than doubled: from 231 RUB per litre of pure spirit in 2010 to 523 RUB in 2017. As a result, the average price for a half-litre bottle of vodka also more than doubled

\(^6\) Federal Law of Russian Federation of 18.07.2011 No. 218-FZ.
from 115 RUB in 2010 to 280 RUB in 2015\(^7\). The floor price for vodka was first introduced in 2010 at 89 RUB for a half-litre bottle (about 2 euro at 2010 exchange rates); it has gradually increased to 205 RUB in 2017 (about 3 euro at 2017 exchange rates).

Today the Russian government uses all the measures of alcohol policy known in international practice: price regulations (excise taxes and a floor price); restrictive measures (consumer age limits, temporal bans on retail sales, minimal limits of authorized capital and/or space for producers and retailers, bans on alcohol advertising); and information (social advertising). Based on the results of numerous studies made in various countries, the restrictions for physical and price availability are considered among the most effective measures not only for decreasing alcohol consumption but also for preventing its negative external effects (Babor et al., 2010). Recently a number of studies appeared devoted to estimates of the effectiveness of the Russian alcohol policy (Khaltourina, Korotayev, 2015; Kolosnitsyna et al., 2014; 2016; Pridemore et al., 2013; 2014; Radaev, 2015; Radaev, Kotel'nikova, 2016; Skorobogatov, 2016). In general, they confirm the influence of restrictive measures on the consumption of certain alcoholic beverages or on alcohol consumption as a whole. However the impact of alcohol policies on the external effects of alcohol consumption has not been the subject of intensive research in Russia. This study aims to estimate the influence of alcohol policies recently implemented in Russia on crime rates in the regions of the country.

**Alcohol policies and crime: a survey of literature**

There has been much research on the impact of alcohol policy on the external effects of alcohol consumption including crime. A number of papers consider an impact of *price measures*. The estimates of the consequences of a floor price set for alcohol in England and Wales demonstrated that the increase of the price of standard measure (10 ml of ethanol) by 20 pence reduced the number of crimes by 12,000 per year (Meier et al., 2008).

The growth of excise tax for alcoholic beverages in the USA is associated with the decreasing probability of domestic violence towards children (Markowitz, Grossman, 2000). Another study in the same country confirmed that a 10% growth of the beer price reduced the amount of violence among college students by 4% (Grossman, Markowitz, 1999).

A survey of more than 50 research papers, analysing the consequences of alcohol price growth, revealed that a twofold increase of the tax rate can reduce crime rates by 1.4% on average (Wagenaar et al., 2010). Other surveys also concluded that an alcohol price increase leads to a decline in crime rates, including violence and theft (Carpenter, Dobkin, 2010;

\(^7\) http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b16_17/Main.htm
Chaloupka et al., 2002).

A comparative analysis of the effect of alcohol policy price mechanisms shows their effectiveness in combating violence in Sweden and reducing the number of crimes in the USA (criminal violence, assaults and robberies) (Nelson, McNall, 2016). However the authors find no influence of price measures on the numbers of murders in the USA or general crime levels in Denmark and Finland (Nelson, McNall, 2016).

Many studies confirm the positive impact of temporal bans on alcohol retail sales on alcohol consumption and connected issues. Popova et al. (2009) considered 15 research papers, estimating the effectiveness of such measure in 11 countries. They found that bans on alcohol sales during certain night hours or on whole days reduced the volume of alcohol consumed and crime rates. Wilkinson et al. (2016) summarize the results of 21 studies on temporal bans in different countries. They note a positive correlation between the numbers of hours and days of sales and the number of cases of violence in all the countries investigated (Australia, the USA, Canada, Norway), excluding England and Wales. A similar conclusion about crime reduction as a result of time restrictions can be found in the other international survey of alcohol policies (Carpenter, Dobkin, 2010).

A number of studies show that softening trade restrictions can aggravate the negative externalities of alcohol consumption. For example, in Australia extending the retail trading hours of alcoholic beverages in public spaces led to an increase in alcohol consumption and growing numbers of violent incidents, including among youth (Chikritzhs, Stockwell, 2002; 2006).

Overall the research confirms that price mechanisms and temporal restrictions of alcohol sale can reduce the external effects of alcohol consumption, including criminal activities.

**Alcohol policies and crime rates in Russia: an empirical analysis**

Criminality and excessive alcohol consumption are both urgent problems for modern Russia. According to official data, in 2016 more than 2 million criminal cases were registered in the country, more than 400,000 of which (or more than 20%) were committed by people under the influence of alcohol, including 65,000 serious and very serious crimes⁸. It is especially important to note the high rate of juvenile crime. In 2016 54,000 crimes were committed by minors (aged less than 18) or with their participation, including 11,500 serious and very serious crimes⁹. Contemporary Russian crime rates are ahead of those in many countries of the world. In 2011 10.2 murders were committed per 100,000 of citizens which is twice as high as in the USA.

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and almost 10 times as high as in the UK, Germany, Japan and China. The number of robberies per 100,000 citizens committed in Russia in 2011 was twice as many as in Germany and 35 times higher than in Japan. Quite predictably, Russia is also among countries with the highest numbers of convicts. In 2012 there were 487 per 100,000 citizens, or 3 times more than in the UK and China, and 6 times more than in Germany.

Countries bear significant social costs of criminal activities. First of all, there are costs of crime itself: lost lives, a lower quality of life, damaged or destroyed property, and additional health care expenses. Secondly, there are response costs, including the financing of police, courts and prisons. And thirdly, there are intangible costs of crime, i.e. fear of crime that decreases quality of life. In 2012 citizens of the OECD and some other countries were asked whether they felt safe walking alone at night in the city or area where they lived. Russia was at the second to the last place in the list of 42 countries (the last one was South Africa). Only 43% of Russians said they felt safe after dark on the streets in urban areas (OECD, 2014).

Figure 3 shows the trend of general crime rates in Russia 2003-2015. Until 2006 one can observe upward dynamics while after that crime rates have gradually decreased with insignificant growth in 2015.

Figure 3. Annual number of crimes in Russia per 100,000 citizens, 2003-2015


http://crimestat.ru/world_ranking_homicides
http://crimestat.ru/world_ranking_robberies
http://crimestat.ru/world_ranking_convicted
We can suppose that such a decline in crime rates was caused, at least partially, by the alcohol policies introduced in this period. Alcohol policies should reduce not only alcohol consumption itself but also its externalities. However, a detailed analysis of statistical data by Russian region shows different trends in different territories. For example, in 2008-2014 the most obvious reduction of crime (by 45-65%) took place in Astrakhan, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Yaroslavl Regions, Republics of Mari El, Sakha (Yakutia) and Tatarstan, in Kamchatka, Perm and Khabarovsk Territories. During the same period other regions (Moscow, Altai Territory and Primorye Territory, Republics of Adygeya, Daghestan, Khakassia) demonstrated non-monotonic trends with decreases and increases of crime rates in different years. Though in 2015 the average number of crimes per citizen in Russia has increased, eight regions reported decline in crime rates: from 1.5% in St. Petersburg to 7% in Astrakhan Region\(^\text{13}\).

As we observe different crime trends and various alcohol policies in separate regions (in 2006-2010 temporal alcohol restrictions varied significantly across the country, as did average prices) it is impossible to definitely assert that stricter alcohol policies lead to crime reduction. To understand whether particular alcohol policies actually influence crime rates it is necessary to apply econometric analysis based on the regional data.

**Hypotheses, data and variables**

The results of research in other countries (Babor et al., 2010; Carpenter, Dobkin, 2010; Chaloupka et al., 2002; Wilkinson et al., 2016) and the analysis of alcohol consumption trends and the measures of alcohol policy implemented in Russia recently let us formulate the following hypotheses:

**H1**: The introduction of temporal restrictions on alcohol sales reduces the number of crimes committed by minors\(^\text{14}\), other things being equal.

**H2**: The introduction of temporal restrictions on alcohol sales reduces the number of crimes committed by adults (aged 18 and older), other things being equal.

**H3**: A rise in alcohol prices contributes to a decrease in the number of crimes committed by minors, other things being equal.

**H4**: A rise in alcohol prices contributes to a decrease in the number of crimes committed by adults (aged 18 and older), other things being equal.

We consider minors separately because the members of this group change all the time unlike the group of adults. Adolescents are very much exposed to external influences, their


\(^{14}\) According to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, minors are citizens aged from 14 to 17 (Part 1, Clause 20).
consumer habits are still being formed. The rates of juvenile crime should react faster to alcohol policies introduced than the rates of adult crime.

The analysis was based on Rosstat statistical data on the Russian regions\textsuperscript{15}. The balanced panel sample included 962 observations from 74 subjects of the Russian Federation 2003-2015. To eliminate double count, we excluded from our analysis autonomous areas: Nenets, Yamal-Nenets, Khanty-Mansi, Yugra, and Chukotka (the latter is not included in another subject of the Russian Federation, but the amount of alcohol consumption by its population is much higher than in all other regions, so Chukotka was considered as a statistical outlier). Nor did we include in our sample regions with alcohol consumption close to zero: Republics of Ingushetia, Daghestan, Chechen Republic, Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, Karachayevo-Circassian Republic. The time period for our analysis included the years when the investigated measures of alcohol policy were gradually introduced and changed. In particular, starting from 2006 regional authorities could set time restrictions on alcohol retail sales; from 2011 these restrictions became obligatory. In 2010 a floor price of vodka was set for the first time; later it was raised, then reduced and then raised again. From 2011, excise tax rates on alcoholic beverages rose significantly until 2014, then they were frozen until 2016. That is why this period allows a comparison of the variation of crime rates in regions with the different measures of alcohol policy applied. Further, only from 2003 the necessary data on alcohol prices by regions is available.

According to the hypotheses of the study two \textit{endogenous variables} were chosen for econometric models:

(1) \textbf{number of crimes committed by minors} (aged from 14 to 17) or with their participation, per 100,000 citizens in the region;

(2) \textbf{number of crimes committed by adults} (aged 18 and older) per 100,000 citizens in the region.

The trends of these indicators and the general crime rates in our sample of regions are represented in the Table 1.

\textsuperscript{15} http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/publications/catalog/doc_1138623506156
Table 1. Number of crimes per 100,000 citizens in the sample, 2003-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of crimes per 100,000 citizens</th>
<th>Number of crimes committed by minors or with their participation, per 100,000 citizens</th>
<th>Number of crimes committed by adults, per 100,000 citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>100,3</td>
<td>1805,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>107,0</td>
<td>1902,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2477</td>
<td>107,6</td>
<td>2369,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2695</td>
<td>104,9</td>
<td>2590,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2509</td>
<td>97,4</td>
<td>2411,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2249</td>
<td>81,3</td>
<td>2167,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2097</td>
<td>66,4</td>
<td>2030,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>55,0</td>
<td>1785,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1682</td>
<td>50,3</td>
<td>1631,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1608</td>
<td>44,9</td>
<td>1563,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1537</td>
<td>46,9</td>
<td>1490,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1499</td>
<td>41,4</td>
<td>1457,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1631</td>
<td>42,3</td>
<td>1588,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Table 1 shows, in 2003-2006 all the crime indicators rose. However after 2006 when the alcohol policy was toughened\(^\text{16}\) the downward trend started. This was clear until 2015, when the average crime rates increased slightly, although in some regions of Russia there was a decline in crime rates in 2015. In 32 regions (from 74 in our sample) juvenile crime rates decreased (for example, by 40% in Republic of Kalmykia, by 30% in Kursk Region). A fall in adult crime rates was reported by 9 regions of our sample where the rates of adult crime decreased by 1-8%\(^\text{17}\).

Significant variation of general crime rates by the regions of the country can be seen in the Figure 4. The lightest colour depicts the lowest rates (less than 500 crimes per 100,000 citizens), the darkest shows the highest rates (up to 3,000 crimes per 100,000 citizens). Maximal numbers of crimes (more than 2500 per 100,000 citizens) were committed in Republics of Khakassia, Tuva, Komi, Buryatia, in Kurgan Region and Trans-Baikal Territory. Ingushetia, Daghestan, Chechen Republic had less than 500 crimes per 100,000 citizens.

\(^{16}\) Federal Law on the changes to the Law on the Government regulation of production and turnover of ethyl alcohol, alcohol and ethyl containing products, and on the no longer valid statutes within the Law on the Government regulation of production and turnover of ethyl alcohol, alcohol and ethyl containing products. 21 July, 2005, N 102-FZ

\(^{17}\) Authors’ calculations based on the Rosstat data: http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/publications/catalog/doc_1138623506156
Figure 4. Crime rates in the regions of the Russian Federation, 2015 (per 100,000 citizens)


Relying on numerous studies analysing factors of criminality (alcohol policies among them) (Andrienko, 2001; Carpenter, Dobkin; 2010; Chikritzhs, Stockwell, 2002; Duailibi et al., 2007; Grossman, Markowitz, 1999; Latov, 2011; Meier et al., 2008), we chose exogenous variables for the models:

1. To take into account the age structure of the region’s population we used two indicators. Firstly, share of minors (aged 14 to 17) in the whole population of the region (%) (variable ‘share of population aged 14-17’). The regions with a higher share of minors can demonstrate a higher level of juvenile crime (Ellis, 1991). Secondly, share of population aged 20 to 49 years (%) (variable ‘share of population aged 20-49’) represents the share of population of an age when according to statistical data18 people typically commit crimes.

2. The share of urban population in the whole population of the region (%) (variable ‘share of urban population’), the variable that can influence criminality in different ways, increasing (Lobont et al., 2017) or decreasing (Andrienko, 2001) crime rates.

3. The density of the population of the region (variable ‘population density’)19. This variable according to some research can influence the criminality increasing its rates (de

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19 Number of citizens (.000) per 1 square km.
Albuquerque, McElroy, 1999; Lobont et al., 2017).

4. **Unemployment rate (%)** (variable ‘unemployment rate’) is the share of unemployed persons in the labour force of the region. This can have a differently directed influence on the crime rates: increase criminality (Ellis, 1991; Raphael, Winter-Ebmer, 2001) or decrease it (Andrienko, 2001).

5. To account for the impact of **time restrictions** on crime rates, we used two dummy-variables. The first one is the variable ‘start of time restriction (1st year when the restriction was introduced)’, i.e. the time when the temporal ban on alcohol sales started in the year when the restriction was firstly introduced in the region (for example, 9.00 PM). The variable is equal to 1 if in the region in a certain year the restriction (9.00 PM) was firstly introduced, and 0 otherwise (i.e., in a certain year the restriction in a region was not novel, or if there were no restrictions). The indicator of the start of restriction was included in the analysis because previous research has shown its effectiveness in terms of drinking reduction (Kolosnitsyna et al., 2014). The second variable ‘start of time restriction (following years when the restrictions were in place)’ characterizes the time when restrictions on alcohol sales started in the region in the following years after the first year of their introduction. The variable is equal to 1, if in a certain year the particular restriction was in place in the region and it was not first introduced, and 0 otherwise (if in the region in a certain year the restriction was firstly introduced or did not exist at all). Including both variables in the model give us an opportunity to account for a possible deferred impact of time restrictions on crime rates.

In Russian regions where time restrictions on alcohol sales take place they most often started on 9.00 PM, 10.00 PM or 11.00 PM (see Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Start of restriction (local time)</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>Number of regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.00 PM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.00 PM</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.00 PM</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.00 PM</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00 PM</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.00 PM</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00 AM</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. **The relative price of vodka** (variable ‘price’) (Grossman, Markowitz, 1999; Meier et al., 2008) was estimated as a ratio of nominal average price per litre of vodka in the region to the nominal average income\textsuperscript{20}. The variable of relative price expresses the availability of alcohol better than nominal price, because it accounts for regional variations of household income\textsuperscript{21}.

*Econometric analysis results*

The methodology used in similar research (Carpenter, Dobkin, 2010; Duailibi et al., 2007) determined the choice of model applied in this paper: a panel linear regression with fixed effects. This model lets us account for unobserved regional characteristics which were presumably fixed and did not change during the period under review. At the first stage a correlation matrix was constructed which confirmed a lack of evident multicollinearity, so all the variables chosen could be included into the model.

The model was estimated twice – separately for each of the independent variables, the number of crimes committed by minors, and the number of crimes committed by adults. All the variables were included in the models in logarithmical form except the variables of time restrictions. Both models estimated proved to be statistically significant. The coefficients estimates are illustrated in Table 3.

\textsuperscript{20} Authors’ calculations based on the Rosstat data: http://www.gks.ru/dbscripts/cbsd/DBInet.cgi?pl=1902001

\textsuperscript{21} We did not use a variable of average households’ income as a separate control variable because it demonstrated strong correlation with nominal price of vodka; including both relative price and average household income in the models made the variable of household income insignificant.
Table 3. Econometric models estimates: impact of time restrictions and relative price of vodka on the crime rates in Russian regions, 2003-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Logarithm of the number of crimes committed by adults, per 100,000 citizens</th>
<th>Logarithm of the number of crimes committed by minors or with their participation, per 100,000 citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of population aged 14-17 (%) (log)</td>
<td>1.394***</td>
<td>1.394***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of population aged 20-49 (%) (log)</td>
<td>2.040***</td>
<td>1.209***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of urban population (%) (log)</td>
<td>-0.495</td>
<td>-1.209***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (.000 citizens/ square km) (log)</td>
<td>-0.487*</td>
<td>-0.240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%) (log)</td>
<td>-0.0513*</td>
<td>-0.118***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start of time restriction (1st year when the restriction was introduced) (dummy-variables)</td>
<td>8.00 PM 0.320* (0.182) 0.0699 (0.180)</td>
<td>8.00 PM 0.320* (0.182) 0.0699 (0.180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.00 PM -0.132* (0.0787) -0.141* (0.0786)</td>
<td>9.00 PM -0.132* (0.0787) -0.141* (0.0786)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.00 PM -0.121*** (0.0395) -0.0636 (0.0399)</td>
<td>10.00 PM -0.121*** (0.0395) -0.0636 (0.0399)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00 PM -0.0855*** (0.0297) -0.0579* (0.0299)</td>
<td>11.00 PM -0.0855*** (0.0297) -0.0579* (0.0299)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.00 PM -0.162** (0.0787) -0.0262 (0.0786)</td>
<td>12.00 PM -0.162** (0.0787) -0.0262 (0.0786)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00 AM 0.00410 (0.125) 0.0456 (0.124)</td>
<td>2.00 AM 0.00410 (0.125) 0.0456 (0.124)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start of time restriction (following years when the restrictions were in place) (dummy-variables)</td>
<td>7.00 PM -0.0268 (0.0953) 0.0408 (0.0950)</td>
<td>7.00 PM -0.0268 (0.0953) 0.0408 (0.0950)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.00 PM -0.272*** (0.0794) -0.0723 (0.0800)</td>
<td>8.00 PM -0.272*** (0.0794) -0.0723 (0.0800)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.00 PM -0.192*** (0.0345) -0.0797** (0.0373)</td>
<td>9.00 PM -0.192*** (0.0345) -0.0797** (0.0373)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.00 PM -0.285*** (0.0236) -0.123*** (0.0286)</td>
<td>10.00 PM -0.285*** (0.0236) -0.123*** (0.0286)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00 PM -0.236*** (0.0212) -0.0933*** (0.0249)</td>
<td>11.00 PM -0.236*** (0.0212) -0.0933*** (0.0249)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.00 PM -0.258*** (0.0542) -0.170*** (0.0548)</td>
<td>12.00 PM -0.258*** (0.0542) -0.170*** (0.0548)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00 AM -0.265*** (0.0842) -0.202** (0.0839)</td>
<td>2.00 AM -0.265*** (0.0842) -0.202** (0.0839)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price (log)</td>
<td>-0.0475 (0.0314) -0.139*** (0.0286)</td>
<td>-0.0475 (0.0314) -0.139*** (0.0286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>26.73*** (3.893) 23.65*** (1.884)</td>
<td>26.73*** (3.893) 23.65*** (1.884)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq within</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>0.839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq between</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq overall</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability (F)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The model estimates let us draw the following conclusions:

The analysis of the impact of time restrictions on juvenile crime (hypothesis H1) shows that the variable ‘start of time restriction (1st year when the restriction was introduced)’ is significant for restrictions starting from 9.00PM and 11.00PM. The variable ‘start of time restriction (following years when the restrictions were in place)’ is significant for restrictions starting from 9.00PM, 10.00PM and 11.00PM. Signs of all these coefficients are negative which mean that the existence of time restrictions on alcohol sales in the region contributes to a reduction of the juvenile crime rate. The year when the restriction was first introduced gives a relatively small crime reduction compared to the regions without restrictions. However, the years following, when restrictions have already been in place, contribute more to the difference in crime rates between the regions with and without restrictions.

The estimates of the influence of time restrictions on adult crime (hypothesis H2) reveal that the restrictions staring at 9.00PM, 10.00PM and 11.00PM lead to declining crime rates, other things being equal. Similar to minors, the degree the decline of the adult crime rates becomes more evident over the course of the restrictions. In the year the restrictions were introduced the crime rates in these ‘pioneer’ regions were 9-13% less than in the regions without restrictions. But in the following years this gap reaches 19-29%.

The analysis of the correlation between juvenile crime and the relative price of vodka (hypothesis H3) confirmed that a price rise significantly and negatively influences the number of crimes committed by minors. This result could be explained by their lack of independent income; which is why for adolescents even a small increase of the price of vodka can become an obstacle for purchase and so leads to a reduction in externalities.

Hypothesis H4, the influence of the relative price on adult crime rate, was not confirmed: the coefficient of the variable ‘price’ was insignificant. This result could reflect the inconsistency of the alcohol policy implementation in Russia. The excise tax rates for alcohol were frozen in 2014–2016; the floor price for vodka increased in 2010-2014, but in 2015-2016 it was reduced, and in 2017 it is currently less than in 2014 even in nominal terms. In summary, during the period of observation the relative price of a half-litre bottle of vodka fluctuated between 0.6% and 0.9% of average monthly income.

The estimates of the coefficients of the control variables show that, other things being equal, the higher the share of minors and ‘young adults’ in the region’s population, the higher the corresponding rates of crime. In regions with a large share of urban residents juvenile criminality

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22 We do not make any conclusions with regard to the restrictions starting at 7.00, 8.00, 12.00 PM and 2.00 AM because of the small numbers of corresponding observations in our sample (see Table 2).

23 Authors’ calculations based on the Rosstat data:
is relatively low. The most populated regions demonstrate relatively low rates of adult crime. Unemployment rates are negatively correlated with the rates of crime committed both by adults and by minors.

**Discussion and Conclusions**

In contemporary Russia the alcohol policy includes all the main instruments of international practice. Research shows that price and time restrictions on alcohol availability are the most effective measures to correct market failures and prevent alcohol damage (WEF, 2011). This paper investigates the effectiveness of these measures in Russian regions.

The study shows that the indicators of adult and juvenile crime depend on the policies of time restrictions on alcohol sales in the regions. Crime rates declined, other things being equal, after the introduction of the bans on night sales. This result is in line with the conclusions of numerous studies conducted in other countries (Carpenter, Dobkin, 2010; Popova et al., 2009; Wilkinson et al., 2016). The decrease in crime is more evident in regions where the restrictions have been in place for several years, in other words, alcohol consumers change their behaviour gradually.

The effectiveness of price mechanisms is confirmed for underage consumers: juvenile crime rates decrease, other things being equal, with an increase in the relative price of vodka. The rates of adult crime are still insensitive to price fluctuations. These results are only partially consistent with the findings of other studies (Nelson, McNall, 2016; Wagenaar et al., 2010), probably because of the inconsistency of the price policy observed in the last few years.

The estimated coefficients of the control variables also let us draw certain conclusions with regard to criminal situation in the Russian regions. Juvenile crime is higher not only for regions with a higher proportion of young people, but also for regions with more rural population. In urbanized regions the rates of crime committed by minors are relatively low which could be explained by the wide choice of educational and leisure activities, and by more efficient law-enforcement agencies. The negative correlation between unemployment and (adult and juvenile) crime rates which at a first glance seems to be counterintuitive is actually explained by pro-cyclical alcohol consumption confirmed by numerous studies (Ásgeirsdóttir et al., 2015; Ruhm, 2005;). Alcohol consumption depends on the phase of the economic cycle; it increases during economic growth and declines during recessions. The high rates of unemployment coincide with the low level of alcohol consumption, and as a result, with the relatively low crime rates. This result is in line with the earlier studies (Andrienko, 2001).

The findings of this study confirm the contribution of contemporary alcohol policies to the observed negative trends of crime rates in Russia. These finding also let us conclude that
alcohol policy measures should be tightened. In particular, the excise tax rates on alcoholic beverages, which were frozen in 2014-2016, should be increased gradually; the period of obligatory ban on night sales must be widened (after the introduction of the Federal Law No. 218 in 2011 some regions where the sales stopped before 11.00PM or began after 8.00AM have adopted the unified federal norm and so have, in fact, relaxed their restrictions). A consistent state policy of alcohol restrictions will lead to a decline in the crime rates which are due to alcohol externalities, which in turn will lead to social welfare growth.

**Literature**


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