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Избыточность критики позитивизма
The indiscriminate criticism of positivism in terms of "types of legal understanding" (reduction of various thinkers, many of whom criticised each other's scientific constructions, into one category, attributing to them uniform views on the essence of law and other theoretical and legal theses) reveals its redundancy. After all, as far as the correctness or incorrectness of their conceptual constructions is concerned, which the theorists critical of positivism try to legitimise against the background of the "narrowness" of positivism, such criticism proves nothing. The psychological implication of this criticism is understandable - the desire to put oneself and one's theoretical constructions in the best light before the reader against the background of the absurd theses of competing 'types of legal understanding' that such a researcher ascribes to thinkers of the past. But inevitably there remain doubts about the extent to which this implication can justify unscrupulous practices of scholarly argumentation.