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Of all publications in the section: 122
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Working paper
Andrey A. Gnidchenko, Vladimir A. Salnikov. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2015. No. 119.
In this paper, we examine a number of indices used for measuring comparative advantages of a country in international trade for a good and propose the new net comparative advantage index that has several strong features. First, it reflects net trade, and that’s why it is more theoretically grounded than indices calculated only from export data. Second, it is consistent with Kunimoto (1977) theoretical framework that is highly appreciated among trade economists. Third, it is not totally focused on a single commodity (that is, it takes world trade structure into consideration), unlike net export index. Fourth, it accounts for economic openness, using GDP as a scale variable. Fifth, it is hardly exposed to structural distortions. Finally, its sign is consistent with the sign of the net trade. We compare the new index with CEPII theoretically grounded econometric indicator and show that the proposed index has better empirical characteristics and is much easier to calculate and interpret.
Added: Jan 28, 2016
Working paper
Parakhonyak A. N. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2013. No. 30.
I study a model of oligopolistic competition in which consumers search for prices, but have no idea about the underlying price distribution. Consumers’ behaviour satisfies four consistency requirements such that beliefs about the underlying distribution maximize Shannon entropy. I derive the optimal stopping rule and equilibrium price distribution of the model. Unlike in Stahl (1989), the expected price is decreasing in the number of firms. Moreover, consumers can benefit from being uninformed, if the number of firms is sufficiently large.
Added: Jun 12, 2013
Working paper
Gavrilovich M., Kreps V. L. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2015. No. WP BRP 112/EC/2015 .
It is well-known that large random structures may have non-random macroscopic properties. We give an example of non-random properties for a class of large optimization problems related to the computational problem MAXFLS^= of calculating the maximal number of consistent equations in a given overdetermined system of linear equations. A problem of this kind is faced by a decision maker (an Agent) choosing the means to protect a house from natural disasters. For this class we establish the following. There is no “efficiently computable” optimal strategy for the Agent. When the size of a random instance of the optimization problem goes to infinity the probability that the uniform mixed strategy of the Agent is ε optimal goes to one. Moreover, there is no “efficiently computable” strategy for the Agent which is substantially better for each instance of the optimization problem.
Added: Nov 24, 2015
Working paper
Andreev N. A. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2014. No. WP BRP 38/FE/2014.
We research the properties of implicit transaction costs function for general-shaped limit order book. Equivalent conditions for linearity of the function are presented in terms of market liquidity. We also present a suitable functional form of implicit costs for MICEX order-driven market based on high-frequency trading data. The proposed form meets the denition of costs and implied properties while corresponding to the real form of order distribution.
Added: Oct 21, 2014
Working paper
Kreps V. L. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2016. No. WP BRP 150/EC/2016 .
We consider finite non-cooperative N person games with fixed numbers mi, i = 1, . . . , N , of pure strategies of player i. We propose the following question: is it possible to extend the vector space of finite non-cooperative m1 × m2 × . . . × mN - games in mixed strategies such that all games of a broader vector space of non- cooperative N person games on the product of unit (mi − 1)-dimensional simpleces have Nash equilibrium points? We get a necessary and sufficient condition for the negative answer. This condition consists of a relation between the numbers of pure strategies of the players. For two-person games the condition is that the numbers of pure strategies of the both players are equal
Added: Sep 22, 2016
Working paper
Kichko S., Picard P. M. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2020. No. 239.
This paper studies the e¤ects of consumer income heterogeneity on monopolistically competitive product markets and individual welfare in the context of non-homothetic pref- erences. When expenditure of richer individuals is less sensitive to price change compared to poorer ones, a mean-preserving contraction of income distribution makes firm revenue less sensitive to price changes. This entices firms to charge higher prices. As a result, new firms enter the market, broadening product diversity. General equilibrium e¤ects have a negative impact on poorer individuals and, in specific circumstances, on richer individuals. Furthermore, reduced income inequality may shift the market equilibrium further away from optimal product diversity. In open economies, lower income inequality in a country creates a price divergence between countries and decreases trade volumes and values. Those general equilibrium e¤ects are shown to be quantitatively non negligible.
Added: Mar 24, 2021
Working paper
Pospelov I. G., Radionov S. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2014. No. WP BRP 80/EC/2014 .
  We consider standard monopolistic competition models with aggregate consumer's preferences defined by two well-known classes of utility functions | the Kimball utility function and the variable elasticity of substitution utility function. It is known that market equilibrium is efficient only for the special case when utility function has a constant elasticity of substitution, but we find that in both cases a special tax on firms' output may be introduced such that market equilibrium becomes efficient
Added: Dec 4, 2014
Working paper
Pekarski S. E., Norkina O. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2014. No. 81.
Modern financial repression in advanced economies does not rely on increasing seigniorage revenue, but mostly rests upon regulatory measures to enlarge the demand for public debt that delivers extremely low or negative real interest rate. In this paper we propose the extension of the overlapping generations model to question the optimality of financial repression in the form of non-market placement of the public debt in the captive pension fund. We show that financial repression and capital income taxation are not perfect substitutes. The optimal degree of financial repression depends on the growth rate of population. Moreover, the benevolent government makes a decision to confiscate some part of the pension wealth.
Added: Dec 11, 2014
Working paper
Parakhonyak A. N., Vikander N. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2013. No. 41.
This paper examines the optimal sequencing of sales in the presence of network externalities. A firm sells a good to a group of consumers whose payoff from buying is increasing in total quantity sold. The firm selects the order to serve consumers so as to maximize expected sales. It can serve all consumers simultaneously, serve them all sequentially, or employ any intermediate scheme. We show that the optimal sales scheme is purely sequential, where each consumer observes all previous sales before choosing whether to buy himself. A sequential scheme maximizes the amount of information available to consumers, allowing success to breed success. Failure can also breed failure, but this is made less likely by consumers’ desire to influence one another’s behavior. We show that when consumers differ in the weight they place on the network externality, the firm would like to serve consumers with lower weights first. Our results suggests that a firm launching a new product should first target independent-minded consumers who can serve as opinion leaders for those who follow.
Added: Dec 9, 2013
Working paper
Bykadorov I., Ellero A., Funari S. et al. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2016. No. 132.
In the standard Krugman (1979) non-CES trade model, several asymmetric countries typically lose from increasing trade costs. However, all countries transiently benefit from such increase at the moment of closing trade, under almost-prohibitive trade costs (i.e., near autarky, which is possible only under non-CES preferences). In other words, during trade liberalization the first step from autarky to trade is necessarily harmful. Our explanation rests on market distortion and business destruction effects.
Added: Oct 23, 2016
Working paper
Karpov A. V. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2014. No. 64.
This paper justifies unequal health care quality in a model with two regions and patients differentiated by location and quality perception. Efficient distribution with unequal healthcare quality arises when there are low travel and/or quality provision costs. If costs are sufficiently low, then both regions win from inequality. Lump-sum transfers and price regulatory policies restore an efficient solution.
Added: Oct 4, 2014
Working paper
Gimpelson V. E., Monusova G. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2014. No. 84.
This paper explores the perceptions of inequality and their associations with social mobility exploiting the ISSP and LITs cross-country data set. These perceptions vary across countries as well as across individuals within countries. We try to explain this variation by examining the diverse opportunities for vertical social mobility  available to individuals. The main research question raised in the paper is whether our perception of income differentiation is driven by experience of past mobility and availability of the upward leading instruments. In other words, is a more socially mobile society more tolerant  to income inequality than a less mobilite and segmented one? The intuitive answer seems to be an obvious "yes", but empirical evidence is still scarce.
Added: Dec 17, 2014
Working paper
Golikova V., Kuznetsov B. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2015. No. 115.
The paper is focused on assessing the factors of risks for Russian manufacturing firms due to sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU, US and other countries in 2014. While there is an extensive literature on assessing the successes and failures of international sanctions on the economies of both senders and targets on macroeconomic level (Hufbauer et al., 2007; Drezner  1998, 2003; Morgan et al, 2009; Krustev, 2010; Morgan et al, 2009 among others), we are interested more in trying to understand the corporate response, i.e. what firms evaluate the introduction and increasing the scale of economic sanctions as a threat to their corporate strategy and their possible reactions aimed to adjust to changing environment due to geopolitical shock. Our research, based on the recent survey of manufacturing companies provides evidence that Russian manufacturing firms have become in the last decade much more integrated into the global economy via FDI, foreign trade, including both the import of technological equipment and intermediates, via establishing international partnerships and extensive supplying foreign companies which operate in Russia than is ordinary supposed. Considering the self-selection effect of best performing firms for foreign trade we can state that sanctions could be the most harmful for better performing and globalized firms and, thus, the impact of the sanctions for the prospects of Russian manufacturing sector may be very strong in the medium and long-term perspectives.
Added: Dec 3, 2015
Working paper
Aleskerov F. T., Vladimir V. Pislyakov, Timur V. Vitkup. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2014. No. 73.
An analysis of journal rankings based on five commonly used bibliometric indicators (impact factor, article influence score, Source Normalized Impact per Paper, SCImago Journal Rank, and the Hirsch index) has been conducted. It is shown that despite a high correlation, these single indicator-based rankings are not identical. Therefore, a new approach to ranking academic journals is proposed based on the aggregation of single bibliometric indicators using threshold aggregation. The main property of this procedure is its non-compensability, which reduces opportunities for manipulation.
Added: Mar 6, 2015
Working paper
Veselov D. A. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2013
We consider the problem of finding sufficient conditions for political support of liberal, growth-enhancing policy in a quality-ladders model with heterogeneous agents differing in their endowment of wealth and skills. The policy set is two-dimensional: Agents vote for the level of redistribution as well as for the level of entry barriers preventing the creation of more efficient firms. We show that under the majority voting rule there are three possible stable political outcomes: full redistribution, low redistribution and low barriers for entry (“liberal” order), high redistribution and high barriers for entry (“corporatism”). We show that key variables determining the political outcome are the expected gain from technological adoption, the ratio of total profits to total wages, and the skewness of human capital distribution.  
Added: May 2, 2013
Working paper
Nesterov A. S., Bonkoungou S. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2020
Recently, many matching systems around the world have been reformed. These reforms responded to objections that the matching mechanisms in use were unfair and manipulable. Surprisingly, the mechanisms remained unfair even after there forms: the new mechanisms may induce an out come with a blocking student who desires and deserves a school which she did not receive. However,as we show in this paper, the reforms introduced matching mechanisms which are more fair compared to the counterfactuals. First, most of there forms introduced mechanisms that are more fair by stability: when ever the old mechanism does not have a blocking student, the new mechanism does not have a blocking student either. Second,some reforms introduced mechanisms that are more fair by counting: the old mechanism always has at least as many blocking students as the new mechanism. These findings give a novel rationale to there forms and complement there cent literature showing that the same reforms have introduced less manipulable matching mechanisms.We furthers how that the fairness and manipulability of the mechanisms are strongly logically related.
Added: Aug 26, 2020
Working paper
Ozhegov E. M., Ozhegova A. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2017. No. WP BRP 174/EC/2017.
In this research we analyze new approach for prediction of demand. In the studied market of  performing arts the observed demand is limited by capacity of the house. Then one needs to account for demand censorhip to obtain unbiased estimates of demand funnction parameters. The presence of consumer segments with dierent purposes of going to the theatre and willingness-to-pay for performance and ticket characteristics causes a heterogeneity in theatre demand. We propose an estimator for prediction of demand that accounts for both demand censorhip and preferences heterogeneity. The estimator is based on the idea of classiffication and regression trees and bagging prediction aggregation extended for prediction of censored data. Our algorithm predicts and combines predictions for both discrete and continuous parts of censored data.We show that our estimator performs better in terms of prediction accuracy compared with estimators which accounts either for censorship, or heterogeneity only. The proposed approach is helpful for finding product segments and optimal price setting.
Added: Sep 20, 2017
Working paper
Polishchuk L., Syunyaev G. R. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2013. No. 43.
We provide a theory and empirical evidence showing that the rotation of ruling elites in combination with elites' asset ownership could improve property rights protection, and that such association holds for non-democratic political regimes when it is based on elites' concerns about security of their own property rights in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent.
Added: Dec 19, 2013
Working paper
Akhmedjonov A., Ilina I. N., Leonard C. S. et al. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2013. No. 42.
This paper assesses the impact of the quality of governance on economic performance in  Russia’s 83 regions (Oblasts, Republics, Krais and Okrugs) from 2000 to 2008, a period of rapid  economic advancement. Defining governance broadly as how authority is exercised, and using as  a proxy a measure of the investment risk by region, this paper contributes to the literature on  identifying the economic impact of governance. Our results find a significant association  between governance in Russia’s diverse regions and economic well-being, that is, we find a  performance gap in government practices. Specifically, our study shows that the main  components of effective governance are the ability of the government to run effective public  health programs aimed at decreasing the overall mortality rate among the working-age  population, to create fair labor market conditions for all individuals who are still capable of  working, and to improve the investment climate in the region leading to a higher level of  investment in fixed assets. Our results implicitly suggest that effective governance comprises the  tangible aspects of policymaking such as the adoption of effective public health, investment and  labor policies and most importantly, for the regions of Russian Federation, although effective  governance can be also an artifact of unobserved and unmeasurable managerial attributes of the  local government to implement federal and region level laws and regulations.   
Added: Dec 23, 2013
Working paper
Dagaev D., Suzdaltsev A. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2015. No. WP BRP 91/EC/2015 .
What is the optimal way to seed a knock-out tournament in order to maximize the overall spectator interest in it? Seeding affects the set of matches being played in the tournament, while neutral spectators tend to prefer to watch (i) close and intense matches; (ii) matches that involve strong teams. We formulate a discrete optimization problem that takes into account both these effects for every match of the tournament. With deterministic outcomes and linear objective function, we solve this problem analytically for any number of participants. It turns out that, depending on parameters, only two special classes of seedings can be optimal. While one of the classes includes a seeding that is often used in practice, the seedings in the other class are very different. When we relax the assumptions, we find that these classes of seedings are in fact optimal in a sizable number of cases.  
Added: Mar 20, 2015
Working paper
Yanovskaya E. B. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2014. No. WP BRP 85/EC/2014 .
A weakening of covariance property for solutions of cooperative games with transferable utilities - self-covariance - is defined. Self-covariant solutions are positively homogenous and satisfy a "restricted" translation covariance such that feasible shifts are only the solution vectors themselves and their multipliers. A description of all nonempty, efficient, anonymous, self-covariant, and single-valued solution for the class of two-person TU games is given. Among them the solutions admitting consistent extensions in the DavisMaschler sense are found. They are the equal share solution, the standard solution, and the constrained egalitarian solution for superadditive two-person games. Characterizations of consistent extensions (Thomson 1996) of these solutions to the class of all TU games are given.
Added: Dec 17, 2014