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Of all publications in the section: 3 578
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Working paper
Арефьев Н. Г., Арефьева А. И. Научные доклады лаборатории макроэкономического анализа. WP12. Высшая школа экономики, 2010. № 02.
Added: Mar 15, 2013
Working paper
Капелюшников Р. И. Проблемы рынка труда. WP3. Высшая школа экономики, 2019. № 01.
Added: Feb 25, 2019
Working paper
Рудаков В. Н. Научные труды Лаборатории исследований рынка труда. WP15. НИУ ВШЭ, 2015
This paper considers youth economic status in the Russian labor market in terms of wages. Using the data from RLMS HSE (2000–2013) we analyze the real wages of young workers and compare with wages of adult workers. We analyzed the dynamics of adult-young wage gap, including wage gap by education, industry, occupational group and gender. The analysis also includes separate estimation of Mincer wage equation for adult and young workers. We found out a significant improvement of youth economic status in terms of wages: adult-young wage gap decreases by 13%, earnings of youth and adult workers equals, youth wages grew faster than wages of older cohorts. Nevertheless, adult-young wage gap for educated and qualified workers remains. Adult workers earn higher wages on the workplaces that require tenure (education, public sector), as well as on the high skilled jobs that require tenure and higher education. For low-skilled jobs on the contrary there is no return to tenure and young worker earnings are higher. 
Added: Nov 2, 2015
Working paper
Алескеров Ф. Т., Белянин А. В., Погорельский К. Б. Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике. WP7. Высшая школа экономики, 2010. № 05.
The paper uses an experimental approach to study the voting power distribution in the context of classical preferences, as well as in generalized form which takes into account players’ preferences to coalesce with each other. Our results extend those of Montero, Sefton & Zhang (2008), confirming their basic findings using independent experimental data, and explain some of their empirical paradoxes. A major result of our experiment is that even small modifications of preferences lead to statistically significant differences in players’ shares, justifying the use of generalized power indices over classical ones. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the interplay of preferences significantly affects the process of bargaining and the resulting coalitions.
Added: Mar 23, 2013
Working paper
Черных А. И. Политическая теория и политический анализ. WP14. Высшая школа экономики, 2010. № 05.
Added: Mar 11, 2013
Working paper
Урнов М. Ю. Политическая теория и политический анализ. WP14. Высшая школа экономики, 2007. № WP14/2007/01.
Added: Nov 8, 2012
Working paper
Сувалко А. С. Философия и исследования культуры. WP20. Высшая школа экономики, 2013. № WP20/2013/05.
Added: Oct 3, 2013
Working paper
Солнцев С. А., Пентюк А. Р. Научные труды Лаборатории исследований рынка труда. WP15. НИУ ВШЭ, 2015. № 2.
The article examines an efficiency of corporate governance in the leading Russia’s companies using empirical data. The impact of companies’ poor financial results on CEO replacement is estimated using original empirical data. The main factor of CEO replacement is ROA fall while fall of company’s capitalization hasn’t significant effect on CEO change. During the crisis years (2008-2009) there was higher rate of CEO changes. 
Added: Oct 28, 2015
Working paper
Кузнецов Б. В., Голикова В. В., Гончар К. Р. Институциональные проблемы российской экономики. WP1. НИУ ВШЭ, 2011. № 02.
Added: Dec 20, 2012
Working paper
Аистов А. В. Научные доклады лаборатории количественного анализа и моделирования экономики. P1. Нижегородский филиал НИУ ВШЭ, 2008. № 1.
Added: Sep 10, 2012
Working paper
Баранов А. Ю., Долгопятова Т. Г. Институциональные проблемы российской экономики. WP1. НИУ ВШЭ, 2013. № WP1/2013/02.
The paper investigates innovation activities of enterprises, and the impact both of intra-firm features and external determinants of business climate on these activities in transitional economies. The main attention is focused on administrative barriers and accompanying corruption burden in the case of innovative fi rms. We use “Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey” (BEEPS – joint initiative of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank) 2009 data base for the analysis. The binary logistic regression was implemented. Analysis revealed correlation between increase of administrative barriers and various types of innovations (product and organizational innovations, and R&D expenditures), and increase of corruption costs for product innovations.
Added: Apr 25, 2013
Working paper
Сосунов К. А., Малаховская О. А., Громова Е. А. Научные доклады лаборатории макроэкономического анализа. WP12. Высшая школа экономики, 2009. № 01.
Added: Mar 14, 2013
Working paper
Долгопятова Т. Г., Уварова О. М. Институциональные проблемы российской экономики. WP1. НИУ ВШЭ, 2007. № 03.
The paper analyzes concentration of stock ownership and finds out ways for organization of internal corporate control in Russian companies by dominating shareholders. A set of determinants for owners’ choice of hired top-managers vs. of managers-shareholders against the background of corporate integration is defined. Statistically significant factors based on binary logistic regression models are revealed. The study is based on the data of a survey of 822 top-managers of large and medium-sizes joint stock companies in industry and communications conducted in 2005 at 64 regions of Russia within the joint research project implementing by scholars from Hitotsubashi University (Japan) and State University – Higher School of Economics.
Added: Apr 2, 2013
Working paper
Голованова С. В. Институциональные проблемы российской экономики. WP1. НИУ ВШЭ, 2008. № 01.
The article presents an overview of results of theoretical and empirical researches devoted to explain the phenomenon of spatial concentration of production. It also presents the main concepts of the author’s research, aiming to identify an effect of spatial concentration of production in the Russian economy during the period of 1998–2004. The article demonstrates that the spatial organization of production is still under the influence of soviet times’ policy. However in the period of economic growth there is a trend of production redistribution between the regions. Speed and scale of the process differs from one industry to another. The factors that influence the organization of production include vertical links between the industries, access to recourses, proximity of the main sales markets, impact of international competition.
Added: Apr 2, 2013
Working paper
Сосина Ю. В. Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике. WP7. Высшая школа экономики, 2004. № 04.
Added: Mar 22, 2013
Working paper
Гасан Гусейнов Все факты о научных проблемах, теориях и понятиях. Текстовые версии видео-лекций.. 26.03.2013. Постнаука, 2013
Added: Mar 24, 2014
Working paper
Гасан Гусейнов Все факты о научных проблемах, теориях и понятиях. Текстовые версии видео-лекций.. 26.03.2013. Постнаука, 2013
Added: Mar 24, 2014
Working paper
Ахременко А. С. Политическая теория и политический анализ. WP14. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. № 01.
Added: Dec 16, 2012
Working paper
Polishchuk L., Borisova E. I. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2010. No. 01.
Performance of Russian homeowners associations – non-profits established to manage common property in residential housing – is assessed using the stochastic frontier technique, which is a powerful tool of productivity analysis. Performance variations are explained by physical and social factors, prominent among them is the availability of social capital among tenants, required to resolve collective action problems and ensure accountability of managing bodies and outside contractors. Lack of civic capacity could be an obstacle to implementing community-governance solutions in residential housing, making homeowners associations dysfunctional or prone to capture by vested interests.
Added: Mar 16, 2013