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Regular version of the site
Of all publications in the section: 4
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Working paper
Gokan T., Kichko S., Thisse J. CESifo working paper. CESifo Group Munich, 2019. No. 7888.
We consider an economic geography setting in which firms are free to choose one of the following organizational types: (i) integrated firms, which perform all their activities at the same location, (ii) horizontal firms, which operate several plants producing the same good at different locations, and (iii) vertical firms, which perform distinct activities at separated locations. We show that there exists a unique organizational equilibrium, which typically involves the coexistence of various organizational forms. We also give necessary and sufficient conditions for the three types of firms to coexist within the same region and show that transportation and communication costs have opposite effects on firms’ organizational choices. This suggests that, depending on its nature, the supply of a new transportation infrastructure may lead to contrasted locational patterns.
Added: Oct 28, 2019
Working paper
Kichko S., Behrens K., Ushchev P. CESifo working paper. CESifo Group Munich, 2018. No. WP6965.
We develop a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with a traded and a nontraded sector. Using a broad class of homothetic preferences—that generate variable markups, display a simple behavior of their elasticity of substitution, and nest the ces as a limiting case— we show that trade liberalization: (i) reduces domestic markups and increases imported markups in the traded sector; (ii) increases markups in the non-traded sector; and (iii) increases firm sizes in both sectors. Thus, while domestic and export markups in the traded sector converge across countries, markups diverge across sectors within countries. The negative welfare effects of higher markups and less consumption diversity in the non-traded sector dampen the positive welfare effects of lower markups and greater diversity in the traded sector.
Added: Apr 26, 2018
Working paper
Kadochnikov S. M., Drapkin I. M. CESifo working paper. CESifo Group Munich, 2008. No. 2227.
This paper is based on the model of backward linkages from foreign direct investment (FDI) Lin/Saggi (2003), where the market structure of the final goods sector is represented by a monopoly or Cournot oligopoly, and the supplier sector – by a pure monopoly. We extend this model by examining cases of perfect competition and a vertically integrated domestic company in the intermediate goods market. Our analysis shows that coming of foreign companies to the final goods sector provides positive backward linkage effects. Although this result doesn’t depend on the market structure in the final goods sector, the latter significantly affects the size of FDI linkage effects – the more competitive is the intermediate goods sector, the larger are the backward linkage effects. They reach their maximum under perfect competition in the intermediate goods market, minimum – under monopoly in this sector, and medium size - when a vertically integrated local firm exists in the market. We have also discovered that a more competitive market structure per se doesn’t guarantee larger positive effects of FDI. It is important that in addition to a competitive structure local firms do not significantly lag behind foreign firms in their technological level.
Added: Sep 24, 2013
Working paper
Kichko S., Liang W., Mai C. et al. CESifo working paper. CESifo Group Munich, 2020. No. 8527.
Tech clusters play a growing role in knowledge-based economies by accommodating high-tech firms and providing an environment that fosters location-dependent knowledge spillovers and promote R&D investments by .rms. Yet, not much is known about the economic conditions under which such entities may form in equilibrium without government interventions. This paper develops a spatial equilibrium model with a competitive final sector and a monopolistically competitive intermediate sector, which allows us to determine necessary and sufficient conditions for a tech cluster to emerge as an equilibrium outcome. We show that strongly localized knowledge spillovers, skilled labor abundance, and low commuting costs are key drivers for a tech cluster to form. Not only is the productivity of the final sector higher when intermediate firms cluster, but a tech cluster hosts more intermediate firms and more R&D and production activities, and yields greater worker welfare, compared to what a dispersed pattern would generate. With continual improvements in infrastructure and communication technology that lowers coordination costs, tech clusters will eventually be fragmented.
Added: Mar 24, 2021