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Regular version of the site
Of all publications in the section: 8
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Working paper
Lazareva O., Rachinsky A., Stepanov S. CEFIR / NES Working Paper. Центр экономических и финансовых исследований и разработок в российской экономической школе, Российская экономическая школа, 2007. No. 103.
Added: Nov 25, 2013
Working paper
Khovanskaya I. A., Sonin K., Yudkevich M. M. CEFIR / NES Working Paper. Центр экономических и финансовых исследований и разработок в российской экономической школе, Российская экономическая школа, 2007. No. 112.
We study hiring decisions made by competing universities in a dynamic framework, focusing on the structure of university finance. Universities with annual state-approved financing underinvest in high-quality faculty, while universities that receive a significant part of their annual income from returns on endowments hire fewer but better faculty and provide long-term contracts. If university financing is linked to the number of students, there is additional pressure to hire low-quality short-term staff. An increase in the university’s budget might force the university to switch its priorities from ‘research’ to ‘teaching’ in equilibrium. We employ our model to discuss the necessity for state-financed endowments, and investigate the political economics of competition between universities, path-dependence in the development of the university system, and higher-education reform in emerging market economies.
Added: Apr 4, 2013
Working paper
Zamulin O. A., Sosunov K. A. CEFIR / NES Working Paper. Центр экономических и финансовых исследований и разработок в российской экономической школе, Российская экономическая школа, 2006. No. 83.
The paper investigates whether the 80% real appreciation of the Russian ruble in 1998-2005 can be explained by the increase in oil revenues in a calibrated general equilibrium model. It is shown that the oil prices alone cannot account for the appreciation with forward-looking permanent-income consumers, unless the oil price increase is assumed permanent. Accounting for the increase in the volume of oil exports, however, can help, provided that the increase is assumed to be permanent.
Added: May 29, 2013
Working paper
Guriev S., Vakulenko E. CEFIR / NES Working Paper. Центр экономических и финансовых исследований и разработок в российской экономической школе, Российская экономическая школа, 2012. No. 180.

In this paper we study convergence among Russian regions. We find that while there was no convergence in 1990s, the situation changed dramatically in 2000s. While interregional GDP per capita gaps still persist, the differentials in incomes and wages decreased substantially. We show that fiscal redistribution did not play a major role in convergence. We therefore try to understand the phenomenon of recent convergence using panel data on the interregional reallocation of capital and labor. We find that capital market in Russian regions is integrated in a sense that local investment does not depend on local savings. We also show that economic growth and financial development has substantially decreased the barriers to labor mobility. We find that in 1990s many poor Russian regions were in a poverty trap: potential workers wanted to leave those regions but could not afford to finance the move. In 2000s (especially in late 2000s), these barriers were no longer binding. Overall economic development allowed even poorest Russian regions to grow out of the poverty traps. This resulted in convergence in Russian labor market; the interregional gaps in incomes, wages and unemployment rates are now below those in Europe. The results imply that economic growth and development of financial and real estate markets eventually result in interregional convergence.

Added: Nov 21, 2012
Working paper
Lazareva O., Rachinsky A., Stepanov S. CEFIR / NES Working Paper. Центр экономических и финансовых исследований и разработок в российской экономической школе, Российская экономическая школа, 2008. No. 119.
Added: Nov 25, 2013
Working paper
Enikolopov R., Petrova M., Stepanov S. CEFIR / NES Working Paper. Центр экономических и финансовых исследований и разработок в российской экономической школе, Российская экономическая школа, 2012. No. 184.
Recent empirical research suggests that country-level and firm-level governance institutions are substitutes with respect to their effect on firm value. In this paper we demonstrate that these institutions may become complements once we look at the decline in firm’s value during a crisis. Specifically, we find that the decline in companies’ valuation during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was more sensitive to firm-level transparency in countries with stronger investor protection. We propose a theoretical model that reconciles our findings with the results in the literature. In our model, during "normal times" strong firm-level governance is crucial to attract outside financing in countries with weak investor protection, but is less important in countries with good investor protection. During the crisis, however, corporate governance becomes important even in regimes with strong investor protection, and, as a result, relative importance of firm-level governance increases in countries with good investor protection.
Added: Nov 25, 2013
Working paper
Сосунов К. А., Замулин О. А. CEFIR / NES Working Paper. Центр экономических и финансовых исследований и разработок в российской экономической школе, Российская экономическая школа, 2006. № 82.
The paper investigates the ability of monetary authorities to keep the real exchange rate undervalued over the long run by implementing a policy of accumulating foreign exchange reserves. We consider a model of a three-sector, small, open economy, where the central bank continuously purchases foreign currency reserves and compare the results to Russian and Chinese economies in recent years. Both countries appear to pursue reserve accumulation policies. We find a clear trade-off between the steady state levels of the real exchange rate and inflation. After calibration, the model predicts an 8.5% real undervaluation of the Russian currency and a 13.7% undervaluation of the Chinese currency. Predicted inflation is found to match observed levels.
Added: May 29, 2013
Working paper
Stepanov S. CEFIR / NES Working Paper. Центр экономических и финансовых исследований и разработок в российской экономической школе, Российская экономическая школа, 2013. No. 185.
I study transfers of control in a firm having atomistic shareholders and one dominant minority blockholder (incumbent). A potential acquirer can try to acquire control by purchasing the incumbent's share. If the negotiations are successful, the control changes hands via a block trade. If the negotiations fail, the acquirer can launch a public tender offer. According to empirical evidence, both types of transactions occur in such companies. However, the existing models that allow for both types of control transfer never obtain tender offers in equilibrium. My model fills this gap in the literature. The key feature of my setup is asymmetry of information about the acquirer's ability to generate value, which makes bargaining between the acquirer and the incumbent imperfect. As a result, both block trades and tender offers can arise in equilibrium. Specifically, high ability acquirers take over the firm by means of a tender offer, intermediate types negotiate a block trade, and low types do not attempt any transaction. This result provides an immediate explanation for higher target announcement returns in tender offers as compared to block trades. The model also explains why takeover premiums and targets' stock price reaction to tender offers may be higher in countries with stronger shareholder protection and predicts that better shareholder protection should result in higher announcements returns for targets in block trade transactions as well. Finally, I obtain that transfers of corporate control in firms with a dominant minority blockholder are more efficient when shareholder protection is better and provides an argument against the mandatory bid rule in strong legal regimes.
Added: Nov 25, 2013