• A
  • A
  • A
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Regular version of the site
Of all publications in the section: 50
Sort:
by name
by year
Working paper
Kuzminov Y. I., Yudkevich M. M. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2007. No. 01.
In areas of creative activity where the evaluation of efforts and results requires major expenditures, the intrinsic motivation of agents is an important factor of efficiency, whereas stringent monitoring fails to counteract opportunistic behavior. University professors are a case in point. The lack of comprehensive control and detailed regulation of professorial work that traditionally characterizes the university milieu creates an atmosphere of academic freedom that is propitious to intrinsic motivation. Academic freedom lies at the basis of the convention regulating the behavior of university administration and professors. It gives rise to an equilibrium state in which professors engage in both teaching and research, yet this equilibrium is not evolutionary stable in itself: as a rule, it is maintained by academic standards. New conditions of financing that are imposed on both the professoriate and the university administration lead to the destruction of this equilibrium and the emergence of new behavioral patterns at universities. Their characteristics depend both on external conditions (on the education market as a whole) and on internal ones (the university’s policy and the university academic environment).
Added: Mar 16, 2013
Working paper
Menyashev R., Polishchuk L. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2011. No. 01.
In a number of studies social capital is shown to have substantial positive impact on economic development, institutional performance, and quality of governance. So far no such analyses were available for Russia, and the present paper is intended to fill this gap. We propose a model which differentiates the impact on economic welfare of bridging and bonding forms of social capital. The empirical part of the study is based on 2007 survey data collected in the Geo-Rating project. We establish significant positive relationship between bridging social capital and urban development in Russia. Bonding social capital works in the opposite direction: its impact on development is negative. It is further shown that the transmission mechanism between social capital and economic outcomes is based on municipal governance: bridging social capital improves government accountability, whereas bonding social capital reduces the political costs of malfeasance and thus facilitates the abuse of power.
Added: Nov 29, 2012
Working paper
Yudkevich M. M. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2005. No. 05.
We present an incomplete contract model of relationship between University and Professor to analyze the impact of control rights distribution at University on faculty incentives to invest in human capital and University development. Secondary employment of teaching staff outside University may create positive externalities within University inducing Professors to invest in their human capital. We derive conditions under which an adverse selection problem is severe, and end up with conclusions regarding optimal employment and contract policy.
Added: Mar 15, 2013
Working paper
Polishchuk L., Syunyaev G. R. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2011. No. 04.
We propose a theoretical model and provide empirical evidence that show that rotation of ruling elites could improve property rights protection, and that such association holds for nondemocratic political regimes when it is based on elites’ concerns about security of their own property rights in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to credible commitment problem in maintaining secured property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent. It is further shown that the strength of such immediate incentives to maintain secured property rights depends positively on the size of elites’ market assets. These conclusions are confirmed empirically by using a panel of 58 developed and developing nations for the period from 1975 through 2005.
Added: Nov 29, 2012
Working paper
Yudkevich M. M., Kozmina Y. Y., Sivak E. et al. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2013
This paper is a Russian report about the research in the framework of the international project "the Changing academic profession". It is an impressive one-of-a-kind research endeavor that examines the academic profession across 20 countries, including Russia. It collected knowledge and data about systems of higher education, functions, productivity and attitudes of the academics in a comparative perspective. This report describes how the CAP questionnaire was adjusted to the Russian higher education system, how the sampling of Russian academia was drawn, and how the survey was administered in Russia. It also provides tables of means on each of the sections of the survey and reports on the limitations of the Russian survey. The survey data provides important information for future country-specific research and for international comparisons.
Added: Feb 20, 2014
Working paper
Balsevich A. A., Podkolzina E. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2011. No. 05.

One of the measures implemented as a part of administrative reform in Russia was the introduction of administrative procedures — special rules for providing government services that specify the process, the timing, the sanctions, etc, which can be used by bureaucrats for coordinating their activities, and by their principals (higher ranking bureaucrats and citizens) to control their agents. The main idea behind the administrative procedures was to increase the transparency of bureaucracies that provide government services, to simplify the control over bureaucrats, to prevent corruption, and, consequently, to increase the quality of government services. But after a few years since the introduction of administrative procedures we still face the problem of low accountability of bureaucrats. Thus, the main goal of the paper is to show whether administrative procedures can solve the problem of bureaucrats’ opportunism, and if they can, what are the key determinants of their effectiveness. To answer the question we provide two simple models of interaction between bureaucrats and citizens, and bureaucrats of different ranks, and describe the links between the models, to show how the introduction of administrative procedures influences the outcome of the interaction between the agents. We also define the set of parameters that can make administrative procedures a real means of control over bureaucrats and thus lead to better quality of government services.

Added: Nov 29, 2012
Working paper
Юдкевич М. М., Козьмина Я.Я., Сивак Е. В. и др. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2013
В данной работе представлены описание методологии и результаты опроса преподавателей в российской сфере высшего образования.
Added: Dec 19, 2013
Working paper
Борисова Е. И., Полищук Л. И., Суворов А. Д. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2013. № 3.
Added: Jan 31, 2014
Working paper
Борисова Е. И., Полищук Л. И. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2008. № 02.
The key distinction of non-profit organizations (NPO) from for-profit private firms is that the former have no owners and do not distribute profit to shareholders. This feature leaves NPOs without a natural efficiency criterion reflecting goals of such organizations, and greatly complicates the analysis of NPO efficiency. The paper critically assesses the existing approaches to measurement of NPO efficiency and proposes the production frontier approximation as an efficiency measurement tool which is both practical and, under certain assumptions, adequate to the problem of NPO performance evaluation. Application of the proposed method is discussed, including measurement of efficiency of non-profit associations, such as associations of homeowners.
Added: Mar 16, 2013
Working paper
Прахов И. А. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2013. № 1.
Despite the introduction of the Unified State Examination (the USE) , the main forms of pre-entry coaching to get into university – pre-entry courses and classes with tutors – which existed long before the new system of admission, have not lost their popularity . The introduction of the USE has unified a set of requirements for applicants: in most cases, the selection of applicants is conducted only on the basis of USE scores. As a result, the costs associated with the preparation for enrollment and admission to the university should be reduced. This also applies to investment in pre-entry coaching, as formally such preparation within the university in most cases does not provide those benefits which existed before. This paper assesses the impact of temporary and money investing in training for entry on results of the USE. Estimation of the modified educational production function revealed a positive relationship between investment in pre-entry coaching at courses and the results of the exam, although the return on such investment is low. The effects of school and school performance in a number of cases are higher than the effect of pre-entry coaching. In addition, the factors that influence the probability of attending pre-entry coaching programs are estimated.
Added: Dec 18, 2013
Working paper
Манаков А. Г. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2006. № 02.
This article considers the relationship between government and private oil&gas company and analyses impact of different degrees of political instability. The model is elaborated which shows that in case of political instability and absence of government control over the methods of oil extraction, company would choose “predatory” methods of extraction. According to the model the “UKOS case” did a lot of harm to the current situation. The result followed from the fact that the government provided a high degree of political instability, i.e. increased the preference of “predatory” method of oil extraction and made regulation more complicated. The most important result of the model is a nonlinear effect of political instability on the required severity (measured by size of tax/penalty) of government policy. With stabilization of the political situation required severity of regulation increases to the certain level, after which regulation is not necessary.
Added: Mar 15, 2013
Working paper
Бальсевич А. А., Подколзина Е. А. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2013. № 2.
Эффективность государственных закупок в значительной степени зависит от количества участников конкурентной процедуры. Чем больше фирм принимает участие в торгах, при прочих равных, тем выше будет конкуренция за контракт, тем больше вероятность, что контракт достанется фирме, которая сможет его выполнить с наименьшими издержками и по лучшей цене. Однако обеспечить необходимый уровень конкуренции на торгах достаточно сложно. Особенно в ситуации, когда количество участников ограничено структурой розничного рынка. В данной работе мы отвечаем на вопрос, как связаны структура розничного рынка и цены государственных контрактов на примере закупок топлива в нескольких регионах России, и показываем, что монополизация частных рынков приводит к более высоким ценам на государственные контракты в данных регионах.
Added: Dec 20, 2013
Working paper
Бальсевич А. А., Ерёмина А. В., Зороастрова И. В. и др. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. № 01.
Added: Nov 1, 2012
Working paper
Андрущак Г. В., Прудникова А.Е. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2011. № 02.
Added: Nov 29, 2012
Working paper
Одинцова М. И. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2007. № 07.
The paper surveys the approach of law and economics scholars to the commercial impracticability doctrine in common law, which is invoked when an extraordinary contingency materializes that makes the promisor’s performance extraordinary costly. The doctrine’s efficiency justifications are analyzed and contrasted to the critical assessments of the commercial impracticability rule. The main objection to the impracticability defense is that the information necessary to identify the conditions under which it’s application is efficient may be extremely difficult to formulate. Thus the possibility exists that the impracticability doctrine introduces uncertainty into the contacting process and fosters greater litigation costs. Some of the leading cases are analyzed.
Added: Mar 16, 2013
Working paper
Креховец Е. В., Польдин О. В. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2014. № 1.
We consider the structure of social network of university students, and analyze factors that lead to the network formation. Using the data from student survey and administrative information, we estimate econometric models that assume homophily and propinquity effect on the likelihood of being friends. Specifically, we estimate linear probability models with and without fixed effects, and logistic model for probability of a tie between two students. The results confirm the significance of such friendship formation factors as sharing the same study group, living in the same dorm, closeness of academic achievement and gender homophily.
Added: Dec 26, 2014
Working paper
Podkolzina E. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2006. No. 03.
The main function of the institution of bankruptcy is to resolve problems arising from insolvency. The main goal of this paper is to study the possible approaches to resolving the insolvency problem. We define the structure of the institution of bankruptcy, which we consider to consist not only of legislation and its enforcement, but to also include informal out-of-court mechanisms and the possibility of different economic agents interpreting the same fact differently. This helps us understand the differences in how agents behave in the framework of this institution. The focus in this paper is on the mechanisms that could be used outside formal proceedings, all of which are illustrated by examples from Russian evidence. We also discuss the development of the institution of bankruptcy in Russia.
Added: Mar 15, 2013
Working paper
Аузан А. А. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2007. № 09.
This paper is based on the author’s lecture given at the Russian Summer School on Institutional Analysis 2007, organized by the State University — Higher School of Economics with the financial support of Innovation educational program. The author focuses on prospects and difficulties related to the recently outlined tendency of carrying out reforms basing on new institutional economic approaches. Following his own experience, the author describes three cases of reforms. In each case three aspects are considered: legislation design, its implementation and some mistakes that reformers tend to make. The author begins with consumer rights protection institutions formation in the beginning 1990s. It was based on the ideas of a variety of formal tools which a consumer could use, reduction of transaction costs of the judicial system use and the competition inside the institution. Then the author analyzes a de-bureaucratization problem, which is related to the institutions aimed to reduce the transaction costs of firms’ activities. In this case the nature of an administrative barrier is analyzed by rules estimation in terms of social and private benefits. Finally the author pays attention to opportunities for new institutional economic theory in developing the country’s 2008-2020 economic development strategy: the analysis of discrete institutional alternatives cost and benefits, proper attention to population, namely the groups of special interests, and the compensation mechanisms development.
Added: Mar 16, 2013
Working paper
Semenova M. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2007. No. 03.
The introduction of institutions of credit information sharing — private credit bureaus and public credit registries — in the market for bank loans represents one of the possible solutions of information asymmetry problem, — the problem which most of the creditors tend to face. However the possibility of information sharing influences the bank's incentives in two different ways. While it disciplines the borrowers and, therefore, reduces the share of bad loans, a bank loses the competitive advantage, namely the monopolistic knowledge about the data in its clients' credit histories. Does the bank have an opportunity to use the benefits of information sharing without losing its competitive advantage and its clientele? One way to do so is to report false data on borrowers. In this paper we analyze the bank's incentives to misreport given the bank cannot refuse to participate in the information sharing system as the membership is obligatory. Our main result is that the opportunity to get extra profit and to offer less expensive credit to new clients explains why banks may prefer the strategy of dishonest behavior.
Added: Mar 16, 2013
Working paper
Семенова М. В. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2005. № 01.
The introduction of institutions of credit information sharing – private credit bureaus and public credit registries & in the market for bank loans represent one of the possible solutions of information asymmetry problem which the creditors tend to face. However the possibility of information sharing influences the bank’s incentives in two different ways. While it disciplines the borrowers and, therefore, reduces the share of bad loans, a bank loses the competitive advantage, namely the monopolistic knowledge about the data in its clients’ credit histories. Does the bank have an opportunity at its disposal to use the benefits of information sharing without losing its competitive advantage and its clientele? One way to do so is to report false data on borrowers. This paper analyses the bank’s incentives for such opportunistic behavior and describes the impact of false information reporting on the characteristics of market equilibrium. The opportunity to get extra profit and to offer less expensive credit to new clients explains why banks prefer the strategy of dishonest behavior. The paper outlines the role of the informational intermediary in quality control for the data contained in credit reports. Also it describes the conditions under which verification of a certain share of reports provides that the parameters characterizing the equilibrium are equal to those in no information asymmetry situation.
Added: Mar 15, 2013
Working paper
Прахов И. А. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2009. № 04.
This paper reviews empirical studies focused on influence of school resources on student achievement. The paper is based on the main studies on the U.S. and European markets of secondary education. They show that the relationship between school characteristics and test scores is ambiguous. Possible reasons of significant variations in the results of previous research, such as aggregation level, different data sets and heterogeneity of schools, are discussed in this paper. Furthermore, the results of a study based on international comparative project TIMSS (Third International Mathematics and Science Study) are analyzed. As a result, significant effects of institutional characteristics of school system on student achievement are determined.
Added: Mar 16, 2013