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Of all publications in the section: 66
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Working paper
Rodionova L., Kopnova E. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2015. No. 117.
A comparative analysis of the age impact on happiness in Russia and European countries was conducted. The European Social Survey data in 2012 for 29 countries were used. On the basis of an ordered logistic regression, a U-shape relationship between age and happiness was obtained for some of the analysed countries. By using cluster analysis, the countries were divided into 3 groups, in which the age effect varies greatly. In the counties of group 1 (for example, Iceland and Norway) happiness did not change at any age or increase smoothly in old age. Group 2 (Germany and France) had a clear U-shaped age-happiness form. Russia and some counties of former Soviet Union: Ukraine, Lithuania and Estonia were analysed in group 3, where the level of happiness decreased significantly in old age (over 60). In some countries (Belgium, Switzerland, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Israel, Italy, Sweden) all people were happy, regardless of age and the assumption of age-happiness U-shape relation was not found. The socio-economic determinants of happiness were also analysed in different age groups. Income satisfaction and subjective health were the more significant characteristics.
Added: Dec 24, 2015
Working paper
Sandomirskaia M. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2014. No. 70.
We examine the novel concept for repeated noncooperative games with bounded rationality: ``Nash-2'' equilibrium, called also ``threatening-proof profile'' in (Iskakov~M., Iskakov A., 2012). It is weaker than Nash equilibrium and equilibrium in secure strategies: a player takes into account not only current strategies but also the next-stage responses of the partners to her deviation from the current situation that reduces her relevant choice set. We provide a condition for Nash-2 existence, criteria for a strategy profile to be the Nash-2 equilibrium in strictly competitive games, apply this concept to Bertrand and Hotelling game and interpret the results as tacit collusion.
Added: Oct 21, 2014
Working paper
Yanovskaya E. B. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2016. No. 127.
Two-person games and cost/surplus sharing problems are worth for studying because they are the base for their extending to the classes of such problems with variable population with the help of very powerful consistency properties. In the paper a family of cost-sharing methods for cost sharing problems with two agents [Moulin 2000] is extended to a class of solutions for two-person cooperative games that are larger than both cost-sharing and surplus-sharing problems, since cooperative games have no no restrictions on positivity of costs and surpluses. The tool of the extension is a new invariance axiom -- self covariance -- that can be applied both to cost-sharing methods and to cooperative game solutions. In particular, this axiom replaces the Lower composition axiom not applicable to methods for profit sharing problems.
Added: Oct 14, 2016
Working paper
Shulgin A. G. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2017. No. 170.
This paper constructs a theoretical general equilibrium model for exchange rate determination in a small open commodity exporting economy based on an imperfect capital market a la Gabaix-Maggiori and appropriate for estimation on high frequency data and could be used for the evaluation of sterilized intervention effectiveness. To find empirical confirmation of the theoretical setup validity I use Russian daily statistics to estimate the model and investigate the reaction of the Russian ruble-US dollar exchange rate to sterilized interventions in the form of foreign currency repo auctions conducted by the Bank of Russia in the period of 2014-2017. I also estimate a vector error correction model on the same dataset and use it as important empirical benchmark for the theoretical model. The empirical analysis revealed a temporary statistically significant effect of sterilized intervention on exchange rate level, which peaked eight working days after the auction day. The combination of theoretical and empirical approaches demonstrates the effectiveness of the portfolio and the ineffectiveness of signalling channels in the transmission mechanism of the sterilized intervention instrument in Russian case
Added: Oct 16, 2017
Working paper
Lazareva O. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 21.

This paper estimates the effect of economic shocks that affect families with young children on children’s health, educational and behavioral outcomes in adolescence.  Transition period in Russia provides a natural experiment setting for estimating this effect.  During the economic turmoil of early transition many people lost their jobs, experienced salary declines or occupational downgrading. These individual labor market shocks were mainly caused by the structural changes in the economy. Analyzing household survey data from Russia I find that children who were under the age of five and whose parents were negatively affected during the early transition have poorer health in adolescence and are less likely to have completed high school. For the comparison group  –  children who were at the school age during the early transition  –  there is an effect on educational outcomes and risky behaviors but not on health. Absence of a father in a family during the early transition years has a negative health effect only for the younger age group. I also find differential effects for boys and girls, by mother and father.

Added: Jan 17, 2013
Working paper
Korf D. V. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2016. No. WP BRP 74/LAW/2017.
Added: Apr 5, 2017
Working paper
Bogomolnaia A., Sandomirskiy F., Moulin H. et al. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2017. No. 158.
A mixed manna contains goods (that everyone likes), bads (that everyone dislikes), as well as items that are goods to some agents, but bads or satiated to others. If all items are goods and utility functions are homothetic, concave (and monotone), the Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes maximizes the Nash product of utilities: hence it is welfarist (determined utility-wise by the feasible set of profiles), single-valued and easy to compute. We generalize the Gale-Eisenberg Theorem to a mixed manna. The Competitive division is still welfarist and related to the product of utilities or disutilities. If the zero utility profile (before any manna) is Pareto dominated, the competitive profile is unique and still maximizes the product of utilities. If the zero profile is unfeasible, the competitive profiles are the critical points of the product of disutilities on the efficiency frontier, and multiplicity is pervasive. In particular the task of dividing a mixed manna is either good news for everyone, or bad news for everyone. We refine our results in the practically important case of linear preferences, where the axiomatic comparison between the division of goods and that of bads is especially sharp. When we divide goods and the manna improves, everyone weakly benefits under the competitive rule; but no reasonable rule to divide bads can be similarly Resource Monotonic. Also, the much larger set of Non Envious and Efficient divisions of bads can be disconnected so that it will admit no continuous selection.
Added: Mar 2, 2017
Working paper
Yanovskaya E. B., Dietzenbacher B. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2019
This paper axiomatically studies the equal split-off set (Branzei, Dimitrov, Tijs 2006) as a solution for cooperative games with transferable utility. This solution extends the well-known (Dutta Ray 1989) solution for convex games to arbitrary games. By deriving several characterizations, we explore the relation of the equal split-off set with various consistency notions.
Added: Jul 29, 2019
Working paper
Menyashev R. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2011. No. 05.
A popular view in Russian studies argues that underdevelopment of Russian civil society is partly responsible for the failure of liberal idea in Russia. The fragmented society may see no alternative to massive government regulation, which is why support for a strong state is so high. If this logic is true, the di erences in civicness across urban societies should show up in di erent levels of liberal parties' support. The paper estimates this e ect. It was found that the transition from the most passive urban society to the most active in the sample increases the vote for liberal parties by a third. A unit increase in the number of consumer cooperatives per 1000 of citizens leads to a 3.5% drop in Communist Party results in 1995 and a 4% drop in United Russia votes in 2007. To demonstrate the causality we instrument the development of civil society by the number of years since the foundation of the rst university in each city.
Added: Aug 29, 2012
Working paper
Kichko S. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2017. No. 159.
We study the role of (i) initial differences in shares of immobile workers between countries which stand for the agglomeration forces, and (ii) positive trade costs in the traditional sector which are related to the dispersion forces, in shaping the spatial pattern of the developed and transition countries. We show that on the trade liberalization path in skill-intensive industries, keeping high trade barriers in less skill-intensive sectors is enough to protect a transition country from de-industrialization. If trade liberalization in a skill-intensive sector is accompanied by decreasing trade barriers in the traditional sector, the developed country has a higher probability to become a Core. When partial agglomeration is stable, it is characterized by the Home Market Effect (HME).
Added: Mar 9, 2017
Working paper
Dower P., Egor Malkov, Leonid Polischuk et al. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2015. No. WP BRP 107/EC/2015.
Private ownership confers numerous benefits, including stronger performance incentives, better use of privately owned assets, and improved access to finance. We argue that privately owned land could be both an asset and a liability, and overall net benefits of land ownership are contingent on the quality of surrounding institutions. We present a simple model and empirical evidence based on the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) in Russia, which clearly demonstrates such conditionality in the case of land ownership by Russian industrial firms. Consistently with earlier literature, land ownership facilitates firms’ access to finance (the “de Soto effect”), but at the same time entails additional risks and obstacles to doing business. When the quality of property rights protection and other key institutions is poor, land ownership could have an adverse effect on firms’ performance.
Added: Oct 28, 2014
Working paper
Smirnov S. V., Kondrashov N. V., Petronevich A. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2016. No. 122.
This paper establishes a reference chronology for the Russian economic cycle from the early 1980s to mid-2015. To detect peaks and troughs, we tested nine monthly indices as reference series, three methods of seasonal adjustments (X-12-ARIMA, TRAMO/SEATS, and CAMPLET), and four methods for dating cyclical turning points (local min/max, Bry-Boschan, Harding-Pagan, and Markov-Switching model). As these more or less formal methods led to different estimates, any sensible choice was possible only on the grounds of informal considerations. The final set of turning points looks plausible and separates expansions and contractions in an explicable manner, but further discussions are needed to establish a consensus between experts.
Added: Jan 22, 2016
Working paper
Stepanov I. A., Albrecht J. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2019. No. 211.
The issue of instrument choice is vital for climate policy. Carbon pricing is used next to a range of traditional energy taxes and renewable energy policies such as feed-in tariffs and minimal renewable generation targets. Several countries introduced carbon taxes alongside existing energy taxes such as excise duties on vehicle fuels. Since 2005, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has attached a direct price to the GHG emissions of ETS companies. The combination of multiple instruments and explicit and indirect carbon price signals created a complex and frequently changing institutional landscape that blurs the contribution of each policy instrument. Can the decarbonization of the European economy be attributed to carbon price instruments or to renewable energy policies together with other fiscal instruments? This paper clarifies the relative impact of explicit carbon price instruments (carbon taxes and EU ETS) compared to other instruments, namely renewable energy policies and indirect carbon price signals (general energy taxes). The methodology is based on the calculation of the implicit carbon price in existing fiscal systems. On the basis of panel data for 30 European countries 1995–2016, several fixed-effect regression estimations were performed. The results indicate a greater but decreasing impact of price instruments on carbon intensity compared to renewable energy policies and a greater but decreasing relative impact of indirect price signals compared to explicit ones.
Added: Feb 15, 2019
Working paper
de Vries G. J., Erumban A. A., Timmer M. P. et al. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2011. No. 04.
This paper studies structural transformation and its implications for productivity growth in the BRIC countries based on a new database that provides trends in value added and employment at a detailed 35-sector level. We find that for China, India and Russia reallocation of labour across sectors is contributing to aggregate productivity growth, whereas in Brazil it is not. However, this result is overturned when a distinction is made between formal and informal activities. Increasing formalization of the Brazilian economy since 2000 appears to be growth-enhancing, while in India the increase in informality after the reforms is growth-reducing.
Added: Aug 28, 2012
Working paper
Bogomolnaia A., Moulin H., Sandomirskiy F. et al. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2016. No. 153.
When utilities are additive, we uncovered in our previous paper (Dividing Goods or Bads Under Additive Utilities) many similarities but also surprising di erences in the behavior of the familiar Competitive rule (with equal incomes), when we divide (private) goods or bads. The rule picks in both cases the critical points of the product of utilities (or disutilities) on the eciency frontier, but there is only one such point if we share goods, while there can be exponentially many in the case of bads.   We extend this analysis to the fair division of mixed items: each item can be viewed by some participants as a good and by others as a bad, with corresponding positive or negative marginal utilities. We nd that the division of mixed items boils down, normatively as well as computationally, to a variant of an all goods problem, or of an all bads problem: in particular the task of dividing the non disposable items must be either good news for everyone, or bad news for everyone.   If at least one feasible utility pro le is positive, the Competitive rule picks the unique maximum of the product of (positive) utilities. If no feasible utility pro le is positive, this rule picks all critical points of the product of disutilities on the ecient frontier.
Added: Nov 14, 2016
Working paper
Bogomolnaia A., Moulin H., Sandomirskiy F. et al. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2016. No. 147.
The Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes is an especially appealing efficient and envy-free division of private goods when utilities are additive: it maximizes the Nash product of utilities and is single-valued and continuous in the marginal rates of substitution. The CEEI to divide bads captures similarly the critical points of the Nash product in the ecient frontier. But it is far from resolute, allowing routinely many divisions with sharply different welfare consequences. Even the much more permissive No Envy property is profoundly ambiguous in the division of bads: the set of ecient and envy-free allocations can have many connected components, and has no single-valued selection continuous in the marginal rates. The CEEI to divide goods is Resource Monotonic (RM): everyone (weakly) bene ts when the manna increases. But when we divide bads eciently, RM is incompatible with Fair Share Guarantee, a much weaker property than No Envy.
Added: Aug 19, 2016
Working paper
Veselova Y. A. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2016. No. 152/EC/2016 .
We consider the problem of individual manipulation under incomplete information, i.e. the whole preference profile is not known to voters. Instead, voters know the result of an opinion poll (the outcome of a poll information function π, e.g. a list of scores or a set of winners). In this case, a voter has an incentive to misrepresent his preferences (π-manipulate) if he knows that he will not become worse off and there is a chance of becoming better off. We consider six social choice rules and eight types of poll information functions differing in their informativeness. To compare manipulability, first we calculate the probability that there is a voter which has an incentive to π-manipulate and show that this measure is not illustrative in the case of incomplete information. Then we suggest considering two other measures: the probability of a successful manipulation and an aggregate stimulus of voters to manipulate which demonstrate more intuitive behaviour. We provide results of computational experiments and analytical proofs of some of the observed effects.
Added: Oct 16, 2016
Working paper
Gimpelson V. E., Oshchepkov A. Y. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 13.
Using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey data, the paper examines Russian workers' fear of unemployment under different economic and labour market conditions during the last 15 years. We employ two alternative measures for this fear. The first one looks at the workers’ fear of losing their current jobs, while the second deals with the fear of not finding relevant re-employment in case of displacement. In order to get the best possible measurement of unemployment for those local and social environments where our respondents live and work, we design unemployment rates for narrowly defined regional and demographic (peer) groups. Estimating ordered probit models for both fear measures, and controlling for various worker and job characteristics, we do not find significant causal effects of unemployment on these fears in most of our specifications. These results are robust to exclusion of potentially endogenous variables; they hold for different periods, subsamples, and levels of job security. Moreover, our simulations show that even a large increase in the unemployment rate has little impact on conditional probabilities of expressing a strong or weak fear of unemployment. These results suggest that the high level and persistence of fear of unemployment in Russia may be caused by non-economic factors.
Added: Aug 28, 2012
Working paper
Gafarov B. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2013. No. WP BRP 35/EC/2013.
I apply the model with unobserved components and stochastic volatility (UC-SV) to forecast the Russian consumer price index. I extend the model which was previously suggested as a model for inflation forecasting in the USA to take into account a possible difference in model parameters and seasonal factor. Comparison of the out-of-sample forecasting performance of the linear AR model and the UC-SV model by mean squared error of prediction shows better results for the latter model. Relatively small absolute value of the standard error of the forecasts calculated by the UC-SV model makes it a reasonable candidate for a real time forecasting method for the Russian CPI.
Added: Oct 4, 2013
Working paper
Lukyanova A. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2011. No. 09.
The available minimum wage literature is mostly based on evidence from developed countries or developing countries of Latin America. Little empirical work has been done on the effects of minimum wages in transition economies, where labour institutions experienced rapid changes and law enforcement differs in many important ways. This paper presents the first empirical evidence on minimum wage effects for Russia, the largest transition economy. I use regional variation in the relative level of the federal minimum wage to identify the impact of the threefold increase in the real value of the minimum wage on the Russian wage distribution between 2005 and 2009. The analysis suggests that the minimum wage can account for the bulk of the decline in the lower tail inequality, particularly for females.
Added: Aug 28, 2012
Working paper
Yarkin A. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2014. No. 72.
Does less inequality in wealth distribution imply better property rights protection? In this paper we show that this impact is non monotonous and is conditional on a) equilibrium type: conflict (rent-seeking) or peace, b) the reasons of changes in wealth distribution, and c) the size of the ruling class, “elite”. In the conflict stage, institutional quality positively depends on the wealth of the elite, but negatively – on the size of the elite class. However, the transition from conflict to peace stage (with no rent-seeking and fast growth) requires the reduction of inequality. This generates an institutional trap. Moreover, the intensity of rent-seeking behavior increases both with progressive redistribution of wealth and with widening of the ruling class. Our results allow characterizing wealth distributions, wherein it is better to redistribute wealth or to expand the ruling class in order to improve institutions and limit rent-seeking incentives.
Added: Nov 15, 2014