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Of all publications in the section: 4
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Working paper
Yakovlev A. A., Freinkman L., Makarov S. et al. BOFIT Online. DP. Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, 2017. No. 10.
Tight budget constraints confronting the Russian authorities since the 2008 crisis urge the federal government to adjust the traditional system of its relations with the regions. The paper presents the case of the Republic of Tatarstan (RT) to analyze potential regions’ response to the emerging, considerably harsher “rules of the game.” Our main conclusion is that Tatarstan and other stronger Russian regions can take advantage of the current crisis for transitioning to a new economic development model resembling developmental states in Southeast Asia. This conclusion draws on analysis of the strategies recently implemented by the RT elites in response to external shocks the republic had to cope with in the post-Soviet period. Special focus is on identifying key factors that helped the republic successfully tackle the previous shocks, such as effective mechanisms of aligning the interests of the main regional elite groups and forming a consensus regarding the republican developmental priorities and the instruments for their attainment. The actual prospects for the formation of a developmental state model in Tatarstan will depend upon the success of the current regional elite in finding a consolidated response to new challenges facing the republic in recent years, as well as the constructiveness of the federal policy towards the regions. One of specific obstacles for Tatarstan to follow on Asian experience of catching up relates to a need to accelerate opening up of the regional economy for new, domestic and foreign, players.
Added: Dec 28, 2017
Working paper
Yakovlev A. A. BOFIT Online. DP. Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, 2013. No. 7.
This paper considers the reasons for increasing the interest of Russian leaders in improving the investment climate in Russia. The paper shows that this change in economic policy is connected not only to the natural rent decline but also reflects the search of the ruling coalition for a new social base represented by successful medium-sized business. These new trends can be interpreted in terms of the “limited access order” concept developed in the recent works of Douglass North and his co-authors.
Added: Nov 15, 2013
Working paper
Yakovlev A. A. BOFIT Online. DP. Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, 2016. No. 2.
Contrary to the focus on the events of the last two years (2014–2015) associated with Crimea and military conflict in Eastern Ukraine, I stress here that serious changes in Russian internal politics (with strong pressure on political opposition, state propaganda and sharp anti-Western rhetoric, and the fight against ‘foreign agents’) became visible already in 2012. Geopolitical ambitions to revise the ‘global order’ (introduced by USA after USSR collapse) and the increased role of Russia in ‘global governance’ were declared by leaders of the country much earlier – with the famous Munich speech of Vladimir Putin in 2007. These ambitions were based on the robust economic growth of the mid-2000s, which encouraged the Russian ruling elite to adopt the view that Russia (with its huge energy resources) is a new economic super-power. In this paper I will show that the concept of ‘militant Russia’ in a proper sense can be attributed rather to the period of the mid-2000s. After 2008–2009, the global financial crisis and especially the ‘Arab spring’ and mass political protests against electoral fraud in Moscow in December 2011, one can speak mostly of ‘militant’ attempts of the Russian ruling elite to defend its power and assets.
Added: Jan 28, 2016
Working paper
Voskoboynikov I., Solanko L. BOFIT Online. DP. Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, 2014. No. 6.
Based on newly available data, we argue that multifactor productivity increases over the period 1995–2008 generated only about a half of Russia’s GDP growth, a smaller increase than most previous estimates. Further, growth in multifactor productivity seems to have contributed to a smaller share of GDP growth in 2003–2008 than in the first seven years of our observation period. These results imply that increases in capital inputs, and consequently investments in fixed capital, are more important than previously thought for Russia’s economic growth. Detailed analysis of industry-level data reveals two drivers of economic growth in the period: the extended oil & gas sector and high-skill-intensive services. Our analysis indicates that growth in the extended oil & gas sector reflected increased capital inputs, while growth in high-skill-intensive services seems to be part of catching up with more advanced markets. Neither sector is likely to spur growth in the coming decade.
Added: Jun 7, 2014