Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?
By extending manipulability indices defined for single-valued social choice rules to the multi-valued case, we explore the degree of manipulability of seven multi-valued social choice rules. Our analysis is based on computational experiments.
Procedures aggregating individual preferences into a collective choice differ in their vulnerability to manipulations. To measure it, one may consider the share of preference profiles where manipulation is possible in the total number of profiles, which is called Nitzan-Kelly's index of manipulability. The problem of manipulability can be considered in different probability models. There are three models based on anonymity and neutrality: impartial culture model (IC), impartial anonymous culture model (IAC), and impartial anonymous and neutral culture model (IANC). In contrast to the first two models, the IANC model, which is based on anonymity and neutrality axioms, has not been widely studied. In addition, there were no attempts to derive the difference of probabilities (such as Nitzan-Kelly's index) in IC and IANC analytically. We solve this problem and show in which cases the upper bound of this difference is high enough, and in which cases it is almost zero. These results enable us to simplify the computation of indices.
The article is devoted to the development of the principles of communicative strategies typology construction which is considered to be a method of scientific research of individuals' communicative interaction.
Conference Proceedings report findings presented at the 20th Annual Conference of the National Association of Teachers of English in Russia held in Voronezh in April, 2014. The proceedings might be useful for English language teachersworking at different levels - from University to kindergarten. linguists, interpreters and translators, as well as students and postgraduates majoring in EFL, linguistics and cultural studies.
We study Bertrand competition models with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where uncertainty is given by independent identically distributed random variables. It turns out that Bayesian Nash equilibria of the simplest of these games are described as Cournot prices. Then we discuss general conditions when Cournot prices give Bayesian Nash equilibria for Bertrand games with incomplete information about rivals' costs.
We consider the ranking of decision alternatives in decision analysis problems under uncertainty, under very weak assumptions about the type of utility function and information about the probabilities of the states of nature. Namely, the following two assumptions are required for the suggested method: the utility function is in the class of increasing continuous functions, and the probabilities of the states of nature are rank-ordered. We develop a simple analytical method for the partial ranking of decision alternatives under the stated assumptions. This method does not require solving optimization programs and is free of the rounding errors.
We consider the problem of selecting a predetermined number of objects from a given finite set. It is assumed that the preferences of the decisionmaker on this set are only partially known. Our solution approach is based on the notions of optimal and non-dominated subsets. The properties of such subsets and the objects they contain are investigated. The implementation of the developed approach is discussed and illustrated by various examples.