This paper is devoted to the explanation of selected bureaus’ behavior patterns in the soviet type of totalitarian dictatorships with the command economic model. It is a proven fact that the plan figures in the soviet economy were fabricated as a consequence of intrigues and secret negotiations between different interested parties. Generally, bureaus, as rational agents that minimize risk and maximize slack, should have been interested in reducing the plan figures, nevertheless, they strived to increase them. As examples, mass repression under dictatorships and overexpenditure of an administrative leverage at elections in non-democratic and quasi-democratic countries can be observed. In the article we develop a simple model of coordination between principal (dictator) and his agents (bureaus), which explain the mentioned paradoxical situation.
Game-theoretic model of election to a corporate board of directors is proposed. It is shown that the equilibrium distribution of seats is unique. The uniqueness guarantees nonmanipulability of elections. The distribution is obtained by the d’Hondt method of seats distribution in proportional representation problem. The model is tested on real data from a Russian company.
The article is dedicated to analysis and comparison of arrangement and socio-political function of democratic and republican parties of the USA. The main stress is made on ideological vectors of both parties and also on the role of geographical position and interests of the USA population which influence forming of the political platforms of the parties. The main goal of the article is to demonstrate the growth of polarization of American society closely associated with the growth of parties' emphasis on target audience and differences in financial policy.
This work looks at a model of spatial election competition with two candidates who can spend effort in order to increase their popularity through advertisement. It is shown that under certain condition the political programs of the candidates will be different. The work derives the comparative statics of equilibrium policy platform and campaign spending with respect the distribution of voter policy preferences and the proportionality of the electoral system. In particular, it is whown that the equilibrium does not exist if the policy preferences are distributed over too narrow an interval.
The textbook is made in accordance with the requirements for the results of the development of the undergraduate program, approved by the Order of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation of December 1, 2016 No. 1511 of the FSES HPE in the area of training 40.03.01 Jurisprudence, the level of training is undergraduate. Co-hosts an introductory lecture on “Electoral law and the electoral process in the Russian Federation”, a lecture course, as well as the necessary materials, including tables, charts for the development of the training course "Electoral law and the electoral process", annexes - documents. Addressed to undergraduate and graduate students, undergraduates, teachers, practitioners in order to improve their skills. The team of authors of the textbook Electoral law and the electoral process are laureates of the regional stage (Moscow) of the 2018 All-Russian contest for the best work on electoral law and electoral process, improving the legal and political culture of voters (referendum participants), organizing elections to state bodies authorities, local governments in the Russian Federation and participants in election campaigns
The collection publishes articles on topical issues of electoral law and process, examines issues of improving Russia's electoral legislation, participation of political parties in elections of deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly and the President of the Russian Federation, ensuring the alternativeness of public elections, consolidating state power and civil society in Russia, and right and others
In the article are : the social bases of power as a nation, the nation, the elite, the elemental forces of the political market. It is noted that the idealistic view on social grounds authorities do not correspond to modern realities. Long enough described expenses provisions on the management Board of the nation. It is proposed to consider the rationalist approach in the determination of the constitutions of the social bases of power. The examples of the constitutions of a number of foreign States, in which the provisions of popular sovereignty is not understood completely. Russia proposes changing approaches to understanding the essence of popular sovereignty and representative government.