Стратегии управления культурными ресурсами в российских малых исторических городах (на примере Ростова Великого и Переславля-Залесского)
New political, social and cultural reality in the first five years since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The article analyses main historoical myths and symbolic poits of reference, structuring offitial pictures of the (mainly medieval) past in the Soviet and post-Soviet metanarratives.
The book reveals the interconnection between social, cultural and political protest movements and social and economic changes in a post-communist country like Russia still dominated by bureaucratic rulers and "oligarchs" controlling all basic industries and mining activities. Those interests are also dominating Russia’s foreign policy and explain why Russia did not succeed in becoming an integral part of Europe. The latter is, at least, wished by many Russian citizens.
This article revisits the evolution of intergenerational social mobility in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. In particular, it looks at historical changes in the residential, educational and occupational mobility of Russians. The study contributes to the literature by extending the spectrum of institutional and historical contexts, in which the (in)equality of opportunity has been considered so far, re-examining existing evidence by using alternative datasets and a different methodology.
For an empirical investigation I utilize data from four representative cross-national surveys conducted in Russia in 1994, 2002, 2006 and 2013. Following the theoretical arguments developed in the comparative social mobility research and being informed by their empirical findings, I anticipated (1) a trend towards lesser openness in the late years of the Soviet era; (2) a temporary discontinuity of mobility patterns during the turbulent 1990s; and (3) the stagnation of social mobility in the more stable years of Russia’s post-Soviet history. However, my findings reveal no unambiguous trends suggested by previous research, moreover they contradict some of the earlier evidence. In particular, I found (1) steadily decreasing residential mobility both in absolute and relative terms (implying increasing closure of residential communities); (2) a weakening link between parental and child educational attainment in the post-Soviet era; and (3) the invariance of social fluidity in terms of occupational attainment both in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. The paper concludes by highlighting some of the remaining questions and possible directions for future research.
Published here is the second part of the article. It begins with discussion of loglinear modeling, a technique which is used to analyze mobility tables and to explore the patterns of relative social mobility. In the rest of the article I discuss the empirical findings with regard to the three dimensions of social mobility outlined above. Finally I draw the conclusions, which generalize findings from both parts of the article.
The article demonstrates how over the past two decades Russian television has changed its interpretation of the Soviet Past and used myths of the Soviet period in order to shape a new collective identity. The author analyses popular Russian television programs (i.e. those that are broadcast by Russian state channels and have high rating). She argues that the consequences of a cultural trauma (the collapse of the USSR) have not been overcome and that Russian television offers its viewers models of everyday life that do not promote modernization or successful nation building.
This chaper refers to the problem of low productivity and weak competitive stand of plants located in small and particulalry small specialized towns as compared to firms in bigger and more diversified locations. The findingds imply that the urban size and density of economic space, as well as its excessive sectoral specialization significantly reduce the firm competitiveness. Yet, the sectoral structure matters: textile and garmet plants in small towms are most vulnerable. Minimal diversification of economic structure and sufficient scale economy at the plant level allow to reduce the negative effects of the urban size.
The current crisis between the EU and Russia is influenced by much more serious factors than political tensions over Ukraine or the US political agenda. We suppose that to some extent it has represented a consequence of the crisis of national identity in Russia during the post-Soviet period. And the ongoing crisis clearly reflects that unclear social, political and national identities allow some stakeholders to substitute an objective stimulus for sustainable cooperation with cultural and economic partners that have been historically close, i.e., Russia and European countries, by negative propaganda. The current perception of Europe and Europeans, which is widely shared by the majority of the Russian population, has switched from a thousand years of joint history, development and cultural enrichment to ‘irreconcilable divergences’. This dramatic process develops both in the EU and Russia nowadays but in this paper we focus on the challenge to Russian identity, its roots and modern aspects. The analysis we provide within this paper demonstrates some fundamental preconditions of the political crisis between the EU and Russia that started in 2014, related to identity challenge rather than to international relations per se or value conflict. The concluding part of this paper is dedicated to a search for new approaches to identity policy that might be implemented in Russia and would positively influence a political dialogue between Europe and Russia by making it more predictable.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.
We address the external effects on public sector efficiency measures acquired using Data Envelopment Analysis. We use the health care system in Russian regions in 2011 to evaluate modern approaches to accounting for external effects. We propose a promising method of correcting DEA efficiency measures. Despite the multiple advantages DEA offers, the usage of this approach carries with it a number of methodological difficulties. Accounting for multiple factors of efficiency calls for more complex methods, among which the most promising are DMU clustering and calculating local production possibility frontiers. Using regression models for estimate correction requires further study due to possible systematic errors during estimation. A mixture of data correction and DMU clustering together with multi-stage DEA seems most promising at the moment. Analyzing several stages of transforming society’s resources into social welfare will allow for picking out the weak points in a state agency’s work.