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Working paper

Beyond the Fregean Myth: The Value of Logical Values

Philisophy of Language and Linguistics (The Formal Turn). ISBN 3110330105. De Gruyter, Editiones Scholasticae, 2010. No. 2.
One of the most prominent in analytic philosophy is the so-called "Fregean Axiom", according to which the reference of a sentence is a truth-value. In contrast to this referential semantics, a use-based formal semantics will be constructed in which the logical value of a sentence is not its putative referent but the information it conveys. Let us call "Question Answer Semantics" (thereafter: QAS) the corresponding formal semantics: a non-Fregean many-valued logic, where the meaning of any sentence is an ordered n-tuple of yes-no answers to corresponding questions. A sample of philosophical problems will be approached in order to justify the relevance of QAS. These include: (1) illocutionary forces, and the logical analysis of speech-acts; (2) the variety of logical negations, and their characterization in terms of restricted ranges of logical values; (3) change in meaning, and ute use of dynamic oppositions for belief sets.