Corporate Governance, Ownership Structures and Investment in Transition Economies: the Case of Russia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan
This article discusses the objectives and challenges for corporate governance of SOEs in Russia, and provides an international perspective of the performance of SOEs as compared to privately owned companies. Recent trends in the policy and management of state property are described. The problems of corporate governance in Russia are described in an agency perspective, and survey evidence on corporate governance and transparency of Russian SOEs is provided. Particular attention is given to the legal construction of the state corporation. The final section on the performance effects of state ownership summarizes the key contributions in the international economic literature in this field.
The Working Paper examines the peculiarities of the Russian model of corporate governance and control in the banking sector. The study relies upon theoretical as well as applied research of corporate governance in Russian commercial banks featuring different forms of ownership. We focus on real interests of all stakeholders, namely bank and stock market regulators, bank owners, investors, top managers and other insiders. The Anglo-American concept of corporate governance, based on agency theory and implying outside investors’ control over banks through stock market, is found to bear limited relevance. We suggest some ways of overcoming the gap between formal institutions of governance and the real life.
The chapter describes the current state of corporate governance in Russia and the dynamics of recent years. Important features of the environment that affect corporate governance include weak legal institutions that lead to high private benefits to control, underdeveloped capital markets, high levels of ownership concentration and significant state involvement in business. In this situation, the main conflict of interest is not between a manager and a large number of dispersed shareholders, but between large and small shareholders, between different large shareholders, and between minority shareholders and managers/board members in state-owned companies. Many of these features are very similar to other emerging markets, but substantially different from conditions faced by firms in developed countries. Despite substantial improvement during the 2000s, the quality of corporate governance in Russia is still much lower than in developed countries, primarily because of the low quality of Russian institutions.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. We distinguish between banks that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank of Russia, by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks, and by "state corporations". We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and erosion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking system. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in CEE countries.
The purpose of this paper is to carefully assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. For the state-owned banks, we distinguish between those that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank of Russia, by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks, and by "state corporations". We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and erosion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking system. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in CEE countries.
The article is dedicated to fiscal incentives for business angels. Business angel, a comparatively new phenomenon in Russia, is defined in the first part of the article. The second part is a research of fiscal incentives intended for private investors in order to encourage them to support small innovative enterprises. The research is based on European and North American experience. Finally, the third part suggests the ways of creating a system of fiscal incentives for business angels in Russia.
Strong distinction between contractual claims and claims arising out of bilateral investment treaties (BIT) exists in modern investment disputes resolution. This distinction has a practical importance when the competence of international tribunal to decide the claim is in question, because investment contract and BIT contain different dispute resolution provisions. The common mechanism of dealing with this conflict is introduction of umbrella clause in the particular BIT. Umbrella clause is the clause lifting the breach of contract between investor and host state to the level of breach of BIT between this state and investor’s home country. The role of umbrella clauses in international investment law and the issue of competence conflicts arising of them are analyzed in this article.
During 1998-2010 the National Research University – Higher School of Economics (Moscow) has been surveying the results of activities of most leasing market operators in Russia, including all the largest ones. The results of the scheduled annual analysis undertaken by us to survey the activities of leasing companies in the Russia indicate that the year 2010 was successful for the leasing business. According to the Leaseurope, and author’s data, Russia occupies the 5th place in Europe after Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, French. In practice many Russian leasing companies have managed not only to copy but also successfully to adapt the experience of the countries with developed leasing industries. Despite the growth in new business, account must be taken of the quality of the leasing portfolio. It turned out that it just got a little better as compared with the previous year. The analysis showed that cost of loans taken for financing leasing operations, as well as the cost of the funds of a leasing company, the funds of the lessee, the use of factoring, promissory notes/exchange bills, securities and other instruments, depends on a variety of factors, including: financial independence of leasing companies; the risks associated with the sale of a leasing product; the security for the transaction; the terms of depreciation of leased property, the terms of credit contract and of leasing contracts; the currency of the leasing transaction; whether the funds are borrowed on the domestic or on the international capital market; the schemes for carrying out a leasing operation, etc. With each year there the number of Russian leasing companies that can obtain financing directly from foreign banks grows. There is a growth in the volume of credit operations with the involvement of the national agencies for insurance of export-import operations, e.g. from Germany, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, the USA and other countries. Securitisation of leasing assets held at the junction of four financial tools – lending, leasing, factoring, securities issues. This innovative mechanism that requires subtle scientific and practical configuration achieves remarkable economic performance update, modernisation and re-equipment of enterprises. The author has developed a system of securitisation leasing asset pricing which is feasible through a set of equations that balance the interests of the participants. The article also examined the status of concentration of leasing market, its regional and sectoral structures.
The present article aims to analyze the degree of diffusion of modern international business ethics practices in Russian enterprises.