Регулирование рынка ценных бумаг
This article investigates the behavior of the Russian government bond yields and its sensitivity to a selected range of macroeconomic, monetary, international and event factors. The analysis concerns both individual and joint, short-term and long-term influence of factors under study, with emphasis to the most informative determinants of yields. In whole the results of the empirical study using monthly data from 2003 to 2009 indicate a major significant role of changes in monetary factors, notably the minimum repo rate and the interbank interest rate, as well as of foreign exchange rate risk factor. Joint influence of theoretical fundamentals, namely inflation and its expectations, exchange rate and money supply growth, explain less than a third of bond yields movements. On the other hand, no importance of GDP and domestic debt growth as well as of external risk factors, such as oil prices, foreign interest rates and changes in international reserves is found. Also the results provide evidence for the fact that most government bond yields respond to certain political and economic events and reflect crisis changes of the market.
We consider multistage bidding models where two types of risky assets (shares) are traded between two agents that have different information on the liquidation prices of traded assets. These prices are random integer variables that are determined by the initial chance move according to a probability distribution p over the two-dimensional integer lattice that is known to both players. Player 1 is informed on the prices of both types of shares, but Player 2 is not. The bids may take any integer value.
The model of n-stage bidding is reduced to a zero-sum repeated game with lack of information on one side. We show that, if liquidation prices of shares have finite variances, then the sequence of values of n-step games is bounded. This makes it reasonable to consider the bidding of unlimited duration that is reduced to the infinite game G1(p). We offer the solutions for these games.
We begin with constructing solutions for these games with distributions p having two and three-point supports. Next, we build the optimal strategies of Player 1 for bidding games G1(p) with arbitrary distributions p as convex combinations of his optimal strategies for such games with distributions having two- and three-point supports. To do this we construct the symmetric representation of probability distributions with fixed integer expectation vectors as a convex combination of distributions with not more than three-point supports and with the same expectation vectors.