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Regular version of the site

Book chapter

Getting One for Two, or the Contractors

P. 461-493.

Say that a theory of truth is transparent i  the theory treats ` `'' is true' as fully intersub-
stitutable with '. Transparency is an appealing formal principle about truth, whose force
should be equally recognised by very di erent theories about the nature of truth, such as, for
example, a broadly correspondentist theory and a broadly de ationist theory. As for correspondentism,
transparency is naturally understood as saying that ''s being true is in a very
strong sense both necessary and sucient for what ' says being the case, and that is in turn
something strongly suggested by the claim that ''s being true consists in ''s corresponding
to the facts. As for de ationism, something like transparency is directly required if the notion
of truth is adequately to serve the expressive needs that, according to the de ationist, constitute
its raison d'^etre. However, plausible as it may seem from a wide variety of perspectives,
transparency is not without its problems. I've discussed some of these at great length in Zardini
[2008], pp. 545{561; [2012], pp. 260{266; [2013e], arguing that they do place substantial
limits on transparency. Here, I'd like to focus on a di erent and, in some respect, even more
fundamental problem for transparency|the semantic paradoxes|arguing in favour of a view
according to which those paradoxes actually do not place any further limit on transparency.















In book

Dordrecht: Springer, 2015.