Предел достоверности у Декарта и Витгенштейна
The paper outlines the concept of absolute truth as presented in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Descartes’ cogito.
The search for the Russian philosophy of its own way of understanding “Self” have identified and detected in the presented concepts. They imply that the philosophy of the Silver Age sought to recapture part of the "territory" of the irrational and to extend the concept of the rational by reviewing the nature and assessment of a number of noetic schemes.
the Purpose of this study is to detect a positive program of modern artificiality, namely the analysis non-physicalists solutions to the mind-body problem in contemporary analytic philosophy of consciousness. This article attempts to find out whether the contemporary antiphysicalism has a positive program. Using the approaches of such contemporary analytical philosophers as Colin McGinn, Joseph Levine, Noam Chomsky, Thomas Nagel, and David Chalmers, the author evaluates the ratio of negative and positive components in modern antiphysicalistic approaches, and determines the role of skepticism in their theories. To what extent can non-physicalism withstand physicalism, and is physicalism in spite of its faults in a better position, since it offers, admittedly imperfect answers, while antiphysicalism does not offer anything other than criticism of the existing theories? For example, approaches such modern analytical philosophers as C. McGinn, J. Levin, N. Chomsky, T. Nagel, and D. Chalmers is considered what is the correlation of critical and positive components in modern non-physicalists methods, and also reveals the role of the sceptical position in their theories. The research methodology is a historical and descriptive method, and the method of comparative studies, which in this study implies comparison physicalistic and artificiality approaches to the study of the problems of consciousness. Information base of this study are modern Anglo-American non-physicalists study programs of consciousness, such as a substantial and varieties of substance dualism, the duality properties or naturalistic dualism, epistemic skepticism, interactionism, and some other. Conclusions: Therefore, although today antiphysicalism gives very serious criticism of physicalism, the positions of the later are still strong. Whether this situation will change depends on how convincing the positive program of antiphysicalists will turn out to be. This will allow the discussion participants to choose (as it may turn out) the lesser of two evils. The scope of research/the possibility of subsequent use of results of scientific work. The results obtained in the course of the research may be useful for understanding of a number of influential contemporary contexts, dedicated physicalistic and non-physicalistic programs modern analytical philosophy of mind. Originality/value. Originality of the work lies in understanding non-physicalistic programs in the context of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of mind, a critical analysis of the main thought of moves and the key arguments of modern Anglo-American artificiality and presentation of many non-translated into Russian the works of contemporary Anglo-American philosophers of consciousness, released in the past years.
The paper explores the conceptual links between Vyacheslav Ivanov's poem "Fio, ergo non sum" and the cartesian cogito. Special attention is given to the way the concepts of "Being" and "becoming" function in Ivanov's text. The article conveys the poet's controversial combination of the description of the '"crisis of individualism" and the medieval Christian perception of Being.
The purpose of this essay is to examine the view that every human being is a natural skeptic when confronted with the issues of objective knowledge or moral value. This view is characteristic by so-called new skeptics in contemporary analytical philosophy, many of whom refer to Hume's naturalism as a source for their account of the nature of human knowledge. In particular, they argue that the intuitive conceivability of a skeptical hypothesis is much stronger and immune to refutation than anti-skeptical arguments based on theoretical speculation about the meanings of the words or the contexts of their application. Moreover, new skeptics insist on the irrelevance of anti-skeptical responses when viewed in the light of human condition in the world. In this essay I argue that anti-skeptics in fact have sound arguments against epistemological skepticism because they point out that the intuitive status of a skeptical hypothesis is not so much natural, but rather dependent on the social context and historical traditions of our culture. At the end of the essay I also argue that some versions of pragmatism in epistemology are not to be confused with relativism.
This article attempts to find out whether the contemporary antiphysicalism has a positive program. Using the approaches of such contemporary analytical philosophers as Colin McGinn, Joseph Levine, Noam Chomsky, Thomas Nagel, and David Chalmers, the author evaluates the ratio of negative and positive components in modern antiphysicalistic approaches, and determines the role of skepticism in their theories. To what extent can antiphysicalism withstand physicalism, and is physicalism in spite of its faults in a better position, since it offers, admittedly imperfect answers, while antiphysicalism does not offer anything other than criticism of the existing theories?
Author shows how and why the method of radical interpretation proposed by D. Davidson can solve the problems that are ormulated in a variety of skeptical scenarios. In particular, the method of radical interpretation renders the Cartesian skeptical scenario (both in its traditional and recent versions) obscure and even deprives it of its status of a philosophical problem as such. Appealing to the diberence between intended and unintended lies, one can see how the global skeptical scenario gets solved in both cases. This paper also extends Willard Van Orman Quine’s argument for an expanded version of a naturalized epistemology by introducing social factors to this approach. In addition, there are always at least two necessary limitations imposed by communication on our hypotheses about knowledge and delusion.