Антимонопольное регулирование в нефтяной промышленности
The paper is about Russian practice of introducing a leniency program. In the article authors examine the history of changes to the norms governing the exemption from liability for participating in cartel agreements and the characteristics of competition policy in Russia, which objectively hinder the effectiveness of the program.
This fascinating new book dissects, from a Competition law perspective, how Research and Development collaborations operate under both US and EU antitrust law. Analyzing the evolution of this innovation landscape from the 1970s to the present day, Blomqvist details the modifications and amendments made over this time to the relevant legal acts and guidelines. In doing to, the author picks up on the slow shift that has taken place in both the antitrust laws of the USA and the Competition Rules of the EU. The book concludes by discussing the necessity for a stringent attitude towards the antitrust establishment, and how this can be developed by reviving the concept of the ‘innovation market’.
This article is devoted to some aspects of antitrust law influence on economical processes. Considered problems are interconnection antitrust regulation and innovation activity, applicability of antitrust law terms and applicability of geographic market for retail markets.
In recent years the role of anti-monopoly policy in Russia has grown significantly. The enforcement power of the anti-trust agency has increased dramatically. At the same time adverse trends in competition policy have emerged and strengthened. The main reason was, paradoxically, a growing role of anti-trust policy in the Russian government. The enforcement of anti-trust rules is expected to result immediately in control of the price level and/or support of a defined group of market participants (e.g. suppliers of food products). In this context legal rules are changing in a way that leads to an increase in the number of false positives (type I errors) in anti-trust cases. False positives not only impose a burden on the accused but also distort the incentives of market participants, restrain potentially efficient business practices and also paradoxically can prevent competition. This article considers three examples of adverse development of anti-trust rules in Russia: regulation of trading activity, rules on collusion and excessive prices of collectively dominant market participants, and rules on discrimination as an abuse of a dominant position.
The paper explores how EU competition law has integrated so far the concept of brands in different areas of enforcement. Although EU competition law has engaged in multiple instances with branding and product differentiation, brands do not yet constitute an operational concept in EU competition law. This is due to an important uncertainty as to the normative choices that need to be made with regard to the relation between brands and the formation of consumer preferences. The concerns raised by retailer power and the development of private labels also indicate that the existing economic theory on product differentiation may not also provide a complete picture on the effects of brands on the competitive process and ultimately on consumers. Competition law will also need to tackle the issues raised by the development of ‘social branding’ and the dialogic interaction between brand owners and consumers in the constitution of their brand identity.