Истина и ценность: этико-экзистенциальная проблематика в прагматическом реализме Хилари Патнэма
The present catalogue contains abstracts for some 150 volumes, among which books, periodicals, miscellanies, published by the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the principal institute in Russia for academic research in all kinds of philosophical knowledge. These works, written by eminent Russian scholars, cover such fi elds as the history of Russian, Western and Oriental philosophy, ethics and aesthetics, synergetics and epistemology, social and political philosophy and concentrate on problems that have attained particular importance in the age of globalization and growth of national self-consciousness.
The problem of free will remains one of the primary unsolved problems of John Sealre’s philosophy. In his book ‘Freedom and Neurobilology’ (2007) Searle proposes two alternative hypothesis that would allow one to make sense of the nature of freedom, but ultimately finds both of them unsatisfactory. In this paper we propose a modified version of Searle’s argument, which attempts to reconcile the common sense intuitions with physiological determinism on the basis of Kahneman’s theory of cognitive systems. Specifically, we focus on the collision between the fast and the slow cognitive system as the basis for the experience of freedom.
Author shows how and why the method of radical interpretation proposed by D. Davidson can solve the problems that are ormulated in a variety of skeptical scenarios. In particular, the method of radical interpretation renders the Cartesian skeptical scenario (both in its traditional and recent versions) obscure and even deprives it of its status of a philosophical problem as such. Appealing to the diberence between intended and unintended lies, one can see how the global skeptical scenario gets solved in both cases. This paper also extends Willard Van Orman Quine’s argument for an expanded version of a naturalized epistemology by introducing social factors to this approach. In addition, there are always at least two necessary limitations imposed by communication on our hypotheses about knowledge and delusion.