Тупики позитивизма (или к вопросу о споре Р.Дворкина и Х.Л.А.Харта)
Article analuses the dispute between Ronald Dworkin and H.L.A Hart in the context of legal positivism and attempts to overcome it in the contemporary legal education.
This work is classical for the history of legal science in the XX century. In this work Hans Kelsen formulates the basic principles of his normative theory of law. This volume serves as a foundation of the critical program of the Kelsenian legal theory which sought to reveal ideological dogmas and presuppositions which often are taken by lawyers for granted. The ultimate goal of this program was to avert legal science from investigation into the factual dimensions of law. Kelsen was confident that different methodological approaches inevitably lead to construction of different objects of scientific analysis. That is why law as a subject-matter for legal analysis differentiates itself from law as a subject-matter of sociological or psychological analysis. At the same time Kelsen did not intend to contest possibility of analysis of the factual dimension of law or to claim such analysis as unscientific. His point was to construct a special applied science of law which would examine law from the perspective of special legal methodology. This methodology resides in a particular linkage between facts and norms. This linkage or imputation is to be found and examined by legal science. This methodological step could afford delimitation between law and morality. Kelsen tried to describe the authentic normative structure of law through this special mechanism of imputation which made law self-referential.
This book of conference papers includes presentations and articles of Russian scholars, who took part in the 1998 conference in the lae faculty of Mari State Univeristy. The leading scholars discussed problems of theory and philosophy of law and teaching programs on theory of state and law discipline in Russian law schools.
The collection of papers presents an overview of the study of the analytic legal philosophy in Russia.
The book under review not only concerns an issue that is extremely impor- tant for European lawyers but it, also, offers a set of theoretical and practical recipes for restarting human-rights discussions that, nowadays, often seem to be trapped in a deadlock. Professor Posner is famous for his critical attitude toward international law, and this book continues this criticism as far as the utilization of human rights is concerned as leeway for Western democracies to exert political influence on developing countries. This critical view, however, does not undermine their value: in fact, many things—including the most sublime ones—have been utilized for reprehensible purposes (to take the ex- ample of religious beliefs and the Inquisition). Professor Posner’s book can be an effective remedy—even if a quite bitter and disillusioning one—for curing the theoretical and practical inadequacies that are neglected by partisans of human rights.
The book comprises the articles about legal methodology and new developments in understanding of law and its tools of art.
The article represents the retrospective view of J. Bentam’sideason the state, law, moral and their historical dependence. The assumption is made on the relevance of the thinker’s ideas to modernize the political and legal life in Russia including those on legal laws.
In this article Professor Bulygin analyzes rationality of law in the light of legal positivism