Book
Нестабильность в Северной Африке и на Ближнем Востоке: влияние на мировой рынок нефти
М.: ИМЭМО РАН, 2012.
Editor-in-chief:
С. В. Жуков
Chapters
Синицын М. В., Королев И. С. В кн.: Нестабильность в Северной Африке и на Ближнем Востоке: влияние на мировой рынок нефти. М.: ИМЭМО РАН, 2012.
Added: Oct 29, 2013
Similar publications
Следзевский И. В. В кн.: Арабский кризис и его международные последствия. М.: Издательская группа URSS, 2014. Гл. 10. С. 150-159.
Added: Jan 24, 2014
Синицын М. В., Королев И. С. В кн.: Нестабильность в Северной Африке и на Ближнем Востоке: влияние на мировой рынок нефти. М.: ИМЭМО РАН, 2012.
Added: Oct 29, 2013
Братерский М. В. Вестник аналитики. 2012. Т. 48. № 2. С. 66-72.
Interference of regional and global players in Syrian conflict may be analyzed from different perspectives, but it is clear that the attack is launched not only against the ruling regime of an Arab country, but against Iran as well. The objective of intervention are not limited to downplaying the role of Syria in the region only. The collapse of Assad regime will significantly weaken the potential of Iranian policy on all vectors.
Added: Feb 6, 2013
Rodionova L., Kopnova E. Basic research program. WP BRP. National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2017. No. 166/EC/2017.
This paper investigates the issue of food security as the basis for stable economic development using the example of North Africa. A statistical analysis of economic and financial factors in relation to the determinants of food security was carried out using a panel cointegrating model based on official international statistics of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Bank for 1991-2014. According to the results, population growth and the intensification of agricultural production, foreign trade and foreign direct investment play a crucial role in food security. The study revealed the relationship between food security and the development of the banking and financial systems in the region, and their degree of globalization. The strategy of a long-term investment policy pursued by the World Bank and FAO to combat hunger and poverty was justified. The methodology proposed can be used to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of policies to maintain food security in the regions of Africa.
Added: Jul 3, 2017
Братерский М. В. В кн.: VIII Международная научная конференция. Модернизация экономики и общественное развитие: В 3 кн.. Кн. 3. М.: Издательский дом ГУ-ВШЭ, 2007. С. 405-418.
Added: Oct 1, 2013
Added: Jan 27, 2013
Edited by: А. Логунов М.: Кранкэс, 2006.
Added: Mar 24, 2013
Скабара С. О. Безопасность Евразии. 2009. № 2. С. 452-456.
Added: Feb 24, 2013
Ч. 1. Волгоград: Волгоградское научное издательство, 2010.
Added: Jan 18, 2013
Anisimova A. I., Muradyan P. A., Vernikov A. V. SSRN Working Paper Series. Social Science Research Network, 2011. No. 1919817.
This empirical paper adds to competition and industrial organization literature by exploring the interplay between industry structure and competitiveness on local, rather than nation-wide, markets. We use micro-level statistical data for banks in two Russian regions (Bashkortostan and Tatarstan) to estimate Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Lerner index, and Panzar-Rosse model. We estimate Panzar-Rosse model in two ways: via the widely used price-equation that accounts for scale effects and then via a revenue-equation that disregards scale effects as suggested by Bikker et al. (2009). We find both regional markets to be ruled by monopolistic competition, although estimation by revenue-equation does not reject monopoly hypothesis for Tatarstan. Existence of sizeable locally-owned and operated institutions does not necessarily lead to higher competitiveness of the given regional market, and the results from non-structural methods of estimation suggest that bank competition in Bashkortostan is stronger than in Tatarstan. Going further away from aggregated analysis we compute Lerner indices in two product segments of Tatarstan – retail and corporate loans – and find that retail segment is significantly more competitive. Local banks exert more market power in corporate loans, while federal branches – in retail loans.
Added: May 14, 2012
Трунин П. В., Дробышевский С. М., Евдокимова Т. В. М.: Издательский дом «Дело» РАНХиГС, 2012.
Added: Mar 26, 2013
Penikas H. I. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 03.
The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision initiated a discussion on the most efficient practices to prevent bank managers from excessive risk-taking. This paper proposes a game-theoretical approach, describing the decision-making process by a bank manager who chooses his own level of risk and effort. If the level of risk implies the variability of the future outcome, the amount of effort applied affects the probability of a positive outcome. Although effort is unobserved for the bank’s stakeholders, the risk level is under control, and is associated with certain indicators such as capital adequacy ratio or leverage level. The risk-neutral utility function of a bank manager and a binary game outcome of gaining profit or loss for a bank are assumed. Starting from the general incentive contract scheme having the fixed and variable parts of remuneration, it is proposed that differentiating the variable part of remuneration is sufficient to motivate bank managers to make fewer risky decisions. More precisely, the variable part of remuneration (e.g. the share of the bank’s profit) needs to be higher in proportion to the higher variance of outcome for the high -risk outcome case to stimulate a bank manager to opt for lower-risk decisions in place of higher-risk situations.
Added: May 3, 2012
Penikas H. I., Titova Y. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 02.
In this paper we elaborate a simple model that allows for the predicting of possible reactions from financial institutions to more stringent regulatory measures introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in regard to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The context is framed by a 2011 BCBS document that proposes higher capital requirements for global systemically important banks. We attempt to analyze bank interactions in an oligopolistic market that is subject to demand constraints on loan amounts and additional loss absorbency requirements introduced by the regulator. We distinguish between the bank’s announced funding cost that determines both the loan amount issued and the market interest rate, and the bank’s true funding cost that has a direct impact on retained earnings. We conclude that in a two-stage game both banks will announce the highest funding cost, thus reducing the amount of loans granted (in line with the regulator’s objective), but at the expense of a higher cost of borrowing established in the market. If the game is repeated, then both banks also choose lower loan amounts in the periods prior to the last one in which the declared funding cost is the lowest possible. It should be noted that the designated outcome also coincides with the findings of the Monetary Economic Department of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Added: May 3, 2012
Added: Jun 24, 2011