Энергобезопасность и климат: глобальные вызовы для России
The issue of energy has been one of the reasons behind the creation of the G7 mechanism and with later added climate change problem, it remains high on the G8 agenda. The major powers of the West needed to coordinate their efforts in order to confront the new challenges: the need to ensure security of energy supply, introduce energy saving and energy efficient technologies and make sure that leading industrial countries can afford proper economic development with the adequate and unhampered energy supply. The global energy system has come through three major stages, with the last system structure still being in the making – with all the stakeholders, namely producer, consumer and transit states, big transnational energy corporations and national energy companies, still going through grand reshuffle and redistribution of “decision-making vs. accepting the rules of the games” roles. The G8 in general follows the suit along the lines of changes introduced within the global energy architecture fluctuations. As for the club’s activities, there is a way to provisionally single out five phases in the G7/G8 energy activities. During the times of the two energy crises – 1970s – early 1980s energy security issues took a prominent place on the G7 agenda. Further on during the period of much lower prices and sustainable excess of supply over demand this issue became second rate and was mentioned only within the environmental context. End of 1980s – early 1990s, after the demise of the Soviet Union and the socialist block falling apart the main focus of the G7 lead178 Part III. Critical cCase sStudies ers was shifted to the problems of nuclear security (not only as an environmental issue, especially after Chernobyl AES accident of 1986, but also in the light of growing risks of proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies. After 2000 energy security in its own right recaptured the attention of the G8 countries, with the so popular climate change issue being not only ecological, economic and political issue, but also intensified to a certain extent a PR and market-oriented reaction of the hydrocarbon consuming actors to the sky-rocketed oil prices. The fifth phase is still to be introduced and developed by the G8+ participants, since the current global financial and economic crisis has brought its own differentials into the process.
The energy security theories are based on the premises of sufficient and reliable supply of fossil fuels at affordable prices in centralized supply systems. Policy-makers and company chief executives develop energy security strategies based on the energy security theories and definitions that dominate in the research and policy discourse. It is therefore of utmost importance that scientists revisit these theories in line with the latest changes in the energy industry: the rapid advancement of renewables and smart grid, decentralization of energy systems, new environmental and climate challenges. The study examines the classic energy security concepts (neorealism, neoliberalism, constructivism and international political economy) and assesses if energy technology changes are taken into consideration. This is done through integrative literature review, comparative analysis, identification of ‘international relations’ and ‘energy’ research discourse with the use of big data, and case studies of Germany, China, and Russia. The paper offers suggestions for revision of energy security concepts through integration of future technology considerations.
The article defines the position of Russia in the European Union’s concept of resilience as it is put forward in the 2016 Global Strategy, five principles of relations with the Russian Federation and consequent documents. The discourse analysis of EU documents demonstrates that Russia is linked to resilience through threats, which – as Brussels believes – Moscow provokes. These are the challenges of energy supply, fake news, cybersecurity, chemical weapon and security services’ activities. Two approaches to dealing with these threats are identified. The realistic one presupposes isolation of the European Union from these threats. The liberal one is based on the inclusion of threats and their places of origin, given the complexity of the world and impossibility of fences as they challenge market principles, civil freedoms and benefits of the interconnected world. This liberal approach constitutes the basis of resilience in the EU and presumes a construction of spaces that include both the European Union and territories beyond its geographical borders (inter alia Russia). This inclusion – although it is in line with theoretical writings on resilience – is problematic for Moscow for four reasons. 1) Unevenness of inclusion originates from diversity of fields of cooperation, time and diversity of the EU member states. 2) Inclusion solely through threats that Russia provokes is a limited form of inclusion. 3) Russia is included as a part of several spaces – energy, information, cyberspace, free circulation of people and goods, – but not in the governance system of these spaces. 4) Although resilience presupposes actions of states and societies, the European Union views partners mostly in the civil society of Russia while limiting cooperation with its state institutions. Although resilience might constitute a concept for future EU-Russia relations, it cannot be applied in the way it is currently promoted by the EU.