Выпускники среднего профессионального и высшего образования на российском рынке труда: информационный бюллетень
М.: Издательский дом НИУ ВШЭ, 2020.
Факторович А. А., Смирнова Ю. В., Клинк О. Ф. и др. Вып. 2. М.: АНО "Национальное агентство развития квалификаций", "Полиграф сервис", 2018.
Added: Jun 13, 2019
Бондаренко Н. В. Аккредитация в образовании. 2013. № 7. С. 54-55.
Added: Jun 13, 2016
Зороастрова И. В., Ерёмина А. В. В кн.: Итоги 5-летия реализации Президентской программы в НИУ ВШЭ - Нижний Новгород (2007/08 - 2012/13) у.г.): материалы Международной научно-практической конференции, 29 ноября 2012 г.. Н. Новгород: Издательство НИСОЦ, 2012. С. 66-78.
Added: Mar 22, 2013
Социологический мониторинг трудоустройства выпускников Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета сервиса и экономики
СПб.: СПбГУСЭ, 2012.
Added: Sep 26, 2015
Маркарян А. Г. В кн.: Социологический мониторинг трудоустройства выпускников Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета сервиса и экономики. СПб.: СПбГУСЭ, 2012. Гл. 1.4. С. 40-47.
Added: Sep 26, 2015
The article is devoted to the impact of university quality on graduates’ wages. We defined the quality of the university according to an average applicant’s Unifi ed State Exam (USE) enrollment rate combining data from Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS HSE) and HSE Monitoring of the quality of enrollment in Russian universities (2011–2013). Authors combined information on university, graduates’ wages, socio-demographic characteristics with data on USE enrollment rates. Using means of descriptive and regression analysis authors evaluated economic return to university quality measured by USE enrollment rate. We discovered that graduates of high-quality universities have stable wage premium comparing with ordinary university graduates after controlling on academic, socio-demographic and labor market factors. One additional point at university USE enrollment rate provides graduates’ with 1,9–2% wage premium. Earnings of graduates’ of most selective and quality universities are 31% higher than earnings of graduates of the low-quality universities.
Added: Nov 27, 2015
Бондаренко Н. В. Вопросы образования. 2013. № 1. С. 174-182.
Added: Jun 11, 2016
Рудаков В. Н., Чириков И. С., Рощин С. Ю. и др. Научные труды Лаборатории исследований рынка труда. WP15. НИУ ВШЭ, 2016. № 1.
This paper analyses the impact of student academic achievement on future wages of Russian university graduates through looking into GPA-earnings relationship for graduates of Russian selective university, based on cross-sectional graduate survey data. The issue of how student academic achievement, measured by GPA impact future labor market rewards is analyzed through the set of academic, demographic and labor market factors. Our results indicate that there is no significant impact of GPA on future earnings for male graduates and negative impact for female graduates (8,2% wage penalty for additional GPA point). The effect of GPA on earnings is insignificant if we control for sectoral segregation. The evaluation of most detailed specification that reflects differences in spheres and sectors of employment and taking into account job tenure reveals that the effect is negative with low significance for entire sample (-5,2%) and for female graduate (-6,5%), but insignificant for male graduates. The existence of work experience before graduation is the most significant factor that positively affects future wages for both groups. However, we found no evidence that combining study and work affects student academic achievements.
Added: Apr 28, 2016
Коновалова М.С., Максимов А. Г. В кн.: Системное моделирование социально-экономических процессов: труды 39-й Международной научной школы-семинара. Воронеж: Воронежский государственный педагогический университет, 2016. С. 327-330.
Added: Dec 12, 2016
Динамика отдачи от профессионального образования и дифференциация доходов выпускников российских вузов
Андрущак Г. В., Прудникова А.Е. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2011. № 02.
Added: Nov 29, 2012
Логунова О. С., Войно И. А. Социология образования. 2014. № 3. С. 36-50.
Added: Mar 17, 2014
Экономика и управление: проблемы и перспективы развития. Сборник научных статей по итогам международной научно-практической конференции г.Волгоград 15-16 ноября 2010 г.
Ч. 1. Волгоград: Волгоградское научное издательство, 2010.
Added: Jan 18, 2013
Anisimova A. I., Muradyan P. A., Vernikov A. V. SSRN Working Paper Series. Social Science Research Network, 2011. No. 1919817.
This empirical paper adds to competition and industrial organization literature by exploring the interplay between industry structure and competitiveness on local, rather than nation-wide, markets. We use micro-level statistical data for banks in two Russian regions (Bashkortostan and Tatarstan) to estimate Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Lerner index, and Panzar-Rosse model. We estimate Panzar-Rosse model in two ways: via the widely used price-equation that accounts for scale effects and then via a revenue-equation that disregards scale effects as suggested by Bikker et al. (2009). We find both regional markets to be ruled by monopolistic competition, although estimation by revenue-equation does not reject monopoly hypothesis for Tatarstan. Existence of sizeable locally-owned and operated institutions does not necessarily lead to higher competitiveness of the given regional market, and the results from non-structural methods of estimation suggest that bank competition in Bashkortostan is stronger than in Tatarstan. Going further away from aggregated analysis we compute Lerner indices in two product segments of Tatarstan – retail and corporate loans – and find that retail segment is significantly more competitive. Local banks exert more market power in corporate loans, while federal branches – in retail loans.
Added: May 14, 2012
Added: Feb 22, 2013
Трунин П. В., Дробышевский С. М., Евдокимова Т. В. М.: Издательский дом «Дело» РАНХиГС, 2012.
Added: Mar 26, 2013
Яковлев А. А. Общественные науки и современность. 2008. № 4. С. 21-37.
Added: Sep 22, 2012
Penikas H. I. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 03.
The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision initiated a discussion on the most efficient practices to prevent bank managers from excessive risk-taking. This paper proposes a game-theoretical approach, describing the decision-making process by a bank manager who chooses his own level of risk and effort. If the level of risk implies the variability of the future outcome, the amount of effort applied affects the probability of a positive outcome. Although effort is unobserved for the bank’s stakeholders, the risk level is under control, and is associated with certain indicators such as capital adequacy ratio or leverage level. The risk-neutral utility function of a bank manager and a binary game outcome of gaining profit or loss for a bank are assumed. Starting from the general incentive contract scheme having the fixed and variable parts of remuneration, it is proposed that differentiating the variable part of remuneration is sufficient to motivate bank managers to make fewer risky decisions. More precisely, the variable part of remuneration (e.g. the share of the bank’s profit) needs to be higher in proportion to the higher variance of outcome for the high -risk outcome case to stimulate a bank manager to opt for lower-risk decisions in place of higher-risk situations.
Added: May 3, 2012
Уринсон Я. М. Вестник Европы. 2014. № 38-39.
Added: Feb 5, 2018
Penikas H. I., Titova Y. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 02.
In this paper we elaborate a simple model that allows for the predicting of possible reactions from financial institutions to more stringent regulatory measures introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in regard to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The context is framed by a 2011 BCBS document that proposes higher capital requirements for global systemically important banks. We attempt to analyze bank interactions in an oligopolistic market that is subject to demand constraints on loan amounts and additional loss absorbency requirements introduced by the regulator. We distinguish between the bank’s announced funding cost that determines both the loan amount issued and the market interest rate, and the bank’s true funding cost that has a direct impact on retained earnings. We conclude that in a two-stage game both banks will announce the highest funding cost, thus reducing the amount of loans granted (in line with the regulator’s objective), but at the expense of a higher cost of borrowing established in the market. If the game is repeated, then both banks also choose lower loan amounts in the periods prior to the last one in which the declared funding cost is the lowest possible. It should be noted that the designated outcome also coincides with the findings of the Monetary Economic Department of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Added: May 3, 2012
Added: Jun 24, 2011