ЭКОНОМИКА СИБИРИ В УСЛОВИЯХ ГЛОБАЛЬНЫХ ВЫЗОВОВ XXI ВЕКА. Том. 2. Как превратить пространство из проклятия в ресурс развития?
The paper describes the institutional organization of the resource type regions. The advantages of the political and economic approach based on structural alternatives of development identification are justified. The choice between those alternatives is decided by dominant political and economic actors’ interactions, motivations and limitations of the actors are regarded in the context of path dependence and lock-in effects. Different configurations of those actors’ interactions can both strengthen and weaken resource dependence. The results of the resource type regions development in 2005-2015 are regarded bearing in mind the structural shift effects. The authors show that emerging due to structural shift effects cannot be explained without involving institutional factors that determine the degree to which the regional economy operated as an integral unit or as a set of enclaves in its social and economic development.
Most researchers believe that states that are rich in natural resources are more able to maintain stability than those in which they are absent. The research problem touches upon the exceptions that do not fit into this proposition. Based on the idea that the state’s ability to extract resources imposes on it certain obligations to secure a public contract, the author hypothesizes that the quality of government is a mediating factor in the influence of resource dependence on the stability of autocracy. This factor is operationalized as the ability to pursue the declared policy and to distribute the public goods effectively. Using the Cox regression, the author carries out the survival analysis, which made it possible to substantiate this assumption statistically. The hypothesis was theoretically substantiated and observed in some examples of resource rent economies. The analysis showed that the of survival time of the authoritarian regime increases if the indicators of quality of government are high. The author tackles the issue of quantitative measurement of resource dependence and argues in favor of using the share of natural resources rents in GDP as such indicator. The article also provides the analysis of limitations and possibilities of Cox regression in analyzing the survival of autocracies and makes suggestions for improving the proportional hazards model.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.