Кто боится большого злого дракона? Почему в Китае лучшая (и худшая) система образования в мире
The author of the preface to the monograph by Zhao Yong showes, that the working in the USA Chinese professor uses the criticism to the Chinese high and higher school as the "politically correct" cause to warn the Western public against such trends of the educational system in the West as unification and formalization of educational process. The author of the preface supposes that these trends reflect the common intentions of the Western managemet to uiversal models and deviation from the technocratic principles.
The collective monograph includes practical and theoretical materials on the questions of innovation activity in the system of education.
Тhе article is devoted to the analysis of science, education and business as key institutional agents of civil identity in contemporary society. The civil identity is specified as a subject-object interaction between an individual and a state. Also preconditions for diversification of state power in the field of civic identity forming are determined.
Institutions affect investment decisions, including investments in human capital. Hence institutions are relevant for the allocation of talent. Good market-supporting institutions attract talent to productive value-creating activities, whereas poor ones raise the appeal of rent-seeking. We propose a theoretical model that predicts that more talented individuals are particularly sensitive in their career choices to the quality of institutions, and test these predictions on a sample of around 95 countries of the world. We find a strong positive association between the quality of institutions and graduation of college and university students in science, and an even stronger negative correlation with graduation in law. Our findings are robust to various specifications of empirical models, including smaller samples of former colonies and transition countries. The quality of human capital makes the distinction between educational choices under strong and weak institutions particularly sharp. We show that the allocation of talent is an important link between institutions and growth.