Heidegger in the Twenty-First Century
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In the twenty-first century, philosophy still needs to raise the question of the meaning of being. We therefore, follow Heidegger’s return to Parmenides - for being is neither a being nor a concept; rather, it is an essentially ambiguous universal. Being’s ambiguity allows us to understand both why it withdraws from thought and why there is something rather than nothing. The problem for philosophy then becomes: How can we think the original ambiguity of being without disambiguating it? Heidegger’s answer - ironically or not - is by not thinking it.