Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions
Within the group of BRICS, China, Russia, and South Africa use conduct remedies more often than developed jurisdictions. Remedies are applied under merger approval or as an outcome of investigation of anticompetitive conducts. Effects of conduct remedies on companies’ decisions and market performance still need explanation. This chapter explains the use of conduct remedies, with special emphasis on Russia, by specific position of BRICS in international division of labor, which allows the large companies, including and first of all domestic ones, to discriminate customers in BRICS home markets, vis-à-vis international customers. Together with positive effects on domestic customers, competition economics predicts the possibility of negative effects of remedies on the managerial decisions within the target company. Under some circumstances, remedies may even weaken competition in the global product markets.
This article explores how behavioral merger remedies of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation affects the price level. The main assumption implies that issuance of price remedies by antimonopoly authority may cause downward price rigidity as a result of ratchet effect or tacit collusion. The article includes analysis of 11 mergers with behavioral remedies during the period 2006-2010 and price dynamics for 14 products. In the course of the research the hypothesis that the issuance of price remedies brought about downward price rigidity was not confirmed.
In the article we analyze the mergers between Russian and foreign companies influence on competition in metal industry. Using the event study approach confirms the statement that Russian metal suppliers have more market power in domestic market than foreign companies in their markets. Thus mergers in Russia may indeed lead to more anticompetitive consequences, negatively influencing social welfare.
This article is delighted to the mergers expected influence on competition in metal industry. The results confirm the statement that Russian metal producers have more market power in domestic market in comparison with foreign companies in their markets. Thus mergers in Russia may indeed lead to anticompetitive consequences, negatively influencing metal buyers welfare.
Issues of ex post evaluation of mergers and antitrust bodies prescriptions are discussed. Among them: interrelation of enactment and enforcement from the perspectives of errors of I and II types in antitrust mergers control; probable consequences of mergers for competition; Аннотации к статьям 206 тьям № 1, 2012 comparative advantages and failures of decision variants available for antitrust bodies; ways of decision-making in expected merger. Also there are issues on efficacy of antimonopoly body decisions taking into account cost of monitoring, sanctioning of mergers participants, including influence on competition condition on relevant markets.