In the present article, I propose the following thesis: most of the problems related to the ethical choices in moral philosophy are false. This thesis might be illustrated with an example of the novel "Sophie's Choice" by William Styron. The main character of the novel (Sophie) faces a difficult choice being held in Auschwitz: she has to decide which of her two children to save; the other one will be sent to the gas chamber. At first sight, the question here is about ethical choices; however, there is no ethical choice in an authentic sense. We will consider four strategies to solve this problem, which provides by Kant, Hegel, Schelling and Wittgenstein. Hence, all attempts to find a philosophical solution to the problem of choosing between two valuable alternatives are hopeless. In this case, we either have to withdraw this issue from the purview of philosophy and bring it to the other fields of knowledge (e.g., evolutionary psychology explains Sophie's choice, using Darwin's theory), and to recognize the impotence of the Reason and assign the problem a regulatory status, as if it indicates the boundaries of what we can know in the field of moral philosophy.
"The ultimate end goal of the finite I and the not-I, i.e., the end goal of the world," writes Schelling in Of the I as the Principle of Philosophy (1795), "is its annihilation as a world, i.e., as the exemplification of finitude." In this paper, I explicate this statement and its theoretical stakes through a comprehensive re-reading of Schelling's 1795 writings: Of the I and Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, written later in the same year, in relation to what Schelling proclaims to be the central problem of all philosophy: the existence of the world (Dasein der Welt). To that end, I analyze Schelling's 1795 conceptions of synthesis and morality, and the structure of the I's striving in the world that they serve to create and uphold – a structure in which the I is torn between a paradisal past and a striven-for future that it constitutively cannot reach as long as the world is there. Schelling's 1795 metaphysics is ultimately caught, I argue, in the tension between two poles: justifying the world, this world of negativity, division, and endless striving – and annihilating or dissolving it in the bliss of absolute identity and freedom, in which there is no world, and no possibility of or need for a world.
This article outlines the main threads in the reception of Friedrich Schelling’s ideas by Alexei F. Losev as reflected in his philosophical works. The author singles out three main sets of issues where Schelling’s influence on Losev manifests itself especially vividly: the dialectical interpretation of primordial essence, the conditions for the possibility of language, and the theory of the symbol and philosophy of mythology. The author shows that within Losev’s reception of Schelling’s philosophy, there could be observed a tightly woven solidarity with Schelling’s position, an instrumental appropriation of individual Schellingian concepts, productive misunderstanding, and precise hermeneutic penetration into the semantic interrelations of various semantic clusters within Schelling’s extensive corpus of texts.