In the 1960–1970s, in Western intellectual circles the old Marxist dogma about the “withering away of the state”, which has been considerably weakened by that time, suddenly acquired unexpected allies not only in the person of influential post-Marxists like Jürgen Habermas, but also such liberals as Karl Jaspers and Hannah Arendt: They all believed in the advent of a new, “post-national”. By the beginning of the 21st century, the belief in the inevitable decline of the nation-state has become predominant in the worldview of Western elites. However, it is precisely today that the dogmatic and inconsistent nature of the post-national idea, having many signs of a phobia (the “nation-phobia”), seems evident, while national unity as an essential condition for the functioning of liberal democracies becomes ever clearer than before. The rise of populism can be seen as a peculiar proof of this thesis to the extent that it is a response to the erosion of political nations and deepening split between elites and popular masses. The article analyzes he relationship between elites’ nation-phobia and national populism, appealing to popular masses, as that of two closely linked opposites. It advances the hypothesis that the rise of populism in Western societies is caused not so much by new economic circumstances, but rather by long accumulated ideological, political and sociocultural problems, which have been exacerbated in the context of globalization. On the other hand, the peculiarity of contemporary Russian historical circumstances is emphasized. Here, it is not populism, but its alter ego – elitism – which poses the main political problem while producing nation-phobia.
In the rst article, the authors discuss the hybrid type of nationhood in Russia. Although the latter has some formal, both legal and cultural, features of a becoming political nation, it is still largely shaped by an “imperial syndrome”, re ecting the country’s imperial past and obstructing the building of demo- cratic institutions. The authors highlight that it is poorly understood by the masses and by the academics, while two di erent ideological movements, the liberal and the conservative, do not seen to be interested in discussing them. The authors distinguish three academic will approaches to the idea of civic nation in Russia. First, “defensive constructivism” appealing to the broadly used discursive methodology to defend Russia from any criticism focused on the imitation of the major Russian institutions, i.e. civic nation, de- mocracy, federalism, and the rule of law. Second, the “pragmatic relativism” approach postulating that then is no a hybrid character of Russian nationhood. Finally, the “historical fatalism” which claims that Russia remains an imperial polity and, thus, cannot become a nation state. While opposing to each of these three positions, the authors develop their own approach to the problem.
Until 2010, the Russian federal elite could turn a blind eye to violent pressure on business in regions in exchange for high results for the ruling party at the federal elections. Based on the analysis of public information on violent pressure on business from 2011 to 2016 collected by Center of Public Procedures “Business against corruption” we show that the economic crisis could force the authorities to reconsider this informal agreement. Since attempts to centralize raiding were ineffective, the government started to use an additional tool to manage violence associated with the appointments of the governors. We believe that the control of violent pressure on business has become part of the responsibilities of the new governors, and the ability to fulfill these responsibilities is related to the level of political competition in the region. In regions with relatively high political competition, control over violence is achieved through the creation for consensus between the elite groups, in regions where there is practically no competition on regional elections, the model of authoritarian control over violent pressure on business is possible
Analysis of system of values and norms in Russian society and its changes in recent years is presented in the article. It is shown that its specifi city compared with other countries lies not so much in a radical contrast of norms typical for Russians, but in objective situation in the country that prevent implementation of these norms and values in practice.
The article discusses the features of the Aristotelian tradition of studies in human behavior and the concept of justice that was focal to this tradition. An appeal to the Aristotelian tradition allows to revise critically the incontestability and productivity of relegating the role of ethics to the sphere of normative judgments that characterizes the approach of modern economics