The article deals with the evolution of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) into a full-scale and sound authority of international banking regulation. Founded in 1999 as the Financial Stability Forum, the FSB has become an international body in 2009 overseeing the international fi nancial regulation reform, also known as Basel III. Nonetheless, FSB’s responsibilities and competence are still limited to the annual determination of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and the development of the reform strategies for G-20 consideration. FSB has already proved to be a credible coordinator of Basel III implementation. Its initiatives on effective resolution strategies and total loss absorbing capacity for G-SIBs not only notably contributed to the set of regulatory tools and techniques aimed at minimization of systemic risks and enhancement of stress resilience of the banking industry but also designed approaches to mitigate the threat of “too big to fail” banks for the national economy at large. However, new regulatory paradigm requires principally new metrics to measure macro- and micro-level risks. Yet synchronization of the regulatory reform at the national and supranational levels stands beyond the accepted scope of synergetic effect of the reform. This means that FSB’s organizational status makes it less capable to be in line with fi nancial sector dynamics, its growing interconnectedness and complicating infrastructure, and rapidly changing economic environment. Under these circumstances regulatory transformation lacks mechanism that would overcome fallouts of regulatory arbitrage as well as risks of shadow banking. Reform inconsistency may spur perilous effect of regulatory “glocalization” in that national regulatory regimes may stop abiding by most of the Basel III principles and standards, which may ultimately ruin sense, logic, and continuum of the reform. Shortage of factors that calibrate consistency and continuity of regulatory reform diminishes FSB’s involvement into it. FSB’s efforts in promoting basics of reform synchronization between national and international realms are weakened by fragmentation of the fi nancial markets as well as by different adaptive abilities of fi nancial institutions to the new regulatory order. On the other side, single-principles-centered quantitative and qualitative platforms of banking regulation are among the imminent traits of the global fi nancial sector. The mentioned confl icts put on the agenda the inevitability of a higher international status of the FSB as a powerhouse of a single regulatory concept aiming at global fi nancial stability. Driven by that mission FSB is urged to become an independent international institute to administer closer collaboration among national regulators as a regulatory information hub. This will decisively complement its kit of existing instruments in attaining more balanced reform implementation and will ensure synergetic effect when applying regulatory actions into risk identifi cation and risk management as well as resolution and recovery of G-SIBs.
The article identifies and describes three new waves of emigration from Russia after the collapse of the USSR on the basis of prevailing push factors and the socio-demographic structure of emigrant flows. The authors examine regional and socio-demographic features of modern emigration flows from Russia. It is noted that the socio-economic factors which determine these emigration processes are becoming more significant. The article considers the shortcomings of national and foreign sources of statistical data on the number of Russian emigrants. An approximate estimate of the number of Russian-speaking migrants outside of the country is provided on the basis of comparison between domestic and foreign statistical sources. The geography of migration lows from Russia are revealed, including a description of priority countries for the resettlement of Russian emigrants. The peculiarities of their employment, resettlement, socioeconomic adaptation are highlighted. The features of resettlement and employment of Russian citizens in various regions and countries of the world are noted. The main channels of emigration are estimated. Emigration channels for permanent residence and temporary labor migration are singled out. New channels of emigration are also described: marriage emigration, the adoption of children by foreign citizens, educational emigrants, refugees and others. Several approaches to the identification of the Russian-speaking population abroad, which are used by experts and state structures, are described. There are several types of identification of Russian-speaking migrants abroad based on different approaches. The consequences of emigration for the Russian Federation are singled out on the basis of three methods of estimating economic losses. A certain evolution of the emigration policy of Russia during the recent history of the country is considered. In particular, the transition of the immigration policy from an indifferent attitude towards emigrants and the diaspora to an active interaction with them is noted.
This paper focuses on the link between the modern authoritarianism and corruption. Even though corruption plays an important role in Communist regimes, post-colonial dictatorships and authoritarian monarchies, coercion - which is a traditional tool used by authoritarian rulers - remains the basis of these regimes. However, a new type of non-democratic regimes, which we call neoauthoritarian, has emerged since the last quarter of the XX century. The new regimes are based on a dynamic interplay between coercion and corruption. That interplay allows authoritarian rulers to bring to the forefront either coercion or corruption, depending on the current political situation in the country and the political, economic and social issues on the political agenda. In this type of regimes, ruling political-economic groups capture the state and the public authority in the country and use all their instruments and resources to achieve their private goals. This paper presents empirical results showing that the Communist regimes, dictatorships and authoritarian monarchies exist in 33 modern non-democratic states, while neoauthoritarian regimes can be found in 19 states. I show that high levels of corruption are typical of all of these regimes, especially in dictatorships and neoauthoritarian ones. I explain a relatively lower level of corruption in the authoritarian monarchies using Olson's theory of stationary bandit. In particular, I speculate that the ruling monarchs fight corruption among bureaucrats since they perceive it as stealing their own property that damages the sources of their administrative rent and their revenues. At the same time, the high-level political corruption persists. Finally, I show that dictatorships are on average more fragile than economically elastic neoauthoritarian regimes, although it might be challenging to differentiate between them. All authoritarian and neoauthoritarian regimes, except a few monarchies, are non-stable regimes, allowing me to hypothesize their coming transformations or collapse.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the information on current social protests, which was published in the leading Latin American news websites and actively discussed on the social media platforms to identify the main causes of public discontent and the main problems discussed by Latin Americans. The first part of the paper provides an overview of the materials on the social movements of the fall of 2019, which were published in the news websites, which are the most popular in Latin America, and have the greatest influence, and the biggest Internet traffic volume. The second part is devoted to an overview of hashtags on the topic of mass protests that have gained huge popularity among Latin American users on the biggest social media platforms. A review of informational articles on the autumn social movements, which were published in the leading Latin American newspapers, revealed the main points of view on the factors and causes of these events, and the main problems discussed by Latin Americans. An appeal to various sources, both the countries in which the protests took place and the states that have passed such a crisis, will help readers to see the current socio-political situation in a new way.
The article defines the position of Russia in the European Union’s concept of resilience as it is put forward in the 2016 Global Strategy, five principles of relations with the Russian Federation and consequent documents. The discourse analysis of EU documents demonstrates that Russia is linked to resilience through threats, which – as Brussels believes – Moscow provokes. These are the challenges of energy supply, fake news, cybersecurity, chemical weapon and security services’ activities. Two approaches to dealing with these threats are identified. The realistic one presupposes isolation of the European Union from these threats. The liberal one is based on the inclusion of threats and their places of origin, given the complexity of the world and impossibility of fences as they challenge market principles, civil freedoms and benefits of the interconnected world. This liberal approach constitutes the basis of resilience in the EU and presumes a construction of spaces that include both the European Union and territories beyond its geographical borders (inter alia Russia). This inclusion – although it is in line with theoretical writings on resilience – is problematic for Moscow for four reasons. 1) Unevenness of inclusion originates from diversity of fields of cooperation, time and diversity of the EU member states. 2) Inclusion solely through threats that Russia provokes is a limited form of inclusion. 3) Russia is included as a part of several spaces – energy, information, cyberspace, free circulation of people and goods, – but not in the governance system of these spaces. 4) Although resilience presupposes actions of states and societies, the European Union views partners mostly in the civil society of Russia while limiting cooperation with its state institutions. Although resilience might constitute a concept for future EU-Russia relations, it cannot be applied in the way it is currently promoted by the EU.
During the whole first five-year period of the PRC Chairman Xi Jinping’s rule, foreign and domestic observers had plenty of reasons to debate the direction of his policies, particularly the question whether there would be more steps by the Chinese leadership toward the “comprehensive deepening of reforms”, refining basic institutions of the political system, constructing more channels of feedback from the society to the government – or rather a kind of statist and left-leaning tendencies would dominate, pushing the country to certain practices of the past decades in the sphere of ideology, culture and treating intellectuals. The sudden eruption of the Chinese-American “trade war” roughly around March 2018 showed a significant range of rifts and contradictions previously hidden behind the rhetoric of unity, social cohesion, all social forces arguably united around the current leadership’s notion of the “great struggle” and the idea of “Chinese Dream” put forward by the Chairman. What will be the direction of further development in the social and ideological spheres under the second term of Xi Jinping, “Xi’s second season”, as one Chinese author has put it, taking into account that the restrictions on intellectual freedoms have already reached unprecedented level? At the same time, one can sense that there is a burgeoning trend inside the Chinese society to present the government with various demands ranging from ecology to workers’ rights. At this point, it is hardly possible to make a sound prognosis, but certain salient features can be drawn from the notions and concepts currently debated by intellectuals in and outside the country