An article is devoted to description of the research results with the following objectives: Working out the proper pricing model for Moscow office rental market based on the foregoers' researches and microeconomic market analysis; 65535 Testing developed model on the empirical data, results interpretation; 65536 Calculation of the margin effects of the identified determinants on the 65537rental rate level; Identification where the market is on the real rental rates circle curve. Research has a great practical significance due to rapidly increasing interest from Russian and foreign investors in Russian and especially Moscow real estate market, concerned its high return with moderate, decreasing over time risks. It can be useful for the wide range of readers: from investors to university students and academics, due to its theoretical improvements of existing real estate pricing models and practically applicable results.
The paper analyses determinants of efficiency of Russian universities. The analysis is based on the data from annual monitoring of performance of higher education institutions conducted by the Ministry of Education and Science. Special attention is paid to the factors that are associated with public policy in the sphere of higher education. In order to explain the variation of the efficiency scores we implement one of the most modern techniques for analysis of efficiency’ determinants – Two-Stage Semi-parametric DEA. The high level of heterogeneity in Russian higher education sector is controlled for by considering two different specifications of DEA model: with the focus on educational activity and with the focus on scientific activity. The results show that relatively less efficient universities are more likely to be affected by the considered efficiency’ determinants compared to efficient ones. Universities that are governed by the Ministry of Education and Science and by regional governments appeared to be relatively more efficient compared to the universities that are governed by another federal authorities except for the Ministry of Education and Science (Ministry of agriculture, Ministry of Healthcare, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Sport and so on). Governance by the Ministry of Education and Science has the strongest effect on efficiency level among considered factors. Governance by regional authorities has the weakest effect. The total square of buildings available for the university appeared to be positively and statistically significantly related to efficiency level. While the autonomous status has no any effect.
The fundamental idea underpinning spatial econometric models of economic growth is as follows: regional growth is determined not only by social, economic, geographic traits of a region but also by spillovers from other regions, most importantly adjacent ones. If one region starts booming, it can left neighbors unaffected (neutral mechanism), spur their growth (cooperation mechanism) or slow their growth by pulling resources over (competition mechanism). What mechanism and to which extent occurs in practice matters for designing balanced economic policy and evaluating efficiency of regional policy investment. Classic spatial econometric models make strong although simplifying assumption that the same mechanism matters for all regions in the same manner, and there is no variation in spillovers intensity across regions. This assumption seems plausible for relatively small and homogenous regions of European countries, but it looks excessively strong for large and diverse Russian regions. In this paper we attempt to relax this assumption and propose a new model, fitting better in Russian conditions and bringing only slight sophistication from the estimation point of view. We introduce sensitivity parameter governing regional exposure to externalities. We assume this parameter to be a linear function of region-level observables, like area, population density or urbanization rate. These hypotheses have been confirmed at least partially. We found that dense and urbanized regions were more sensitive to spillovers. In other words, a region surrounded by the fast-growing areas, will grow the more intense, the more its population density and the higher the level of urbanization.
The paper describes the new version of the model of the Russian banking system, which successfully reproduces a wide set of parameters characterizing its performance: loans and deposits of firms and households, liquidity nominated both in rubles and in foreign currency, mandatory reserves. We describe the technique of derivation of model relations, which includes the statement of the problem of macroeconomic agent “bank”. This problem is based on the maximization of discounted flow of profit subject to budget constraint, balance of loans and deposits, liquidity constraints and reserve sufficiency requirements. The paper contains the system of equations which describes the solution of the problem. We provide a detailed description of transition of continuous to discrete time and the new approach to the relaxation of complementary slackness conditions based on the assumption that the model exhibits a turnpike property.
Apart from the standard approach to the parameter estimation for this class of models, we apply a method of multi-step forecasting. We show that the standard method of estimations allows to closely reproduce the historic series but leads to the poor quality of forecasts. The method of multi-step forecasting, on the other hand, successfully reproduces historic series and also leads to rather accurate forecasts. We compared it with standard econometric techniques and show that the model with parameters obtained via multi-step forecast method provides somewhat better forecasts than ARIXAM and much better ones than AR, ARIMA, VAR and VARX. We also show that then we use multi-step forecasting method, optimal values of parameters are about the same for different intervals of estimation and different lengths of forecasts (from one to six months). Such a stability of parameters makes us think that the model reproduces long-term relations of variables and can be used for forecasting and scenario analysis.
The model can be used for the evaluation of reaction of the banking system on the monetary policy, external constraints of different kind and the general condition of the economy. The model can be used as a block of a bigger general equilibrium model of the Russian economy.
In this paper, we consider the classical problem of maximizing discounted utility, provided that the moment of the next purchase and receipt of a loan is random (Poisson). The purpose of the study is to take into account the uncertain waiting period for receipt of a credit in consumption decision-making. The model is formulated as the problem of optimal stochastic control. The consumer at random moments buys the product at a non-random price and at the same random moments can take and return indefinite loans. For loans, the agent continuously pays interest. He constantly receives dividends in the form of external receipt of money into the account and can accumulate non-interest non-cash money. The optimality conditions are obtained using the Lagrange multiplier method. Sufficient optimality conditions reduce to partial differential equations with variable and unknown delay. They can only be solved by using a combinations of analytic expansions with respect to a small parameter. A special difficulty is the regularization («softening») of the conditions of complementary slackness. As a result, functions were obtained that determine the optimal control of consumption purchases and the size of the loan. One can see how the consumption expenditures change as the end of the planning period approaches. First, consumption depends on money and debt not separately, but on their difference – own means of the consumer. Secondly, far from the planning horizon, consumption is small and grows as the final point in time approaches. This model can be used as part of the description of the consumer agent in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models.
The problem of evaluation of the real power of players when they make collective decisions is considered. The new model of the real power evaluation is proposed. The basics of the new model are: modification of the classical power Shapley - Shubik index for accounting of possibility of coalition formation, adding of the new index of the position of coincidence which is evaluating the closeness of the political position of groups and faction, and the new developed index of power efficiency. The index of power efficiency shows to what extend the players exercised their potential power which depends on the number of their votes. Besides, a new way of accounting the impact of cohesion of groups and factions in their final power score is proposed. This model is applied for the evaluation of the power distribution at the Russian State Duma of the 3d convocation.
After the recent debt crisis governments of many developed and developing countries turned to the use of financial repression as a way of government spending financing along with explicit capital taxation. Financial repression can be considered as an implicit tax on capital, because it leads to the outflow of resources from investment to the government debt. We question what type of government spending financing is better: explicit or implicit tax on capital (financial repression). The criterion is the minimization of consumption crowding out effect in the steady-state where government spending can be of three types. We propose a Ramsey model modification with financial repression and three types of government expenditures: wasteful, productive and one in the utility. There are two instruments of financial repression: artificial increase in debt demand and lowered government debt yield. We find that regardless of government spending type, the choice of the government, which guarantees maximum level of consumption or minimum crowding out in the steady state, is explicit tax on capital in the absence of financial repression (in the form of artificial increase in debt demand). The higher is artificial debt demand the bigger is the direct outflow of capital to the government debt and less is the average interest of savings, while increase in the explicit capital tax rate affects only the savings yield. However, increase in the explicit tax on capital and lowering debt yield leads to the same crowding out effect.
The paper analyses the differences between firms with centralized model of decision-making and firms with decentralized model of decision-making, and studies the factors that affect choice of the decision-making model at the firm. The empirical analysis is based on the large survey “European Firms in a Global Economy” conducted in 2010 in 7 European countries: Germany, United Kingdom, France, Austria, Spain, Italy and Hungary.
It is shown that decentralized firms demonstrate better performance in a spectrum of different areas: they are more involved in the international trade (in particular, in the more complicated forms of international trade), innovative activities, R&D, training of employees. It is also shown that probability of centralization of firm management is significantly influenced by factors related to the distribution of property, as well as by individual characteristics of the CEO. In particular, concentration of property in the hands of individuals or families, belonging of the CEO to the family that controls the firm lead to a considerable increase in the probability of centralization. These results can reflect influence of personal (behavioral) motives of the firm owners or top managers on the choice of the governance model at the firm.
The results hold not only at the whole sample of the survey, but also for each of the countries in the sample. The influence of personal motives of individuals who run or control the firm on the probability of governance centralization at the firm is strong. For example, according to the predictions of proposed in the paper simple regression model, for the firms where CEO is an individual who controls the firm or a member of the family that controls it, probability of centralization of governance is on average 15 percentage points higher. In Austria, where the described effect is most prominent – 38 percentage points higher.