The purpose of this article is to differentiate between the two concepts, normative power (NP) and soft power (SP) and to examine the developments in EU-Russian relations through this prism. In the theoretical part the authors draw distinctions between the NP and SP, using constructivist methodology and elaborating the difference in how NP and SP treat the ‘Other’. Three issues are identified. Firstly, SP is an instrument of foreign policy, of conscious manipulation of the ‘Other’ whereas NP is a discursive identity practices, which cannot be used instrumentally; its goal is to spread the norms. Secondly, SP maintains the difference between the agent and the recipient whereas NP presupposes that this distance will be overcome, that the NP will eventually incorporate the ‘Other’. In order to do so, both territorial and temporal criteria can be used. Finally, the decline of the NP is linked to its success, more specifically, to the constant reassessment of the norms and to the enlargement of its agents as a result of the incorporation of the ‘Other’. In other words, the decline of NP is due to the ‘Other’, to the recipient, whereas the decline of SP is the result of the activities of its agent mainly. The empirical part of the article traces key milestones in the development of the EU’s NP as well as its current difficulties: these are a new round of reassessment of the values and increase in the number of agents of the NP Europe as a result of the EU’s enlargements in this century. The authors also examine the dialectics of EU-Russian relations through the prism of the difference between NP and SP. It is demonstrated that Brussels has evolved in these relations from the NP in the beginning of the 1990s to the SP in present. Moscow, for its part, has moved from the role of the recipient of the EU’s NP to the demands to be accepted as an agent of the NP. It is demonstrated that this inclusion has happened for Russia but not for the EU, which leads to harsh discussions. Finally, the authors analyse the reasons of Russia’s inability to form its NP: these are its emphasis on the de-ideologised relations, instrumentalisation of all resources as well as its being in the ideational and normative space of Europe. All these aspects allow Russia to successfully apply its SP but they also create barriers for its NP where Russia would be a key agent. In today’s world, however, NP is an essential element for an international actor to be recognised as a centre of power.
The article analyzes the paternalistic model of the interaction of power and society on the example of the functioning of the public chambers of the Tver region and St. Petersburg. The study is based on preliminary results of the scientific project “Institutions and Practices of Interaction between the Government, the Expert Community and Public Organizations in Russian Regions”, conducted in Tver and in St. Petersburg in 2017–2019. The main research methods used were analysis of the regulatory framework, content of the Public Chamber of the Tver Region and St. Petersburg, semi-structured interviews with chamber members, experts, government officials and deputies of regional parliaments with experience in interacting with public chambers. The article analyzes the logic of transformation of public chambers from the point of view of: a) the principles of organization and selection of staff, b) the functionality laid down in the regulatory framework, c) the measures taken reflecting the content and focus of the work, d) the information policy e) building relationships with public organizations, state authorities and local self-government, f) influence on the socio-political situation in the region. An analysis of the principles of organization and functionality of public chambers shows that the potential for their influence on public policy in the law is limited. The authors highlight the general and specific features of the evolution of the public chambers of the Tver region and St. Petersburg. If the Public Chamber of the Tver Region was initially created as a real institute of regional policy, with the levers of influence prescribed in the law on the process of making power decisions (the right of legislative initiative, the possibility of sending representatives to the qualification collegium of judges), the Public Chamber of St. Petersburg was created as a kind of elite club under the governor, with whom the governor could consult if desired. General changes regarding public chambers are moving towards adjusting the principles of their recruitment, numerical strength, the study of individual powers, and the unification of the system of regional public chambers. An analysis of the activities of the public chambers allows the authors to conclude that they correlate with changes in the domestic policy of the Russian Federation. According to the authors, this public-state institution contributes to the activation of those social forces that are ready to integrate into communication to promote socially oriented projects. The authors believe that the genesis and evolution in Russia in the 2000s. public chambers indicate a change in the mechanisms of interaction between civil society structures and the state, the design of a paternalistic model of mediation of power and society.
First two volumes of the anthology “Conservators of Russia” present a unique collection of spiritual-philosophical and historical-political texts belonging to those who have been creating and safekeeping Russia during the first eight centuries of its Christian history. It is not self-evident to place these thinkers into category of “the conservatives” since the classic domestic conservatism conventionally emerged not earlier than in 19th century. Conceptual introductions to both volumes give us opportunity to overcome the difficulty, which is rather an issue of methodology than chronology. For the period of 11th-17th centuries, the idea of safekeeping Russian statehood as the only independent stronghold of Orthodoxy acquired a clearly conservative meaning. In the 18th century, the idea of self-sufficient Empire comes to the fore and gives rise to “a new… conservatism.” Three dots in this author’s formula emphasize the fact that in the 18th century, there was not so much conservatism as such, but rather a search for its new forms dominated.
The article suggests a typology of Spanish conservatism as a political ideology that preserves a certain doctrinal continuity over the past five centuries. Separating in the history of Spanish conservatism three stages - a genetic (from the end of XV and the end of the XVIII century.), Classic (late XVIII to the 60s of XX century) and modern (with 1960), - the author shows that their specificity was conditioned by the nature of the challenges faced Spanish society: the search for the answer to the Protestant challenge (Reformation of the XVI century.) determined its genesis and general features.
The paper reviews the most recent findings in multilevel governance and multilevel political systems. Multilevel governance is defined here as a distribution and sustainable patterns of exchange of the major power resources between autonomous centers of power (governments) situated at different levels within the multilevel structure. Following the trend laid down for the federalism and decentralization research by Tulia Falleti, we distinguish between three types of resources: the budgets (the monetary resources pertaining to fiscal financial flows), the information (mostly provided from the lower to the upper levels of government), and legitimacy (mostly the electoral and clientelist support supplied to each other by governments on different levels during elections). The article reveals the general trends within this research stream and outlines the existent gaps in our understanding of exchange and distribution of particular types of resources between different levels of government in multilevel governance. The first two sections provide a brief overview of the development of empirical research on federalism and multi-tiered systems, and explicate the rationale for the study of the distribution of resources between governments at different levels of power. Researching these resources’ exchange in the short run, and the long-term patters of such exchanges are two different research agendas. In particular, paying closer attention to the long-term sustainable patterns of resource exchange may serve as an explanation for higher or lower resilience in multilevel governance structures. Modeling such exchange may therefore serve as grounds for an endogenous theory of multilevel and federal governance. The second part of the paper provides a more detailed review of the most recent research into particular types of resources and their exchange between levels of government. We describe the “natural” asymmetries in these resources’ distribution between levels. Finally, the conclusion highlights the existent gaps and sets up the agenda for future research
The author sums up the results of the sociological study of the political orientations of people's deputies of the Russian Federation, held in June 1990. These orientations were evaluated according to three criteria: the right — the left; authoritarianism—democracy; and plebiscitarian democracy—predisposition to / estrangement from. 466 deputies were polled, which is 44 per cent of the total number. The poll showed that the political mentality of a great part of MPs was still at the formative stage. The author describes the predominant political views of the MPs as "slightly right of the centre". He goes on to state the attitudes of the deputies to the key economic, social, ethical and other problems this country faces. The influence of "imperial ideology" is very insignificant. The controversial issue of the attitude to the October 1917 revolution plays the role of a splitting factor. The author singles out three sufficiently homogeneous groups in terms of their political selfindentification: the deputies who support Communists alone or Communists and some other parties — 41 per cent; deputies with an exclusively social-democratic orientation, or supporting social democrats plus some other parties except Communists — 36 per cent; deputies who support any parties except Communists or social democrats or those who still have no party orientation—23 per cent. Those belonging to the party/state nomenklatura make up the core of the "communist" group, intellectuals play the same role among the "social democrats". The author believes that political mentality of Russia's deputies will evolve towards the right, with the growing importance of the "social democrats" and the diminishing role of the "communists".
The article explores a particular aspect of the identity policy of the Russian state – an evolution of the official historical narrative describing a genealogy of the nation. It is highly important for legitimization of the political regime as an “explanation” of continuity between collective past, present and future. The research is based on the theoretical frame that conceptualizes a historical component of identity politics and reveals factors that influence its structure in the contemporary Russian context.
The author argues that there were two large periods in the development of the official narrative based on different conceptions – that of “the new Russia” and of “the thousand-years-long Russia”. These periods roughly coincide with presidency of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin – Dmitry Medvedev. The construction of the new narrative maintaining the Russian identity was complicated by a necessity to match two principally different cultural models of political work at the past – that of “coping with a difficult past / collective trauma” and aimed at consolidation of the nation / nation-building. There were different approaches to this political task in different periods. In the 1990s the official narrative had integrated discourse about “trauma and crime” as a part of legitimization of the post-Soviet transformation, but it could not manage to consolidate the nation. In the 2000s the choice was made for apologetic principle of work with collective past which resulted into the eclectic construction that marginalize the topic of “trauma and crime”. In the 2010s we can see some attempts to make the official narrative more consistent which brings ambivalent results. On the one hand, in the context of the current international conflict the apologetic conception of the national past is securitized as a “weapon” against the foreign and domestic enemies. On the other hand, a new round of discussions about the national history opens some windows of opportunities for actors struggling for “coping with difficult past” agenda.