The author asserts that the legal nature of a bankruptcy administrator’s activities is investigation aimed at identifying the debtor’s assets and obligations; and determining the cause of insolvency. It is argued that the debtor’s director or former director could be forcefully taken to court in case of non-appearance.
The principle of justice of administrative proceedings as a procedural principle should have its own specific content. Without this content, the courts cannot apply this principle in administrative cases. Comparison of the possible content of the principle of justice with the principles of legality and equality and analysis of the possibility of disclosure of the principle of justice through the characteristics of consideration (through the active role of the court and the distribution of the burden of proof) and resolution (identification with the means of checking the administrative discretion) of administrative cases show that the principle of justice does not have its procedural content and does not bear any meaning that allows to apply it in administrative proceedings.
In the Russian financial market, there is a significant redistribution of individual investment: funds flow from deposits to the securities market as citizens purchase bonds. The two types of investment appear to be similar, but bonds are much more complex and require more attention than deposits. Their comparison reveals that each investment tool has its own advantages and disadvantages, while bonds carry a higher risk of loss.
The article raises the question of determining the jurisdiction and applicable law for directors’ liability for the breach of insolvency-related duties: the problem is posed on a global scale, on a regional (European) scale, and in a more local Russian context. The emphasis is made on the experience of the European Union in resolving the issues. The author analyses the chain of cases from Gourdain to H. v. H.K. to Kornhaas, where the Court of Justice has gradually clarified which cases fall within the competence of the bankruptcy court (vis attractiva concursus) and which cases come within the scope of the principle of lex fori concursus. The article discusses the phenomenon of insolvencification of directors’ liability, i.e. corporate provisions being reclassified as bankruptcy provisions with a view to applying the lex concursus. It raises the following questions: how does insolvencification of directors’ liability correspond to the freedom of establishment and corporate mobility? Would the insolvencification of directors’ liability lead to regulatory competition because of the States’ desire to attract investors, minimising the standards of management responsibility and thus making their territories more attractive for business? The EU experience can be useful in the light of the discussion of the prospects for the establishment of cross-border insolvency regulation for the EAEU countries