Ranta’s view that all substitutions of variables between MLTT contexts in some sense “extend” these contexts, so the MLTT contexts always form a partial order, is not justified. It is well known that the category of MLTT contexts is, generally, locally Cartesian closed but not necessarily a poset. Thus Domanov’s reading of such general substitutions as mutual interpretations between contexts, which represent their corresponding epistemic agents, is more adequate. The formal analysis offered by Domanov can be improved if this latter viewpoint is developed more systematically than the author does it in his paper.
The framework of simple opposition realism - anti-realism is not enough to analyze the views on the reality of unobservable objects of quantum theory. First, it is necessary to distinguish between realism in relation to the theory and realism in relation to the theory’s objects. Secondly, realism in relation to classical objects can be combined, both with realism and with anti-realism in relation to quantum objects. Third, the concept of "existence" and "to exist objectively" can have different meanings. To take into account these factors, the article describes three approaches: classical realism, quantum anti-realism, and quantum realism. I show that the debate around quantum reality has intensified in recent decades due to a series of new quantum experiments. The current stage of the debate is caused by the second quantum revolution relating to the transfer and processing of quantum information. Classical realism and old versions of quantum anti-realism have become insufficiently effective to explain the results of a series of experiments. Proponents of quantum realism, in turn, refer to the possibility of using the wave function to manipulate quantum objects before their measurement. In conclusion, I assume that not only theoretical discussions but also experiments and new technologies can have a major impact on the seemingly purely philosophical debate about reality.
The article explores the private nature of subjectivity in programs of integration the phenomenology with naturalism. It is considered if their tools are relevant for the phenomenological, rather than naturalistic way of subjectivity`s explaining. Justification of the key ideas is provided with the help of such concepts as "body image", "body scheme", (Sh. Gallagher), "ontological significance" (L. Baker), "experience", "cognitive niches" (F. Varela), "transparent body" (T. Fuchs). Based on the traditional phenomenology of E. Husserl, it is shown that a set of approaches that integrate phenomenology and naturalism within the framework of "first-person philosophy" can be characterized as a phenomenology without a phenomenological subject. It is shown that the phenomenological nature of the self-perspective in integrative programs is more likely to be understood as the qualification and privacy of subjectivity, while the transcendental aspect of the unobservable and biased consciousness is practically not taken into account. The article concludes that the logic of some projects of integration of phenomenology and naturalism overlook this transcendental peculiarity of consciousness, its fundamentally unobserved character. The classical phenomenological approach emphasizes on the extra-natural, biased, and non-empirical nature of consciousness. The role and significance of the phenomenological approach is not limited to the idea of “what-is-likeness” and privacy of subjective states. Phenomenology, which preserves the idea of the subject, means a radical break with the ontology of things and, in general, with the ontology of something objective at all.
In this paper, I argue that quale is a misleading notion.
Immediate subjective experiences of some sense data are usually called phenomenal qualities or qualia. Traditionally phenomenal qualities are considered as one of the most difficult aspect of mind for naturalistic explanation.
Many philosophers are assume that full physical or functional description of human state does not give us univocal indication of her actual feelings at any particular moment. Qualia appear to be non-reductive to the system physical architecture or its functional abilities. Philosophers tend to declare that qualia are special non-physical property. Then what kind of properties? From metaphysical point of view, we can distinguish two kinds of properties: intrinsic and relational. An intrinsic property is a property that an object or a thing has of itself, independently of the world of other things. A relational property on the other hand exist only as one thing relate to something in the rest of the world. There are compelling arguments proving that qualia as intrinsic property of organism or brain are unimaginable. In the paper, I examine the issue of conceptual possibility of meaningful accounting of qualia as relational property of organism and the object it represents.
In the end of the article, I claim that description of phenomenal qualities, as relational properties are reducible to the description of intrinsic properties of organism, the object represented plus their natural relational properties. Since qualia tend to be seen as property and they are unimaginable as intrinsic property and their description to as relational properties meaningfully rephrased as the description of intrinsic property I conclude that the whole notion of qualia is misleading.
The article considers the major approaches towards the integration of philosophical and scientific perspectives on the nature and functioning of subjective consciousness. The project of naturalization of phenomenology is considered as an account of methodological unification of cognitive science and philosophy based on first-person perspective. This alliance is generally thought as an attempt to incorporate the explanatory models of phenomenology into the natural scientific worldview. The proponents of this approach, such as F. Varela, confirm that it can overcome the explanatory gap between the subjective first-person qualitative phenomenological data and third-person neurophysiological data, or at least it can contribute to the project of scientifically informed philosophy of mind, as in S. Gallagher’s front load phenomenology. But is it really possible to build a scientific theory of consciousness? It seems that the project of naturalization contains the inevitable shortcomings which render it impossible to take the first person approaches in cognitive science “seriously”. Hence, the first-person approach to consciousness cannot become the foundation of natural scientific theory of mind as part of nature. Phenomenological approaches to consciousness in the works of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty reject the primacy of the scientific objectivist world picture, claiming that the transcendental consciousness being the condition of possibility of truth and objectivity cannot be seen from the objective point of view. Scientific worldview gives the incomplete picture of consciousness, eliminating its transcendental dimension. However, as I try to show, transcendentalism and naturalism as world projects can contribute into each other, retaining the circular relations between them. Phenomenology can integrate both world projects into holistic picture through phenomenologization, or denaturalization of natural science.
The article shows that Russian philosophical community is very sensitive towards the history and the current state of philosophy of science and of science studies, which are a subject matter of special interest by virtue of a dedicated space in the university education system. This status is also supported by its proximity to the international philosophical mainstream of the 20th century and its specific object, its connection with science. Philosophy of science at the same time retains some neutrality in relation to the dominant political ideology and proposes claims for an objective knowledge. History of philosophy of science, therefore, serves largely as a history of philosophical rationalism, and its prospects are determined by the strengthening of the role of science in modern culture. However, the modern existence of philosophy of science is undergoing substantial change and experiences a series of challenges. Among them there are the humiliation of intellectuals and scientists in society politicalvoluntarism, mass consumption and the cult of mysticism. Under these conditions, a philosophical study of science and technology is forced to take on the challenges of social criticism and shape special civil institutions for self-preservation. Thus philosophy ol science integrates the political, ethical and social components that allowfor treating it as a hard core of interdisciplinary interaction of all socio-humanitarian disciplines.
Interdisciplinary researches of science form a "live" organism in which any its part performs the function in the general communication with others. The philosophy of science plays a role of "think-tank" of this organism, the generator of the sense connecting functions of its separate parts bodies in systematic unity. It is possible to call it consciousness of science. The metaphilosophy of science in relation to philosophy of science plays the role similar to what the philosophy of science plays in relation to science. The ability of philosophy of science to a self-reflection is implemented in it, as well as the investigations of the philosophical importance of the processes taking place in "trading zone" (in P. Galison's sense), are staticized. In such way, trading by the ideas between scientists, science-of-science theorists and philosophers is knowledged. Interaction of philosophy and metaphilosophy of science is carried out during the competition between various philosophical interpretations of science-of-science researches of these "trading" processes. Then, institutional, methodological, historical and culturological researches receiving philosophical interpretation become sources of the metaphilosophical ideas. Metaphorically, one may say, the metaphilosophy of science is self-consciousness of philosophy of science. Idea of metaphilosophy of science as about the direct person involved in the process happening in "trading zone" interrupts a senseless heap of "metalevels" of a philosophical reasoning on science.
This article discusses Hans Poser’s new book “Homo creator” (2016). It aims to open the philosophy of technology to ontological, epistemological and ethical problems. The keynote of the book serves the conviction that the technical creativity builds the core of the engineering. Modal concepts as possibility, necessity, contingency and reality are used in a systematic way to characterize technology. Technological artifacts essentially depend on a special type of interpretation (“technical hermeneutics”). The central ontological problem consists in the fact that technology is based on new ideas, which at the beginning are a mere possibility, because the intended artifacts and processes never existed up to that moment. The author shows that conditions of the real world, cognitive, social and cultural conditions constitute the realm of the technological possibility and influence our culture (“life world”) from the very beginning
The paper proposes an epistemic taxonomy of assertives based on a concept of epistemic presuppositions. Epistemic presuppositions are a special kind of pragmatic presuppositions, which describe the structure of hearer’s and speaker’s meta-reasoning. The epistemic taxonomy of assertives is based on the operator of strong common belief (𝐶𝐵). It is argued that the properties of a strong common belief operator (positive and negative introspection, non-factivity) are relevant for the analysis of pragmatics presuppositions. Also strong common belief operator is used for the explication of gricean epistemic construction: “the Speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks...”.
One of the key aspects of constructivism is the role of the observer and observation. I share this perspective, but beyond that I try to open up some problematic consequences of the core philosophical assumptions of globally observing existence. An additional conclusion could be drawn that in fact we can only speak reasonably about local observations, leaving out the issue of an external reality.