In this paper, I argue that quale is a misleading notion.
Immediate subjective experiences of some sense data are usually called phenomenal qualities or qualia. Traditionally phenomenal qualities are considered as one of the most difficult aspect of mind for naturalistic explanation.
Many philosophers are assume that full physical or functional description of human state does not give us univocal indication of her actual feelings at any particular moment. Qualia appear to be non-reductive to the system physical architecture or its functional abilities. Philosophers tend to declare that qualia are special non-physical property. Then what kind of properties? From metaphysical point of view, we can distinguish two kinds of properties: intrinsic and relational. An intrinsic property is a property that an object or a thing has of itself, independently of the world of other things. A relational property on the other hand exist only as one thing relate to something in the rest of the world. There are compelling arguments proving that qualia as intrinsic property of organism or brain are unimaginable. In the paper, I examine the issue of conceptual possibility of meaningful accounting of qualia as relational property of organism and the object it represents.
In the end of the article, I claim that description of phenomenal qualities, as relational properties are reducible to the description of intrinsic properties of organism, the object represented plus their natural relational properties. Since qualia tend to be seen as property and they are unimaginable as intrinsic property and their description to as relational properties meaningfully rephrased as the description of intrinsic property I conclude that the whole notion of qualia is misleading.
The article considers the major approaches towards the integration of philosophical and scientific perspectives on the nature and functioning of subjective consciousness. The project of naturalization of phenomenology is considered as an account of methodological unification of cognitive science and philosophy based on first-person perspective. This alliance is generally thought as an attempt to incorporate the explanatory models of phenomenology into the natural scientific worldview. The proponents of this approach, such as F. Varela, confirm that it can overcome the explanatory gap between the subjective first-person qualitative phenomenological data and third-person neurophysiological data, or at least it can contribute to the project of scientifically informed philosophy of mind, as in S. Gallagher’s front load phenomenology. But is it really possible to build a scientific theory of consciousness? It seems that the project of naturalization contains the inevitable shortcomings which render it impossible to take the first person approaches in cognitive science “seriously”. Hence, the first-person approach to consciousness cannot become the foundation of natural scientific theory of mind as part of nature. Phenomenological approaches to consciousness in the works of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty reject the primacy of the scientific objectivist world picture, claiming that the transcendental consciousness being the condition of possibility of truth and objectivity cannot be seen from the objective point of view. Scientific worldview gives the incomplete picture of consciousness, eliminating its transcendental dimension. However, as I try to show, transcendentalism and naturalism as world projects can contribute into each other, retaining the circular relations between them. Phenomenology can integrate both world projects into holistic picture through phenomenologization, or denaturalization of natural science.
The article shows that Russian philosophical community is very sensitive towards the history and the current state of philosophy of science and of science studies, which are a subject matter of special interest by virtue of a dedicated space in the university education system. This status is also supported by its proximity to the international philosophical mainstream of the 20th century and its specific object, its connection with science. Philosophy of science at the same time retains some neutrality in relation to the dominant political ideology and proposes claims for an objective knowledge. History of philosophy of science, therefore, serves largely as a history of philosophical rationalism, and its prospects are determined by the strengthening of the role of science in modern culture. However, the modern existence of philosophy of science is undergoing substantial change and experiences a series of challenges. Among them there are the humiliation of intellectuals and scientists in society politicalvoluntarism, mass consumption and the cult of mysticism. Under these conditions, a philosophical study of science and technology is forced to take on the challenges of social criticism and shape special civil institutions for self-preservation. Thus philosophy ol science integrates the political, ethical and social components that allowfor treating it as a hard core of interdisciplinary interaction of all socio-humanitarian disciplines.
Interdisciplinary researches of science form a "live" organism in which any its part performs the function in the general communication with others. The philosophy of science plays a role of "think-tank" of this organism, the generator of the sense connecting functions of its separate parts bodies in systematic unity. It is possible to call it consciousness of science. The metaphilosophy of science in relation to philosophy of science plays the role similar to what the philosophy of science plays in relation to science. The ability of philosophy of science to a self-reflection is implemented in it, as well as the investigations of the philosophical importance of the processes taking place in "trading zone" (in P. Galison's sense), are staticized. In such way, trading by the ideas between scientists, science-of-science theorists and philosophers is knowledged. Interaction of philosophy and metaphilosophy of science is carried out during the competition between various philosophical interpretations of science-of-science researches of these "trading" processes. Then, institutional, methodological, historical and culturological researches receiving philosophical interpretation become sources of the metaphilosophical ideas. Metaphorically, one may say, the metaphilosophy of science is self-consciousness of philosophy of science. Idea of metaphilosophy of science as about the direct person involved in the process happening in "trading zone" interrupts a senseless heap of "metalevels" of a philosophical reasoning on science.
The paper proposes an epistemic taxonomy of assertives based on a concept of epistemic presuppositions. Epistemic presuppositions are a special kind of pragmatic presuppositions, which describe the structure of hearer’s and speaker’s meta-reasoning. The epistemic taxonomy of assertives is based on the operator of strong common belief (𝐶𝐵). It is argued that the properties of a strong common belief operator (positive and negative introspection, non-factivity) are relevant for the analysis of pragmatics presuppositions. Also strong common belief operator is used for the explication of gricean epistemic construction: “the Speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks...”.
One of the key aspects of constructivism is the role of the observer and observation. I share this perspective, but beyond that I try to open up some problematic consequences of the core philosophical assumptions of globally observing existence. An additional conclusion could be drawn that in fact we can only speak reasonably about local observations, leaving out the issue of an external reality.
This article considers the problem of analysis of Ernst Mally’s theory. The problem mainly lies in the fact that this theory is usually considered in connection with other theories. For example, it can be considered as the development of Alexius Meinong’s theory of objects. Meinong was Mally’s teacher and his ideas have formed the basis of the contemporary study of nonexistent objects, the basis of the theories of Terens Parsons, Richard Routley etc. But he was often criticized for the fact that he claimed as they said that from his point of view all things exist in one form or another, that the golden mountain or round square exist just like the real mountains, but in some weak or low-grade way. Mally understood problems of Meinong’s theory and tried to suggest possible solutions to these problems. So that in fact we can say that he has created an alternative theory of objects.
Mally’s theory in turn has also influenced the development of Edward Zalta’s theory of abstract objects. In this regard, we can also consider Mally’s theory as a first version of Zalta’s theory. But at the same we want to understand the relations between the theories of Meinong and Mally, Mally and Zalta. Was Mally really so close to introduce a distinction of two types of predication - exemplification and encoding (which was introduced later Zalta), or not? To answer this question, we should consider the Mally’s theory itself.
The article considers the origins of the ethnomethodological studies of science. It is shown that neither A. Schutz’s approach, nor ethnography of science (also known as a «second wave of the sociology of science») can serve as an origin of the ethnomethodological studies of science, because former rules out the possibility of the empirical investigation of scientific rationality and later presupposes the distinction between scientists’ technical and social competences. Therefore, the origins of the ethnomethodological studies of science should be found within the ethnomethodology itself.
In the article author develops the analysis of genesis of B. Whorf’s views on language and reality. First part is dedicated to the historical analysis of Whorf’s views on mind and language. Genesis of his views is threefold: modern logic, cultural linguistics and mysticism. The latter becomes in a sense prevalent. Second part deals with analysis of arguments of the critics of principle of ‘linguistic rela-tivity’ and concludes in evaluation of the validity of the arguments for the proponents of the ‘principle’. The article accompanies first Russian translation of Whorf’s article ‘language, mind and reality’, important for critical evaluation of his background views and his theosophical mysticism in particular.
This text is a translation of an article of B.L. Whorf “Language, mind and reality” (first published in 1941). The text was originally written for the journal Theosophist (India) during the last year of Whorf’s life. The article contains a formulation of the principle of linguistic relativity that relates to the idea of that the world picture of a user of a language depends on the grammar of the language she is using. The article also contains a critique of the Western science from Whorf’s theosophist perspective. The paper was translated in Russian by Andrey A. Veretennikov.