This article focuses on the development of antitrust policy in transition economies in the context of preventing explicit and tacit collusion. Experience of Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the creation of antitrust institutions was analyzed, including both legislation and enforcement practice, in particular, unique features in the use of "rule of reason" approach. Also were shown problems that still remain actual for transition economies in this area, including the problem of cooperation between competition authority and police system and the standard of proof problem in the case of collusion. These countries in the early 90th were in similar socio – economic conditions and were forced to create completely new institutions in the field of protection of competition. It is shown that existing quantitative ratings of competition can’t be regarded as certain final assessment of the effectiveness of antitrust policy. The article proposes a special approach to evaluation of preventing collusion mechanisms, based on the institutional analysis. This approach takes into account such enforcement problems as: classification problems (tacit vs explicit collusion, vertical vs horizontal agreements), flexibility of prohibitions (“per se” vs “rule of reason”), design of sanctions, private enforcement challenge, leniency program mechanisms, the role of antitrust authorities, especially in criminal investigation issues etc.
IT small innovative companies in Nizhny Novgorod were studied in 2013. Their sustainable competitive advantages were analyzed. Findings are based on the structured interviews with 15 small IT companies.
Respondents pay more attention to the quality of client service. They involve clients in innovation process and in product adaptation. Personnel as key resource are attracted by interesting projects and are kept by the informal environment. In case of new products creation an image and reputation of the company make stronger the sustainability of its competitive advantage.
The development of Internet retailing implies the presence of competing interests among the participants of the supply chain and requires regulation of vertical restraints. As government regulation of the vertical restraints due to their possible anticompetitive effects, then the change in the nature of competition requires a review of applicable regulations, which were adopted on June 1, 2010 in the EU. The new rules of regulation on the vertical restraints will remain in place until 2022.