Based on public opinion data carried out in 1995-2019 by Russian Public Opinion Research Center and Levada Analytical Center we study the dynamics of reproductive attitudes in the Russian population. We analyze the mean ideal, desired and expected number of children in women aged 18-44 and men aged 18-54. We consider the differences in desired and expected numbers of children by education and subjective financial well-being. Our analysis confirms the stability of the two-child family ideal among Russian men and women. The mean desired number of children was very close to the mean ideal number of children during 1990s. However, we have found that the mean desired number of children sharply fluctuated during 2000s and 2010-s. The periods of rise of this indicator may be caused by the positive reaction of the population to the measures of financial support for families with children announced shortly before the surveys. Nevertheless, the expected number of children is stable. The new evidence from October 2019 public opinion poll suggest that each ten Russian want to remain childless and we may observe the convergence of one-child and two-child family’s prevalence.
The article analyzes the main changes in health care over the past five years, using an institutional approach (Richard Scott). The survey based on in-depth interviews with physicians, focus groups with patients in three types of cities in Russia (large, medium and small), as well as data on the mass survey of physicians and the public.
Summing up the consideration of the positions of key system participants it can be concluded that there is a clear imbalance of resources, obligations and responsibilities, in particular, to medical institutions and healthcare providers. Ongoing transformation of institutional rules in 2012-2016 was mainly motivated by economic logic, which does not coincide with the logic of consumers (patients) and professional institutional logic (doctors). Imperfection of the state healthcare system is compensated by doctors who give priority to professional standards moving away from formal rules encouraged by the current system. Reproduction of «old» norms applies only to the most qualified specialists; young professionals are more susceptible to following formalist approach
In Russian society there are mutually excluding approaches to evaluating economical consequences of inward migrations: from extremely liberal focusing on positive consequences of drawing immigrants for future Russia's socio-economical development to prevailing state-guarding ones paying attention to negative consequences of illegal employment, money transfers of immigrants, "brain draining", etc. The article sets forth the peculiarities of discourses on migration and migrational policy in terms of mass media, officials, public politics and academic interests. The conclusion is drawn about weak communication between them, segmentation of discourses mentioned. The only intersection point of these discourses is forcing up alarmist attitudes in society. The comparison is drawn between the discourses on migration policy in Russia and the USA and on the role of tragic events in these countries (reaction to terrorist acts in Beslan and September 11,2001).
The authors analyze the data of the representative survey of the Russian citizens carried out by Levada Center in April-May, 2009 (N=2000) and compare them with the findings of the Center previous researches. The Russians nowadays mention money as the main value, deficiency and hypothetical factor for solving all the problems including education and employment (the authors speak about this super value of money as of the poor society mythology). The paper shows extremely little concern of urban population and urban youth for quality education per se and lack of real efforts aimed at increasing this quality. It refers mainly to high school but to a considerable degree to higher educational institutions. The leading motive for acquiring higher education is getting a good (that is, well-paid) job. The core problem of higher school 118 for the majority of population and its younger part is excessively high payment for training and its discrepancy with the quality of education received by students, and correspondingly new inequality that has appeared in recent years in access to higher education, infringement of the rights of less well-to-do or provincial applicants.
This paper is concerned with media coverage of candidates in the 2018 Russian presidential election, with the emphasis on regional printed media. Following theory of agenda-setting, we analyze the number of articles about presidential candidates in the federal and regional press and on major TV channels that demonstrate that presidential candidates were getting unequal coverage in the media. The tone and focus of the discussion about candidates in regional print media is also considered. Vladimir Putin was getting more attention from the media, probably due to his position as the current president in that period. Other candidates got less coverage, more differentiated by the press than by television, in the way that previously known (by their political or other public activity) candidates were getting more attention than those who not yet well-known to Russians. This way new and less popular candidates did not have an opportunity to obtain agenda ownership and were overshadowed by their more well-known competitors. The disparity in media coverage is also issued by the fact that most candidates did not have their own agenda and do not play a leading role in the news which they are mentioned in. At the same time, the number of publications about candidates in the regional press is not connected to the result of the elections for candidates who are well familiar to Russians, who at that time held public posts (V.Putin, V. Zhirinovsky) or speakers in another public function (K.Sobchak) nor for candidates-outsiders. The exception is P. Grudinin and G. Yavlinsky, the number of publications about whom is positively associated with their results. Perhaps, for opposition candidates, including new players in the political arena, access to the regional press can become a significant factor affecting the election results.
The article discusses the relationship between estimates of subjective status and dynamics of income. Uses data of the Russian Longitudinal Monitor Survey (RLMS-HSE) for 2000 and 2005 author points out that this period is marked by high fluidity both in the estimates of subjective status, and in the distribution of respondents between deciles of income scale. However, the movement between deciles of the income scale do not affect the assessment of the dynamics of status.
Bank card payments, Internet banking, payment systems for online activities (WebMoney, etc.) are developing in contemporary Russia. In 2015 more than 70% Russian citizens have a bank card, more than 40% pay for goods and services via a bank card, more than 25% use Internet banking and about 15% use payment systems for online activities. Using electronic money is a common practice mostly for urban citizens who are well educated and have high levels of income. There are some barriers to the development of bank card payments, Internet banking and payment systems for online activities. They are technological obstacles, economic restrictions and unfavorable social contexts. The research is based on the Zelizer’s theory of money that emphasizes the social meaning of money. The Monitoring of Financial Behavior and Trust in Financial Institutions by the National Research University Higher School of Economics (the HSE) is the data source for the study.
Repressions against elites in Russia are analysed, including regional and siloviki elites. Repressions are considered as a political institute of systematic, demonstrative, politically motivated selected punishments aimed at threatening and controlling society and elites. Statistics of repressions both at the federal and regional level is given, with the latter having the rate of 1.5-2 per cent annually starting from 2015. Repressions are characterized by scale, genesis, targets etc, as well as repression machine and the effect - both shortterm and in a long run. The conclusion is made about probable strengthening of repressions leading to the system's degrading and at the end its crises and crash.
The papers focuses on stratification of Russian society based on life chances and risks in economic conditions of life, situation at work, possibilities of maintaining and increasing human capital, consumption and leisure. It examines the dynamics of the structure, the movement of Russians between the structural positions and their mobility between strata. Based on RLMS HSE panel data for 2013- 2018 yy. it was revealed that the stratification model is formed, stable, and the main trend was to increase a number of positions from the lower stratum to the middle one. The structure is highly dynamic - various chances or risks form and disappear from year to year in everyday life of most Russians. At the same time the stratification is characterized by low mobility rates - the fluctuations mentioned above lead to a change of stratum for no more than a third of Russians. It is shown that there are zones of sustainable well-being, living standard and disadvantages, and the latter being significantly wider than the former. Staying in these subgroups is mainly associated with the position of individuals in the labor market, which is significant not only for working Russians, but also for pensioners. It is because the specifics of their work activities in the past depleted their physical resources to varying degrees, provided unequal opportunities to continue working after reaching retirement age, and as a result, significantly differentiated their chances for wellbeing at their old ages. It is also shown that although stratification by chances and risks correlates with income stratification, sustainable well-being is far from the everyday routine of high- income Russians, just as sustainable disadvantages is often typical for non-poor people, which is a challenge for Russian society and social policy.
The structure and intergenerational dynamics of youth life aspirations and resource strategies in Russia and Ukraine: 1985-2001 (by Vladimir Magun and Michael Engovatov). The research described was held in the period of the rapid social change in Russia and Ukraine and has been based on the four repetitive surveys taken place in 1985, 1990-92, 1995 and 2001. The respondents were high-school graduates studied in the common nonprivileged schools. The generations were compared along the integral dimensions resulted from the three factor analysis — the factor analysis of aspirations (1), factor analysis of the dispositions to make one's own sacrifices (2) and the factor analysis of expectations of assistance (3). The structure of the first factors in each of the three factor matrixes appeared very similar: they were the general factors designated correspondingly as the general factor of high aspirations, the general factor of high dispositions to one's own sacrifices and the general factor of high expected assistance. The intergenerational dynamics of the respondents' estimates along these general factors demonstrated that the tendencies of the second half of the 1980's has continued to the period since 1990-92 to 1995: the aspirations were raising and the dispositions to make one's own sacrifices and overcome difficulties were decreasing. But in the period since 1995 to 2001 these tendencies has been changed: the aspirations went a little down (or at least stop their climbing up) and the dispositions to make sacrifices went up. Still it's important that the recent comeback tendencies didn't retrieve the aspirations and willingness to make one's own sacrifices to the level of 1985, saving a share of the changes accumulated since 1985 up to 1995. The initial raising of the level of aspirations and decrease of the willingness to make one's own sacrifices to realize these aspirations is explained as a result of the revolutionary changes taking place in the end of 1980's and in the beginning of 1990's in the sociocultural, economic, and political foundations of life in the former Soviet Union, and as a conditio sine qua поп of these changes themselves. The most optimistic (even euphoric) expectations of the opportunities provided by the new social regime evolving in Russia and Ukraine were widely spread in that time. The costs and difficulties inseparable from the awaited new style and level of life were left hidden and unaware. The level of aspiration stagnation and its going down during the second half of 1990's accompanied by the increase in willingness to make one's own sacrifices are interpreted as an effect of the more cold-eyed awareness of the barriers and costs limiting the individual and social achievements. The single most important event generated that awareness was the financial crisis of 1998. The dynamics of expected assistance was not similar in the different cities studied: these expectations went down (or stagnated) in Moscow and went up in three other cities. Taking together the changes of aspirations, willingness to make one's own sacrifices and expected assistance we can "calculate" the dynamics of the total volume of resources extended by young people per unit of their aspirations. It appeared that until 1995 the resource consuming capacity of the aspiration unit went down and after 1995 it started to go up in all the places but Moscow. At the first stage of social transformation the life achievements looked to the young people as more and more easy and then the correction of this tendency has happened and perceived difficulty of the world as a place for living started to grow up. The structure of the second factors in each of the three factor matrixes appeared very similar also. They were the bipolar factors and one of the poles in each of three factors include the variables relevant to education and skills, i.e. aspirations concerning work complexity and creativity, own sacrifices necessary for education and responsible job, expected assistance in education. The decade changes of these second factors since 1990—91 to 2001 has happened to be similar to each other and demonstrated the intergenerational proeducational shift. Each next generation of youth redistributes their personal resources and the resources of their group of support so that to spend the bigger share of the total volume of resources on their own higher education. This is explained by the fact that the postsoviet socio-economic regime appeared more meritocratic and the general and specific skills became more rewarded in the new socio-economic reality of 1990's than in the Soviet system.