Article on the formats and directions of reformation of the United Nations peace operations in conflict regions
The main purpose of the research is to identify key models of oil exporting countries inclusion into oil refining global value chains. The countries possess high potential of integration into the processing sector with higher value added, but tend to implement it with different degrees of efficiency. Positive balance of foreign trade in refined oil products, calculated in value added terms, can be accompanied by dependence of country’s exports on foreign value added content, and negative balance can be explained by country’s imports of intermediate products with low level of processing to insure domestic production. Five of eight analyzed oil exporting countries show positive dynamics of inclusion into oil refining global value chains. The world biggest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia, doesn’t rely on foreign 109 МИРОВАЯ ЭКОНОМИКА И МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ 2020 том 64 № 1 МОДЕЛИ ГЛОБАЛЬНЫХ ЦЕПОЧЕК СОЗДАНИЯ СТОИМОСТИ value added in its exports, whereas country’s forward participation index in global oil refining sector is very high. USA, Canada and Norway pursue specific models of integration into oil processing, which are developed in compliance with countries’ energy policies and aimed to create higher value added. Despite Kazakhstan dependence on Russian economy the country reduces foreign value-added content in its exports of oil refining products and improves participation in GVC. Two of the world leading oil exporters, Mexico and Brazil, demonstrate negative dynamics of inclusion into oil processing sector. High dependence of production on foreign value added, negative balance of foreign trade and poor integration into complex links within value chains are key parameters of ineffective GVC inclusion. The case of Russian Federation could be identified as positive integration with some obstacles. High volumes of Russian exports in oil refining products, positive trade balance in value added terms and high GVC forward participation index are accompanied by country’s increasing dependence on foreign value-added which forces Russia to rethink its participation in global refining sector and implement supporting policies.
One of the important tasks in the study of international politics today is the elaboration and empirical verification of new theoretical models for the coexistence of several regional leadership projects, simultaneously implemented by various countries and international organizations. Until now, the existing models, as a rule, have described this kind of leadership at the international arena in fundamentally hierarchical terms: either as a unipolar world with a hegemonic country dominating global politics, or as a bipolar system. These models unambiguously assume that the world either “belongs” to one hegemon, or is divided between two superpowers. In the latter case, there are practically no regions where both leadership projects would be carried out simultaneously, since such a geographical “overlap” would inevitably provoke conflict. Meanwhile, the task of understanding and explaining the internal mechanics of the simultaneous coexistence of several potential leaders on the same geographic territory for a fairly long time remains unsolved. In the modern world, such parallel (joint or competitive) leadership can no longer be regarded as an anomaly or a temporary phenomenon, it becomes a “new normality”, creating additional opportunities for international players, but at the same time imposing more substantial constraints on them. Thus, the relevance of the agenda put forward in the article is determined by a number of circumstances, the most fundamental of which is the crisis of the global governance system and the neoliberal model of globalization. Today, macro-regions become “building blocks” for the multipolar structure of the world, and the role of individual states or their groups, which begin to play a structure-forming role in “their” macro-regions, is increasing. These are potential leaders with special characteristics and special relations with their “followers”. The problem of leadership is most interestingly actualized in the Eurasian region, the internationalization of which is rapidly growing. In this region, several leaders are observed (such as Russia, China, the European Union) who compete for the same followers, offering them different agendas and using a wide range of power tools – from “soft” to “hard” power. It is in Eurasia that the variability of relations connecting the leader and followers is extremely high. In this article, the authors put forward and ground the possibility and necessity of developing a research agenda on regional leadership based on the material of modern Eurasia – the most important world macro-region where three leadership projects are being successfully implemented at the same time, the description and analysis of which in their interconnection go beyond the Eurasian theme only and can help advance our understanding of the nature of multipolarity in modern international relations.
The article deals with the comparison between groups of countries based on two indicators: GDP per capita and a percentage of expenditures on research and development (R&D) in GDP. The data are given on 103 states and territories where statistical indicators were available. Despite the fact that in general, statistical data confirm an overall upward drift in expenditures on R&D as GDP per capita grows, it is shown that there are multiple cases stepping out of this trend. Two most populated countries of the world are among them: China and India, including 40–50% of the world population. Special focus of the article is on China whose example shows that the strategy of an accelerated R&D development in conditions of high economic growth rates within 10–15 years, may start even in a group of “lower-middle income” countries, and implementation of this strategy in R&D can provide a real breakthrough with achievement of indicators typical not for developing countries but for developed economies (for instance, average indicators for the Euro-zone states). The researchers make an attempt to determine an optimum level of R&D appropriations by arithmetic calculations based on direct comparisons of such indicators as GDP per capita and the share of expenditures on R&D. However, the examples of China, India, South Korea, also Russia and, on the other side, a specified group euphemistically termed as “Oil and Gas Countries” highlight the fact that such comparisons could be useful, meaningful, cognitive, though not regulatory or, much less, directorial.
The theme of the role and place of ordoliberal views in contemporary European economic policy has attracted attention of many researchers. While some scholars raise their concerns about the ongoing ordoliberalization of Europe and criticize the ordoliberal foundations of the European Union, the others call for the restoration of the ordoliberal principles in economic policy and argue about the necessity of ordoliberal reforms. This article is focused on this discussion and aims to assess the various arguments that use the ordoliberal issue to justify their positions. The analysis leads to the conclusion that this discussion very often faces misinterpretations of the main outlook of the ordoliberal theory, what can be explained by the dominant role of Germany in the European political scene, complexity of the relationship between ordoliberalism and the social market economy model, as well as by political, economic and ideological motives. For ordoliberals, the main task for the state was to create and maintain a competitive order that will allow market forces to distribute the wealth according to merits and will result in what can be called achievement of social justice. Meanwhile, it has become apparent that European policymakers have noticeably eschewed the competitive order proposals, and modern arrangements of the European economy might be better characterized in terms of regulatory capitalism and managed competition. Moreover, it can be argued that the raising concentration of economic power makes the appeals for the return to the ordoliberal principles very reasonable. The Freiburg school ideas continue to be a real alternative not only to the neoclassical mainstream, but also to the socialist wishes to control and direct economic and social processes.
nowadays, it has become very popular to say that the life span of liberal order is over. The authors of the article do not share thos view. They explain that liberal order does not exist and never existed. It is more than an ideological construct, which id tremendously beneficial to its designers and supporters, giving excuses and rationale for intervening, imposing and suppressing. What exist at the national, transnational and world lever a liberal cluster. Lately, the liberal cluster was less succesful than ever. Its inability to win the competition is exacerbated by the permanent crisis it trties to cope with.