The problem of conflicts between the financial industry professionals’ business interests and the SROs' regulatory activities is studied in this paper. With the help of the elaborated methods the intensity of the US SROs conflicts of interest is revealed since 1991 till 2010 on the basis of the industry professionals’ individual preferences with regard to financial market efficiency. We determined that the professionals gained the maximal accumulated portfolio value provided systematic deviation of the market from normality (efficiency). The professionals’ goals of utility maximization did not match the SROs’ goals of the due market regulation in accordance with the regulator and international organizations requirements. These methods and results could be used in decision making about the allocation of financial market regulatory powers between regulator and SRO.
The paper considers the factors of investment activity of Russian companies before and after the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. Given the growth of non-financial corporations debt under the general monetary tightening accompanied by the stagnation of investment in fixed assets, the roles of financial constraints and debt overhang are investigated. We also raise the question about the influence of the government participation in the company’s capital on investment behavior. In order to identify the phenomenon of debt overhang we provide a new indicator and show its advantages over others previously used in studies. We estimate investment functions using annual panel data on financial indicators of Russian public companies for the period from 2000 to 2014.
The results show differences in the investment behavior of firms before and after the crisis of 2008–2009: the weak influence of financial constraints before the crisis turned into statistically and economically significant thereafter. The behavior of private companies and state-owned ones differs much. State-owned companies have relatively soft budget constraints and are almost not subject to debt overhang, while the post-crisis decline in investment of private companies, according to our estimates, is 14% due to the aggravation of the problem. This result means that in the post-crisis environment of limited financial resources state-owned companies’ borrowing can crowd out borrowings of other companies, and thus crowd out private investment.
The presence of debt overhang may have implications for monetary policy: central bank has an additional argument in favor of softer policy. The central bank also has to take into account the heterogeneity of economic agents: the major "burden" of tight monetary policy falls on the market segment, while state-owned enterprises get advantages of their easier access to financing.
The article presents the results of the research regarding abnormal return in M&A domestic and cross-border deals completed by Russian mining and metal companies. Contrary to earlier studies that found positive abnormal return of international mergers and acquisitions, our research revealed that cross-border deals performed by Russian metallurgical companies show negative abnormal return. Financial multiples of cross-border transactions are higher than that of domestic deals, which points to overpayment of Russian acquirers when buying assets abroad. In addition market discourages deal targeting financially distressed companies, as well as acquisitions of targets from culturally distant countries. One interesting finding of the research is that the most active cross-border acquirer – Severstal JSC – more often purchases financially distressed targets and generally demonstrates lower cumulative abnormal return compared to other Russian mining and metal companies.
This article discusses the theoretical and methodological issues proposed for use in Russia of a new funding mechanism for big ticket investment leasing projects. To achieve this goal are the following: a new version of the classification of leasing with the view in her special place leveraged-leasing; a critical analysis of the model of leveraged leasing, identifying its strengths and weaknesses; developed proposals for the formation of the Russian model leveraged-leasing; analyzed the feasibility of a mechanism of syndicated lending in the leveraged-leasing; is the formation of quantitative and qualitative criteria for big ticket transactions for Russian leasing market, taking into account the foreign and domestic experience; set a price on leasing contracts on interest rates, taking into account the necessary redundancy associated with the assessment of welfare and allowances for losses on defaulted lessors and lessees; using regression analysis, the hypothesis is that, despite the increased risks from the lessor, are associated with increased incidence and duration of contracts, reduce the advances, the relative reduction of prices on realization of investment projects in the leveraged-leasing; developped а methodology for determining leverage leasing projects; prepare recommendations on formation of pricing models leverage-leasing; analyzes the proportions between financial institutions in overseas leasing transactions and in the Russian leasing market; is determined by the relevance and benefits of using this model for Russia.