Thompson Clarke’s paper marked the beginning of the revival of the interest to the problems of philosophical skepticism in the early 70’s. In his paper Clarke raises the issue of skepticism’s relevance to the philosophical inquiry and provides a new interpretation of the traditional skeptical problems. Also Clarke points out the significance of G. E. Moore’s defense of common sense. Particularly, he shows that the lack of ordinary contexts does not make skeptical questions and Moore’s attempts to answer these questions are meaningless, as philosophers of ordinary language claimed. However, skeptics and their opponents usually share a theoretical presupposition - the idea of standard human-conceptual constitution. As Clarke points out, this constitution supposedly determines the limits and content of the human knowledge about the world. The notion of objective knowledge and the conception of philosophy itself are based on the idea of such a constitution. However, Clarke, by applying the concepts of dream and hallucination, illustrates that this idea contradicts the functioning of the concepts we use to learn about and understand the world.
Using the case of Grūto parkas (Lithuania), the article explores the practices of preserving and exhibiting the Soviet monumental heritage. Official discourses describing similar expositions update the memory of collective trauma and Soviet colonialism. However, the traumatic experience and “naked Soviet ideology, which suppressed and hurt the spirit of the nation” cannot be reproduced in the aesthetic experience of the open-air museum visitor. To prove this thesis, a dual-methodological framework is employed: a historical reconstruction of the estimated aesthetic impact of the monument in the place for which it was realized; the analysis of subjective experience of the visitor and the technique of its construction. The article argues that monumental sculpture, whatever its material form, artistic merit and ideological significance in the past, is primarily an art object and exhibit that makes it a potentially attractive item for a collection. The relationship between the material form of the monument and its ideological value is historical; it is connected to the space where the people engage in the collective commemorative practices in accordance with group identity discourses. Soviet monumental propaganda is, first of all, an urban project. The resettlement of the monument from the avenue or square modifies the aesthetic and social experience, depriving it of the ideological value that depends on the circumstances of the exposure. To describe the process of appropriation of the Soviet monumental heritage by moving objects from public urban spaces in a natural (park) landscape, the concept of “naturalization” is introduced. The method of preserving objects of monumental propaganda in the landscape environment can be positively understood and described as a retrospective of the national school of monumental sculpture.
In this article I investigate the place of philosophy in the organizational structure of the Humboldt university model. I reconstruct an understanding of the meaning of philosophy for the new university, as well as look at to what extent declarative claims and rhetorical formulation coincided with the real-life practice of including philosophy into the system of the production and dissemination of university knowledge. Through looking at university manifestoes and statutes, as well as bureaucratic circulars, I look to the history of German philosophy as the history of the formation of one of the university disciplines. I conclude by arguing that the implementation of university reforms in the 19th century assisted the transformation of philosophical knowledge into a well-structured and methodologically diverse discipline.
In his work Critiquing Husserl: Elements, Eugen Fink reviews the main hurdles encountered by phenomenological research in philosophy. Among these hurdles he lists the interweaving between moments of description, analysis and speculation; the outer-philosophical presuppositions conicting with the claim of presuppositionlessness; the non-thought relation to the philosophical tradition; contradictions between the philosophical project and the practiced method; idols (or operative concepts) of phenomenological research, such as “immediate givenness,” “prepredicative experience,” “rigorous science,” “ultimate foundation.” This discussion became the topic of the present article.
e emergence of “new wars” in the second half of the twentieth century has changed the conventional paradigm for thinking about military con icts and called into question the relevance of what previous theorists have o ered. However, the most useful approach to the analysis of war is based on the widely accepted concep- tual framework of the theory of just war, which is itself grounded in analytical eth- ics. e interpretations of just war theory by Michael Walzer, Nick Fotion, Brian Orend and Je McMahan are central to an ethical understanding of war, but they are of only limited value for considering the topic of “new wars,” which meanwhile are in constant flux. Philosophical thinking on these matters is failing keep pace with the transforma- tion of the object it is considering. War is becoming a media phenomenon, a subject for futuristic speculation, and a routine reality for a number of countries and regions. It is losing its clear spatial and temporal contours, and although we are gaining greater control over its management and increasing the variety of forms that military con icts take, we are losing control over the overall situation. War should be now seen as a complex phenomenon of social reality that demands a revision of the outdated and limited ethical supports that have been provided for this “necessary evil.” Military conflicts are among the images of modernity that must be apprehended in all their complexity.
The article considers the novel Pride and Prejudice by British writer Jane Austen as it is reflected in its adaptations, its literary and film sequels, and the fan practices associated with this novel. A characteristic feature of the bicentennial cult of Austen is its active self-reflection: Austen fans themselves are often described in sequels and parodies. The figure of an Asten fan, “Janeite,” and his or her ways of interacting with classical texts is the main focus of the article. First, the paper describes the transformation of the Jane Austen cult: from the literary communities of the 19th century, through the consolidation in the literary canon and in the popular culture during the 20th century, and finally, “austenmania,” a boom of popularity from the 1990s. Furthermore, specific subgenres of film adaptations and literary sequels devoted to fans of the writer, are analysed. Special attention is also paid to practices of using accessories thematically based on the novels by Jane Austen. Due to their visibility, these practices have helped create a framework of analysing the literary cult of Jane Austen through the figure of her fan in two emotional modes: nostalgia and irony. For an illustration of nostalgia and irony as key factors of “austenmania,” the article reviews the film Austenland, a screen adaptation of the sequel and a series based on the original script, Lost in Austen. To conclude, the article proposes to consider the interaction of the contemporary reader with the novels of Austen as a never-ending shared re-creating of the imagined literary world, a critical description and self-description of the fans, and a nostalgic dreaming about an idealized historical period of the early 19th century.
After postmodernism’s key theorists abandoned the topic (Fredric Jameson) or even allowed that postmodernism is no longer exists (Linda Hutcheon), various concepts under the umbrella term “post-postmodernism” have begun to emerge since 2000. One of the last intellectual alternatives to post-modernism was the metamodernism proposed by two Europeans, Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker. In 2010 they published a kind of manifesto entitled Notes on Metamodernism in which they argued that there had been a pivot away from cynicism and irony toward sincerity and romance in the newly emerging culture. This pivot heralds the arrival of the new era of metаmodernism. The author of the article critically evaluates the manifesto and concludes that the concept of metamodernism does not stand up to scrutiny and has little of substance to offer. The metamodernism manifesto is at best a set of declarations. However, this does not mean that the metamodernists had not intuitively hit upon the key to cultural and social tendencies that are still not completely clear. At the end of 2017 a new collection of articles edited by Vermeulen and van den Akker was published. Even though the authors of the metamodernism concept had almost nothing new to offer and failed to develop their ideas any further, other researchers and thinkers with different theoretical orientations from the original authors have taken up the metamodernism impulse and made it qualitatively more interesting. The metаmodernism project has been developed with greater sophistication by theorists and also through empirical research. Metamodernism has been vindicated by the new life it has been given.
The article is a statement of lecture, which was hold on the Radio Free Berlin (Sender Freies Berlin) in 1983. It was published in the collection of Marquards’ papers “Skepticism and agreement” (Skepsis und Zustimmung). The articles of this collection specify and evolve the position, which was fist articulated in the work “Farewell to Matters of Principle” (Abschied vom Prinzipiellen). The lecture “In Defense of the Power Solitude” is addressed to a broad audience. Therefore the author doesn’t indicate his main opponents. Nevertheless, there is a polemic with Jürgen Habermas theory of communicative action and Theodor Adorno critical theory. In contrast to the critical theory the author states, that trouble of modernity isn’t the solitude, but the lack of capability to the solitude.
In the first part of the article the author deals with the sociocultural premises, because of which solitude becomes inevitable phenomena of modernity. In the second part he describes, how modern citizens try to avoid the solitude, and points out, that these attempts could produce opposite results. The third part presents detailed argumentation for the statement, according to which it is useless to try to avoid solitude. On the contrary, it should be accepted, at least as much as it helps to make a distance, which is necessary for a sober assessment of reality. This conclusion is reflected in the fourth, final part, where the author indicates the phenomena, which couldn’t save from the solitude, but contribute to the formation of the culture of capability to the solitude.
The article examines the intellectual biography and views of the greatest German polemist and philosopher of the second part of XX century, Odo Marquard. From a historical philosophical point of view, Marquard is considered as the member of Joachim Ritter’s school, who is mostly known as initiator and editor-in-chief of the fundamental encyclopedic “Historical dictionary of philosophy” (Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (1971-2007)). Marquard himself points out that his reception of Ritter’s philosophy was strongly influenced by the protests of 1968. His affirmative position to the modern world is partly the consequence of these political events. Heretofore Marquard was deeply interested in Frankfurt school and wrote sarcastic epigrams about Ritter’s philosophy. But after 1968 Marquard debates with the theories of Theodor Adorno and Jürgen Habermas and Ritter’s philosophy of diremption (Entzweiung) becomes the object of his reflection and partly the polemical weapon against the attempts to question the basics of liberal-democratic society of postwar West Germany.
From a political point of view, Marquard's philosophy is often considered as the philosophy of liberal conservatism. Marquard points out, that the history of formation of liberal institutes has great importance for modernity itself. This emphasis can be explained historically. Marquard belongs to the generation, which was called by Helmut Schelsky “skeptical generation”. This generation went through the radical historical breaks. The extreme politicization of everyday life in national socialism period, the second World War, the collapse of third Reich, the experience of radical disorientation form his skeptical position, which distance itself from any ideology, from any assertion, which pretends to be the absolutely truth. According to Marquard, the aim of skeptic is not to search the theory, which could “reconcile” the conflict among different points of view, but to keep this conflict. In other words, the aim is to keep the principle of separation of powers, where the powers are considered not only as the political institutions, but also as assertion, theories, conceptions, which could influence the position of individual. The study was implemented in the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2016.
The present article traces the origins and forms of aggressive rhetoric in the Soviet literary criticism of the 1920s, using the example of the debates surrounding the Len- ingrad branch of the Russian Formalist School. e discussions around this research circle can be traced to the destructive experience of revolution and civil war, and the shi from conventional forms of debate to the abuse and annihilation of opponents, transforming the latter practices into the new mainstream. e discussion as such becomes a race for power, or a straight-up competition between political groups. In turn, literary criticism also starts reproducing the repressive methods of the victor. e so-called “formalists” represent the most prominent example of this process, as they were sentenced to annihilation as pure ideological enemies of the new hegem- onic class — both in a political and cultural sense.
The contrast dualism that characterizes the opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in Russian culture to the present day became visible during that time, as the trium- phant class was fundamentally unwilling to compromise with the defeated. e Bol- sheviks were not feeling magnanimous a er the victory of the October revolution. eir strategy was to cultivate hatred, pitting di erent groups against each other under the banner of class struggle in order to further strip and/or remove any phe- nomena diverging from the established way forward. e primary motivation for the crackdown through terror was civil war. Subsequently, it was replaced by the require- ment for special vigilance during the temporary resurgence of the bourgeoisie in the period of New Economic Policy (NEP). e conceptualization of the NEP was not only an economic and industrial, but also inevitably a cultural matter, and the prole- tariat simply had to feel threatened by the surviving oppressors whose consciousness remained the same as before the revolution. Ultimately, the announced and long- awaited rejection of the NEP and its “restorative” culture legitimized a new round of aggressive rhetoric that reinforced the internal crisis of the Soviet “poputchiks” (pri- marily discriminated intelligentsia) and allowed to put an end to them on the cusp of the 1920s and 1930s.