Due to some recent researches the problem of the reciprocity of logic and psychology got back into the philosophy of logic. Logicians and psychologists reconsider the relations between the logical laws and the human reasoning and deny the idea expressed by antipsychologists that exploration of the human reasoning is non-informative for logical theory. In the course of the controversy over psychologism at the turn of the XXth century some thinkers claimed that these disciplines were strongly connected. Some current researchers united under the name “Neopsychologism”. The article covers the problem of the reciprocity between logic and psychology in terms of Wilhelm Wundt’s theory and the Keith Stenning and Michiel van Lambalgen’s case research of reasoning peculiar to children with autism.
Wundt was not a typical psychologist. He argued that the laws of logic and the laws of thought should be strongly separated. His idea of the correlation between the thought process and the other cognitive functions is “heuretic” as well. Despite that – or thanks to that - his theory is prolific. Its analysis and comparison with the recent logical researches show the difference between the classical psychologism and the neopsychologism. The article also reveals which of Wundt’s ideas are still important for philosophy of logic and psychology today.
Thought experiments can be used in various ways. A part of them seems to have a special epistemic value: they can give us a new, unknown information about reality. One of the most famous thought experiments of that kind is the thought experiment of Galileo which demonstrates that two bodies of the same kind should fall with the same speed. However, an analysis of this argument shows that it is based on several ontological presuppositions. Therefore it's not the thought experiment itself that has a significance, but its correspondence to real experience.
This reply to Oleg Domanov’s target paper is not concerned with the technicalities of the proposed approach. Rather, I discuss the fruitfulness of the underlying ideas in dealing with Quine’s famous “double vision” scenario, for which the approach is designed. I point out some key ingredients of Domanov’s proposal: (a) context dependence of propositional attitude ascription (and ascribability); (b) replacement of individuals with finer-grained entities for reference and quantification, such as Kaplan’s “vivid names”, Frege and Yalcin’s senses or Percus and Sauerland’s concept generators; and (c) using the apparatus of cross-identification functions. I show that those ingredients were already present in a body of work preceding the target paper. On the other hand, there are known problems related to the fact that sometimes the choice of the pertinent mode of presentation depends on the choices associated with quantifiers higher in the syntactic tree. No account based on manipulations with the global context, such as Domanov’s in its current form, can handle them.
Usually the impact of the science in the civilization development is identified as scientific-technical progress. Impact of the science in the moral and culture is important never the less. It is determined by peculiarities of the scientific argumentation, experiences. All of these obvious facts, however, relate only to the first round of correlation ethical themes with modern science. We are talking about the socio-cultural context of perception of science and its results of the society, that is, the ethical factors acting on the outside with respect to the position of science, is not inherent in science itself. The second round of the ethical issues in relation to science related to the problem of rationality. Post positivism demonstrated the role and importance of the normative, regulatory and valuable moment in the content of theoretical knowledge. In this regard, even the question arose about the different types of scientific rationality and normatively. In this case we are talking about statutory regulators built into the very content of scientific knowledge, internally inherent therein. There is another circle in which there are ethics and science. It is a question of ethics, regulations, acting in the scientific community, to be exact – communities. There is impossible to get adequate understanding of the genesis of the liberalism, multiculturalism without take into account this role of science.
This text is a translation of an article by British idealist J.E. McTaggart “The Unreality of Time” pub- lished in the journal Mind in 1908. Author argues for the unreality of time by employing his typical methods – rejection of reality of contradictory objects, difference between real and existent, etc. This paper became a standard of excellence of McTaggart analytical style and is a classic example of British absolute idealism. The translation was made by Andrey A. Veretennikov.
Author treats an issue on getting a new knowledge from thought experiments. A history of the notion of thought experiment is presented in a few words. Author considers a concept of instinctive knowledge, which Ernst Mach used in his investigations of the thought experiments. He puts a question on about the cultural conditionality of “instinctive knowledge”. In conclusion author makes a conjecture on the method of thought experiment as a tool for selection of the new knowledge patterns of the world.
Review of Sinnott-Armstrong and W., Fogelin R. «Understanding arguments: an introduction to informal logic». 9th ed. Wadsworth : Cengane Learning, 2014
The aim of this paper is to discuss one distinct feature of linguistic communication, namely, misunderstanding. Along the general lines of the work of J. L. Austin misunderstanding treated as mistakes in communication or infelicities. The classification offered in the paper is based on the teaching practice and deals with two cases of infelicities – “total misunderstanding” and “overinterpretation”.
In the article approaches to a problem of “methodological pluralism” in psychology are discussed. Instead of hierarchy of “explanation levels”, essentially reduced to a certain fundamental level, the idea of “topological system” of the interconnected explanations is offered. Then, the experimental refutation of the explaining hypothesis crashed not only this one (more generally: not only system of theoretical sets in which this hypothesis is put forward) but all complex of scientificallypsychological explanations which could not remain indifferent to such refutation. Psychology keeping the methodological pluralism would become a disciplinary organism with uniform “nervous system” reacting on results of empirical researches.